



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines


Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:


- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>




BR  
1  
.C54









THE  
71986  
CHRISTIAN EXAMINER

AND  
GENERAL REVIEW.

VOL. XXIV.

THIRD SERIES, VOLUME VI.

---

BOSTON:  
PUBLISHED BY JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY.  
LONDON:  
R. J. KENNETT, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.  
1838.

CAMBRIDGE PRESS:  
METCALF, TORRY, AND BALLOU.

# CONTENTS

OF

VOL. XXIV. — THIRD SERIES, VOL. VI.

## No. I.

ART. I. — Life of Swedenborg.	1
1. Life of Emanuel Swedenborg, with some Account of his Writings, together with a brief Notice of the Rise and Progress of the New Church.	
2. Biographie Universel. Vol. XLIV. Art. <i>Swedenborg</i> .	
3. Letters to the Members of the New Jerusalem Church. By Dr. PRIESTLEY.	
4. Reply to Dr. Priestley's Letters. By ROBERT HINDMARSH.	
ART. II. — Incidents of Travel in Egypt, Arabia Petrea, and the Holy Land. By AN AMERICAN.	31
ART. III. — The Elements of Political Economy. By FRANCIS WAYLAND, D. D.	47
ART. IV. — The Wine Question.	65
ART. V. — A Collection of Hymns for Public and Private Worship. Compiled by JOHN R. BEARD.	90
ART. VI. — History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Catholic. By WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT.	99
ART. VII. — Histoire critique du Gnosticisme et de son Influence sur les sectes religieuses et philosophiques des six premiers siècles de l'ère chrétienne. Par M. JACQUES MATTER.	112
NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE. — Joanna of Naples, by the Author of "Miriam." — A Love Token for Children. Designed for Sunday-School Libraries. — Sketches of a New England Village in the Last Century. — American Quarterly Register. — Prof. Palfrey's Academical Lectures on the Jewish Scriptures and Antiquities. Vol. I.	131

## No. II.

ART. I. — De Wette's Views of Religion and Theology.	137
1. Lehrbuch der Christlichen Dogmatik, in ihren historischen Entwicklung dargestellt. Von D. WILHELM MARTIN LEBERRECHT DE WETTE.	
2. Ueber Religion und Theologie. Erläuterungen zu seinem Lehrbuche der Dogmatik. Von Dr. W. M. L. DE WETTE.	
3. Ueber die Religion, ihr Wesen, ihre Erscheinungsformen, und ihren Einfluss auf das Leben, Vorlesungen. Von Dr. W. M. L. DE WETTE.	

ART. II. — The Presence of God. - - - - -	171
ART. III. — The Sunday School System. - - - - -	181
1. The Sabbath School Teacher; designed to aid in elevating and perfecting the Sabbath School System. By Rev. JOHN TODD.	
2. The Sunday School Guide and Parent's Manual. By A. B. MUZZEY.	
ART. IV. — Influence of Christianity and of the Progress of Civilization on Epic Poetry. - - - - -	201
ART. V. — Introduction to American Law, designed as a First Book for Students. By TIMOTHY WALKER. - - - - -	221
ART. VI. — The True Christian Religion, containing the Universal Theology of the New Church, foretold by the Lord in Daniel vii. 13, 14, and in Rev. xxi. 1, 2. By EMANUEL SWEDENBORG. - - - - -	230
NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE. — Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature. Edited by GEORGE RIPLEY. Vols. I. and II. — Peirce's Elementary Treatise on Algebra. — 1. Ware's Discourse occasioned by the recent Duel in Washington: 2. Barrett's Sermon in Consequence of the late Duel in Washington. — The Sacred Offering; a Poetical Gift. - - - - -	270

---

### No. III.

ART. I. — The Limitations of Human Responsibility. By FRANCIS WAYLAND. - - - - -	277
ART. II. — The Americans, in their Moral, Social, and Political Relations. By FRANCIS J. GRUND. - - - - -	296
ART. III. — The Works of George Berkeley, D. D., Bishop of Cloyne. To which are added an Account of his Life, and several of his Letters to Thomas Prior, Esq., Dean Gervais, Mr. Pope, &c. - - - - -	310
ART. IV. — The French Revolution, a History. By THOMAS CARLYLE. - - - - -	345
ART. V. — Reports of the Geological Surveys of the States of New York and Maine. - - - - -	363
ART. VI. — Retrospect of Western Travel. By HARRIET MARTINEAU. - - - - -	386
NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE. — Proof of the Genuineness of the Writings of the New Testament: for intelligent readers of all classes. Translated from the German of Dr. H. OLSHAUSEN, with Notes, by DAVID FOSDICK, JR. — A History of the Corruptions of Christianity. By JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LL. D. In some parts abridged, with Appendices. By A. L. L.	406

INDEX. - - - - -	409
------------------	-----

THE  
CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

N<sup>o</sup>. LXXXV.

THIRD SERIES — N<sup>o</sup>. XVI.

---

MARCH, 1838.

---

- ART. I. — 1. *Life of Emanuel Swedenborg, with some Account of his Writings, together with a brief Notice of the Rise and Progress of the New Church.* Boston : Allen & Goddard.  
2. *Biographie Universel.* Vol. XLIV. Article, SWEDENBORG.  
3. *Letters to the Members of the New Jerusalem Church.* By DR. PRIESTLEY.  
4. *Reply to Dr. Priestley's Letters.* BY ROBERT HINDMARSH.

SWEDENBORG claimed to be a divinely appointed interpreter of the Scriptures, — the bearer of a new revelation, and for a long course of years he professed to hold free intercourse with the spiritual world. From his visits there he has purposed to give us revelations of God, of the human soul, and of its eternal condition after death, infinitely surpassing in definiteness and extent all that has been taught by Jesus Christ and his apostles. A thorough investigation of his claims would embrace necessarily a multitude of moral, historical, and metaphysical questions, which of course cannot be discussed here. It will be well for us to be on our guard against so identifying the several parts and bearings of a broad subject, as to make the only issue of the whole inquiry to be the truth or the falsity of the whole. Kant said in relation to the subject before us, that “the prejudice which rejects without reason the whole of a relation which is brought forward with some degree of plausibility, is just as absurd as the prejudice which receives without

examination all that is affirmed by common report." Thus the question before us is not whether Swedenborg was a prophet or an impostor; it is not whether the system which he taught be wholly true or wholly false; but we are to inquire what his claims were, and how they are supported; what are his teachings, and how far are they consonant with reason and truth? We must premise such a statement of his early life as is necessary for the understanding of his subsequent character. We have drawn most of our materials from the sources specified at the head of this article.

Emanuel Swedenborg was born at Stockholm, January 29, 1688, a period before and after which every conceivable form of religious phrensy, fanaticism, and enthusiasm abounded. Fifth-monarchy men, French prophets, Hutchinsonians, and Quakers, are merely the general terms under which a multitude of almost unremembered extravagancies are to be classed. Jesper Swedberg, the father of Emanuel, was the Lutheran Bishop of Skara in West Gothland, somewhat celebrated in his time as a member of the Society for Propagating the Gospel, and appointed by Charles the Twelfth President of the Swedish Churches in Pennsylvania and London. The family was ennobled in 1719, but the descendants alone took the name of Swedenborg. It is said that the father was not a stranger to mystical reveries, and that the religious education which he gave to his son was based upon the stern principles of Lutheranism, and exercised a very marked influence upon the mind of the youth. The rest of his education was acquired at the University of Upsal. He early excelled in the study of philosophy, natural history, chemistry, and anatomy, and in the Eastern and European languages. It was not till the later period of his life that he manifested publicly his strong attachment to theological inquiries. But in a letter to a friend, written after his alleged illumination, he refers to some indications of spirituality in his early youth. His words are as follows. — "From my youth to my tenth year my thoughts were constantly engrossed by reflecting upon God, on salvation, and on the spiritual passions of man. I often revealed things in my discourse which filled my parents with astonishment, and made them declare at times that certainly the angels spoke through my mouth. From my sixth to my twelfth year it was my greatest delight to converse with the clergy concerning faith, &c." Taking it for granted that this letter is authentic, we



must suppose that the later occupations of Swedenborg had in a measure colored his remembrances of his youth, as we find no contemporary evidence of such spiritual precocity. Having finished his studies at Upsal with distinction, he published there in 1709, at the age of twenty-one, a collection of the best maxims of antiquity, — entitled “Select Sentences of L. An. Seneca, and Pub. Sy. Nimus, and others, with the Annotations of Erasmus, and the Greek version of Scaliger, illustrated with notes.” Having displayed his erudition in this publication, he asserted his claim to the powers of imagination in a collection of Latin verses, printed in the year following. From 1716 to 1720 he devoted his time to the study of mathematics in the universities of England, Holland, France, and Germany. He also travelled to different parts of Europe to inspect the principal mines. The fruits of these journeys appeared in a periodical work entitled “*Dædalus Hyperboreus*,” containing Essays upon the mathematics. About the same time he published an introduction to Algebra. It is not necessary to our present purpose to give a detailed account of the philosophical labors of Swedenborg. At the age of twenty-eight, he was appointed by Charles the Twelfth assessor of the royal college of Mines, though he did not enter upon his duties there till some time after, as he wished to qualify himself by becoming acquainted with the science of metallurgy. He was likewise appointed to assist Polheim, the counsellor of commerce, in the construction of his mechanical works.

Swedenborg was admitted to terms of intimacy with Charles, probably with reference to a new Calculus invented by that prince. Dr. Nordberg, in his biography of Charles, relates several of their conversations. Voltaire does not mention him. Swedenborg displayed great knowledge and genius in the administration of his important office. He invented a rolling machine in 1718, by which two galleys and five large chaloups were transported over mountains and valleys for two and a half Swedish miles at the siege of Frederickshall. In the midst of his labors he continued to publish treatises upon natural philosophy, such as, *An Essay upon Moneys and Measures*, *On the position and the movement of the Earth and the Planets*, *On the Tides*, &c.

Charles died in 1718, and Swedenborg continued to enjoy the favor of his queen, Ulrica Eleonora, who conferred upon him the title of nobility, and changed his name from Swedberg to Sweden-

borg. Thus he became entitled to a seat with the nobles of the Equestrian order in the Triennial Assemblies of the States of the realm. He belonged to the third rank in nobility, to which there was attached in Sweden no title. He was afterwards offered the next rank, with the title of Baron, which he declined, though we generally find it attached to his name. His ambition and gratitude being thus excited, he persevered in his labors. He visited the mines of Saxony, of the Hartz, and of the Electorate of Hanover, and was particularly noticed by the Duke of Brunswick, Lewis Rudolphus, who took an interest in his researches, and afterwards published his philosophical and mineralogical works in three splendid folio volumes at his own expense. About this time Swedenborg published several scientific treatises relating to minerals, the form of chimneys, the calculation of longitude by means of the moon, the construction of ships, &c. These writings procured for him the offer of a chair as mathematical professor in the University of Upsal, which he declined. His great work, just referred to, was published in 1734, ornamented with one hundred and fifty-five engravings. It is a treatise upon physics in general, and contains his views of the visible world digested into a complete system, describing the great edifice of nature, the operations of internal forces, of the secondary agents, magnetism, ether, air, and the gases, and the whole kingdom of organizations. This publication was held in high estimation. Swedenborg had already been elected a member of the Royal Society of Sciences at Stockholm, and was now enrolled in the imperial academy at Petersburg. The Academy of Sciences at Paris translated his treatise upon iron, as the best and most satisfactory for insertion in its history of the ARTS and TRADES. Swedenborg next published a work upon speculative philosophy, on the union of the soul with the body. He again commenced his travels for the purpose of establishing his system of natural science in England, Holland, and France, and spent the year 1738 at Venice and Rome. He finished his labors on the visible world by publishing his *Economy and Illustrations of the Animal Kingdom*, and thus he completed his development of the system of nature.

It was while Swedenborg was enjoying his well earned fame as a philosopher in the year 1743, the fifty-fifth of his age, that he resigned his office in the mines, retaining its name and pension, and gave himself exclusively to the duties of his

alleged mission from God. Of the particulars and objects of this mission, we shall soon speak. He returned to Stockholm, where he inhabited a very plain house situated in an isolated quarter. The apartment which he occupied was hung with allegorical and mystical pictures. An air of impenetrable mystery seemed to hang over him. Though by no means wealthy previous to his alleged illumination, he suddenly obtained the control over an immense fortune, by which he established many commercial houses, and supported them by favors, amounting, as we are told, to millions. The "*Biographie Universel*" says that we are authorized by Swedenborg's disciples to ascribe his wealth to the assistance of a certain Elias Artita, an extraordinary man of low extraction, who had by some means obtained great knowledge and a colossal fortune. He wrote a treatise upon the philosopher's stone, which adepts consider the *chef d'œuvre* upon their art.

When Swedenborg was visited by any of his friends, they were often obliged to wait until his heavenly meditations or colloquies were finished, as he dared not dismiss abruptly the distinguished persons whose society he was enjoying. These delays and preparations seem to have suggested doubts of his good faith. While thus secluded, he composed his philosophic works. These are seventeen in number. As soon as he had completed one of them, he went to London or to Amsterdam to superintend its publication. All except the last one were published anonymously. He read but little, if at all. The Bible in its Hebrew and Greek originals constituted his whole library. The gardener with his wife were his only attendants. Swedenborg himself was never married. He had arrived at a very advanced age when he undertook his last journey to London for the publication of his most important theological work, "*The True Christian Religion*." He was attacked by an apoplexy at London, and died three months after, on the 29th of March, 1772, at the age of eighty-four years. He was buried under the Swedish church, near Ratcliffe Highway in that city.

Swedenborg, if a prophet at all, was one who, unlike the Savior, had honor even in his own country, on the score of his philosophical attainments, for which he richly deserved it. Count Hopken, prime minister of Sweden, speaks of his character in the highest terms of commendation, designating him as the most learned man in his country. His principal

friends in England were Dr. Hartley, Dr. Hampe, the preceptor of George the Second, and Dr. Messiter. His society and friendship were sought by many scholars. As a man of science he undoubtedly deserves to be held in high honor. He introduced the differential calculus into Germany, and made valuable discoveries in metallurgy. In private life and moral character he was likewise much esteemed. Though not very communicative, he was always agreeable. He was strictly temperate, moral, and charitable. He never urged the acceptance of his doctrines, and when called upon to maintain them, he did it with mildness. On all accounts he deserves the character of a useful, an honorable, and a respected man and a Christian. His funeral eulogy was pronounced October 7, 1772, in the royal academy of Stockholm, by M. Sandel, superintendent of the mines and secretary of the society. The eulogist ascribes to him noble parentage and a fine education, uncommon assiduity and universal knowledge of the belles lettres, and a remarkable degree of learning. Such we have already admitted are his just claims. It is to be observed, however, that the eulogist neither allows nor disputes his divine illumination. He thought it his duty to restore the scholar, the former assessor of the mines, and he dismisses his higher pretensions with the passing remark, that the discussion of them would be inappropriate to the audience.

Let us now turn our attention to this point, and inquire what were his pretensions to superhuman knowledge, how they are supported, and what are their results.

How far the change which took place in the character and pursuits of Swedenborg was a sudden one, is to be gathered from the circumstances of the case. His early education by his father, and the supposed tendency to mysticism by which it was characterized, has already been mentioned. We have spoken of his *Essay upon speculative philosophy*, relating to the final cause of the creation and the mechanism of the union of the soul with the body. His disciples look upon his life up to this period as a preparation for his subsequent employment. He had been fitting himself from his youth, they say, for the great office to which he was called. He had already approached as near to the spiritual world as science could carry him, and thus was furnished for the reception of spiritual truths and for the understanding of the interior significations of the inspired word. His first great object was the discovery of the

soul.\* This he thought was to be sought for in the body with which it was joined. The body, he said, is the image, resemblance, and type of the soul; she herself is the model, the idea, that is, the soul, of her body. Therefore he sought to discover the soul in the anatomy of the body, by exploring the brain, by examining the fibres and the other organic forms, the springs and forces of life. He maintained fully the distinct essence of matter and spirit, and acknowledged that the latter could be examined only by means of its influences, forms, and effects. He said it was his hope that if he labored to advance inwardly, he should be enabled by Divine favor to open all the doors which lead to the soul, and at length be admitted to view and contemplate it.

There is some discrepancy of statement respecting the manner in which Swedenborg was made acquainted with his alleged mission from the Lord. In the preface to the French translation of his Treatise on Heaven and Hell, there is a letter purporting to be from Swedenborg to his friend, Mr. Robsam, a gentleman of some note in Sweden. This is quoted as of authority in the *Biographie Universel*, (art. *Swedenborg*.) Swedenborg here says:

"I was dining very late at my inn in London, in the course of the year 1743, and I was eating with a great appetite, when just at the end of my repast, I perceived that a kind of mist spread over my eyes, and that the floor of my chamber was covered with hideous reptiles. They disappeared; the darkness was dissipated; and I saw clearly in the middle of a bright light a man seated in the corner of the chamber, who said to me in a terrible voice, '*Do not eat so much.*' At these words my sight was obscured; it afterwards cleared again slowly, and I found myself alone. The following night the same man radiant with light presented himself to me, and said to me, '*I, the Lord, the Creator and Redeemer, have chosen you to explain to men the internal and spiritual sense of the Holy Scriptures. I will tell you what you must write.*' This night the eyes of my inner man were opened and disposed to look into heaven, the world of spirits, and into hell, where I found many persons of my acquaintance, some long since and others but lately deceased."

The author of the Treatise on the Life and Writings of Swedenborg, which was published at Boston in 1831, who is likewise a receiver of the doctrines, disputes the genuineness of

---

\* See Introduction to the Animal Kingdom.

this letter. He says this account was attached to the prefaces of some of the early translations of the works of Swedenborg, but that no mention is made of it in any of his writings, and that it has been traced to the French translation first referred to, which was printed many years after the death of the alleged author. Other things in the same preface are said to have been proved untrue, and it is added that this account is considered as improbable, or at least, as incorrect in its details by the disciples of Swedenborg.

These assertions, however, are not sufficient to prove the fabrication of the whole, or indeed of any part of the letter. Mr. Robsam we know was an intimate friend and an admirer of Swedenborg, and many other statements of a similar character, resting upon his authority, are allowed to go unquestioned. This narration has likewise received the sanction of many of the followers of Swedenborg, and the author to whom we have referred, is, as far as we can discover, alone in questioning it.

But whatever may be the truth upon this point, we are by no means destitute of information, coming without dispute from Swedenborg, relative to his illumination. We have referred to his own statement that he had been prepared from his youth, for the office to which he was called. In his letter to the king of Sweden on the subject of his persecution by the clergy, he writes thus: "I have already informed your majesty and beseech you to recall it to mind, that the Lord our Savior manifested himself to me in a sensible personal appearance; that he has commanded me to write what has been already done and what I have still to do; that he was afterwards graciously pleased to endow me with the privilege of conversing with angels and spirits, and to be in fellowship with them." Again, in a letter to Mr. Cettinger, superintendent of the mines in Sweden, Swedenborg says, "I can sacredly and solemnly declare that the Lord himself has been seen of me, and that he has sent me to do what I do, and for such purpose he has opened and enlightened the interior part of my soul, which is my spirit, so that I can see what is in the spiritual world and those that are therein, and this privilege has now been continued to me for twenty-two years."

This letter was dated in 1766, and thus would fix his first illumination as given in the disputed letter above referred to.

We are not so distinctly informed of the nature of the illumination and the manner in which it operated. Swedenborg

speaks of himself as a servant of the Lord, subject to his authority, and writing as directed by him. His inspiration however was different from that which he and others have attributed to the prophets. He supposed that what they wrote was dictated to them, but that they did not understand its import. In Swedenborg, on the contrary, the rational principle was always operative; he digested and embodied the truth which was revealed to him. It is important to attend to this distinction, as upon it is founded the different estimation in which the disciples of Swedenborg regard his writings and the Scriptures. What the prophets wrote came through their external, not through their internal minds. The truth which they communicated came directly from the Lord, and therefore is infinitely holy; but no holiness is to be attached to them, as they wrote solely from dictation. Swedenborg wrote with the aid of his rational principle. His writings then are finite, the Scriptures are infinite. Swedenborg says that from the first day of his call he never received any of his doctrines from any angel, but from the Lord alone. An open manifestation of the Lord himself and an entrance into the spiritual world, were the sources of his light. He says he enjoyed a privilege which had been granted to no one since the creation of the world. His language on this point is very intelligible. He asserts the proof of actual ocular evidence, the very scenes and the very words which came under his observation. Now he relates what he heard at a conference in the temple of wisdom, now the substance of his discourses with Luther, Calvin, Melancthon, &c. These are given at the close of each chapter under the title of Relations.

As we have now arrived at the principal point in our inquiry, it will be well to have one distinct idea of the purpose and end of the alleged mission of Swedenborg.

His chapter on the "Consummation of the Age," the last in his great work, entitled "The True Christian Religion," states this purpose most clearly, and it is frequently hinted at throughout his writings. The following sentence is from the introductory remarks to his Exposition of the Doctrines of the New Church. "Several works and tracts having been published by me during some years past, concerning the New Jerusalem, whereby is meant a new church about to be established by the Lord; and the Apocalypse having been revealed, I am come

to the determination to lay before the world a complete view of the doctrine of that church in its full extent."

Again in his letters to Mr. Ettinger already quoted, he says, "Every person may see that by the New Jerusalem is meant a new church or congregation, the doctrines and articles of whose faith cannot shine in their true splendor, and give light to others, without the Divine aid, because only figuratively described in the Revelations; that is to say, according to correspondence; and the true doctrine of it cannot be published through the world, but by such unto whom the needful revelation is made." He then declares his appointment for that purpose. He says that this church was foretold by the Lord, in Daniel vii. 13, 14, and in Revelations xxi. 1, 2. "And I saw a new heaven and a new earth; for the first heaven and the first earth were passed away; and there was no more sea. And I John, saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband."

To unfold the doctrines of this new church was the duty committed to Swedenborg. To effect this he must refute the errors under which the old church lies buried, he must expose the defects of other systems in order to build up his own. But the greatest accessory object was the unfolding and explaining the Scriptures. This consists in applying the key of natural and spiritual correspondences, and in discovering and stating the interior sense of the Word.

Such were the high claims of Swedenborg. If we were listening to such pretensions for the first time, we might well be startled, but similar claims have often been advanced; history is full of them. From the time when Theudas and Judas of Galilee, certainly with a greater show of reason in their pretensions than many of their successors have exhibited, first "boasted themselves to be something and led away much people after them," the character and office of a prophet have been assumed and maintained, better or worse, according to the degree of enthusiasm on the one side and of credulity on the other. Such assumptions have been confined to no period of civilization, to no degree of intellectual advancement, to neither sex. To decide upon their claims is to try the spirits whether they are of God. The proper question is, "By what authority doest thou these things, and who gave thee this authority?"

Swedenborg says that he received his authority from God. He surely could not expect that this assertion would carry its



own proof. The nature of his claims justifies us in calling upon him for evidence of a peculiar character, because he professes authority from the author of an existing system of doctrine to modify that system. When Jesus Christ came upon the earth, he stated his purpose to be the fulfilment of a plan already made known; he came to complete a system, parts of which were already in operation. His own alleged intentions could then be measured by the previous development of one consistent purpose, and they were fulfilled in exact concordance with all the anterior manifestations of that purpose. Thus the nature of his instructions and of the evidence by which they were to be sanctioned was known beforehand. If the claims of Swedenborg be just, the same analogy will hold in relation to him. He professed to build upon a foundation already laid, to complete a work begun by another. Not only then must he have his authority from the founder of the system which he extends or modifies, but there must be a symmetry and a harmony between the former part and his own. There must be a strict unity in the whole, when united. The fruit must partake of the nature of its seed, the body, of its members; and if Swedenborg was a true prophet, his doctrines and those of Jesus Christ must have an intimate connexion in their evidence, their principles, and operations. If this reasoning be correct, it will be of important use to us in the whole inquiry, and we may make it the leading principle of our judgment and decisions. As yet we are concerned with it only as it bears upon the evidence which we demand from a professed messenger of Christ.

And first of all, it would seem that we might expect to find in the Christian scheme itself some provision for any purposed alteration of it, and in the records which contain the original plan, something of the nature of a prediction in regard to its further development. But except the particular expressions in the passage of Scripture already quoted, and which may mean a thousand things, no direct provision of this kind, to be found in an undisputed interpretation of the New Testament, is pretended. Thus far the Swedish must yield to the Arabian prophet; for Mahomet alleged the promise of the Paraclete as a prophecy of him.

No one can deny that the New Testament has accustomed us to evidence of a miraculous nature, — an evidence based on signs and wonders. We must have a proper degree of that spirit, which was censured by the Savior only when allowed an

undue influence. We must ask of Swedenborg for some evidence,—either moral evidence, that of the will, the understanding and the heart, or that of the senses. Moral evidence is that for which we already asserted our claim in asking for some provision or promise in the Christian scheme, for any authorized modification of it. Such evidence would undoubtedly be the more elevated, as it instructs while it convinces, and performs its work upon the nobler elements of human nature. But authorized as we are to look for miracles, the bodily senses may lawfully demand that power may be given to them to aid the convictions of the mind by their own persuasion. Unless therefore the alleged bearer of a Divine mission can show good reasons against the demand for miracles, we must not waive our claim to them. This point is met and discussed by Swedenborg and his disciples, and they profess to found the whole evidence of their faith in its doctrine. It will be seen from what follows, how far this profession is adhered to. Swedenborg did not profess to work miracles; he advances both philosophical and conscientious objections to them. To a question from a friend, “whether there was occasion for any sign that he was sent by the Lord to do what he did?” he answered, “that no signs or miracles would be given, because they compel only an external belief, but do not convince the internal.” Yet it is well known that the receivers of the doctrines of Swedenborg have claimed for him the exhibition of miraculous knowledge and power. No matter how slight a degree of importance they profess to attach to some strange circumstances relating to him, in their higher regard to the internal evidence; all will allow that it is of infinite importance to decide whether or not he was possessed of miraculous gifts. These are not titles and honors to be bandied about at hazard, and rested upon uncertainties. If the followers of Swedenborg assert that he exhibited miraculous powers, let them state the facts plainly, and produce the proofs. If they can establish their position, then, with those who do not believe that the government of the universe is divided between God and Belial, the question concerning Swedenborg is decided in his favor. And on the contrary, if such claims are asserted and not maintained, we certainly have advanced one step towards an opposite decision.

But to come to the point, great importance is in reality attached to such claims by the followers of Swedenborg. The

author of the book on his *Life and Doctrines*, already quoted, says, that "these external evidences may in some cases be instrumental in producing a kind of belief favorable to future progress towards the truths of the New Church." Probably all the receivers of the doctrine agree with him, for the narration of the wonders of Swedenborg forms an important part in every discussion of the subject which we have met with. Another\* of the advocates of Swedenborg says, that he "would not wish the assertions of the Baron to be considered of a miraculous nature, but simply as evidences that he had converse with angels and spirits." Surely this is a distinction without a difference. What can such evidence consist in, save in acts properly called miraculous? Yet the same writer produces some wonders which, he says, "have been so fully attested, that none but an infidel can controvert them." This declaration is sufficient to justify an examination, for we may be assured that even an infidel cannot controvert them if no one else can. We shall therefore bring forward some of the wonders attributed to Swedenborg, and make such remarks upon their character and evidence as may naturally suggest themselves. We must premise two discretionary considerations; the one in justice to Swedenborg, the other to ourselves. First, it is very probable that many wonders have been attributed to Swedenborg, both before and after his death, which are only the creations of fancy. These by the mere frivolity which characterizes them may throw an air of ridicule over the more sober and better attested narrations, unless we discriminate be-

---

\* Hindmarsh's *Letters to Priestley*.—On the building of a church for the worship of the followers of Swedenborg at Birmingham, Dr. Priestley, in 1791, wrote a series of Letters addressed to them. The original draught of these Letters was lost on the night before the day appointed for them to be read to the minister, in the riot which destroyed his house and library. He afterwards rewrote them. They were replied to by Robert Hindmarsh, who was chosen for that work by the members of the Society, at a meeting in London. The doctrines of Swedenborg prevail in England, more than in any other part of Europe. From the time of his death until 1787, he had many disciples who continued their connexion with the Church of England, but at this date, a distinct Society was organized, and a place of worship occupied at London. This was thought to be the first in Europe. Conferences took place in 1789–90–92, when a division into Congregationalists and Episcopalians occurred, and another place of worship was erected.

tween them. But again, it is certain that many, if not all, of these supposed evidences of miraculous knowledge rest upon personal and private statements, the accuracy of which we have now no means of testing.

The first wonder we shall mention is not adduced by any follower of Swedenborg, but presented itself to us in the sermons of Mr. Lindsey, who relates it casually, as an illustration of his argument. In the address to which we refer below,\* speaking of Justin's alleging himself to be inspired, he says, "we cannot admit it on his own word, any more than we can admit the waking dreams and revelations of Baron Swedenborg"; and then, in a note, he relates the anecdote which he received from a living person of great worth and credit. "A friend of his was one day walking with Swedenborg along Cheapside, when the Baron suddenly bowed very low towards the ground. The gentleman lifting him up, asked him what he was about? The Baron replied by asking him if he did not see Moses pass by, and told him that he had bowed to him." Mr. Lindsey adds, that a man who could see Moses walking along Cheapside, might see anything.

Mr. Springer, the Swedish Consul, for many years resident at London, a gentleman, it is said, of the utmost veracity, in a letter to the Abbe Pernety, librarian to the king of Prussia, dated June 18, 1782, gives the following particulars. Swedenborg being about to sail from London to Sweden, desired him to procure him a good captain. Mr. Springer agreed with a person named Dixon, and as he took leave of Swedenborg and wished him a happy voyage, he inquired of Captain Dixon if he had good and sufficient provisions. "On this Swedenborg said, 'My friend, we have not need of a great quantity, for this day week we shall, by the aid of God, enter into the port of Stockholm at two o'clock.' On Captain Dixon's return, he related to me that the event happened exactly as Swedenborg had foretold." Now supposing all the particulars of this statement to be true, there seems to have been neither a pretended nor a real miracle in the case. Swedenborg had often made the passage, and perhaps the Captain's love of the marvellous,

---

\* A Second Address to the Students of Oxford and Cambridge relating to Jesus Christ, and the origin of the great errors concerning him, &c. By Theophilus Lindsey, M. A. London : 1790. p. 179.

his pride of place, and his desire of pleasing his distinguished passenger, might all concur to decide the length of the voyage, both in its real performance and in the subsequent history of it. Taking the most candid construction of the occurrence, no cautious man could allow the alleged prediction to be anything more than a happy conjecture.

This same Mr. Springer says that Swedenborg related to him many secrets concerning his deceased friends and enemies, explained to him some affairs of state in regard to the peace between Sweden and Prussia, about that time, praised the conduct of the consul in reference to it, with many other surprising particulars. These narrations it will be observed concern certain measures of government, of which Swedenborg is supposed to have been ignorant, that is, to use his own *modus loquendi*, as far as the external man is signified. The probable explanation of this wonder will be given after the relation of another. Mr. Springer says that Swedenborg told him that common report, in reference to his remarkable narrations, was partly true and partly not so.

Swedenborg's *Arcana Cœlestia* was printed by Mr. Hart, in London, between the years 1748 and 1756. They consequently became attached and intimate. Swedenborg returning from abroad called at Mr. Hart's house, who during his absence had died. Being introduced, he was told that his old friend was dead, to which he replied, — "I know that very well, for I saw him in the spiritual world while I was in Holland, at such a time, [near the time of Mr. Hart's death,] also whilst coming over in the packet to England. He is not now in heaven, but is coming round, and in a good way to do well." This anecdote is related by Mr. Noble. He says he took it from a memorandum of Dr. Provo, who in his turn received it from a son of Mr. Hart. Whether the story be true or false, it amounts to nothing, and we would willingly excuse Swedenborg from any concern in it. Mr. Noble may be a very sincere man, but he must possess a good share of credulity, for in the same book he brings forward the diabolical events of the French Revolution, and the progress of the Arts, such as the invention of steam engines and gas lights, in proof that the last judgment took place, as Swedenborg asserts, in the spiritual world, in the year 1757.\*

---

\* An Appeal in Behalf of the Views and Doctrines held by the body of Christians who believe that a New Church is signified by

We next come to several wonderful particulars related by a Swedish gentleman named Robsam, before alluded to. We have mentioned that the only attendants of Swedenborg in his house at Stockholm were the gardener and his wife. Mr. Robsam says he once asked her if she had ever seen a change in the countenance of her master, after his conversations with spirits. She replied, "entering one day after dinner into his chamber, I saw his eyes like unto a most bright flame; I drew back, saying, in the name of God, Sir, what has happened extraordinary to you, for you have a very particular kind of appearance? What kind of look have I? asked he. I then told him what had struck me. Well, well, replied he, (which was his favorite expression,) don't be frightened, the Lord has so disposed my eyes, that by them spirits may see what is in our world. In a short time this appearance passed away, as he said it would. I know when he has conversed with heavenly spirits, for there is a pleasure and a calm satisfaction in his countenance, which charms those that see it; but after he has conversed with evil spirits he has a sorrowful look."

Such is the story. Whoso can, let him believe it; and if he *wishes* to believe it, let him, — as the old father advised the scrupulous strainer at the doctrine of the Trinity, — let him pray God that he may understand what he believes. This "particular kind of appearance" in the eyes, does not seem to have been the uniform attendant of the visions of Swedenborg, as the gentleman who was with him when he met Moses in Cheapside, makes no mention of it.

Mr. Robsam likewise speaks of two captains with whom Swedenborg had sailed from Gottenburg to London, who said that they always had quick passages and favorable winds when Swedenborg was with them, and that they should be glad to carry him without pay. He seems to have been more favored on the sea than the apostle Paul. One of the disciples of Swedenborg (Hindmarsh) says, it would be wrong to think that these things are mentioned to convince, as that must be left to the simple evidence of truth. Most people will acquiesce in this opinion, and it would be better for the progress of the opinions of Swedenborg, if his disciples had never been instrumental in circulating these accounts.

Senator Count Hopken, prime minister to the king of Sweden, had a high opinion of the doctrines of his countryman, which he considered as the most rational of any maintained by Christians. Of the truth of his revelations he said he could not judge, not having had any himself, but he thought they were not more extraordinary than the apocalypse and other similar relations in the Bible. He once asked Swedenborg why he published his visions and memorable relations, which seemed to throw so much ridicule on his doctrine, otherwise so rational, and suggested that it might be better for him to keep them to himself. But Swedenborg answered that he had orders from the Lord to publish them. The Senator had so high an opinion of his doctrines that he recommended them to the king as the best religion that could be used in settling a new colony. Very much is made by the disciples of Swedenborg of the high encomiums thus pronounced; but we do not find that Count Hopken says anything which indicates his belief that Swedenborg possessed miraculous powers, on the contrary, he says, on reading his books, he always passes over the revelations.

In 1831 there was living in Philadelphia the Rev. Nicholas Collin, the rector of the Swedish Church in that city. This gentleman had seen and conversed with Swedenborg, and published an account of a visit to him in the *Philadelphia Gazette*:\* he was not, however, a receiver of his doctrines. He once had a conversation with Swedenborg on the nature of human souls, and their state in the invisible world, when Swedenborg positively asserted, as he often does in his writings, that he had intercourse with the spirits of deceased persons. Mr. Collin requested of him as a great favor to procure him an interview with his brother, late a distinguished clergyman of Stockholm. Swedenborg replied that God had for wise purposes separated the world of spirits from ours, and that an intercommunication could not be granted except for cogent reasons. As Mr. Collin could not produce these, his request was refused.

There is another wonderful narration relating to Swedenborg, in which John Wesley was concerned, but after a proper consideration and investigation of the affair, we can see nothing remarkable in it. The account of it originally appeared in that

---

\* For August 5th, 8th, and 10th, 1801.

strange book by Mr. Noble, already referred to. It is said by him that Wesley was once an admirer of Swedenborg, and inclined to receive his doctrines, but that he afterwards joined with the opposers of the Baron in London in calling him a madman. Mr. Noble, however, undertakes to prove that Wesley once had "indubitable experience of Swedenborg's supernatural knowledge." The amount of his attempted proof is as follows. Among Wesley's preachers in 1772, was Mr. Smith, a man of piety and integrity, afterwards a minister of the New Church. Mr. Noble had heard the anecdote as resting upon his authority, and he wrote to Mr. Hawkins, a celebrated engineer and a friend of Mr. Smith, to learn the particulars.

The following was the answer.

"Dear Sir, — In answer to your inquiries, I am able to state that I have a clear recollection of having repeatedly heard the Rev. Samuel Smith say about 1787 or '88, that in the latter end of February, 1772, he, with some other preachers was in attendance on the Rev. John Wesley, taking instructions and assisting him in the preparations for his great circuit, which Mr. Wesley was about to commence; that while thus in attendance, a letter came to Mr. Wesley which he perused with evident astonishment, that after a pause he read the letter to the company, and that it was couched in nearly the following words —

'Great Bath St., Cold Bath Fields, Feb. 1772.

'Sir, — I have been informed in the world of spirits that you have a strong desire to converse with me; I shall be happy to see you if you will favor me with a visit. I am, Sir, your humble servant,

'EMANUEL SWEDENBORG.'

Mr. Hawkins adds that Mr. Wesley frankly acknowledged to the company that he had been very strongly impressed with a desire to see and converse with Swedenborg, and that he had never mentioned this desire to any one. Mr. Wesley returned in answer, that he was preparing for his six months' journey, but would wait on Swedenborg on his return to London. Mr. Hawkins says that Mr. Smith told him that he had been told on good authority, that Swedenborg wrote back that Mr. Wesley would then be too late, as he (Swedenborg) should take his final departure for the world of spirits on the coming twenty-



ninth of March, when he accordingly died. This extraordinary circumstance converted Mr. Smith.\*

Such is the narration. Now supposing that Swedenborg really wrote the letter attributed to him, was there anything remarkable in his knowing that Wesley, who, it is said, was favorably inclined to his opinions, would be glad to see the author of them? As it regards the last part of the story, it would be time enough to receive that as true, when proper evidence shall be brought to sustain it. Such evidence it appears to us to want. We should look for it in the effect which the occurrence, if really mysterious, would certainly have produced on the most susceptible mind of Wesley, and of this we can obtain no knowledge, as we have failed to find a mention of anything relating to it in any of the biographies of Wesley.

We come now to the relation of three marvels attributed to Swedenborg, and supposed to rest upon incontestable authority, that of the celebrated metaphysician, Professor Kant. His testimony is contained in a letter dated August 10, 1758, addressed to his esteemed friend Madame Charlotte de Knoblock, who had sought information from him. It appeared first in a work entitled a *Delineation of the Life and Character of Emanuel Kant*, by L. W. Borowski, revised and corrected by Kant himself, published at Königsberg in 1804. Thence it was taken by Dr. Tafel, a famous Swedenborgian of Germany, to support the pretensions of Swedenborg, and was subsequently published in the "New Jerusalem Magazines" of England and Boston. In this letter Kant certainly appears to give credit to the remarkable narrations which we will relate in substance, as briefly as possible.

First, Swedenborg is said to have related to the Queen Dowager, Louisa Ulrica, of Sweden, the substance of a secret interview which she had had with her brother, the prince royal of Prussia, afterwards Frederick the Second. One account of this matter is that Swedenborg related the contents of a secret letter. This is the statement of the affair which Hindmarsh gives in his *Letters to Priestley*. Another version of it is given by M. Thiebault in a work entitled "*Original Anecdotes of*

---

\* There is a very full account of this matter in *Noble's Appeal*, pp. 131 – 135. He endeavors to substantiate the wonder by dates and facts. Wesley afterwards became a strenuous opposer of Swedenborg's doctrines, and published an opinion against them in 1781.

Frederick the Great, King of Prussia." Kant does not relate the story in his letter, but refers to it as already known to his correspondent. He says he inquired about it, and found it generally believed at the court. The author of the article, Swedenborg, in the *Biographie Universel*, offers a very reasonable explanation of the matter. He says that all who were aware of what was passing in the court of Stockholm, knew that Swedenborg had been instructed by a senator who held particular relations at Berlin, and who would be gratified with being able to make known to the Queen, that no one in Sweden was ignorant of what concerned her. The same explanation will probably apply to the particulars above recorded of Mr. Springer.

The second circumstance related by Kant, is as follows. The widow of the Dutch envoy at Stockholm was importuned by a goldsmith, soon after the death of her husband, for the payment of a bill which she was convinced had been paid by him. The amount was considerable, but the receipt could not be found. The lady desired of Swedenborg, who she had heard could converse with departed spirits, to inquire of her husband concerning it. He complied, and a short time after he stated to her that he had spoken with her husband, and that the receipt would be found in a secret drawer in a bureau, where it was accordingly discovered. Another version of the story places the receipt in a book, which her husband had been reading previous to his death.

The third wonder specified by Kant, which, to use his own words, "appeared to have the greatest weight of proof, and to set the assertion respecting the extraordinary gift of Swedenborg out of all possibility of doubt," is, that the Baron made known at Gottenburg that a fire was at that moment breaking out at Stockholm, three hundred miles distant. He described the commencement, situation, progress, continuance, and cessation of the conflagration, very particularly, to a company with whom he was dining. This was on Saturday. On Sunday morning he repeated it to the governor. On Monday evening a despatch arrived at Gottenberg which confirmed his statement, and on Tuesday morning the royal Courier attested it with the utmost accuracy. Kant adds that a friend *who informed him* of the affair had examined all the particulars and found them well attested. The circumstances of the case are very differently related by Hindmarsh.

This letter of Kant has been much insisted upon by the dis-

ciples of Swedenborg, as if he had been convinced that superhuman knowledge was involved. But there is abundant evidence to the contrary. We know very little about the German metaphysician, but our idea of him is that he was too cautious in the selection of the grounds of any article in his creed, to be thus easily convinced. What is perhaps more to the point, his own enlarged views of the extent of man's natural powers so far from permitting him to ascribe a proper supernatural knowledge to Swedenborg, would dispose him at once to exaggerate whatever there was wonderful in his character, and at the same time to confine it within the strict limits of unaided reason. Eight years after his letter was written, and while Swedenborg was yet alive, Kant published a treatise, entitled, "The Dreams of a Ghost Seer, explained by the Dreams of a Metaphysician." From this, his opinion of the pretensions of Swedenborg may be satisfactorily gathered, as he wrote it with express reference to the accounts which he had before communicated. "The kingdom of the shades," he says in the preface, "is the paradise of fools." That is a country in which they may settle wherever they please. Materials will never be wanting for hypochondriacal vapors, anile fables, and monastic miracles. Still, he says, it becomes the philosopher to inquire whether he should reject the whole of such wonders, and what may be the means for refuting them. Should he admit even one of the narrations as probable, how important would such a concession be! What astonishing consequences would follow if only one event of the kind were to be admitted as proved! There is however a third alternative, and that is, not to meddle with such curious questions of *leisure*, but to confine yourself to the *useful*. But this counsel though wise and sober, has a majority of the voices even of solid scholars against it. He confesses with somewhat of shame that he was so simple as to inquire into the truth of certain strange stories, and as is usually the case where nothing is to be looked for, he found absolutely nothing. This circumstance alone would justify him in writing a book; but besides this there was the importunity of his friends known and unknown, which had often before made him an unwilling author. He had likewise purchased, and what was worse, he had read Swedenborg's monstrous work, the *Arcana Cœlestia*, and such a task ought not to be futile. Thus originated his "Dreams of a Metaphysician," which he flatters himself will satisfy his readers as far as the nature of the subject will

admit ; beyond this he cannot go, for the reader will not understand the greater part of it ; more still he will reject, and will laugh at the rest.

The first part of the treatise discusses the nature, constitution, and operation of spirit, and the means and modes of spiritual converse. His conclusion is that we may *think* much on these matters, but can *know* nothing. He gives us enough of philosophy and of ridicule to explode all the ghost stories which have ever been invented. In the latter part of his treatise he brings up the wonders attributed to Swedenborg, and whatever may have been his opinion of them before, it is very plain from the ridicule and irony with which he treats them, that he regarded them but as idle tales.

There remains to be mentioned but one more marvel related of Swedenborg, that is, he foretold the time of his death. It seems a report was circulated after his decease, that he had become mad. Another report said that he had changed his opinions. His friends therefore thought it expedient to take an affidavit before the Lord Mayor. Mr. and Mrs. Shearsmith, with whom Swedenborg lodged, bore witness on oath that he retained his senses and memory to the last, and that he foretold the day of his death a month beforehand. The woman said she thought she could affirm safely that he died on the day specified. That a little while before his decease he lost his spiritual sight, and cried out vehemently in great tribulation, "O my God ! hast thou then wholly forsaken thy servant at last ?" But in a few days he recovered his spiritual sight and was happy.

This statement was made about thirteen years after Swedenborg's death, and this was abundant time for anything of a remarkable character attending it to take the form in the minds or the mouths of the witnesses, which appears in the affidavit.

If any other external proof of Swedenborg's alleged inspiration has escaped our notice, we have certainly shown the character of all of them, and our readers must make up their own opinions concerning them. Some who will not admit of Swedenborg's claims, will not care to dispute that the remarkable narrations which we have specified are substantially true. They would, however, confine the knowledge and the power of the subject of them strictly to the earth, and would seek for a satisfactory explanation of them in the operation of some unexplained faculties of the unsounded mind. They will refer us to

the unknown depths of our own natures, to the necessary illimitation to the bounds of possible knowledge. They will tell us that we know not the point where the finite meets the infinite, that a miracle is only an unwonted, or a new operation of some long existing law; that it is impossible to mark the precise point where the united faculties of the mind must cease their combined action, and yield to the imagination alone; that in the point of junction between the natural and the spiritual world, the horizon, above which is the broad light of the sun, beneath which is deep darkness, the union of light and shade, the ideal and the actual — at this very point, where all eyes are turned and strained the more painfully as they gaze the more eagerly, there is an unknown region crowded with chimeras and fantasies. This is the realm of romance, whence are drawn charms and portents, apparitions and prodigies, omens and all unexplained marvels. Hence the fortune-teller, the wizard, the magician, the astrologer, derive their secret charms and skill, and though it must be confessed that they leave behind them several unexplained wonders, they yet have not moved one step from the same spot of earth where we tread, nor had their vision lighted by a single beam which has not travelled through the whole universe. Let all this be granted. When we are told, and still more when we realize that we have spiritual powers, we admit all upon which the most extravagant mystic *founds* his strangest dreams. This very belief and confession bind us to believe what we do not know. Mysterious processes there must be. The steps of the Almighty are to be traced by the mind, when they leave no sight for the eye, and fall noiseless upon the ear. It is well for us to make these high truths a part of the experience on which we reason and decide, for it is well to have their assistance at our call. The earth has witnessed many scenes which the earth cannot explain. That man can have allowed his imagination but a narrow range, who has not even created and guided as well as beheld those abstractions of reverie, to which sober sense denies even an existence. But when we are called to yield our belief to the visions of another who has been dreaming while we were broad awake, we become somewhat suspicious of fancies not our own. Undoubtedly there are some of the many unexplained wonders of the world's long and strange history, some perhaps in the narrow experience of many individuals, which will not mingle their causes with any known natural law. Yet these are but

dim lights to particular truths ; they may all combine their rays for a beacon to faith, but they cannot define the distinct boundaries of any one object. If this be true, then we should not be satisfied with merely that attestation of the claims of an inspired man, which a thousand mere wonders would furnish. Nor, on the other hand, will the unexplained powers of the mind or the vagaries of thought be sufficient to accredit the marvels of Swedenborg. There is an efficacy going forth from the truth to which we have referred, which is able to cast out much mightier demons than those by which he was possessed. If any one finds it necessary to satisfy his own mind in relation to the alleged miracles which we have brought forward, he will be at no loss to decide upon their due by recurring to that truth. For ourselves, we cannot think that much philosophic labor would, for that purpose, be well bestowed. If we call to mind the extraordinary pretensions of Swedenborg, his own irreproachable character, which puts him beyond the reach of a suspicion of voluntarily deceiving others, the credulity which is ever so ready to take the place of real conviction, and more than all, the very confined circle in which his supposed wonders were performed, we cannot but decide that there is a strong probability against their truth. We must for ourselves confess that these claims appear to us to be almost antecedent objections against the doctrine of Swedenborg, they are so based upon shadows and trifles.

All that we have thus far said in relation to these wonders is founded upon the supposition that we had a right (unless good reasons could be shown to the contrary) to expect the evidence of miracles as proofs that a professed messenger of God was what he pretended to be. We said, however, that Swedenborg objected to such evidence being asked or given. As we found nevertheless that something of the kind was alleged, it was necessary to examine it. By its unsatisfactory character we are brought back to the point from which we started, namely, our right to demand the evidence of miracles, and the manner in which our claim was met. It may seem to be in anticipation of an examination of the internal evidence of Swedenborg's mission ; but as his doctrine on the subject of miracles stands by itself, we may as well consider it here.

Swedenborg treats of miracles in his *Arcana Cœlestia* (n. 7290.) His great objection to them is, that they affect only the external man, and are of a compulsory, not of a persuasive

and moral power. He refers to their origin in the form of signs and wonders among a people in external worship, without any knowledge of an internal worship, and therefore capable of being influenced only by external means. With those, however, who are in internal worship, that is, in charity and faith, miracles are hurtful. The internal man is enlightened by intellectual, rational ideas; but such ideas are controlled by reason, not by sense. To use his own words:

“That miracles are of a hurtful nature likewise, may appear from the following consideration: they compel to believe, and fix in the external man an idea that a thing is so or so. If the internal man afterwards denies what the miracles have confirmed, then there commences an opposition and collision between the internal and external man, and at length when the ideas produced from miracles are dissipated, the conjunction of falsehood and truth takes place, which is profanation. Hence it is evident how dangerous and hurtful miracles would be at this day in the church wherein the internals of worship are dis-closed.”

Such is the language of Swedenborg. That of his disciple Hindmarsh is even more explicit. He says that the fact that former dispensations required the aid of miracles, proves that they did not carry with them clear and rational evidence of their truth. Miracles show that whatever they are brought forward to prove is involved in obscurity, doubt, and uncertainty. This was the case with all the dispensations which preceded this most magnificent of all, the New Jerusalem. This requires no miracles, because the truths it displays are clear, rational, and satisfactory. It is too dignified to stoop down to the earth for anything that resembles a miracle; for by so doing, its heaven-born glory would be tarnished, and a cloud would intercept the celestial light from the sun of righteousness. He who requires a miracle in preference to rational investigation, is like a man who strikes a light to see whether the sun shines.

Now this reasoning can hardly be said even to sound plausibly. It rests upon the assumption that miracles may be equally performed by magical enchantments, and that witnesses being only struck with a momentary astonishment, not convinced or affected in their hearts, have given no credit to the workers of them, but have only been hardened in unbelief. The conclusion plainly is, that neither signs nor miracles can avail any-

thing towards producing a rational conviction of truth in the understanding.

But the whole argument proves no more than that miracles are not the only evidence of truth. When we call to mind the many beneficent exhibitions of superhuman power which our Savior offered in proof of his claims, can we think that his mission was degraded by them? Is it indeed true that Christ, by the mighty works which he did, admitted that his revelations were deficient in rational evidence? Did he lower the dignity of his religion by stooping to perform miracles? Such reasoning seems hardly to fulfil the conditions which at the outset of our inquiry we decided might properly be expected in the doctrines of a professed messenger of Christ, an alleged divine expounder of Christianity. The example of our Savior agrees with the lessons of truth and philosophy on this point. Miracles are not exempted from the influence of that universal law, "by their fruits ye shall know them." A miracle may have as high a moral meaning as a thought, a mental impulse, or a spiritual operation on the heart. The miracles of the Savior had such an influence over those who witnessed them; and not only so, but they continue to exert it over us who read them as matters of well attested history. Besides all this, the mere mechanical, material effect produced by a miracle, has its use. It is to arrest the steps of the passer by, when otherwise his ear would have been deaf to words. The power of the teacher will recommend the truth of the doctrine. Inasmuch as objects of sense do interpose and bound our ideas of what is possible, by the confined limits of experience, these boundaries need to be overleaped. We must be aided to look beyond the usual sphere of vision; intervening objects must be interposed between us and the faint spot in the distance. Surely, if the tenant of a grave is called back to life by one who proclaims to us a resurrection, the stupendous act will aid us to conceive that it is not a "thing impossible that God should raise the dead."

Add to all these strong objections to Swedenborg's principle, the final one, that it is inconsistent with itself. His rejection of miracles is founded upon the superiority of the internal over the external man, of mind over matter, of the spirit over the flesh, and where can we conceive of a more open, manifest, unquestionable exhibition of this superiority, than in a miracle? As matter must be present in order to be subdued, so the senses



must be appealed to and convinced, in order that they may no longer present a barrier to the entrance of truth into the mind. To sum up the whole matter, it is by no means sure that miracles compel belief, except in the same sense in which the statement of all truth, in word or deed, is unanswerable. Christ indeed told the Jews, that if his words did not convince them, his works would not. But a *vice versa* statement would have been equally true. The heart could be blinded as well as the eye. Neither words nor works would convince the hardened and gainsaying. Lazarus came forth from the grave, and Jesus rose on the third day; the multitude saw them both; but some believed and some believed not. Again, Jesus proclaimed the lessons of undiscovered wisdom, and yet his words failed of their effect. He had a devil and was mad. Why should he be heard?

Thus we must conclude the ground assumed by Swedenborg to be untenable. Miracles, as he says, may be dangerous now that the internals are disclosed; but a few of them would do no harm in proving that they are disclosed.

The principle maintained by Swedenborg has been asserted in a form more or less modified by many Christians. Perhaps all will not consider it liable to the objections which we have urged against it. We may therefore leave the discussion here, granting that his objections to miraculous evidence are not sufficient to disprove his alleged authority. We must, however, confess that to us, when united with the pretended wonders already examined, they amount to a strong antecedent doubt of the authority of his whole peculiar system.

We come then to the evidence on which Swedenborg and his disciples do rely. This is said to be strictly internal; founded upon the doctrine which he taught. The whole weight of evidence to justify his assumed character is to be found in his writings. There we are to look not only for the fruits of a long and devoted study of revealed truth, for the deductions and convictions of a mind possessing the common powers of humanity, but for much beside. These are attainments which lie within the reach of all, when the price of their acquisition has been paid, and therefore the possession of them to any degree cannot mark any one man as inspired.

We must expect to find something beyond the reach, or above the hitherto most exalted efforts of humanity. Something novel either in the statement, the elucidation, or the appli-

cation of truth, something 'too of so excellent and dignified a nature, that it cannot be ascribed to the chance creations of a fervid imagination, or to the successful efforts of enthusiasm. In conformity with that leading principle of judgment which we have adopted, it becomes us to be jealous on this point. For as Swedenborg takes the foundation already laid and builds upon Christianity, our duty to our Master demands a close examination of all who come in his name. Evidence of this kind we should be justified in expecting in the writings of Swedenborg, whether he recognised this right or not. He, however, does not deny it; he promises to grant it in its full extent.

There is one point which requires a passing notice, and that is, the state of mind so much insisted upon by Swedenborg and his disciples, which is necessary to the proper understanding of his doctrines. They have an answer ready to give to all who have examined his writings without receiving their contents, an answer, as they think, sufficient to remove all consequent objections, and that is, that the mind of the inquirer was not in a proper state for the reception of truth. Mr. Carlyle tells us, "that *mystical* will turn out in most cases to be merely synonymous with, *not understood*." And again, "to the understanding of anything, *two* conditions are equally required; *intelligibility* in the thing itself being no whit more indispensable, than *intelligence* in the examiner of it."\* Now no one will deny the propriety and importance of this principle, but it is very easy to conceive of its being unfairly pressed. There are certain qualifications necessary to the intellection of all truth; religious truth requires something beside these, namely, spiritual discernment. Faith is to be added to experience, belief to knowledge, and while all the powers of the mind are to be allowed their fullest and freest exercise, they are all to operate in a new direction, heavenward, instead of earthward. A certain disposition and frame of mind belongs to all true Christians. A love and reverence for the truth already possessed, and a desire to know more, should characterize all honest inquirers. More, however, should not be claimed. It is hard to be told that we must read all of Swedenborg's theological writings before we can believe on him. If he was inspired at all, he was so during more than twenty years. In that long time he wrote a great many books, and if he had died before, perhaps we should have

---

\* Edinburgh Review, Vol. XLVI. p. 339.

had only a third of the number, perhaps only five or six. The old receipt for making a Hutchinsonian was, that when the reader had got through the sixth of the twelve large volumes of the prophet, he would have an irresistible desire to read them all. If we examine some of the writings of Swedenborg, with the qualifications already specified, we may consider ourselves as possessing the proper tools, and if we do not find the ore, a reasonable supposition will be that there is none to be found.

This being premised, we may state from the book on his Life and Doctrines, the general contents of Swedenborg's works which contain his theological opinions or revelations.

His writings may be divided into three classes, doctrinal, metaphysical, and expository. The style of them all is very peculiar, and his meaning is often unintelligible to common readers. His language is said to be suited to his ideas, if so, we must adopt the rather uncharitable supposition that his meaning was, at times, unknown to himself. Adjectives are used by him as substantives, and the infinitive of verbs to denote abstract ideas. There is, moreover, much repetition in his writings, both of phrases and of thoughts. His theological works already published amount to about thirty octavo volumes, of five hundred pages each. Beside these, a large number of autograph manuscripts were deposited by his heirs in the Swedish academy. Many of these are first draughts of his published works, many are indices, tables, &c.

His metaphysical works are principally these: "The Wisdom of Angels; Concerning the Divine Love and the Divine Wisdom; Concerning the Divine Providence; The Nature of the Intercourse between Soul and Body, and the Delights of Wisdom concerning Conjugal Love." These works are all based upon his peculiar religious and doctrinal opinions, and it is unnecessary to remark upon them separately. They treat of God and Man, and their mutual relations, and of correspondencies in the natural and spiritual worlds. They assert free agency for man, and the constant operation of God's Providence, and maintain very strenuously the doctrine of a particular Providence. The Treatise on the Intercourse of the Soul with the Body, or on the Nature of Influx, concerns what we call Divine Influence. There is, says Swedenborg, a spiritual sun which corresponds to the natural sun. "The Heat of the Spiritual Sun communicating with the Will of Man, and the

Light communicating with his Understanding, produces the Truth of Wisdom. The doctrine of Influx is not to be understood as taking anything from a man's free will. Influx proceeds originally from God to the soul, and thence through the mind to the corporeal organs." This seems to be inverting the order of the philosophical doctrine of perception. The Treatise on Conjugal Love relates to the Nature of Heavenly Marriage. Husband and wife are spiritually married as far as they are regenerated, and their union corresponds with the Marriage of the Lord with his Church. True love can only exist with an acknowledgment of the Deity of Christ. Children born from such a union have similar propensities with their parents. The relations thus formed are continued in a corresponding manner in the spiritual world, and the old patriarchs are living there to this day in houses, families, and tribes.

The Expository Works of Swedenborg are those which unfold the spiritual sense of the Scriptures. These are the *Arcana Cœlestia*, in twelve volumes, octavo, and the *Apocalypse Revealed and Explained*. The *Arcana Cœlestia* is a continuous exposition of the Internal Sense of the Books of Genesis and Exodus, with incidental explanations of other parts of Scripture. It is to be observed that all the books of Scripture have not an internal sense. The Acts and the Epistles are considered only as of subsidiary authority. The Apocalypse is found by Swedenborg to treat of the Consummation of the Christians, and the foundation of the New Jerusalem Church.

There are some of Swedenborg's works which are devoted to the elucidation of some of his most important tenets, and are properly embraced under the head of doctrinal works. Such are the Treatises concerning Heaven and Hell, the World of Spirits and the State of Man after Death, and concerning the Last Judgment. It is not necessary particularly to specify their contents, as they will come under a general review.

We have aimed to give in this article a brief sketch of the life and philosophical labors of Swedenborg, and thus to trace his progress to the date of his alleged inspiration. We stated his claims and speculated upon the kind of evidence which was needful for their support. We recognised his objections to miracles and endeavored to reply to them, while at the same time we thought it necessary to advert somewhat at large to some wonderful particulars which were related of him. We specified the evidence on which he did rely, namely, that of the

internal fitness of his doctrines contained in his works of which we have given a brief enumeration. We are now prepared to give in a future Number an analysis of his great work, and by concentrating our inquiry upon the one fundamental doctrine of his system, to decide on his merits, and finally to support as well as we can the conclusion which we shall adopt concerning the character of Swedenborg and his writings.

G. E. E.

---

ART. II.—*Incidents of Travel in Egypt, Arabia Petraea, and the Holy Land.* By AN AMERICAN. *With a Map and Engravings.* In two volumes. Third edition. New York: Harper & Brothers. 12mo. 1838.

THE notice which we had prepared of these volumes, on their first appearance, was excluded by the press of other matter, and we are glad that the printing of a second and third edition allows us to resume our purpose of recommending them to our readers. They are written in a very sprightly manner, and contain a great deal of vivid description and entertaining narrative. Without the genius and poetry of Lamartine, whose travels over a portion of the same regions were recently noticed in this journal, they are free also from his affectation and extravagance, and leave on the mind a far more distinct image of the countries and scenes described, than the idealizations of that gifted Frenchman. They are almost exclusively occupied with personal narrative. They tell what the author himself saw and heard and felt; they go into no learned or fanciful disquisitions; they pretend to add little to the store of what is already familiarly known. But they give the adventures and observations of an enterprising and spirited man in a manner adapted to excite the liveliest interest, and to bring before the mind an unusually strong persuasion of the reality of the things witnessed, and the places and persons described. The vivacity of the narrator makes us feel, after reading the book, as if we had actually been with him on the route. We seem to have shared his lazy enjoyment on the Nile, where he lolled along in his boat without dressing or shaving, and strolled leisurely on

shore among the mummy pits and pyramids. We can hardly believe that we were not with him in his adventurous scrambling up and down Mount Hor, and his strange quarrels and still stranger reconciliations with his Bedouin guides. Jerusalem, and Petra, and the Dead Sea are plainly pictured before us as if we had but just returned from a visit to them. We could well spare some of the levities with which the book is spiced, and which occasionally give a queer air of irreverence to a very serious passage about sacred things ; but as the writer, though a great lover of fun, seems to have no radical lightness of heart, we are willing to pass by this blemish as a mere matter of manner, unconsciously caught perhaps from the free-and-easy magazine style of the day.

The work opens with the author's arrival at Alexandria, in December, 1835, and proceeds through a large portion of the first volume with a narration of his visit to the cities and ruins on the banks of the Nile, which he ascended as far as Thebes. Of all this we give no account, as we wish to reserve our room for those chapters which have closer relation to the sacred history, and which also have something more of novelty. It was his interest in sacred history and the predictions of the Jewish prophets, which determined his route on leaving Egypt. He desired to follow and examine the track by which the chosen people went out from their bondage to their inheritance, and to see with his own eyes the recently discovered city of ancient Edom, that strange city, which, after having been lost for ages from the knowledge of mankind, has recently reappeared, like Herculaneum and Pompeii, to astonish and instruct the present generation.

The difficulties in the way of access to that secluded place are such, that our author found little encouragement toward the enterprise ; but at Cairo he happily fell in with M. Linant, who had visited Petra, a few years before, in company with Laborde, and who spoke slightly of the difficulties of the journey. This gentleman was a French exile, at that time in the service of the ambitious pacha of Egypt, from whom he had received orders, the very day of our author's interview with him, to make a survey of the pyramids, for the purpose of deciding which should be taken down and demolished, in order to furnish stone for his improvements. M. Linant, it seems, reported that it would be cheaper to procure stone from the quarry, and thus saved the pyramid. He might otherwise have discovered all its secrets.

From Cairo the journey across the desert to Sinai was made with eight camels and three guides. The pacha was preparing to put a rail-road and steam-cars on the route. Arriving at Suez, our author fell in with the great caravan of pilgrims on their way to Mecca, whose appearance and conduct, filthy, unruly, brawling, quarrelling, inspired him with inexpressible disgust. Here he satisfied himself, from an examination of the localities, of the very spot at which the Israelites crossed the sea. His attendant Bedouin assured him that it was not only so, but that even yet, on a still evening, and sometimes during a storm, the ghosts of the departed Egyptians are seen walking on the waters, and that once he himself saw the ghost of Pharaoh with his crown on his head flying with his chariot and horses. The country seems to be full of such traditional superstitions.

It was the tenth day after leaving Cairo, that the travellers reached the convent of Mount Sinai. This is a large stone building surrounded with a wall, looking like a fortress, protected by cannon, and with no entrance except by a subterraneous passage under the garden, or through a small door in the wall, thirty feet from the ground. They arrived at the foot of the wall on a bright moonlight night. The monks were with difficulty roused from their slumbers, and that only after two volleys of fire arms had been discharged. The travellers were heartily welcomed and hospitably entertained, and nothing can be more amusing than the style in which the story is told. The superior was a Greek, forty years exiled from his country, but ardently loving it, and delighted to talk of it to a stranger and an American. "He had heard of her bloody struggle for liberty, and of what America had done for her in her hour of need, and he told me that, next to his own country, he loved mine; and by his kindness to me as an individual, he sought to repay, in part, his country's debt of gratitude." An anecdote is afterwards told of him, which, like several others occurring in these volumes, does nothing to heighten our admiration of the life of monkish seclusion.

"He was single-hearted and simple, or, perhaps I should rather say, simple and ignorant; I remember, for instance, when we had been embarrassed for a time by the absence of the younger monk who served as our interpreter, the old man told me very gravely, and as a new thing, which I could not be expected to know, but which he did not think the less of me for

not knowing, that formerly, in the time of Adam, all mankind spoke but one tongue ; and that men became wicked, and built a tower to reach to heaven (he had forgotten its name), and that God had destroyed it and confounded the impious builders with a variety of tongues. I expressed my astonishment as in duty bound, and denounced, in good set terms, the wickedness of our fathers, which now prevented us from enjoying at our ease the sweets of friendly converse."— Vol. I. p. 281.

The next day, Mr. Stephens, — for it will be convenient to call the traveller by name, — ascended the holy mountain, happy to find that the first spot which could be called "holy ground," raised in him feelings which had not been awakened by the most classic ground of Italy and Greece, or the proudest monuments of Egypt. The scenery of the mountain is subjected to a strange mixture of true and false tradition. A fountain is pointed out, which the monks assert to have been dug by the prophet Elias, who, they say, is still walking about the earth in company with Enoch. They also show a grotto in which he dwelt and slept. The very spot is designated by them where Moses stood praying, with Aaron and Hur by his side, during the battle with the Amalekites ; the whole field of the battle ground is spread out distinctly below, and the holy group must have been within clear view of the contending armies.

"The scenes of many of the incidents recorded in the Bible are extremely uncertain. Historians and geographers place the Garden of Eden, the paradise of our first parents, in different parts of Asia ; and they do not agree upon the site of the tower of Babel, the mountain of Ararat, and many of the most interesting places in the Holy Land ; but of Sinai there is no doubt. This is the holy mountain ; and among all the stupendous works of Nature, not a place can be selected more fitted for the exhibition of Almighty power. I have stood upon the summit of the giant Etna, and looked over the clouds floating beneath it, upon the bold scenery of Sicily, and the distant mountains of Calabria ; upon the top of Vesuvius, and looked down upon the waves of lava, and the ruined and half-recovered cities at its foot ; but they are nothing compared with the terrific solitudes and bleak majesty of Sinai. An observing traveller has well called it 'a perfect sea of desolation.' Not a tree or shrub, or blade of grass is to be seen upon the bare and rugged sides of innumerable mountains, heaving their naked summits to the skies, while the crumbling masses of granite all around, and the



distant view of the Syrian desert, with its boundless waste of sands, form the wildest and most dreary, the most terrific and desolate picture that imagination can conceive." — Vol. i. pp. 274, 275.

From Sinai to Akabah the route lay partly through rude passes of the mountains, and partly along the shore of the Red Sea. After a short detention in Akabah by illness, Mr. Stephens proceeded north, and entered the land of Idumæa. Here began the apprehensions of danger from the Arabs of that vicinity, — a tribe which bears the reputation of being the fiercest and worst of the race, wholly untrustworthy, and violently determined to obstruct the entrance of any stranger into the mysterious city. It being therefore necessary to proceed with great caution, the party on approaching Petra was divided. One division with the baggage was sent on by a different route, while our author, with six attendants and carrying nothing but provisions for one day, turned up the hills for Petra.

We have already hinted at the circumstances which render this city an object of peculiar interest. It was once the capital of a prosperous and wealthy people; it was the central point at which the caravans rested which carried on the rich trade of Persia and India with Egypt, Syria, and Tyre; it was intimately connected at various periods, both in war and peace, with the history and fortunes of the Jewish people; it was the subject of denunciation and anathema for many of the prophets, and it bears in its present condition a fearful testimony to the fulfilment of their words. It was already a city when the Israelites went out of Egypt; it remained such after Jerusalem was destroyed by the Babylonians. It was the seat of a bishoprick in the early centuries of the Christian era. At what precise period it passed into the hands of the Arabs and became the desolation which it now is, history does not tell; it appears to have been what it is at the date of the crusades; and from that time to have passed away from the knowledge of the European world, until visited by Burckhardt in 1812. Such was the watchful jealousy of his guide, that that traveller obtained only a cursory glance, as it were, at the wonders of the place, and could report only enough to stimulate the curiosity of those who should come after him. In 1818, four Englishmen, Captains Irby and Mangles and Messrs. Bankes and Legh, succeeded in reaching the place, and spent there two

days ; too short a time to permit a thorough investigation, but sufficient to enable them to describe some of the most important particulars. Their journal was printed for private circulation but never published. Some fine extracts from it which have been often copied, make us believe that the whole would be found in an uncommon degree worthy of perusal. In 1828, Laborde and Linant, two Frenchmen, spent eight days in the valley, and had an opportunity to secure exact drawings of many of the prominent monuments, and to describe more minutely than their predecessors the various remarkable objects which exist there. The account of this excursion was published by Laborde in a magnificent style at Paris, and has been republished in an abridged translation at London. The latter work, which we have seen, is executed with great elegance in the printing and the engravings, but is said by those who have compared it with the original to be in some respects a garbled and unsatisfactory work. These we believe to have been the only Europeans who have seen this singular place, prior to our own countryman, and it was partly through the encouragement of one of them, Linant, that he was emboldened to put in execution his venturesome design. Undoubtedly the result was well worthy the exertion it cost.

The only avenue to the city was by a passage through the mountains to the last degree wild and picturesque, and perfectly adapted to render the place inaccessible to an approaching foe. It extends for two miles, "a gloomy, winding passage, gradually descending, varying from eight to fifteen feet in width, the sides formed by completely perpendicular precipices, rising from the height of from two hundred to five hundred feet ; occasionally the lofty summits alternately inclined toward each other so as often to exclude almost entirely the light from above."\* In these rocky sides were occasionally niches for statues, rude carved figures, water pipes, and in one place an arch passing over and darkening the passage. Directly in front appeared a beautiful temple cut out of the solid rock, and a winged figure of Victory filled the centre of an aperture like an attic window, looking as if suspended in mid air ; while on the sides of the portico were groups of colossal statues. The temple, with Corinthian pillars of three feet in diameter and thirty-five in height, was entirely excavated from the solid rock,

---

\* Laborde, p. 81.

excepting the two centre columns, which were composed of three pieces each. One of these columns has fallen; but the rest have been preserved from the ravages of time and weather by the projections of the natural cliffs above, and are in a state of exquisite perfection. This circumstance is mentioned by all the travellers; the work looks as clear and bright as if but just finished. With this temple, which is called by the Arabs "The Treasury of Pharaoh," the wonders of the city begin. Beyond this the rocks soon expand into an area of two or three miles in circumference, and form a basin of that extent, almost inaccessible because of the precipitous hills which surround it. These precipices are hewed into temples, dwelling-houses, and tombs, without number, some of them of glorious beauty, with Corinthian pillars and capitals, and "often fantastically decorated with every imaginable order of architecture." A theatre is there, cut from the rocks, with all its benches, capable of seating about three thousand persons. Beyond this the ground is strewn on every side with fragments of columns, remains of architectural works, foundations of buildings, vestiges of paved streets, — all showing where and what the city had been. To render the appearance of the whole the more striking, the stone of which the valley is composed, said by Burckhardt to be red sandstone, presents a constant variety of hues, often disposed so as to produce an effect as beautiful as singular; — sometimes a deep, sometimes a pale blue; streaked with red, shaded off to lilac or purple; veined with crimson or scarlet; striped with yellow or orange; and in some portions white. "It is this wonderful variety of colors," says Mr. Legh, "observable throughout the whole range of mountains, that gives to Petra one of its most characteristic beauties: the façades of the tombs, tastefully as they are sculptured, owe much of their imposing appearance to this infinite diversity of hues in the stone." We must quote a portion of our author's descriptions and remarks.\*

"Though coming directly from the banks of the Nile, where the preservation of the temples excites the admiration and astonishment of every traveller, we were roused and excited by the extraordinary beauty and excellent condition of the

---

\* A very minute and complete description, with copious extracts from all the writers on the subject, may be found in the "American Biblical Repository," Nos. x, xi, xii. Mr. Noyes has largely cited the same authorities in the Notes to his translation of the Prophet Obadiah. This version we have used in our quotations.

great temple at Petra. Even in coming upon it, as we did, at disadvantage, I remember that Paul, who was a passionate admirer of the arts, when he first obtained a glimpse of it, involuntarily cried out, and moving on to the front with a vivacity I never saw him exhibit before or afterward, clapped his hands, and shouted in ecstasy. To the last day of our being together, he was in the habit of referring to his extraordinary fit of enthusiasm when he first came upon that temple; and I can well imagine that, entering by this narrow defile, with the feelings roused by its extraordinary and romantic wildness and beauty, the first view of that superb façade must produce an effect which could never pass away. Even now, that I have returned to the pursuits and thought-engrossing incidents of a life in the busiest city in the world, often in situations as widely different as light from darkness, I see before me the façade of that temple; neither the Coliseum at Rome, grand and interesting as it is, nor the ruins of the Acropolis at Athens, nor the Pyramids, nor the mighty temples of the Nile, are so often present to my memory.

"The whole temple, its columns, ornaments, porticoes, and porches, are cut out from and form part of the solid rock; and this rock, at the foot of which the temple stands like a mere print, towers several hundred feet above, its face cut smooth to the very summit, and the top remaining wild and misshapen as Nature made it. The whole area before the temple is perhaps an acre in extent, enclosed on all sides except at the narrow entrance, and an opening to the left of the temple, which leads into the area of the city by a pass through perpendicular rocks, five or six hundred feet in height. \* \* All around the theatre in the sides of the mountains were ranges of tombs; and directly opposite they rose in long tiers one above another. Having looked into those around the theatre, I crossed to those opposite; and, carefully as the brief time I had would allow, examined the whole range. Though I had no small experience in exploring catacombs and tombs, these were so different from any I had seen, that I found it difficult to distinguish the habitations of the living from the chambers of the dead. The façades or architectural decorations of the front were everywhere handsome; and in this they differed materially from the tombs in Egypt; in the latter the doors were simply an opening in the rock, and all the grandeur and beauty of the work within; while here the door was always imposing in its appearance, and the interior was generally a simple chamber, unpainted and unsculptured.

"I say that I could not distinguish the dwellings from the tombs; but this was not invariably the case; some were clearly

tombs, for there were pits in which the dead had been laid, and others were as clearly dwellings, being without a place for the deposite of the dead. One of these last particularly attracted my attention. It consisted of one large chamber, having on one side, at the foot of the wall, a stone bench about one foot high, and two or three broad, in form like the divans in the East at the present day; at the other end were several small apartments, hewn out of the rock, with partition-walls left between them, like stalls in a stable, and these had probably been the sleeping apartments of the different members of the family; the mysteries of bars and bolts, of folding-doors and third stories, being unknown in the days of the ancient Edomites. There were no paintings or decorations of any kind within the chamber; but the rock out of which it was hewn, like the whole stony rampart that encircled the city, was of a peculiarity and beauty that I never saw elsewhere, being a dark ground, with veins of white, blue, red, purple, and sometimes scarlet and light orange, running through it in rainbow streaks; and within the chambers, where there had been no exposure to the action of the elements, the freshness and beauty of the colors in which these waving lines were drawn, gave an effect hardly inferior to that of the paintings in the tombs of the kings at Thebes. \* \* But it would be unprofitable to dwell upon details. In the exceeding interest of the scene around me, I hurried from place to place, utterly insensible to physical fatigue; and being entirely alone, and having a full and undisturbed range of the ruins, I clambered up broken staircases and among the ruins of streets; and, looking into one excavation, passed on to another and another, and made the whole circle of the desolate city. \* \* The shades of evening were gathering around us as we stood for the last time on the steps of the theatre. \* \* I mounted my horse from the very steps of the theatre, and followed the sheik in his progress up the valley. Turning back from the theatre, the whole area of the city burst upon the sight at once, filled with crumbling masses of rock and stone, the ruined habitations of a people long since perished from the face of the earth, and encompassed on every side by high ranges of mountains; and the sides of these were cut smooth, even to the summit, hundreds of feet above my head as I rode past, and filled with long-continued ranges of open doors, the entrances to dwellings and tombs, of which the small connecting staircases were not visible at a distance, and many of the tenements seemed utterly inaccessible.

“Every moment the sheik was becoming more and more impatient; and, spurring my horse, I followed him on a gallop

among the ruins. We ascended the valley, and rising to the summit of the rocky rampart, it was almost dark when we found ourselves opposite a range of tombs in the suburbs of the city. Here we dismounted; and selecting from among them one which, from its finish and dimensions, must have been the last abode of some wealthy Edomite, we prepared to pass the night within its walls. I was completely worn out when I threw myself on the rocky floor of the tomb. I had just completed one of the most interesting days in my life; for the singular character of the city, and the uncommon beauty of its ruins, its great antiquity, the prophetic denunciations of whose truth it was the witness, its loss for more than a thousand years to the civilized world, its very existence being known only to the wandering Arab, the difficulty of reaching it, and the hurried and dangerous manner in which I had reached it, gave a thrilling and almost fearful interest to the time and place, of which I feel it utterly impossible to convey any idea. — Vol. II. pp. 71–82.

The scenes thus opened to the eye of modern curiosity are particularly interesting, as we before remarked, because of their connexion with some of the prophecies of the Old Testament, which are strikingly illustrated by the discovery. Several of the prophets denounced war upon Edom in terms whose precise meaning could be but imperfectly understood until compared with the position and structure of this strange city. But now, the most cursory glance at them surprises with the exactness of the application. Take, for example, the following from Obadiah, on “the destruction of Edom.”

- 3 “The pride of thine heart hath deceived thee,  
*Thou that dwellest in the clefts of the rock,*  
*Whose habitation is high,*  
 Who sayest in thine heart,  
 Who shall bring me down to the ground?  
 6 How is Esau searched through!  
 How are his *hidden places* explored!”

Also, from Jeremiah, whose forty-ninth chapter repeats almost the very language of the preceding prophet.

- 10 “But I will make Esau bare,  
 I will uncover *his hiding places*,  
 So that he shall not be able to hide himself.  
 His offspring shall be destroyed and his brethren and  
 his neighbors,  
 And he shall be no more.

- 15 For behold, I will make thee small among the nations,  
Despised among men.
- 16 Thy terribleness hath deceived thee,  
The pride of thy heart,  
*Because thou dwellest in the recesses of the rock,  
And holdest the height of the hill.*  
Though thou set thy nest on high, like the eagle,  
From thence will I bring thee down, saith Jehovah.
- 17 And Edom shall be an astonishment;  
Every one that passeth by her shall be astonished,  
And shall hiss on account of all her plagues.
- 18 As in the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah  
And their neighboring cities, saith Jehovah,  
*There shall not a man abide there,  
Nor a son of man dwell within her."*

The entire desolation of the land is yet more vividly described by Isaiah, (xxxiv. 5–17,) who amongst his maledictions writes,

- 10 "From generation to generation it shall lie waste,  
*None shall pass through it forever and ever."*

And Ezekiel adds the expression, (xxxv. 7.)

"Thus will I make Mount Seir an utter desolation, and *cut off from it him that passeth out and him that returneth."*

When these various expressions are compared with the singular site of that rock-built capital, its entire devastation, and its loss from the knowledge of civilized man for so many centuries, one could hardly demand a more exact and literal accomplishment. It should be enough to satisfy, as it certainly cannot but astonish, every reasonable mind. It seems, however, that even more than this has been demanded; and Mr. Stephens was nearly frightened from his purpose, by finding it urged in Keith's book on the Prophecies, that the prophets are to be understood as declaring that no one should ever pass through the land, and that whoever made the attempt should be destroyed. Keith had even undertaken to argue that certain travellers who made the attempt lost their lives in consequence. "Neither of them lived to return to Europe. *I will cut off from mount Seir him that passeth out and him that returneth.*" \* \* \* Captains Irby and Mangles did not *pass through* Idumæa, and they did return; Seetzen and Burckhardt *did* pass through it, and they did not return." It seems, however, that

each lived several years after passing through it, so that Dr. Keith can hardly bring these instances to bear on his point. Indeed the point is not tenable. "They that pass out and they that return" is obviously a phrase signifying those that belong to the place, — its inhabitants. And as for the expression of Isaiah, "None shall pass through it," the poetical and highly wrought diction of the oriental prophets does not admit of this word-catching interpretation. If so, indeed, we must also construe by the letter the preceding verses :

- 9 "Her streams shall be turned into pitch,  
And her dust into brimstone,  
And her whole land shall become burning pitch ;
- 10 Day and night it shall not be quenched ;  
Its smoke shall ascend forever ;  
From generation to generation it shall lie waste,  
None shall pass through it forever and ever."

But there is no pretence for a possibility of giving to those previous lines a rigidly literal interpretation. There is no pitch, nor brimstone, nor smoke in that region. It is a strong image of horrible destruction, applied by poetical license to a case different from that which it strictly represents. It is of the nature of a metaphor used in place of a simile ; and while everybody at once understands it to be so, it cannot do to come down upon the second half of the same verse with a strictness of construction so scrupulously literal. The interpreter makes a capital mistake, and jeopardizes his whole cause, who rests it strenuously on so untenable a position. Mr. Stephens, though no theologian, nor particularly at home in questions of biblical learning, yet had the good sense to see that such a pretension could not be vindicated. "In my judgment," he says, "the words of the prophet are abundantly fulfilled in the destruction and desolation of the ancient Edom, and the complete and eternal breaking up of a great public highway ; and it is neither necessary nor useful to extend the denunciation against a passing traveller." These expressions seem to us perfectly just ; and with another brief passage on the subject, we take our leave of it.

"Not with the spirit of scoffing at prophecy, but of one who, in the strong evidence of the fulfilment of predictions uttered by the voice of inspiration, has seen and felt the evidences of the sure foundation of the Christian faith ; and having regard to



what I have already said in reference to the interpretation of the prophecy, 'None shall pass through it for ever and ever,' I can say that I have passed *through* the land of Idumæa. \* \* And, unless the two Englishmen and Italian before referred to passed on this same route, I am the only person, except the wandering Arabs, who ever did pass through the doomed and forbidden Edom, beholding with his own eyes the fearful fulfilment of the terrible denunciations of an offended God. And, though I did pass through and yet was not cut off, God forbid that I should count the prophecy a lie: no; even though I had been a confirmed skeptic, I have seen enough, in wandering with the Bible in my hand in that unpeopled desert, to tear up the very foundations of unbelief, and scatter its fragments to the winds."—Vol. II. pp. 143, 144.

The next day he visited the tomb of Aaron, on Mount Hor, which lies in the neighborhood of Petra. This he did against the will and in spite of the remonstrances of his Arab guide. We extract a part of the narrative for the purpose of giving some idea of the spirit of adventure which characterized our traveller, and the charm of which he has contrived to infuse into his whole book. Having quitted the Arabs, he and his servant began the ascent without guide or direction. The task soon became severe. Not only was the side of the mountain precipitous and rocky, but seamed with huge chasms that could hardly be crawled around.

"On the very 'top of the mount,' revered alike by Mussulmans and Christians, is the tomb of Aaron. The building is about thirty feet square, containing a single chamber; in front of the door is a tombstone, in form like the oblong slabs in our churchyards, but larger and higher; the top rather larger than the bottom, and covered with a ragged pall of faded red cotton in shreds and patches. At its head stood a high round stone, on which the Mussulman offers his sacrifices. The stone was blackened with smoke; stains of blood and fragments of burnt brush were still about it; all was ready but the victim; and when I saw the reality of the preparations, I was very well satisfied to have avoided the necessity of conforming to the Mussulman custom. A few ostrich eggs, the usual ornaments of a mosque, were suspended from the ceiling, and the rest of the chamber was perfectly bare. After going out, and from the very top of the tomb surveying again and again the desolate and dreary scene that presented itself on every side, always terminating with the distant view of the Dead-Sea, I returned within;

and examining once more the tomb and the altar, walked carefully around the chamber. There was no light except what came from the door; and, in groping in the extreme corner on one side, my foot descended into an aperture in the floor. I put it down carefully, and found a step, then another, and another, evidently a staircase leading to a chamber below. I went down till my head was on the level of the floor, but could see nothing; all was dark, and I called to Paul to strike a light. Most provokingly he had no materials with him. He generally carried a flint and steel for lighting his pipe with; but now, when I most wanted it, he had none. I went back to the staircase, and descending to the bottom of the steps, attempted to make out what the place might be; but it was utterly impossible. I could not see even the steps on which I stood. I again came out, and made Paul search in all his pockets for the steel and flint. My curiosity increased with the difficulty of gratifying it; and in a little while, when the thing seemed to be utterly impossible, with this hole unexplored, Petra, Mount Hor, and the Dead Sea, appeared to lose half their interest. I ran up and down the steps, inside and out, abused Paul, and struck stones together in the hope of eliciting a spark; but all to no purpose. I was in an agony of despair, when suddenly I found myself grasping the handle of my pistol. A light broke suddenly upon me. A pile of dry brush and cotton rags lay at the foot of the sacrificial altar; I fired my pistol into it, gave one puff, and the whole mass was in a blaze. Each seized a burning brand, and we descended. At the foot of the steps was a narrow chamber, at the other end an iron grating, opening in the middle, and behind the grating a tomb cut in the naked rock, guarded and revered as the tomb of Aaron. I tore aside the rusty grating, and thrusting in my arm up to the shoulders, touched the hallowed spot. The rocks and mountains were echoing the discharge of my pistol, like peals of crashing thunder; and while, with the burning brand in one hand, I was thrusting the other through the grating, the deafening reverberations seemed to rebuke me for an act of sacrilege, and I rushed up the steps like a guilty and fear-struck criminal. Suddenly I heard from the foot of the mountain a quick and irregular discharge of firearms, which again resounded in loud echoes through the mountains. It was far from my desire that the bigoted Mussulmans should come upon me and find me with my pistol still smoking in my hand, and the brush still burning in the tomb of the prophet; and tearing off a piece of the ragged pall, we hurried from the place and dashed down the mountain on the opposite side, with a speed and recklessness that only fear could give. If there was room

for question between a scramble or a jump, we gave the jump; and, when we could not jump, our shoes were off in a moment, one leaned over the brow of the precipice, and gave the other his hand, and down we went, allowing nothing to stop us. Once for a moment we were at a loss; but Paul, who, in the excitement of one successful leap after another, had become amazingly confident, saw a stream of water, and made for it with the glorious boast that where water descended we could; and the suggestion proved correct, although the water found much less difficulty in getting down than we did. In short, after an ascent the most toilsome, and a descent the most hair-brained and perilous it was ever my fortune to accomplish, in about half an hour we were at the base of the mountain, but still hurrying on to join our escort."—Vol. II. pp. 95–98.

Our traveller pursued his way to Jerusalem, and spent some time in Palestine. Among other excursions which he made in the Holy Land, was one to the Dead Sea, during which he came to the knowledge of an enterprising attempt made by an Irishman, some months previous, to explore those hitherto unexplored and most mysterious waters. His narrative of this expedition forms one of the most curious portions of his book, and it is truly fortunate that some one was found to put on permanent record the history of an adventure, which, if successful, would have placed the name of him who achieved it by the side of Ledyard in the list of fame. The fate of Costigan was as melancholy as his achievement was bold; and there is a sad satisfaction in making known his story. It is briefly comprised in the following statement.

"He had purchased his boat at Beyroot, and with a Maltese sailor for his servant, in spite of many difficulties and impediments from the Arabs, had carried it across the country on a dromedary, and launched it on the Sea of Galilee; he had explored this most interesting water, and entering the Jordan, followed it down until he narrowly escaped with his life among the rocks and rapids of that ancient but unknown river; and then, constantly obstructed by the Arabs, even the governor of Damascus refusing him any facilities, with great difficulty he succeeded in bringing his boat by land to the Dead Sea. In the middle of July he had embarked with his servant to make the tour of the sea, and eight days afterward the old woman in whose tent I lodged had found him lying on the shore alone, gasping for breath. She had him carried to her hut, where he lay till the Rev. Mr. Nicolaisen, the English missionary at Jerusalem, came

for him, and the second day after his arrival in Jerusalem he died."—Vol. II. p. 263, 264.

Mr. Stephens found at Beyroot the servant who attended Costigan in the boat, and obtained from him the principal particulars of the voyage. He was a Maltese sailor, who told the story with an air of truth, not seeming to think he had done any thing extraordinary, and drew a rough map of the shores along which they had coasted. This is engraved for the present work. They made the complete tour of the lake, sleeping on shore every night but one, and crossing and recrossing it several times. They sounded every day, frequently with a line of a thousand feet, and found the bottom rocky, and of very unequal depth, sometimes ranging 180, 240, 480, 120 feet within a few boats length. They failed of finding the bottom only in one instance, where bubbles rising to the surface gave indications of a spring. In one place on the bank they found a hot sulphur spring. They looked for the River of Dogs at the southern extremity, but did not find it. In four different places they found ruins, and Mr. Costigan seems to have believed that they were the ruins of Gomorrah. At the southern extremity was a long tongue of high land running out into the sea, composed of solid salt; tending to confirm, says Mr. Stephens, the assertion of Strabo, "that in the great valley south of the Dead Sea, there were formerly large cities built entirely of salt."

"He told me some other particulars; that the boat, when empty, floated a palm higher out of the water than on the Mediterranean; and that Costigan lay on the water, and picked a fowl, and tried to induce him to come in; that it was in the month of July, and from nine to five dreadfully hot, and every night a north wind blew, and the waves were worse than in the Gulf of Lyons; and, in reference to their peculiar exposures, and the circumstances that hurried poor Costigan to his unhappy fate, he said that they had suffered exceedingly from the heat, the first five days Costigan taking his turn at the oars; that on the sixth day their water was exhausted, and Costigan gave out; that on the seventh day they were obliged to drink the water of the sea, and on the eighth they were near the head of the lake, and he himself exhausted, and unable any longer to pull an oar. There he made coffee from the water of the sea; and a favorable wind springing up, for the first time they hoisted their sail, and in a few hours reached the head of the lake; that, feeble as he was, he set off for Jericho, and, in the meantime, the un-

happy Costigan was found by the Arabs on the shore a dying man, and, by the intercession of the old woman, carried to Jericho."—Vol. II. pp. 281, 282.

It is much to rescue from oblivion even these few particulars of a spirited and disastrous enterprise. It cannot now be long before some of the many hardy men who are in greater numbers every year resorting to that wild region, will thoroughly explore its secrets. It is to be regretted that the failure of Mr. Stephens's health prevented him from undertaking this, as he desired to do, for we are persuaded that few men can be found better fitted to accomplish it. Perhaps he will yet return to it. It would be strange, after what he has done, if he were not possessed of a spirit of restlessness and a love of adventure which will render city life too tame to be borne; and when the desire to roam shall seize him, let him remember that he is the very man to whom we have a right to look for the bold and skilful management which shall unveil to us the features of a region always hitherto clouded in mystery. Let him prepare himself by previous study with that minute knowledge which shall enable him to turn his adventures to the best account. He has himself remarked on the disadvantages under which he lay for want of a more thorough preparation, and it would be easy to point out some carelessness and inaccuracies which have thence resulted. But this is not worth while. The book has answered its end, and we should be glad to see another like it.

H. W., jr.

---

ART. III. — *The Elements of Political Economy*. By FRANCIS WAYLAND, D. D., President of Brown University, and Professor of Moral Philosophy. New York: Leavitt, Lord, & Company. 1837. 8vo. pp. 472.

"THE 'Treatise on the Law of War and Peace,' the 'Spirit of Laws,' the 'Essay on Human Understanding,' and the 'Inquiry into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations,' are the works which have most directly influenced the general opinions of Europe during the two last centuries." Of the four works thus distinguished by a very competent judge, the last is the most

practical, and has most directly affected the course of legislation and the policy of government in civilized Europe. We do not deny, that similar changes and improvements would have been effected if Adam Smith had never lived. His work was the production of the age, and not of the individual, in the same way that the revival of letters, not the mere ingenuity of a German mechanic, caused the invention of the art of printing. The increased extent and importance of commercial enterprises in the eighteenth century, and the manner in which the attention of rulers at the same period was turned from disputes with each other and devoted to nursing the prosperity of the communities over which they presided, — *created a demand* for the discovery of true principles in Economical science. Vague suspicions were excited, that all was not right, — that there was some mistake in the well meant efforts of government; loose notions of more correct theories were floating about, which Adam Smith embodied and published in a systematic form, at a period so near the time when they were promulgated by others, as to give some cause, though an inadequate one, to dispute the priority of his discovery. That the minds of men were prepared for such a change of opinions, was shown by the eagerness and favor with which the publication was received. No work has been more successful in gaining the immediate approbation of all persons, whom private interests did not induce to maintain an opposite theory.

Still, the science founded on this remarkable treatise has exerted only partial influence on the policy of states, and practical statesmen, as they are styled, have impugned its leading principles with an earnestness and apparent sincerity, for which we can hardly account. Whence comes this difference of opinions? Why have legislators yielded a theoretical assent to doctrines, which, in many instances, they have refused to reduce to practice? The frequent opposition between a speculative and a practical judgment will hardly explain the problem, for those cannot be termed theoretical truths, which are immediately concerned with the daily pursuits, and affect the most familiar interests of mankind. They do not belong to the class of doctrines, which are usually contested between theorists and practical men. Founded on inductive reasoning from the most obvious facts, and confirmed by remarkable success in the experiments that have been tried, they are supported by a large number of persons most familiar with the *routine* of business

and the minute details of legislation. Most of the important laws affecting the commercial and manufacturing interests of Great Britain, enacted during the past thirty years, have been founded on the principles of this science, and supported in Parliament on this ground. Mr. Huskisson's regulations of the silk trade, the recent improvement of the poor laws, the change effected in the charter of the East India Company, are notorious proofs of this assertion. Yet we meet with men grown grey in politics and legislation, who emphatically term the science of Political Economy a humbug, and its partisans a set of visionary schemers and theorists. The reputation of these men for talent and sincerity is too high and too well attested, to admit of their being assailed in either respect. To say, that they are committed to an opposite policy, is to doubt their honesty; and to affirm, that their private interests effectually blind them to the perception of truth, is to question their superiority of intellect. We do neither. Therefore the prejudice which they have conceived appears unaccountable at first sight.

We believe, that both the *doctrinaires* of Political Economy and their opponents are in the wrong; the former in reducing their principles to practice with too little regard to attendant and qualifying circumstances, the latter in questioning the truth of the principles themselves. The nature and objects of the science are not fully understood. The principles which it embraces are very general in relation to the objects to which they apply, but this generality is obtained by the abstraction of those minute points of difference, that in the application of the truths, must again be taken into view. The propositions are founded on facts only less numerous than the various habits, dispositions, and circumstances of men. The ease with which common people reason correctly upon these facts, does not prove, that an extended and minute observation of them is unnecessary. It only shows their obviousness, — that we observe them unconsciously, and whether we will or no. We admit the Economist's premises, then, and assent to the correctness of the argument, but doubt the conclusion, because it seems impracticable as a rule. Make the proper allowances for the former omissions, qualify the application of the general result, and the apparent impracticability disappears. The case is similar with the theory of mechanics. The mathematician considers levers as straight lines without breadth or thickness, ropes

as perfectly flexible, and disregards friction altogether ; thus he arrives at the most comprehensive and demonstrable conclusions. It would be very absurd in him to insist on the unqualified correctness of these results, and no less absurd in the practical mechanic to neglect entirely these general truths, and go blindly onward, feeling his way by practice and experiment. Yet the Political Economist, who harshly insists on the immediate adoption of his principles, and the practical legislator, who ridicules the whole science, commit an equal mistake. In argument, indeed, both may admit, that the truth of the matter is as we have stated. Practically, they both deny it. General maxims, it is true, must be applied with a cautious regard to the circumstances of each case ; but this admission does not affect the universal truth and practical importance of the maxims themselves. The truths are as comprehensive and unqualified, as they appear to be in the statement. The exceptions are so few in number, that they admit of being enumerated and defined with the utmost precision. But the difficulty consists in ascertaining the proper scope of the principle, and the real character of the case, which is proposed to be governed by it. Different sets of problems require different methods of solution ; the incorrectness of the result is often attributable to an improper classification of the question, by which we have been led to use a rule, that was wholly inapplicable.

Writers on Political Economy are unconsciously influenced by a regard to the situation of their own country, the circumstances of its inhabitants, and the particular policy of its rulers. Their labors are on this account more useful to their own countrymen, than they would have been, if the generalization had been more extensive. But they deceive themselves, when they insist on the universal application of the maxims. Thus, the opinions of British writers on the corn trade are biassed by the insular position of England, and its limited extent of territory. The power of supplying themselves at will with grain from the continent depends on their political relations with the other governments of Europe. The caution, which they evince in advocating restrictions upon importation, and encouraging to the utmost the cultivation of corn within the kingdom, is the well grounded result of close attention to their peculiar position as a people. They deceive themselves, and others are deceived by them, who would make this caution universal, and place any other duties on foreign grain, than



those required to aid the national revenue. Again, the opinions of Mr. Malthus on population lead to certain conclusions respecting the policy of the poor laws in England. But these conclusions are not the less derived, in part, from a regard to the crowded population of the British empire, the immense number of those who seek charitable relief, and the entire absence among them of those feelings of pride and delicacy, which compel the poor of many countries to endure the utmost suffering, before they consent to throw themselves on the public. Obtaining aid from the parish is too common an occurrence among English laborers, to admit the feeling of shame in such a case to control their actions. In this country, we are not obliged to render life in an almshouse more irksome and uncomfortable than it need be, through fear that it may become a favorite place of abode for the suffering poor. Unless we see fit to do so on other grounds, we may refuse to alter our poor laws, without rejecting the theory, on which Malthus rests his proposed amendments. We may admit the principle, but in our own case deny the application.

These remarks may throw some light on a question, which appears to be of no small importance,—the propriety of combining an accurate and extended knowledge of statistics with the study of Political Economy. Writers on the science have objected to the practice of founding conclusions on facts alone, on the ground, that our acquaintance with facts must necessarily be partial and imperfect. At the utmost, statistical accounts are true only for the time being, and principles deduced from them are falsified by every subsequent change. Again, a knowledge of all the facts in each case might lead us to adopt a policy the very opposite from that, which would appear to be recommended by a partial consideration of circumstances. The prosperity of a country may be brought to prove the correctness of its system of legislation, when this very prosperity may exist in spite of the political measures, rather than in consequence of them. The excess of imports over exports is adduced by one set of reasoners to demonstrate, that the country is running in debt; while others hold, that the foreign commerce has been remarkably successful,—the returns so far exceeding the outfits. A general enhancement of prices may seem to evince the national welfare; but if it arises from the depreciation of the currency, it rather betokens national decay. These examples show the facility with which any principle

may be made out by means of what Adam Smith has styled political arithmetic, and they justify the cautiousness of this writer against such a suspicious medium of proof.

But do we infer, that facts are useless in Political Economy? By no means. The office of the Economist is to interpret facts,—not to prophesy what must be, but to explain what is. Statistical returns are thus the object of the science, though it is unsafe to consider them as the *data*, from which the original principles are derived. Instead of creating the rule, they govern its application. For instance, the peculiar situation of our own land is sufficient to qualify materially the force of the general maxims established by European writers. The mere fact, that the ocean rolls between us and Europe, and the consequent delays and expenses of transportation, must influence our theories of foreign commerce, and restrict the reasoning heretofore applied to a system of import duties. We want an American treatise of Political Economy, one that shall contain not merely the higher truths, that are strictly universal, and which no circumstances can limit or disprove, but the less general maxims founded on those of the first class and on a careful observation of facts, that may form a text book for legislators and statesmen. We want a work, which shall bear the same relation to American institutions, that the writings of Malthus and Ricardo do to those of England. We are yet a new people, and, during the past fifty years, the vacillating legislation of the country on the subjects of foreign commerce, domestic manufactures, and the currency, betrays an ignorance of our own vital interests, which shames alike the rulers and the governed. It is time to secure that advantage, at least, which may be gained by undeviating adherence to one general policy, though the system selected be neither the wisest in the abstract, nor the best adapted to our peculiar condition. Unfortunately, the conflict of interests between the states produces a heated discussion of questions relating to commercial and manufacturing policy, and the issue is too often decided at length on party grounds. This evil is irremediable in part, but the habit of general reasoning must tend to soften the acerbity of debate, and repress the more absurd declarations of extravagant theories, to which men are driven in the warmth of contest. It is full time, that the higher subjects of legislation should be handled not merely by politicians, but by *speculative* men—we are not afraid of the epithet—who, separated from

the din of parties, may propose and advocate measures on more substantial grounds, than those of compromise and temporary expediency. It is possible, at least, for one to argue upon such themes, who has no views of political advancement, and no wish to decry the Bank or defame President Van Buren.

But if this end is ever to be attained, if Economical questions are ever to be viewed in any other light than in their relation to the schemes of party, greater attention must be paid to the collection and publication of facts. The science of statistics has hardly an existence in this country. The returns that are made by the Treasury department of the national government are meagre beyond description, and are published in the most ill digested state. Immense labor must be expended to work them up into such a form, that they may elucidate the condition of the country and the policy of its laws. Mistaken reasoning upon facts proceeds from imperfect perception of their mutual bearing, and from partial views. These evils can be remedied only by completeness in the returns, and by such scientific arrangements, as may develope at once the real nature of the circumstances. More has been accomplished in this way by the efforts of an individual, in the several volumes of the American Almanac, than by the government ever since it was instituted. The opportunity afforded by taking the census might be so improved, as to gather a great number of miscellaneous and valuable facts. At present, the returns relate merely to the population, and the only classification attempted is that of ages, while one of employments, and in some degree of property, might easily be added. At a recent session of Congress, Dr. Lieber presented a memorial, containing a comprehensive scheme of classification, and a proposition to institute a Board or Commission, whose duty it should be to collect and publish statistical accounts on this model. The example of many European governments, and the intrinsic advantages of the scheme, were urged in its support. We regret, that this proposition shared the fate of many others, that were out of the ordinary course of legislation, and was passed over with little notice. Its adoption would subserve the best interests of the country, by enlarging the field of argument and illustration in legislative debates, and suggesting important changes of policy. A mere account of the variation of prices in the different markets of our extensive territory, and at different periods of time, must throw great light on the circumstances that affect production, and on the proper modes of regulating commerce.

Great caution would still be necessary in digesting theories and forming plans with exclusive regard to such statistical collections. The higher principles of Political Economy, from their obviousness and universality of operation, are in truth general facts, and reasoning founded upon them is eminently practical. They are deduced from common observation, and lie so closely within the sphere of experience, as to appear trite in the enunciation. That competition will ordinarily produce equality of profits in the several employments of industry and capital, that a private person can manage his own business better than government can manage it for him, that on the welfare of individuals depends the welfare of the state, — these are not principles arbitrarily assumed in defence of theoretical legislation. Whatever conclusions are immediately inferred from them must be true, and it is only when the chain of reasoning is extended, and the consequences are remote, that statistics are of use to check the induction, and qualify or refute the ultimate rule. The class of legislators, who reject the Economist's arguments as too abstract, and his projects as impracticable, and profess themselves to be governed only by common sense and daily experience, are refuted by their own frequent changes of opinion and fluctuating measures. Circumstances bring them round to the very positions they formerly assailed, and they find themselves alternately fighting in opposite camps, without the consciousness of desertion or removal. Consistency is the fruit of those modes of thought which they formally condemn. So true is it, that a shortsighted policy is ever a temporary one.

In this country we are all legislators. The humblest individual, who puts in a vote at town-meeting, exerts an influence on the laws, and does his part in determining vexed political questions. In recommending the study of Political Economy, then, we merely advise, that such knowledge may be obtained, as may fit a citizen for the proper exercise of his functions. The practice, if not the theory, of our government is to elect persons to office who shall represent the opinions of the electors, and not to delegate to the elected the power of thinking and judging for the community. The represented are not humble enough to suppose, that their representative has better means or a better capacity to judge of the state of the country than themselves; but they insist on making the correctness of his opinions, as it appears to them, to be the principal test of his

qualifications for office. Now, it is obvious, that the bulk of the voters will look mainly to the candidate's opinions on those questions, which must directly affect their own pecuniary interests. No government on earth, in proportion to the extent of country, is conducted at so little expense as our own; yet a candidate has no more certain mode of recommending himself to the affections of the people, than by proposing schemes of retrenchment. We have heard of an old representative to the General Court from one of our country towns, who made it his boast, that he had never voted for any proposition to spend the people's money; in other words, he had opposed every bill, whether judicious or not in other respects, which led to the expenditure of a single dollar. The consequence was, that he was elected every time he chose to be considered as a candidate. The common prejudice against direct taxation proves, that in a popular government the community must be cheated into those expenditures, which are essential to the welfare of the state. Nothing is more certain, than that indirect taxation really imposes the heaviest burden, for the costs of collection are greater. But the tax is concealed, the enhancement of cost, which it occasions, being blended with the ordinary fluctuations of price. Universally, where the pecuniary bearings of a measure are indirect, the decision on its propriety is had on false or insufficient grounds, and the consequent mistakes of policy are frequent and serious. We are not quixotic enough to suppose, that the dissemination of scientific principles is possible to an extent, that would entirely remedy this evil. But it is not unreasonable to believe, that, were the study of Economical science made more general than it is at present, the grosser errors might be avoided, and the character of our commercial legislation, which is now so uncertain and changeable, might be materially improved.

It is mournful to reflect, that, in a country where so much depends on the correctness of the opinions held by the people at large, hardly any progress has been made in defining and limiting the maxims of Political Economy for our own use, or in diffusing that degree of elementary knowledge, which is requisite for the security and wellbeing of the state. The absurd prejudice against wholesale dealers in grain, which recently caused an alarming riot in New York, cannot exist in a mind imbued with the simplest and most evident maxims of the science. Unless this degree of knowledge becomes universal,

we may naturally expect in a season of scarcity the most frantic actions on the part of the populace. The experience of the last year has proved, that, even in our extensive and fertile territory, a deficiency of bread-stuffs is a possible occurrence. The recurrence of such a scarcity among a people, who have no means of forming a correct judgment of its nature, causes, and remedies, and in whom the physical as well as moral power of the state resides, would be fraught with the most direct and mischievous consequences. In view of these and other possible occurrences, we think the propriety of paying greater attention to the progress and dissemination of knowledge on Economical subjects to be sufficiently evident.

But, before this study could be introduced into our common schools, and cultivated to a greater extent in our colleges and higher seminaries of learning, some improvements must be made in the theory of the science, and in adapting it to our peculiar wants and situation. We have already alluded to the two principal obstacles to the progress of the science on this side of the Atlantic, — the want of copious statistical returns, and the danger of confounding Economical discussions with party debates. The first of these difficulties cannot much longer exist. Industry may effect much by a proper use of existing means of information, and we trust the attention of Congress has not been called in vain to the urgent necessity of enlarging these sources of knowledge. The prejudices of statesmen may be done away by demonstrating the applicability and usefulness of the doctrines, or they may be driven to a more liberal mode of considering the subject, by finding the people already in advance of themselves. The remedy of the other evil, which we have mentioned, is far more difficult. So strong is the influence of universal example, that we can hardly admit it to be possible for one to advocate or impugn the policy of a tariff on any other than party grounds, and with the wages and motives of a political aspirant. Till a more liberal sentiment prevails, we may well despair of hearing the subject discussed by men, who can have no personal interest in the result, and are well fitted by their previous studies and pursuits to agitate an abstruse and difficult question.

The forbidding appearance of the subject, as it is displayed in most of the formal treatises, the obscurity of the doctrines, and the abstract and repulsive nature of the reasoning employed, have appeared to some an insurmountable obstacle to the dif-

fusion and popularity of the science. There are some grounds for this apprehension. Writers have exhibited the theme in its least inviting aspect, and have prided themselves on the severe and rugged appearance of their discussions, as if attractiveness of style and all embellishment and illustration were foreign to the occasion. But the "*Wealth of Nations*" proves that such a course is unnecessary, for the graceful diffuseness of the author's manner and the abundance of examples veil the abstract nature of the inquiry, and invest its harshest features with a secret charm. For this reason, if a foreign work must be adopted as a text book in our colleges, the writings of Adam Smith should be preferred. The want of method and the digressive character of the book are slight objections to its use, when the only object is to create an interest in the pursuit, to furnish unexceptionable examples of the proper kind of reasoning, and to induce the pupil to think and judge for himself. We have great doubts, whether the first principles of Political Economy have yet been set forth in a more satisfactory manner, than by the founder of the science. A competent instructor might be trusted to suggest such circumstances, as qualify the application of the doctrines in this country.

We are bound to declare, that the preceding remarks have been suggested by the defects of Dr. Wayland's book, considered as a manual of instruction. In other respects, it presents many of those features, which have gained for the author's work on *Ethics* a well merited popularity. The arrangement and division of the subject are almost faultless. We find the same closeness and severity of argument and equal conciseness and purity of style. The author avows, that he has not aspired to originality, and of course the leading opinions are those maintained in the ablest works of the English Economists. But the order and expression are varied to advantage, and some of the maxims are made to rest on a novel and satisfactory train of reasoning. Sometimes, indeed, the writer forgets that his work is addressed to youthful pupils, to whom a more lively manner would have imparted a deeper interest in the subject, and an abundance of examples and facts have reconciled to abstract and dry inquiries.

The great fault of the work is its want of American character,—of adaptation to our peculiar circumstances and institutions. Practically considered, few principles of the science, as they appear in most treatises, are universally true. We

have shown, that they must be cautiously reduced to practice, when the attendant circumstances are different from those, which the author or discoverer had in view. Dr. Wayland has hardly attempted to state the exceptions to the rules, or to limit the enunciation; and the usefulness of his book in this country is proportionably diminished. Thus the argument respecting a legal provision for the poor sets forth a sound doctrine for English statesmen, proposing the only certain remedy for the greatest evil which their country suffers. In the United States, the evil does not exist. Properly speaking, no public relief is granted to the simply indigent, the few cases in which a home is afforded to the able-bodied poor being rightly considered as instances, not of charity, but of punishment. But the argument on this head is worse than useless, for it proves too much. Those who are able to work, says Dr. Wayland, should not be maintained at the public cost, because the inviolability of property is essential to the social welfare. But the right of property is equally invaded, when one receives without labor what is taken from another without an equivalent, whether the necessities of the former are real or factitious, — whether his distress arises from his own fault, or from circumstances without his control. Persons incapacitated by natural causes, the blind, the aged, the sick, have by this argument no better claim on the community, than the indolent and the vicious. But we deny, that the enactment of poor laws amounts in any case to the violation of a right. Property is a social institution, the creature of law, and is of course subservient to all the purposes for which society was created. It was instituted to promote the general welfare, and must therefore be subject to those limitations and instructions, which increase its tendency to this end. It cannot be for the general good, that one man should perish from want, while another is rolling in wealth. The law takes from the latter what is barely sufficient to preserve the former from starvation. To take more would be to encourage idleness, and in this way to diminish the general stock of happiness. To take nothing would be to cause an amount of individual suffering, that would equally lessen the sum of welfare in the community. The poor man has the same right to the portion assigned to him, which the original possessor of the property has to the remainder; for both are indebted to the laws for what they enjoy, and in the judgment of the legislature, whose authority on this subject is supreme, both enact-



ments are equally expedient. Put the question on the ground of expediency, not of right, and Dr. Wayland's conclusion is correct.

One great problem, the most difficult, perhaps, in the whole science, yet the most important, if we consider its bearing on the determination of many other questions, is passed over in this work before us with too little notice. We refer to the effects of great accumulation of capital, of vast improvements in labor-saving machinery, — to the possibility of the productive power in a community outrunning its ability and desire to consume. May not capital be accumulated to a point, beyond which, there would be no possibility of employing it? May not habits of frugality become common to an extent, that would check, rather than favor, the increase of wealth? If the wants of a community were confined to mere bread and water, industry would be required for no other purpose than for the raising of grain, and as the labor of one would in this way provide for the subsistence of a hundred, ninety-nine would be thrown out of employment. What could one in this class offer in exchange for the hundredth portion of the other's produce? The luxurious habits of the rich are necessary to balance the effects of forced economy among the poor. If the higher classes submit from choice to those privations, which less fortunate persons undergo from necessity, the demand for industry and capital would be too far restricted to admit of the universal employment of one, or the general and rapid accumulation of the other. We cannot therefore agree with some Economists, that luxury is always an evil, for it tends to the equalization of wealth.

Before the principles of Economical science were much discussed, the advancement of population was the sole end, which philanthropy had in view. In a given district, the quantum of happiness was held to be in direct ratio to the number of inhabitants. But the sturdiest opponent of Malthus must admit, that an increase of the laboring population of England and Ireland, that miserable and degraded class, is hardly to be desired. A ruinous competition for employment, the reduction of wages to the lowest point, that will suffice to keep life flickering in its socket, is the inevitable consequence of an enlargement of numbers. To increase the comforts of the multitudes who exist, rather than to call other multitudes into being, who must claim a share of the slender stock of enjoyments, is the dictate of cautious and reflecting philanthropy. "Before popu-

lation can advance, there must be something on which it can subsist; before capital can increase, there must be something in which it may be embodied." The same doubts respecting the desirableness, even the possibility, of indefinite increase in the case of population, have now come to be entertained by respectable writers, in regard to capital. We do not participate in these alarms. The evils that are feared seem to result more from defective political organization, than from the natural course of things as established by a beneficent Creator. An exposition of this remark may evince in some degree the necessity of modifying the Economical principles established in Europe, before they are applied to the inhabitants of this country.

The Malthusian principle, that population tends to increase faster than the means of subsistence, cannot be admitted, if a necessary connexion can be shown between enlargement in the number of human beings, and the augmentation of provision for their support. At first sight, such a connexion would seem to exist. More cultivators will raise more products. A farmer, who owns a hundred acres, and has but two sons to assist him in his labors, will suffer a portion of his ground to remain covered with wood, will entirely neglect some fields where the soil is lean and stony, and plough up in the whole, perhaps, not more than a tenth part of his possessions. Ask him why he does no more, and he will reply, that he has not a sufficient number of hands. His "boys" and himself have enough to employ their time, as it is. But should the number of his family increase to ten, a portion of the woodland is cleared up, the scattered stones are collected and formed into walls to protect from the winds and invigorate the cold soil by their warmth; three times as much land is dug up and sown, and the harvest is proportionably increased. The family is farther removed than before from the fear of want, for there is a yet larger surplus to be sent to market. Increase the number of laborers and the disposition to toil, and who shall prescribe bounds to the productiveness of the earth? Nature has scarped the mountain's side, but human industry has chiselled it into terraces, transported soil to the spot, and converted the bare and steep face of the rock into a smiling vineyard. It has drained the fens, and drawn the sustenance of life from the place, which formerly sent forth only the most noxious and fatal exhalations. It has banked out the ocean, and where once the fisherman

plied his oar and fleets were anchored, the fields are now waving with corn.

But the disciple of Malthus, chuckling over the powers of the "geometrical ratio," measures the earth, ascertains the number of square miles on its surface, and tells us how soon the human race, doubling once in twenty-five years, must come to jostling each other in their daily walks. He forgets, that the speculation relates only to a distant futurity, that no country can yet be shown, where the most approved methods of cultivation are carried to the farthest possible extent, and a portion of the inhabitants still perish from starvation. Moreover, the facilities of commercial intercourse are now so extended, that the theory cannot be applied, — it can have no practical truth, — till human industry and skill have exhausted the productive powers of the whole earth, till the last foot of ground has been tilled, and the last resources of agriculture have failed to meet the increased demand. If population ceases to advance, before this point is attained, the evil lies somewhere else. The proper remedy is not to check the demand, but to enlarge the supply. The inmates of an Irish hovel may die by actual famine, or by any one of the thousand diseases consequent on wants imperfectly supplied; but while Ireland continues to export many articles of food, the evil must be attributed, not to the insufficiency of the Creator's bounty, but to the failure of human efforts to second His beneficent designs. The cause is artificial and remediable. The stores of nature are not consumed, but they are unequally distributed. The legislature may find it difficult effect a more equal division of the means of subsistence, without infringing the right of property, and causing evils a thousand fold greater than any which result from the present constitution of things. Still the remedy is possible, and the check upon population is unnecessary. In this country we are accustomed to believe, that many of the particular provisions of English law tend needlessly to favor and increase this inequality of private fortunes. For instances, we need only allude to the constitution of the Irish Protestant church, the tithe system, and the peculiar modes of taxation, which favor *absenteeism* among the great landed proprietors. A comparison of our own institutions with those of England, displaying the effect of each on the distribution of wealth, on the accumulation and perpetuity of overgrown private fortunes, would form an interesting chapter in an American treatise on Economical science.

The system of Malthus was originally proposed to refute those dreams of human perfectibility, which Godwin advanced in his treatise on Political Justice. It is, perhaps, sufficient to this end. Could the moral and intellectual character of the race be changed, could equality of property be maintained without destroying the incitements to toil, and the rules of natural morality and justice be universally enforced without the sanction of law or the dread of punishment, — in a word — could man become a perfectly wise and virtuous being, the fecundity of the species would still prove an insurmountable obstacle to the indefinite growth and continuance of happiness. As all the checks on population existing at present would be done away, the race must multiply, till the crowded earth could receive no more ; contests for place must then ensue, occasioning a new class of evils, that would carry man back to his state of original imperfection. We cannot get rid of the difficulty respecting the origin of evil, by showing that sin and misery are remediable, and continue only by our own fault. In a greater or less degree, they form part of the necessary constitution of things. At present, however, such speculations respecting the tendency of population are wholly inapplicable. In the most civilized countries, the advancement of the race has stopped at a point far short of that, which it is capable of attaining. We are practically concerned only with a class of evils, the remedies for which are within our reach, and can be attained without any necessary diminution in the numbers of mankind.

The question respecting the unlimited accumulation of capital, and its probable effects, admits of a similar solution. The natural desire for enjoyments is always sufficient to exhaust the productive power of machines and human agency united, whenever a virtual equality of means removes all check upon the demand, except the satiety that results from continued gratification. But the inordinate aggregation of capital in the hands of a few, limits from necessity the requirements of the larger class, while the luxurious imagination of a Sybarite cannot so far enlarge the demands of the smaller, as to make up the deficiency. Confining our attention to dress, for instance, if ninety-nine out of a hundred are compelled to use only the coarsest and cheapest stuffs, a small portion of their productive agency will suffice to clothe themselves ; the surplus of industry can be employed only in devising and executing the most costly

fabrics to gratify the tasteful and capricious inclinations of the fortunate individual. So it is with articles of food and with all the appurtenances of household luxury and comfort. The wealthy must expend in wanton gratifications what is saved from the forced privations of the poor, or the demand will stop short of the means of supply. Equalize to a greater extent the distribution of wealth, and the retrenchment of unnecessary expenses on the part of the few is far more than compensated by the enlargement of expenditures by the multitude. If each of a hundred individuals wears broadcloth of a moderate fineness, more industry will be employed in manufacture, than if ninety-nine used only the coarsest serge, and the hundredth paraded his delicate person in silks and satins. Of course, we advocate no Agrarian scheme of distribution, the impolicy of which in an Economical point of view, is demonstrable on the simplest principles of the science. The grand problem, which the legislator has to solve, is to diffuse wealth as equally as possible through the community, without infringing in the slightest degree the right of property. The consequence of such infringements must be, not equality of distribution, but universal impoverishment. We contend, that many European institutions favor the inordinate and unnecessary aggregation of capital in a few hands, and perpetuate the social evils, which their political theorists seek in vain to remedy, because they wilfully shut their eyes on the only real cause. We refer particularly to the right of primogeniture and the laws of entail, which are as pernicious in their Economical effects, as they are absurd in morals.

They operate as a clog upon industry, because they remove the most powerful of all incitements to toil,—the hope of improving one's condition in life. Where they exist, the barriers between the several classes in society are so lofty, that though a passage downwards in the ranks is always possible, nothing but the most extraordinary conjuncture of circumstances can ever enable a common laborer to pass up to a higher grade. To maintain his position, to secure a bare subsistence for himself and family, is the only object which he can reasonably keep in view, and he will ordinarily confine his labors to that end. If he can earn in four days what will maintain him through the week, he will be idle the other three. But place before him the hope, founded on the constant fluctuations of wealth that are going on around him, of securing a more ele-

vated position, and the task imposed by necessity is changed into a labor of love. Nature has made ample provision for this effect. Wealth is never stationary, where her laws are not perverted by human institutions. The property of a father is distributed among his children, and subdivided to an indefinite extent by descendants in the third degree. The industry and providence of a family in one generation are counteracted by the folly and spendthriftiness of the next. This is the equality established by nature, in contradistinction from that maintained by theorists, — an equality, not of actual provision, but of opportunities. The right of primogeniture and laws of entail destroy this beneficial arrangement, by removing one class in society from the operation of fear, and depriving the other and larger portion of hope.

In attempting to show what might be made of an American treatise on Political Economy, we have had no captious design of exaggerating the defects of Dr. Wayland's book. By performing all that he proposed to himself to effect, he has done a good work. A lucid and succinct statement of the leading doctrines maintained by the English school of Economists and a clear abstract of the arguments, by which these principles have been supported, leave little to be desired in a text book for the use of colleges and high schools, provided that we consent to adopt the science in that state, in which foreign writers have left it. It appeared to Dr. Wayland, "that the works on this subject, in general use, while they presented its doctrines truly, yet did not present them in such order as would be most likely to render them serviceable either to the general student or to the practical merchant. This defect, for the sake of his pupils, he endeavored to supply." Had he enlarged his purpose, and, besides removing these defects of arrangement, examined many of the maxims with reference to the institutions and circumstances of this country, he would certainly have qualified the terms in which some principles are expressed, and have rejected others as entirely erroneous or inapplicable. The work is not so interesting as the "Wealth of Nations," for the style is rather lucid and correct, than attractive. It wants the terse and pointed manner, and occasional bursts of pure eloquence, which fascinate us in the pages of Adam Smith. This circumstance alone would make us hesitate to prefer this work for use as a text book of instruction. Political Economy needs some borrowed charms of dress, before the study of it can be made

profitable to youthful pupils. If we must adopt English doctrines in every particular, better take them from the fountain head.

While upon the subject of instruction, we may allude to one expedient, by which the immediate usefulness of the study might be increased. The practice, as well as the principles, of trade deserves attention in a treatise designed to recommend the science to popular notice, and to influence directly both the actions and opinions of men. It would be impossible, of course, to explain the operations of commerce to the full extent; but much information might be given incidentally respecting the modes of business, which it concerns all to understand in some measure, though not destined for a commercial life. The practice illustrates the theory of trade, and those examples are most clear and satisfactory, which are drawn from contemporary events. The knowledge, which Adam Smith acquired as a custom-house officer, was essential to the preparation of his great work. In this country, the various transactions connected with banking and bills of exchange deserve notice in a scientific work, both for illustration and comment. Dr. Wayland has adopted this course in some measure, when treating of banks, and the chapters relating to these institutions are among the most valuable parts of his book. The peculiarities of his situation as a literary and scientific man account for the more abstract manner, in which he has written of other topics.

F. B.

---

**ART. IV.** — *Correspondence on the Principles of Right Reasoning applicable to Temperance, and to the Effects of fermented and distilled Liquors; between Samuel M. Hopkins and Gerrit Smith, Rev. Dr. Justin Edwards, and Rev. Dr. Samuel H. Cox; with other Papers and Notes by the Editor.* Part I. Collected and published by SAMUEL M. HOPKINS. Geneva, N. Y.: John C. Merrell, Printer. 1836. 8vo. pp. 112.

THE history of this Correspondence is as follows. An article appeared in the Albany Evening Journal, in which some hard things were said respecting those who refused to adopt the pe-

cular views of the Temperance Reform which were held by the writer. Mr. Weld, the Editor of the Journal, commented upon this article, and mentioned some estimable men who had fallen under the writer's proscription; among whom was Mr. Hopkins, the writer in part, and collector of the "Correspondence." Mr. Hopkins wrote to the editor of the Journal a letter which does not appear in this collection; but from the notice taken of it by Mr. Gerrit Smith, we conclude that it contained some hard sayings about those who disagreed with Mr. Hopkins in reference to temperance measures.

We knew nothing of the collector of this Correspondence till we heard of his book. His death we have noticed since in the public prints, where he is spoken of as a man worthy of the esteem and love of his fellow citizens, both of which he is said to have enjoyed to a very high degree. He certainly writes like a man in earnest; and no one can peruse his letters without being impressed with the deep and vital importance, which he attached to his own views of the best means of promoting the cause of temperance. He excites our sympathy too for himself. He complains in his letters that he had been repeatedly assailed in the Temperance Intelligencer; that he had not had an opportunity of making his real sentiments known to the public through the same medium which had misrepresented them; that his mouth had been stopped in temperance meetings, when he wished to declare and maintain his opinions. If all, or any of this be true, the writer had just reason to complain. But men can see their rights to be infringed when others cannot; and are frequently apt to feel that their own views are worth more than the public are ready to allow them to be. At all events, we doubt whether Mr. Hopkins had not as good an opportunity for advocating his opinions as their importance merited, and whether he had not as much time allowed him in temperance meetings for advocating them as the public thought them worthy of occupying. However this may have been, one thing is certain, Mr. Hopkins has, by the Correspondence which he has published, given the public an opportunity to judge of the correctness and value of his opinions.

As stated on the title page, this Correspondence is made up of letters written by Mr. Hopkins and other gentlemen there mentioned. Mr. Smith opens the correspondence by requesting Mr. Hopkins to discuss with him the points about which Mr. Hopkins was at issue with the Temperance Society. After the



interchange of a few letters, the death of Mr. Smith's only son prevented his continuing the discussion. Mr. Hopkins then writes to Dr. Justin Edwards to engage him to enter the lists. Dr. Edwards declines, and refers Mr. Hopkins for his views to the Permanent Temperance Documents. Then comes a Review of Dr. Washington's letter on the temperance and honesty of the Mahometans. After this follows what may be called the body of the pamphlet. It is an "Essay on the difference in the Effects of fermented and distilled Liquors respectively upon Individuals." Then comes a letter from Dr. Samuel H. Cox to Mr. Hopkins in answer to this question, "Did our Savior, when on earth, really drink the usual wine of Palestine?" Mr. Hopkins replies to the Doctor in some notes. The pamphlet closes with some miscellaneous remarks upon the different kinds of intoxicating drinks used by different nations, and the contents of another pamphlet to be published by Mr. Hopkins. Whether this intended publication has seen the light or not, we do not know. At any rate, we think that Mr. Hopkins's views are pretty fully set forth in the document before us. We shall not attempt to follow the principal writer in his arguments. The facts which he presents, we doubt not, are as correct as most of the facts which are collected for such purposes and in such a manner. But of his reasoning upon those facts we cannot say quite so much.

We will notice what we conceive to be some of the errors of statement and reasoning of Mr. Hopkins, which cannot readily be embodied in what we intend to say of what we conceive to be the true argument upon the subject. "The fundamental delusion, as I suppose it to be, which has led to the perversion and ruin of the temperance cause, is the opinion that all alcoholic liquors are, according to the quantity of alcohol, alike in their effects upon the human system." Such is the statement of Mr. Hopkins. We doubt whether this statement be true. We have never heard such an opinion uttered by the leading men of the temperance reform, neither have we read it in their publications. We may misunderstand the writer; but we suppose from what he says further on, that he means to affirm that the advocates of total abstinence from all intoxicating drinks contend that all of them are hurtful just in proportion to the amount of alcohol contained in them. This we deny. It is contended, and only contended, as the main position, that men are and have been made drunkards upon them. It is

admitted that some are more, some less hurtful, according to the nature of the substances with which the alcohol is mixed.

One other error at the bottom of all Mr Hopkins's reasoning upon this subject is that he reasons from a negative. *He* "never saw one case in his life" where a man was made a "ruined sot" on fermented liquors; therefore there are none or very few. Because the classic writers of antiquity speak little of the intemperance of their times, there was no intemperance among them. We object to such reasoning altogether. Mr. Hopkins contends strenuously for the Baconian rule, — looking to facts. So do we. We ask then, (admitting what Mr. Hopkins says to be true, which we deny,) what occasion had the ancient writers to speak of intemperance oftener than they do? What should we say of that man's reasoning, who should assert that there was no intemperance in the United States, because little or nothing was said about it in the speeches of Webster, Everett, Story, and Sargeant; or in the Commentaries of Kent; or in the poems of Bryant, Dana, Trumbull, and Dwight? Before the temperance measures, which are now in operation, were adopted, we can find but little in all our literature which would lead us to suppose that our nation was emphatically a nation of drunkards; and yet it is true that such was the fact. We shall prove, by and by, that the classic writers are not so silent on this subject as Mr. Hopkins would leave us to suppose.

Mr. Hopkins falls into the same error of reasoning from a negative in reference to foreign countries in modern times. He quotes from travellers who have rode through the countries, and because they have seen no intemperance, he contends that there is none. We will give a few specimens of this kind of evidence. Speaking of France, he says: "An excellent minister who had resided several years in the country, told me [the writer from whom Mr. H. quotes] he had scarcely seen more than three or four cases of drunkenness." He quotes from Mr. Dewey: "In seven months upon the continent of Europe, though living amidst crowds, in taverns, in hotels, and in public houses, I have not seen four intoxicated persons! But I have seen in parks, in gardens, and in public places of resort, millions of persons exhilarated by music, by spectacles, by scenery, by flowers, and fragrance, cheerful without rudeness, and gay without excess." Now for Mr. Hopkins's own testimony. "Twice I was in a collection of probably from one to two

hundred thousand Parisians; one of which was at a public reception of Bonaparte. To my best recollection, I never saw any wine or other liquor sold on those or any other public occasion, nor saw any person drunk in France. I never was drunk in my life, nor saw any person who was on wine; never saw any where any quarrel or serious dispute or offence at table, never saw any case where wine produced habitual intemperance, or ruinous sottishness, nor anything approaching such a state; nor ever heard of any such thing except from the temperance publications of the last two or three years, and from some letters which will appear in the sequel." He says again: "I never saw a drunken person in France, nor heard such mentioned; nor ever saw a tippling house of any kind there." All this proves to our mind one or both of two things, either that Mr. Hopkins had no good opportunity to learn the true condition of the people, or else was a very poor observer. If the statement be true that there are no tippling shops, where do the thirty thousand "Parisians" who died of the cholera become intemperate, as stated in the accounts received from Europe respecting that scourge? We say, then, that all this is negative testimony. We shall soon show that there are men who have seen something very different in wine countries, and what has been seen is very conclusive testimony against what has *not* been seen. What evidence could we adduce of this kind to show that there was no intemperance in Boston or New York? Let us see. We resided three years where we had an opportunity of being in Boston at all the public festivals and gala days. We have seen more than once thirty thousand people on the Common and around it, and we do not recollect to have seen one drunken person, or any liquor sold on these occasions. We do not know of one tippling shop in Boston. So of New York; we have never seen one drunken man in that city. In fact for the last eight years we do not recollect that we have seen half a dozen drunken men. Now we ask, soberly, how much does such evidence prove? Is it worth reciting? We doubt not that what the gentlemen mentioned above give as *their* knowledge—or rather ignorance—of the intemperance of the people where they travelled is true. We object to the kind of evidence altogether. It proves but little, if it prove anything. A person may be so situated as to know but little of the intemperance which is about him.

Another point supported by the same kind of argument we

would dwell upon a moment. Mr. Hopkins denies that wine produces the effects contended for by many of the friends of temperance, because they did not find out the evil sooner. We need only mention this kind of reasoning to our readers to enable them to see the fallacy of it. The evil done by distilled liquors has but just been discovered. Twenty years ago hardly a voice could be heard reprobating its use. Ten years have but just elapsed since the people arose in their might. On the contrary, when distilled liquor first came into use it was as harmless as wine now is. Arnaud de Velleneuve, a chemist and physician, who died about the year 1300, writes: "This water of wine is called by some water of life (*eau de vie*, brandy); and it well deserves the name, since it is truly a water of immortality. Already its virtues begin to be known. It prolongs one's life; it dissipates superfluous and vicious humors; it revives the heart, and perpetuates youth." (!)

Take another specimen of the recommendation of distilled liquor from Theoricus, as stated in Holinshed's Chronicles, published in the sixteenth century. He says: "It sloweth age, it strengtheneth youth, it helpeth digestion, it cutteth flegme, it abandoneth melancholie, it relisheth the heart, it lighteneth the mind, it quickeneth the spirits, it cureth the hydropsia, *it keepeth and preserveth the head from whirling* (!), the eyes from dazzling, *the tongue from lispings* (!), the mouth from snaffling, the teeth from chattering, and the throat from rattling." These, we should think, were virtues enough; but the writer continues: "it keepeth the weasan from stiffling, the stomach from wambeling, and the heart from swelling; — it keepeth the hands from shivering, the sinews from shrinking, the veins from crumbling, the bones from aching, and the marrow from soaking." What more can be said of the virtues of wine? and many, nay most of these virtues have been ascribed to distilled liquor till within a few years. We object entirely to Mr. Hopkins's conclusion, that wine is harmless because its evil effects have just been discovered, — or, more correctly, just been made known.

Mr. Hopkins argues at great length that just in proportion as wine and fermented liquors have been the free beverage of any people, in that proportion have they been a temperate people. And he adduces, as he thinks, proofs of this position. Bring up the child on wine; let him have as much as he wishes of it, and he never will be a drunkard, never will form vicious habits; but deprive the child of it; bring him up in habits of

abstinence, and when he comes to be a man, and can obtain it, then he will become a sot. Where Mr. Hopkins finds proof of this in the facts which he gives us, we do not see. We contend that there are drunkards in wine-drinking countries, where wine is as free as water; and we will prove it before we are done. He names, it is true, one hundred and eighty families where the experiment had been true; wine had been freely used from childhood. And "as far as he could now learn" (did he learn all about it?) "out of the thousand of whom he *supposed*" (we italicise this word as we wish it to be noted, that we may judge of the accuracy with which Mr. Hopkins collected his facts, as he says much about the "*vague* statements" of others) — he *supposed* "these families were composed, only "twenty were habitually intemperate." Now we do not say a word about the imperfect manner in which this table of statistics is got up. We admit all Mr. Hopkins has said, and we ask the heads of one hundred and eighty families, one hundred and eighty fathers and mothers, who love their children as they love their own souls, if they are willing that "*twenty-two only*" of their offspring should be "*habitually intemperate!*" Look upon the open brow of that sweet boy and tell us, father, if thou art willing that the cloud of "habitual intoxication" should gather there! Let it be that "only" one in fifty would be a drunkard, an "habitual drunkard," by such a regimen as Mr. Hopkins proposes, and in this city, we should have sixteen hundred; in Massachusetts, twelve thousand; in New York, forty thousand; in the United States *three hundred thousand!* "habitually intemperate"!! and this is the result of an argument going to prove that the free use of wine never produces intemperate men! This is the result of an argument drawn up to prove that wine-drinking is no evil! If the evil be no greater than Mr. Hopkins contends, what cause have the friends of temperance to rejoice that they have advanced?

There are a number of other points maintained in this Correspondence, with pretty much the same kind of arguments, which we must pass over in silence, as we wish to give our views in a connected manner; and we can then answer the main points which Mr. Hopkins makes, to better purpose than we now can. One point more will be remarked upon. Much fault is found with some of the friends of temperance for advancing from the ground first occupied. Now the propriety or impropriety of this advance depends upon the question, whether

the first thought be as good as the last, whether the first ground taken be the true ground, or all the ground, and not whether it be the old ground. There is no harm in going forward, if that be the way to go.

We proceed, then, to a more general consideration of the question agitated by this "Correspondence," and shall attempt to state what the true object of the temperance reform is, or ought to be; and endeavor to show that fermented drinks are dangerous to the interests both of individuals and society.

We say, then, that the object of the Temperance Reform is, or ought to be, to free the world from drunkenness, to hinder men from putting out the light of Heaven which shines in their eyes, and warms in their hearts. It is not, ultimately, to put a stop to the use of this or that drink; it is to put a stop to the use of any, and all drinks, which produce intoxication, whatever they may be, however dearly they may be cherished. We make no distinction here. We have but one question to ask, as temperance men, respecting any drink; and this is, Does it intoxicate? are men made drunkards by its use? It matters not to us, whether it be "good old rum," or New England, hot from the "worm." We care little whether it be fermented or distilled, imported or domestic, whether it be honored with a cut glass decanter, or a pine canteen, whether those who become intoxicated upon it are found by the watch in the gutter, or by the physician upon a bed of down. The simple and only question which we have to ask is, Do these articles intoxicate? Let this be answered in the affirmative, and they are on the list of proscribed articles. We care not on what you have intoxicated — made a beast of our son. It is no consolation to us to know that he has become drunk upon Champagne rather than whisky. Drunkenness is drunkenness, and intoxication is intoxication, let them come from what quarter they may. Ask the wife who suffers the brutality of a drunken husband, whether the blows fall lighter when his brain is heated with rum, or when the fire which boils his blood is kindled by bottles of good old Madeira? Go to the children who tremble at the approach of him whom God intended to be their protector, and ask them whether the blow wounds less deeply when he comes from the alehouse than when he comes from the distillery? Is drunkenness less an evil because the inebriate is a wine-drinker? It is plain that all such distinctions are of no use. They are worse than useless. They sanctify one kind, or

means of drunkenness, while they condemn another. It is fit and proper, then, that we have distinct views upon this subject. The object of the temperance reform is to banish intemperance from the earth. Can this be done without proscribing all intoxicating drinks? Let us ascertain the true answer to this question. We say that we cannot. We say that other, besides distilled liquors, are evil and to be abandoned. Our argument is with those who oppose the use of distilled liquors in any degree, and have *pledged* themselves to refrain from their use. We start from common ground with the man who contends for the use of fermented drinks, and opposes the use of distilled drinks. In our remarks, we shall confine ourselves principally to the use of wines, as those constitute the principal point of attack and defence at the present time.

He, who advocates the use of wine while he opposes the use of distilled liquor, does it on one or all of the three following grounds, namely, That wine is harmless in itself, and a useful beverage : or, that its abuse is induced by the occasional use of more exciting drinks, as distilled liquor : or, that its injurious effects are so slight that a combined effort, or an effort of any kind, to bring it into disuse is inexpedient.

First, it is said that "wine is harmless in itself, and a useful beverage." We are sensible that to many readers an attempt to confute this declaration will appear a work of supererogation. It is not, however, so. Many have recently advanced and strenuously supported it, — men, too, who are not in the habit of maintaining opinions without good reasons, and whose opinions have, and ought to have, great weight in the community. That our statement of this matter may not appear too strong, we will say that we have heard this opinion advocated within two years, in public meetings, by professors of colleges, by a judge of one of our courts, and by not a few clergymen of deservedly high reputation. Such being the character and station of the men who maintain the doctrine, we think that an examination of its correctness is imperiously demanded.

But to return to the proposition. The persons with whom we reason admit that alcohol is injurious ; at least that distilled alcohol is. The questions then to be considered in relation to wines and other fermented liquors are, Is there any alcohol in them? and, if so, whether its combination with other ingredients which are contained in them prevents its injurious effects?

Is there alcohol in wines, and other fermented liquors? Mr. Brande published two Essays in the Philosophical Transactions of 1811 and 1813, in which he demonstrated "that alcohol exists ready formed in wine." Many, at the present day, suppose that alcohol is formed by distillation, — that before heat is applied to fermented liquor no alcohol exists. This was the common opinion of chemists before Mr. Brande settled the question by his experiments, which have since been fully confirmed by Gay Lussac, and it is now one of the established facts of chemical science. Fermentation, and fermentation *alone*, produces alcohol; distillation only separates it from the water and vegetable substances with which it was mixed. We say *mixed*, for it is an equally well established fact that it exists in a pure, uncombined state; its connexion with the other ingredients is mechanical, not chemical.

It being clear, then, that alcohol is contained in fermented liquors, let us proceed to consider how great a quantity is contained in them. We will first take wine, the unenforced juice of the grape after fermentation. In passing we would remark, that adding brandy to wine to prevent its damaging is called enforcing it. By unenforced wine, we mean wine to which no brandy has been added. To make the subject plain to all, we shall change the per-centage into pints, and state the number of pints of pure alcohol which are contained in one hundred pints of wine. In order also that we may better understand how the quantity of alcohol which is contained in distilled liquors, compared with that which is contained in fermented ones, we will state that one hundred pints of rum, brandy, gin, or whisky, contain from fifty to fifty-four pints of alcohol; or two gallons of rum contain one gallon and a fraction of pure alcohol. Here it is to be noticed that distilled liquor is very far from being pure alcohol; much water remains mixed with it. Pure alcohol could not be swallowed. Distilled liquor, then, is one half alcohol. Now for wines. The stronger wines, Lissa, Rasin, Marsala, Port, Madeira, Sherry, Teneriffe, Constantia, Malaga, Bucellas, Calcavella, and Vidonia, contain from eighteen to twenty-five pints of pure alcohol to every hundred pints of wine; or four gallons of wine contain one gallon of alcohol. Thus a man who drinks one pint of New England rum drinks half a pint of alcohol, while a man who drinks a pint of any of the stronger wines drinks a gill of alcohol, or half as much as the rum drinker.



The weaker wines, as Claret, Sauterne, Burgundy, Hock, Champagne, Hermitage, and Gooseberry, contain from twelve to seventeen pints of pure alcohol to one hundred pints of wine, or a pint of alcohol to six pints of wine. We have thus far considered pure wines, the real, unenforced juice of the grape. This, however, is rare among us. Henderson, in his "History of Ancient and Modern Wines," gives a table differing slightly from Mr. Brande's in respect to a few of the wines mentioned above; not enough, however, to vary materially the conclusion. If we now make a due allowance for the quantity of distilled liquor of one kind and another which is mingled with our wines, we shall be compelled to add considerable to the quantity of alcohol determined above. We omit it, however; we take the result as it is; saying nothing about the brandy which is usually added, we find in all wines a large quantity of alcohol, a third or a half as much as in rum.

So much for wines. We now come to what are *called* wines; we mean the vile compounds which are made up by our own dealers, and palmed off upon the ignorant (and upon the *amateur* sometimes) as the juice of the grape, when in many cases not a drop of the juice of the grape enters into their composition; and when any is found in them, it is comparatively of no consequence. These wines constitute a large proportion of the wines drunk in the country; perhaps we may say half with safety. Before proceeding to accuse our own countrymen of both adulterating and making wines we would say one word upon the character of imported wine. Very little of this is pure. Various ingredients are mixed with the juice of the grape to give it flavor and color, and in most cases, large quantities of brandy to preserve it fresh and lively. Besides, we by no means think that those, who will deceive the public with home made wines, will be over scrupulous to render their deception more perfect by importing wines which have but very little claim to that name. The ingredients used to give wine its flavor and color are various. Many of them are unknown. But we do know that the flavor is often generated by the application of bitter almonds, oak chips, orris root, wormwood; while its color is produced by the use of dye wood, berries, oak chips, burnt sugar, iron, &c. If any one wishes for further information upon the nature of the composition of imported wines, and the manner in which they are manufactured, let him consult Henderson's work mentioned above.

We wish to make a remark or two, before we leave this point, upon the amount and nature of wines which are manufactured without any, or but little, of the juice of the grape in their composition. As long ago as the time of Mr. Addison there was occasion for him to complain of a certain fraternity of chemical operators who, by the power of magical drugs and incantations, raised under the streets of London the choicest products of the hills and valleys of France. "They can," says he, "turn a plantation of Northern hedges into a vineyard, they can squeeze Bourdeaux out of a sloe, and drain Champagne from an apple." "I suppose," says Dr. Palfrey, to whom we are indebted for the above extract, "that the vineyards which yield the Marsala grape do not produce more wine in one year than is drunk under that name during the same period in our Metropolis alone." A dealer in wines in the interior of the state declares that he has manufactured a large portion of the wines which he has sold. We will transcribe a few recipes that our readers may know how easily wines are made, and what their composition is, and thus understand what they are doing when they "crack" a bottle of Champagne or good "Old Port." We shall quote from Accum's treatise on the "Adulteration of Wines," published in England long before what is now technically called the Wine Question was agitated.

"*Port Wine.* — Take of good cider, four gallons ; of juice of red beet root, two quarts ; brandy, two quarts ; log wood, four ounces ; shatany root, bruised, half a pound. First infuse the shatany root and logwood in brandy and a gallon of cider for one week, then strain off the liquor, and mix it with the other ingredients ; keep it in a cask for a month, when it will be fit to bottle." Not a drop of the juice of the grape is here used. Take another : "*Champagne.* — Take of white sugar, eight pounds ; the whitest brown sugar, seven pounds ; crystalline lemon acid, or tartaric acid, one ounce and a quarter ; pure water, eight gallons ; white grape wine, two quarts ; and three pints of French brandy. By adding one pound of fresh or preserved strawberries, and two ounces of powdered cochineal, the *pink* Champagne may be made."

"*Another kind of Port.* — Take good cider, thirty-six gallons ; elder wine, eleven gallons ; brandy, five gallons ; rasin wine, eleven gallons. Mix."

We forbear quoting farther. If we have excited the curiosi-

ty of one mind to examine into this subject, we have obtained our object. All wines, then, whether domestic or imported, pure or enforced, contain large quantities of alcohol, pure alcohol. Wines cannot be harmless then on the ground that they contain no alcohol. The same may be said of all fermented liquors, cider, ale, porter, &c., though the quantity of alcohol contained in some of them is very small. Good cider, however, contains one fifth as much alcohol as brandy.

We are now ready to consider whether the combination, — or mixture we should rather say, — of alcohol with other ingredients prevents its injurious effects? This question can be decided in one or both of two ways; either by the nature, or observed effects of the composition. Let us glance at both.

Does the *nature* of the mixture prevent the alcohol from producing injurious effects upon the system? It is argued by some that wine is digested, that it enters into, and makes a part of our system. Wine, say they, is digested. This expression is equivocal. How much of it, and what part of it is digested? Is the *alcohol* which is in wine digested? This is the real question. No one in his senses who knows anything upon this subject will deny, that many of the vegetable ingredients contained in wine are made use of by the system. The sugar and nutmeg in a mug of sling are digested, and so is the milk in a bowl of milk punch. But who does not know that the alcohol which enters into their composition is not digested? We do not intend to say that a certain infinitesimal part may not be decomposed, perhaps it is; but we do mean to say that the portion is so small, that we shall not fear being charged with inexactness when we say, that none is digested. We have often read that wine is digested. We know that many minds are led astray by the statement. It is a loose expression, and very liable to be misunderstood. We repeat it, then, the alcohol in wine is *not digested*. It does not enter into the system as a component part of it. We go farther than this; we say that there is more nourishment to the system, more ingredients digested in a mug of well made toddy, or a bowl of milk punch, than in the same quantity of any kind of wine. The sugar in the one, and the milk in the other, furnish much that is nutritive to the system. Yet those with whom we argue contend that these drinks are injurious, and ought to be dispensed with. We admit that the compositions which we have cited are not, in every respect, similar to wine. We did

not bring them forward because we supposed they were. Our object was to show that it by no means follows that, because there are nutritious substances with the alcohol, therefore the alcohol is digested, or at least, harmless. The ingredients composing mixed liquors are not permitted to stand long enough to become so closely combined as the component parts of wine are, and the alcohol is thus enabled to operate more readily. The alcohol, however, in both cases remains pure, and is thus taken into the system; and its only effect is to employ the system in separating it from the nutritious substances, and throwing it off into the atmosphere, or stowing it away in some refuse house, where it will ere long show itself in the gout, or brain fever, or dropsy in the head, or delirium tremens. Alcohol is not, cannot, — let it be mixed with what it may, — be received into the system as nutriment; it is carried off by the million of safety-valves which a good Providence has placed all over our bodies.

These views we are confident will be disputed by none who have been conversant with the lecture rooms of chemists and physiologists. That distilled alcohol produces intoxication quicker, and more powerfully than fermented liquors, is attributable to the fact, that it has a better opportunity to exert its power. Pure alcohol, when taken into the empty stomach, is not so readily thrown off, as when it is combined with something digestible which excites the organs to action, and thus causes the pernicious substance to be driven away. All fermented liquors contain more or less of such digestible substances, and hence the alcohol which they contain is less injurious, as the scavengers of the frame are immediately set to work to remove it. If you take a gill of brandy, and grate into it a quantity of sugar and nutmeg, and let it stand a long time it will be less intoxicating than if drank immediately, for the very simple reason, that the nutritious substances become so completely united with the alcohol that they assist in carrying it off. Hence it is that alcohol produces intoxication much quicker when taken upon an empty stomach, than otherwise. There is true philosophy in the conduct of the old toper who loves the taste of raw rum, as he calls it, that is, of rum unmixed, when he eats awhile and then drinks in order to prevent intoxication. But we have some authority upon this point. The Council of the Massachusetts Temperance Society say that "wine in its moderate use is in no sense necessary for the young in health, and

even in such use it is *always injurious* to them." "It gives new force to the passions, diminishes the power of self-control, and by its exhilarating effects, *natural* to it, invites *directly* to excess." "The balance of the powers will be disturbed by it, and he is placed at once in circumstances *hazardous* alike to his moral and physical good." "The use of wine is not necessary to the adult, in health, even in its moderate use." And the cases are not rare, — so say the first medical men in the country, — where its supposed beneficial effects to the invalid have been found groundless. So much for the argument derived from the nature of wine, to prove that the alcohol which is contained in it is not harmless, and to confute the opinion that it is digested.

We now proceed to inquire of observed facts, whether the alcohol in wine is harmless. This we consider the strong ground. Whether there be alcohol in wine or not, whether it be digested or not, of one thing we are sure, men are made drunk by its use. The voice of blighted hopes, ruined expectations, and premature death comes up to us from hundreds of dwellings, proclaiming the truth for which we contend. We are confident that most of the drunkenness in our literary communities is produced by the use of wine. We have not been so long from the halls of college as to have forgotten many scenes which we there witnessed. And we are not alone. Others have seen the same thing. Dr. Pierce of Brookline, than whom no one is more remarkable for his statistical information, thus writes: "With respect to the University, [Harvard] whose history I have studied with no ordinary interest for more than fifty years, my conviction is strong that the great enemy of temperance there, the source of most of its riots and insubordination, and of habits of drunkenness, contracted in after life, is the convivial use of wine. At this University wine is the all-absorbing stimulus of modern times." Dr. Bates, President of Middlebury College, says, that "In the higher circles wine is the *chief* cause of drunkenness, that a pledge to abstain from the use of ardent spirit was *worse than useless* in the college," that "many, who had indulged in the use of wine, formed inveterate habits of intemperance." Captain Amos Pillsbury, late Warden of the New Hampshire and Connecticut State Prisons, says even: "It is my deliberate opinion, after careful observation, that more men, who become drunkards, in many parts of New England, form their first appetite for stimu-

lating drinks by the use of *cider*, than by the use of rum." We have thus, we think, fully confuted the first position taken by the advocate of wine, and opposer of distilled liquor, namely, that wine is harmless in itself, and a useful beverage.

We are now ready to consider the second position taken by the advocates of wine drinking, which is, "That the abuse of wine is occasioned by the use of more intoxicating drinks, as distilled liquors." This position must be tested by a view of the nature of the case, and by an appeal to facts. We think that a view of the nature of the case plainly makes against our opponents. The coats of the stomach become, in a measure, insensible to alcohol after it has been used a long time, and demand more exciting stimulants; so that a real drinker not only will not dilute raw rum with water or sugar, but will add to it cayenne and red peppers, to make it more exciting. Now it would appear very strange that a man, whose system was in this condition, should change to the use of weaker drinks, as wine, cider, and beer. The regular progress is from the weaker to the stronger, and not from the stronger to the weaker. The man, whose nerves are proof against the effects of whisky, uses corrosive sublimate, he does not drink cider and wine. The nature of the case, then, would lead us to suppose that the lighter drinks would beget a taste for the stronger, and not the stronger for the lighter.

But let us look to facts. We have already quoted some remarks of the Council of the Massachusetts Temperance Society. We repeat one of them, bearing directly upon this point. "It," (that is, wine in its *moderate* use) "by its exhilarating effects *natural* to it, *invites directly to excess*." What say the presidents of our colleges upon this point? Call to mind our quotations from the letters of Dr. Pierce and President Bates. Hear also the opinion of the President of the Massachusetts Temperance Society, Dr. J. C. Warren. "The idea," says he, "that wine does not form intemperate appetites is *not* correct, for I have visited this evening a young man of respectable family who must die this night, and his intemperate appetite was formed *entirely* by the use of wine, and I warned him of his danger when I first discovered his habit, but he disregarded me, *and he is now dying a brandy drunkard!*" We have already given the result of Mr. Pillsbury's observation. It is said by Mr. Hopkins and others, that the moderate and habitual use of ardent spirits *necessarily* produces drunk-

ards, and that the same use of other articles has no such effect. This is not true. We know of men who have been in the habit of taking their brandy or rum regularly, who are not drunkards; many such have died temperate drinkers. Many a clergyman, in days of yore, of sober habits, has been a regular drinker of spirits. It is not true that ALL who have habitually used rum have been drunkards; far, very far from it. Many such have lived and died temperate drinkers. We believe that the same is true of wine drinkers. Not every man who has his bottle of wine on his dinner table becomes, or is, in any proper sense of the word, a drunkard. We only contend that his habits are such as expose him to the formation of appetites which he will find it difficult, if not impossible, to control. Mr. Hopkins's list before noticed furnishes ample proof of this in wine-drinking families.

But let us attempt to settle this point more definitely, for it is an important one. We will pay a short visit to wine countries, and see what report they bring us. France has drunkards as well as we. But we are told that the French do not become intoxicated on their wine; at least that they do not form their intemperate appetites by the use of it, but by the use of brandy. The use of distilled liquor in this country we know invalidates our argument to a certain extent. But we know also that those who have had the best means of observing that, and other countries of a like character, state the matter quite differently. We recollect hearing Professor H. Ware, jr. state at a Temperance meeting, that when, in conversation with an eminent physician in Switzerland upon the subject of temperance, he observed that it was thought by many friends of the cause in our country that if we could introduce the grape we should escape, in a degree, the evil of intemperance; the physician replied, "Do not do it; your countrymen are mistaken about the matter; our people here become drunkards on their wines." Tobias Smollet, in his "Travels through France and Italy," 1776, says, "whoever drinks wine is smaller than others; they are more healthy when wine is scarce. The longer I live I am more convinced that wine and all fermented liquors are pernicious to the human constitution." G. de F., in his correspondence with the "New York Observer," writes thus from France. "Formerly this country contained multitudes of persons addicted to drunkenness. I have often been witness, while I lived in Switzerland, ten or twelve years ago, of the excessive

drinking of the Vaudese; and it is common in France to say of a drunkard, He drinks like a Swiss." New York Observer, Dec. 9, 1837. Another gentleman, writing from Lausainne, Canton de Vaud, says: "In this Canton, whatever it may be in other Cantons, those who are habitual drunkards have become such by the use of wine, made of their native grape, and to which there has been no distilled spirit added." The same remarks apply to Italy. A writer from Smyrna states that when he resided in the island of Malta, where the common Sicilian wine is plentiful and cheap, the most disastrous effects were produced by it. "Nothing," says he, "is more common than to see both soldiers and sailors staggering through the streets under the influence of intoxication, and this, in a majority of cases, produced by wine." William J. Shauffleais' Letter from Constantinople, January 9, 1837, says, "It has often been said in America that pure wine did not produce an artificial appetite for more, as distilled liquor. This is *certainly incorrect*; it does produce it. There are multitudes of drunkards in Russia and Germany, and probably here too, who get drunk on wine, *pure wine only*."

Here, perhaps, it may be said that brandy has been used, and that the appetite was formed upon this, and not upon wine, as the writers testify. Let us go to Persia then. A writer from that country in answer to the question, "What are the principal means of intoxication?" says, "The intoxicating article most used here is the wine of the country, which is very abundant. Another article considerably used is Arrack, Asiatic brandy, distilled from dried grapes, or from the residue of strength in grapes after the wine is extracted. Some persons who have just arrived here were preceded but one week by a caravan, having, among other poisons of the same kind, *eighteen barrels of New England Rum!*" Perhaps it will now be objected to Persia as a witness, that there, also, they have that luxury, New England rum, to vitiate their appetites. We will not dispute the point. We prefer to have the whole truth on our side. We throw down our weapons, therefore, and retreat as fast as possible to the days when distilled liquor was not known. If we find drunkards then, and "habitual drunkards" too, we presume it will be granted to us, that fermented liquors *do* create intemperate habits.

Cicero speaks of the loungers about the wine shops; and Salust, in his history of Catiline's conspiracy, does not speak in



very flattering terms of the temperate habits of his followers. Horace owns that he, sometimes at least, was heady, and Juvenal intimates, not unfrequently, that he knew from observation, at least, what an intemperate man was. No drunkenness at Rome! No drunkards produced by the use of fermented liquor! Why so monstrous was the drunkenness and consequent licentiousness of the Bacchanalia at Rome, that the consuls, Sp. Posthumius Albinus and Q. Martius Phillippus, had a committee chosen to report upon the subject, and the drunken festival was put down by a decree of the Senate, B. C. 187, a thousand years before distilled alcohol was known. What formed these appetites? Pliny says, in his Natural History, at the close of his treatise on wine, "We purchase, at the greatest pains and expense, a liquor [wine] which deprives man of his reason, renders him furious, and is the cause of an infinite variety of crimes." "Some cannot wait to reach their couch, on first quitting the bath, nor even to put on their tunics; but, naked and panting as they are, rush eagerly upon great pitchers of wine, which they drain to the bottom.\* \* \* Thence arise their paleness, their pendulous cheeks, their ulcerated eyes, their trembling hands, incapable of holding a full glass without spilling a portion of its contents."\* Prideaux says, the reason why Mahomet forbade the use of wine was because he feared the stability of his kingdom would be shaken by the drunkenness of his subjects on that drink. Every schoolboy knows that Cyrus would not taste of the wine which he handed to Astyages, because he perceived all their "heads were turned who had drunk of it. They sung, made a noise, and talked they did not know what; and when they danced they could not stand on their legs." Plato seems to have understood the effects of bringing up children on wine better than Mr. Hopkins, if we may judge from what is plainly implied where he says: "Shall we not ordain by law," he writes, "in the first place, that *boys* shall not, on any account, taste *wine*, till they are *eighteen* years of age? In the next place, we should inform them that wine is to be used moderately till they are *thirty years* old; but when they have attained the *fortieth year* then they may attend feasts." Paul says of the Corinthians that when they met to celebrate the supper, one was hungry and another drunken.

---

\* We are indebted for this and some other extracts to L. M. Sargent Esq's. Letters to Bishop Hopkins.

He says to Timothy that a bishop must not be *given* to wine. And it would seem to be a natural inference from the repetition of the same command to Titus, that some men even then were "habitual drinkers." But enough; everybody knows, who is conversant with antiquity, that drunkenness was a common vice in the early period of history, and the Bible gives a sad account of the morals of Judea in this respect.

We are driven therefore by the stubborn testimony of facts to the conclusion that, if distilled liquors were banished from the earth, men now, as they have done heretofore, would become intoxicated on fermented liquors, and that these would be probably used even more than they now are. Distilled liquors are not, then, the only cause of drunkenness, and we could not hope for safety from this terrible evil while fermented liquors were "freely" used. Intemperate habits and appetites are formed on fermented liquors, as well as on distilled liquors. The second position, therefore, which the wine-drinker maintains is shaken.

We now come to examine the last ground on which the advocate of wine-drinking attempts to stand; which is, "that the injurious effects of wine are so slight, that a combined effort, or an effort of any kind, to bring it into disuse is inexpedient." The facts which we shall adduce under this head will corroborate a hint we gave in the closing paragraph of the last division, that the use of fermented liquors will increase, as we give up the use of distilled ones. The quantity of wine imported into the country increases vastly faster than the population. The year 1832 gave an increase of 2,000,000 gallons over any former year. In that year there were 5,000,000 gallons imported; and how much base stuff was manufactured on our own shores, and palmed off upon the public under the name of wine, we know not. We wish we did. One thing, however, we do know, that many men, who have given up the use of distilled spirits altogether, are often immoderately excited by fermented liquors. In fact we believe it to be conceded by the wine-drinker, that there is no safety for a reformed drunkard but in total abstinence from all that can intoxicate. We therefore wave this point.

In colleges the intoxication produced by wine is more alarming than those who have not interested themselves in this part of the subject imagine; and we are happy to know that most of them have societies which adopt the principle of total absti-

nence from all which can intoxicate. We have already quoted authorities upon this subject in the former part of our article. We all know that wine is one great cause of forming depraved appetites in the higher circles of society. We shall not relate any instances of this kind which have come under our observation. It is unnecessary. All know this to be true without such evidence. Each one's own observation has furnished him with proof of this point. We all know also, that wine is the beverage which flows round the social board. Parties of young persons, who have met for social purposes, not unfrequently are much excited by sparkling Champagne, which is placed upon the table to enliven their spirits, and give a fresher glow to their feelings. Habits are very often formed at such places which one carries through life. Hume speaks of very important measures carried by Cromwell when his "council were heated with wine." In every party of pleasure, in every gathering of men of business, in the halls of legislation, at the seat of justice, at the bar, and the altar, all suffer, or have suffered, more or less, from the use of wine. Clergymen and lawyers, judges and legislators, physicians and philosophers could be called upon to testify to the evil of wine-drinking. We do not think it necessary to introduce their testimony; they are among the bright lights of the nation. Philosophers, as Silliman and Hitchcock; statesmen, as Frelinghuysen and Lowrie; military men, as Commodore Porter and Secretary Cass; physicians, as Drs. Warren and Sewell; judges, as Chief Justice Parker and Justice Hall of Delaware; presidents of colleges and theological institutions, as Drs. Humphrey, Porter, Bates, Drs. Woods, Edwards, and Miller. These are good and learned men who agree with us upon this subject. We are not ashamed of our company. We have philosophers who can analyze, and physicians who can apply substances, and they agree with us. We have men who have been round the world and noticed the effects of intoxicating drinks beneath the poles and under the tropics, on the sea and on the land, among Christians, Pagans, and Mahometans, upon rich and poor, old and young, bond and free, and they agree with us. Commodore Porter says: "I can safely declare that I know of *no intoxicating substance whatever*, however used, except as a medicine, but what is *injurious* to the health and intellect of those who are in the habit of taking it; and I conceive that the discontinuance of the use of them throughout the world would be a great benefit."

Such is a very imperfect and brief view of the evils which the world has witnessed from the use of intoxicating drinks. We ask our readers now to look back to Mr. Hopkins's own estimate of those who are made "habitually intemperate" on wine, to add force to our own faint sketch, and we think they will be led to conclude, that those friends of temperance, who plead for the disuse of fermented liquors, are neither mistaken nor fanatical in their views. We have not quoted the names above as conclusive proof that we are right. Far from it. We only adduce them to show that inquiring, philosophic minds have come to the same conclusion as ourselves. If what we have offered be correct, the advocates of wine-drinking are driven from their third and last ground. Its effects are sufficiently extensive and harmful to warrant the friends of sobriety in the use of means to prevent its continuance and spread.

We now propose to consider a few of the objections to temperance measures in reference to fermented drinks. It is said that entire abstinence from wine is not proper, as it is one of God's own gifts to men. So are Henbane and Ivy God's own gift, as much as the grape; but who contends that they were made to eat? Indeed wine is no more God's work than rum is. Men are compelled to extract the juice of the grape and place it in a situation favorable for fermentation; so in distilling you only put a fire under the fermented liquor to produce a further separation; but in the latter operation there is nothing more merely human than in the former. We say that wine is no more a "creature" of God than brandy. We are surprised to hear such changes rung upon this point, and especially by those who ought to know better. It is the quarter from which it comes, and not its importance, which compels us to notice it.

The argument, too, that the extension of the pledge destroys its efficiency, has but little more force to our minds. The object of the friends of temperance has been stated. It is to prevent drunkenness. This can only be done, as we have already proved, by putting a stop to the use of those drinks which intoxicate. Wine is one of those articles; wine must therefore be proscribed. We are no more in favor of having men move in masses, and act in bodies by mere clapping of hands and shouting, than any one; but we see not how men can clap and shout as they move on in solid phalanx, with spears glittering, and shields blazing, and plumes nodding, against distilled liquors, and at the same time "reprove, rebuke, and exhort,"

with anything but "long suffering" and kindness, those who are moving in close files against fermented liquors. The objection cannot be founded upon the means used; it is founded upon different views of the character of the enemy warred against. And we hope that we have given satisfactory evidence in our previous remarks, that it makes but little difference which you look upon "when it is red," the wine or the brandy.

Again, we can see that there may be some radical doubt, in the mind of the man who says he will give up his bitters if we will give up our wine, whether the statements which we make are really true or not. He knows that men can, and very often do, become intoxicated on wine. He cannot believe, therefore, that there is that difference in the intoxicating liquor drunk, which the temperance advocates declare; and he is led to distrust all their reasoning. We have, however, in most instances, no faith in the sincerity of the men who make the plea. One thing, however, is sure; it cannot be made when total abstinence from all alcoholic drinks is practised. On this point, the opinion of the late Chief Justice Parker is worthy of being quoted. "The poor man," says the Chief Justice, "when urged to refrain, is *apt* to retort, 'Why, if we could afford to drink wine as you do, we would not certainly drink rum; but we must have something as well as you, and rum is the cheapest thing we can get at.' It is *necessary*," continues the learned Chief Justice, "*to show such people that there is no need of any stimulants.*" Mark that he says it is "*necessary*" to do this. Temperance lecturers, who are supposed to know something of the obstacles in the way of banishing distilled liquor from the hovels of the poor, say, without a dissenting voice, that the use of other and more expensive drinks in the higher classes of society is one of the chief obstacles. We quote this as a matter of fact; not in justification of the course of any one who makes this plea; that is unjustifiable. And we state the fact because it is disputed by some who should be better informed. Now we contend that the use of all alcoholic drinks is injurious, and therefore we infer that all who use them ought to relinquish them on *that* ground, if on no other. But in addition to this, we say, that they will remove a stumbling-block from the minds of weaker brethren, which is far from being an inconsiderable object to a good man.

But allowing the use of alcoholic drinks to be an innocent luxury, and harmless in itself, which we do not allow for a mo-

ment but for argument's sake, we contend that it would be an honor and a virtue in one to forego their use, if by so doing he could save one man from ruin. There are a thousand changes rung on the theme, that we are not compelled to give up the use of a good thing, because others abuse it. In some cases this is doubtless true. We shall not attempt to specify them. It is not to our purpose. It is sufficient for us to show that it sometimes is our duty, and should be our happiness, to do so. So thought Paul: "If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no more meat while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend." We are to suffer for the good of others. We are to care for their interests, and strive to support them in their weakness. We presume the cases would be rare when a man would be compelled to starve himself because his neighbors were gluttons, or perish with thirst because his companions were drunkards; but we do think that he is bound to make a sacrifice of any innocent, harmless luxury, for their good; we think a good man would feel a real pleasure in doing it. But we do not rest our argument on this ground principally. We repeat the fact proved before, *alcoholic drinks are injurious, and the habitual use of them is attended with PERIL.* If, then, it is our duty to abstain wholly from that whose habitual use is evil, we must abstain from wine.

We are sorry to see so much bitterness between the friends of temperance who disagree upon this subject. We are not sure that the combatants of either party have much to boast of in point of kindness, charity, and forbearance. God forbid that we should reproach the wine-drinker as being a determined opposer of the temperance cause. He intends no such thing. We will be first and strongest to defend him from such an imputation; at least, we will exert all the strength we have. Many, we believe most, who fill the social glass, do not see the evil of so doing. And those, who do, seem not to perceive the true bearing of their course upon the cause they would fain promote. We are all weak enough; we all have foibles and sins enough. It is not best for us to spend our time and strength in throwing stones at each other. We believe that in many places the introduction of wine into the pledge is entirely unnecessary, for the simple reason that no wine is drunk there. In colleges, academies, law schools, and theological schools, in villages of much size, and in cities, we believe it both proper and necessary to have the pledge extended. We are no sworn

foes of those who disagree with us ; and yet we do feel that we have most of the truth on our side. We pray for the rapid approach of that day, when our social circles can meet and disperse without partaking of intoxicating drinks. We do not believe that what a learned foreigner remarked of us is true, " That we are so stupid that we need wine to make us sociable and agreeable." But if we did we should say, let us be stupid, if we can be merry only upon the fumes of wine ; let us be mute, if we must speak only under the influence of alcohol ; let the heart be cold, if cold it must be, unless warmed by that fire which destroys as it excites. Give us interest excited by the force of TRUTH, and not passion inflamed by WINE.

We have no desire to render any harmless luxury unpopular. We are, if not fond of luxuries, no enemy to them. But we see not how our friends can say that we have no *right* to render the use of wine unpopular, when they are striving with all their might to make it a breach of good manners to drink ardent spirits. Is it said, that the latter is productive of harm ? We have proved the same of the former. We do not say that it is equally harmful, but we say, without fear of being contradicted, that it *is* harmful, and that the world would be better without it, than with it, as it is at present used. We acknowledge that the great cause of intemperate habits with us has been the use of distilled liquors. But they have not been the only cause. Were every fire put out which is now doing its work of distillation, and every whisky barrel and rum hogshead bilged, we should still have drunkards ; a mother's tears and a sister's prayers would be offered up for an erring son and brother ; the white locks of the doating father would be brought down with sorrow to the grave by the inhumanity and disgrace of a drunken son ; many a hearth would be fireless, many a child an orphan, from the neglect and ruin of an intemperate husband and father. And when we think of one mind ruined, one immortal creature of God with the light of heaven in his soul put out, uttering his incoherent sentences, now cursing himself, then his Maker, and remember that it is the work of wine, it becomes a trifle to forego the pleasure of placing it upon our dinner table, or gracing our sideboard with its presence ; we dash the sparkling bowl from our lips, and pronounce a malediction on the viper, that is " twisted round its brim," and turn to you —

“Ye gracious clouds! ye deep cold wells!  
Ye gems, from mossy rocks that drip!  
Springs, that from earth's mysterious cells,  
Gush o'er your granite basin's lip!  
To you we look;—your largess give,  
And we will drink of you and LIVE!”

R. P. S.

---

ART. V.—*A Collection of Hymns for Public and Private Worship*. Compiled by JOHN R. BEARD. London and Manchester. 1837. 12mo. pp. 378.

THIS is a novelty every way, except that a collection of Hymns is no novelty. It has the distinction of being compiled on an entirely new principle, and of containing a larger proportion of pieces written expressly for the work than any other with which we are acquainted;—always excepting that of President Allen, where the compiler was also author. Mr. Beard does not write hymns, we believe; but he has been liberally supplied by his friends on both sides the Atlantic, and has thus brought forward a large number of pieces never before published. By this undertaking he has given new proof of the spirit of enterprise and readiness to labor for the public good, of which we had seen evidence in the two volumes of “Family Sermons” prepared and published by him a few years since, and in the establishment and editorship of that valuable journal, “The Christian Teacher.” With the merits of this work many of our readers are familiar, and we wish it were more widely circulated amongst us. Having been begun and carried forward on the pecuniary as well as personal responsibility of the editor, it must be regarded as an unusual effort of public-spirited zeal, which ought to be met by the warm sympathy and ready encouragement of those for whose benefit it is designed. This is the more to be remarked, because Mr. Beard is at the same time the laborious minister of a congregation in a large town, and the teacher of a school, like many of his brethren in England as well as in America; for it is a mistake to suppose, as is done in one of the recent letters of our friend, the Rev.



Samuel Wood,\* that our ministers in New England are never obliged to eke out their salaries by the labors of the school-room. We have several in our minds at this moment, who have acted the pedagogue so long, that they have come to regard it as almost a natural appendage to the pastoral office, and would scarcely account it more than an idle life to take charge of a parish only. Peace be with such on both sides the water; they deserve the hard earnings of their toilsome days. They are men who verify the remark, that those who have most to do are they who are readiest to find time for more. And therefore it is, that when a new periodical is to be set on foot, or a new hymn book compiled, Mr. Beard is the man to step forward, and during the intervals of writing sermons, visiting his flock, and drilling boys in Algebra and Greek, amuse himself with criticising illegible manuscripts, and correcting the proofs of a blundering press.

Whether it be wise in framing a hymn book for common use in public worship, to seek the introduction of a large number of original compositions, will appear to many a very doubtful point. The experiment at best must be exceedingly uncertain. A hymn is a religious and a poetical work; and both religion and poetry, in order to be well and truly expressed, require to be uttered by the impulse of the feelings, spontaneously, without effort or constraint. Neither can be well done as task work. There are many reasons, too, well understood by those accustomed to reflect on this class of subjects, which render the religious ode for public worship a peculiarly difficult composition. In proof of which we only need to observe how many gifted pens have failed in attempting it, and how those peculiar geniuses which have succeeded in it, apparently by a native tact, have yet left but a small number of good hymns in proportion to the whole quantity of their works. Thus Watts, allowed to be the first name in this department, has written the worst as well as the

---

\* We hope that more of these letters will be published; for besides that they are free from the little captiousness of spirit and conceited infallibility of judgment, by which some writers on the country have distinguished themselves, they are free from any considerable inaccuracies in the statement of facts. Perfect accuracy we hold to be impossible in any tourist; he is by necessity and profession a blunderer in hearing, in remembering, in repeating, and in guessing; Mr. Wood, therefore, is sometimes in error. But his mistakes are slight, and his general representations in a high degree fair and just.

best in the language, and out of many hundreds has produced less than one hundred which are above mediocrity. Of three hundred written by Doddridge, the best are equal to Watts's best, but they are extremely few; the remainder are almost worthless. Of Cowper, gifted as he was above most men, some six or eight are all that are remembered of the many which he supplied to the Olney Collection. Montgomery, another of the most felicitous of the sacred bards, versified the book of Psalms unsuccessfully, and of many good hymns has produced but two or three of absolutely first-rate pretension. Addison and Mrs. Barbauld, wisely attempting but few, made those few worthy of perpetual remembrance. And thus it happens, without going further into details, that out of some thousands which exist in the language, we can with difficulty collect five hundred into a satisfactory volume, and of these not more than one hundred are regarded as first-rate works, or nearly approaching the full standard of excellence appropriate to this composition.

The inference fairly is, that no man, be he who he may, can be reasonably expected to furnish in the course of his life more than some dozen or twenty really good hymns; and that these must be produced, as all good poetry must be, in those rare moments, when his mind is in the fit and happy mood. Consequently, if one set about making a book of new hymns, and call on the religious poets of the day to write expressly for the work, there is no probability that he will succeed in obtaining more than a very small number which shall satisfy the worshipper. He may perhaps hope for as large a proportion as are to be found among those of Doddridge; about four in a hundred. Indeed he must be regarded as singularly fortunate if as much as this be the result. Written, in some sense, as a task, they would be produced by minds far less favorably situated for the work than was that of the illustrious divine just mentioned, whose verses were composed in connexion with the subjects of his sermons, and while his mind was glowing with that excitement of both intellect and heart which attends the labors of the pulpit on Sunday. And not only would the situation be thus less favorable, but very few of the contributors could possess the remarkable aptitude of that man for this particular composition. It must be expected, as a matter of course, that, under the most auspicious circumstances, their best doings would fall below his best; and as they would labor under cir-

cumstances far less auspicious, their ordinary doings must be inferior even to his ordinary doings.

If these remarks be well founded, they lead us to view Mr. Beard's experiment with a feeling of surprise at its boldness, and to examine its result with expectations so far chastened as to be prepared for a liberal and candid judgment. Especially as we must add, to what has been said, another feature of the plan not yet adverted to, which restricts materially the limits which already appear so narrow. If the supposed collection were to be made up by contributions from all the poetical writers of the time, and the pens of men like Milman, Wordsworth, Southey, Moore, Montgomery, Campbell, could be put in requisition, we might hope to see something short of a failure. We might then possibly calculate on a larger proportion of true hymns than we have named above. But such is not the scheme before us. Nay, not only are those distinguished names wanting, but, as if to try the experiment on the most unpromising plan imaginable, the list of contributors is made up from the limits of a single and a small sect. It is part of the plan to provide a book for Unitarian worship out of the labors of Unitarian writers alone. It indeed admits the departed as well as living authors to a share in the work; but the departed are few. Mrs. Barbauld, J. Taylor, Henry Moore, Butcher, Sir J. E. Smith, and a few others, exhaust the list; a fair number considering the size of the denomination, but of course excluding from the range of selection those other favorite sons of song who have tuned their harps in the other apartments of the church. Some may think that the plan might at any rate have embraced Watts, since his last days were Unitarian, and he was prevented from making alterations in his hymns only by the circumstance that he had parted with the copyright, and could not obtain the consent of him who held it. But as he wrote them when a Trinitarian, it is not being too scrupulous to exclude them from the list of Unitarian compositions.

The sources from which the materials are to be collected being thus circumscribed, we shall open the book with expectations proportionally limited. We shall bear in mind, also, the disappointment with which we have opened many other compilations, made under all the favorable auspices which are wanting here; we shall remember that we have examined at least a dozen collections of sacred poetry, designed expressly for use

in public worship, some of them by men of eminent genius, piety, and taste, and have almost always closed them with a feeling of dissatisfaction. We shall remember that some congregations have changed their books two or three times in the course of a quarter of a century, hoping to obtain in a newer collection what they did not find in an old. We shall consider, that these various unsatisfying books have been compiled by men who had the whole field of sacred poetry to cull from, all the psalms and hymns of the best writers of all churches and communions since English was a language ; yet never, with all that affluence of materials, has a collection of hymns been made which did not, to a certain extent, displease, because of the large number of only tolerable and *unuseable* pieces. For it is necessary that the books contain five or six hundred, and the language does not afford so many that are excellent. The excellent, those so accounted by all and therefore admitted into all the books, are not probably more than two hundred ; many would say not more than half that number.

With these considerations prepared, we take up the volume which Mr. Beard offers us, and before opening it ask ourselves, What are we to expect ? We cannot resist the reply, — not a first rate collection ; almost certainly the poorest that we have yet met with. When all the choice devotional pieces that have been thrown forth from the soul of Christendom, and have animated its worship for two centuries, are absent, it is not possible that one sect and one generation should make their places good. So we are compelled to reason beforehand. So every man ought to reason who would be in a state fairly to judge of the merits of the work.

We open the book. We read. We compare. The result is, that it is not the poorest collection which we have seen. We have seen worse hymns in some others, than any we meet with here. This surprises us ; it was not to have been expected, under the circumstances as we viewed them. Perhaps we have seen better, and yet we are not certain that there exist any better than a few of the best of these. There are many which are only tolerable, and some that are intolerable ; many incomplete, many prosaic and common place, and some unsuited to use in public worship. But something very like this might be said of any other collection. So that on the whole, we find occasion to congratulate Mr. Beard on the success of his very bold and hazardous experiment, in which to have failed would

be no dishonor, because failure was the thing to be rationally anticipated ; in which to have succeeded moderately is a great honor and credit. He has produced a book which, in our judgment, may be used with greater satisfaction than some which we could name ; and if the preference for those which contain the old remembered favorites, dear by the associations of many years and strong affections, should prevent this newer and more strange work from being readily received into the service of our congregations, it will yet remain in the midst, as a repository from which future compilers may draw valuable additions to their holy treasures.

It is not necessary to analyze minutely the contents of the book, or attempt a classification of its topics. In general we may say, the whole number of hymns is five hundred and sixty, one of which at least, (an accident which often happens in similar compilations,) is the repetition of the same hymn with some variations. The number of those marked as original is three hundred and sixteen, being thirty-six more than one half of the whole ; and the greater part of the remainder have never before appeared in any collection for public worship. The largest original contributor is Dr. Bowring, from whom are eighty-three, about half of them written apparently for the work. The next most numerous contributor is the Rev. W. Gaskell, junior minister of the Cross Street Chapel in Manchester. The Rev. J. Wallace is the author of sixty-four, the Rev. J. R. Wreford of fifty-five, and the Rev. J. Johns of thirty-five. These are nearly without exception original contributions. Of older writers the principal names are, Mrs. Barbauld, Butcher, Henry Moore, W. Roscoe, Sir James E. Smith, J. Taylor, besides many others, living and dead, from whose writings but few hymns have been selected. Of pieces by American authors there are fifty-six, a few of them now for the first time published.

From among those which have pleased us best, we select a few to adorn our pages, taking such alone as have not before made their appearance in print. The very best, the jewels, have been long familiar to the world. We make our first selection from Bowring ; concerning whom, by the way, we must remark, that it surprised us to find that which we have been accustomed to regard as his finest religious ode, indeed as one of the finest which the times have produced, "curtailed of its just proportions" by the abduction of its introductory and clos-

ing stanzas, thus standing a mere torso, all middle, without beginning or ending. We refer to the well known hymn, the fifty-seventh of Greenwood's Collection,

"The heavenly spheres to thee, O God,  
Attune their evening hymn ;"

which is easily seen to be spoiled by the mutilation just adverted to. We miss too another favorite set of verses from the same writer, which was culled from the centre of one of the "Matins and Vespers," and placed in Mr. Greenwood's Collection as the forty-seventh hymn. We find nothing equal to either of these exquisite lyrics among those which the same pen has furnished for the present collection, or to several others which we had expected to find here. Indeed we may adduce the example of this writer in striking corroboration of some of our previous remarks. He is the author of some hundred hymns. He has the feeling, taste, and power of easy and graceful diction, which fit him to be peculiarly successful in this department. He has written some of the best hymns of the present generation. Yet how small a portion do they make of the whole ! Set aside something like ten or twelve which stand up pre-eminent, and the remainder are not distinguishable in the crowd of tolerable verses which no one remembers. If we might make a suggestion here, we would say, that this is not only owing to the intrinsic difficulties of this species of composition, which have caused the same result in the other writers we before mentioned ; but in part to a certain negligence in Dr. Bowring himself, who is too easily satisfied with the first casual expression in which his idea clothes itself, and will not be at pains to seek for that exactness of finish which generally comes only by painstaking. Hence many beautiful conceptions, containing the sketch of the finest odes, are left in their first slovenly draft to perish. Of those which he has now first published in Mr. Beard's volume, we copy one of the best. It seems to us to possess a fine freedom of movement and a striking turn of thought, which only need greater thoroughness of execution to make it equal to anything from the same writer ; unless it may be reasonably objected to this, as well as to several other pieces, that it is of a character, not perhaps too poetical, but too *merely* poetical, to be suited to the purposes of devotion in a congregation ; more like a song than a psalm.

"HYMN 39. *Mysteries of Providence.*

" Lord ! in the unbeginning years,  
 Whose course is wrapt in trackless night,  
 Ere thou hadst launched the heavenly spheres,  
 Or waked this wandering world to light ;  
 What were thy words, thy works, — and how  
 Didst thou thy glorious march record ?  
 For thou wert great and good, as now,  
 Of love the source, of light the Lord !

" And in the unending ages, far  
 Beyond the utmost reach of mind,  
 When all that is, and all that are,  
 Shall leave not e'en a wreck behind :  
 Oh ! what shall be thy bright career,  
 Lord of the eternal, changeless will ?  
 Thou wilt be there supreme, as here —  
 All wise, — all good, — almighty still !

" Yes ! shrouded in the mystery,  
 The past, — the future's dark abyss,  
 Bright clouds of splendor circle thee,  
 And light thy path from bliss to bliss.  
 This is our faith, our hope, our trust,  
 Through thought's immeasurable range,  
 Time is a dream, and man is dust —  
 But thou — but thou canst never change !"

It is not our purpose to pursue a course of critical remark on the hymns or on their authors ; and if it were, we should hardly feel at liberty to do it, since, excepting Dr. Bowring and one or two others who are already known to the public by their works, the writers are persons in private life, making no pretence to authorship, and it would be an intrusion on their feelings to make them the subjects of public remark. We therefore close with our proposed extracts. The first is by the Rev. J. Johns.

"HYMN 472. *Workings of God's Spirit.*

" Known by whatever earthly name,  
 Grace, spirit, influence, blessing, aid,  
 A power there is which stirs our frame,  
 Direct from Him by whom 't was made.

"The reed that feels, sees not the wind,  
Nor man the still, strong ministry  
Which mingles with the working mind,  
Like sunbeams with the heaving sea.

"And as, the more unstained the deep,  
The stronger light pervades its tides,  
So, the more pure our hearts we keep,  
The more God's spirit there resides.

"Then let us so these hearts improve,  
That o'er the abyss unblessed before,  
His spirit may in blessing move,  
Creating light for evermore."

The next is by Miss Emily Taylor.

"HYMN 202. '*Thy kingdom come.*'

"Who that o'er many a barren part  
Of earth, with thoughtful steps hath trod,  
But with a fervent voice and heart  
Will pray '*thy kingdom come,*' O God!

"'*Thy kingdom come!*' The heathen lands,  
In error sunk, thy presence crave:  
And victims bound by tyrant hands,  
Implore thee, Father, come and save!

"'*Thy kingdom come!*' Each troubled mind  
In doubt and darkness calls for thee;  
For thou hast eyes to give the blind,  
And strength to set the captive free.

"Thy reign of peace and love begin!  
Too oft the christian's sacred name  
Is stained by wrath and shamed by sin;  
Oh come, assert the gospel's claim.

"Oh never in that righteous cause,  
Our hearts be slow, our voices dumb,  
Upon the glorious theme we pause,  
And fervent pray, '*thy kingdom come!*'"

H. W., jr.



ART. VI. — *History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Catholic.* By WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT. In three volumes. Boston: American Stationers' Company. John B. Russell. 1838. 8vo.

WE but repeat what we hear from the universal voice of our reading community, when we say that this history is an honor to its author, and a most valuable addition to the literature of his country. We do not say this, however, merely because we have heard it said by others, for we have made up our own opinion of the work independently, and after an attentive perusal; but we confess that we utter our judgment with tenfold pleasure, if not confidence, when it coincides, as in the present case, with that of our friends, and of the intelligent public.

A great felicity of concurrent circumstances has attended this scholar-like production. Happy was the writer to find such a subject, and happy was the subject to find such a writer. Prominent as the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella stands on the wide field of general history, yet no particular history of it, deserving the name, had ever been composed, even in the Spanish tongue. Portions of this reign had been delineated, with different degrees of success by different authors, but the whole, in its stately and comprehensive unity, had never been brought upon one canvass by a master hand. And what a reign it was! how striking were the characters, and how important the events which it comprised! Look at Ferdinand, the brave and warlike but wary, astute, economical Ferdinand; — at his far better half, the queenly, intrepid, generous, fair, and almost saintly Isabella; — at the wise and wonderful Ximenes; — at the Great Captain; — at the Great Admiral! Turn to the events; the consolidation of the rival kingdoms of the Spanish peninsula into one state; — the reëstablishment of the terrible Inquisition; — the conquest of Granada; — the conquest of Naples; — the expulsion of the Moors; — the expulsion of the Jews; — the discovery of a World; — all momentous, though some of them most painful. This was the reign which was waiting for an historian, and seemingly too for an American historian; for though the sovereigns never stirred from their own ancient realms, yet the event, which has left the most distinguishing and enduring mark upon their government, was, beyond all question, the discovery of America. Beautifully as

Mr. Irving has written the life and adventures of Columbus, the work only stimulated our desire to behold their place in the administration of the royal pair, under whose auspices the daring sailor accomplished his glorious project. Our author had no reason to fear that the publication of this, or any other separate portrait, would interfere with his own design of delineating the whole group in their respective positions. His purpose was a history of Ferdinand and Isabella's entire reign. Nothing but a history of the same extent could have crossed his path.

And we now feel that the subject, unattempted so long, though so inviting, had reserved itself for worthy hands. The very first feature, which strikes us in this work, is its thoroughness. We have already called it a scholar-like production. It is so, in the fullest sense. It is free from the fault of superficialness, which has hitherto been too much the characteristic of our literature, with the exception, indeed, of the memoirs of our own country and times. We see that Mr. Prescott's first care was for his materials. He gathered all, and selected from among the best. Fortunately for him, our libraries, though deficient in most departments, are rich in whatever relates to the early history of America. It is probable that the collections in Cambridge and Boston united, though far from complete, cannot be matched elsewhere in the world in this particular; and to these he had free access. But it is evident that a small portion only of the whole ground, could be covered by even the best materials in this department. For the rest, he spared neither labor nor expense in procuring books and manuscripts from Spain, causing public documents to be copied, state archives to be explored, and everything else to be done, which could possibly be effected, to render his acquisitions complete. This indefatigable industry is now crowned by its reward—that confidence which is the historian's most valuable meed—that faith which resorts to him as the true interpreter of past ages. As soon as we open these volumes, we perceive that it is a history, and not a romance—though much of the history be romantic—which we hold in our hands. As we pass along from period to period, we are conscious that we tread on firm ground, and that we may walk securely. Accuracy, that prime virtue of an historian, distinguishes the narrative, and gives us, throughout, the impression of reality, introducing us to real persons, and placing us amidst real scenes. And when we consider that the labor of which this accuracy is the fruit, was performed by one, who,

though not absolutely deprived of blessed eyesight, was deprived of it for all a student's purposes, being utterly unable to use it for reading or writing, and that consequently he was obliged to have the collected mass of books and manuscripts read to him line by line and word by word—in a dead or foreign language, moreover, as by far the greater proportion of them were in Latin or Spanish—our heart swells with admiration at the intrepidity which encountered such an adventure, and at the noble perseverance which achieved it. Is there not an example here? Are there no other men among us, of education, of ample means, of leisure, of ability? What are they doing for the literature of their country; for the instruction of their countrymen?

But thoroughness and accuracy are not our author's only merits. The materials so diligently gathered are disposed with taste and skill. Mr. Prescott's style is clear, easy, flowing; not sententious, but not diffuse; full of meaning, but never tasking the reader's intellect to find out the meaning; free from all affectation. If he uses a foreign word occasionally, when an English one might have served the purpose, he does so not for display, but doubtless because the word has acquired to his apprehension a specific meaning. Once in a while he employs a phrase, which seems a slight shade too familiar for history. But neither of these faults, if they are such, occurs so often, or so decidedly, as to hurt the general effect, which is that of a dignified simplicity, a plain manliness of speech, not unadorned with those classic graces which well become the subjects discussed.

Candor is another eminent characteristic of the pages under our review. It would be hard to tell in what sect the writer stands in religion, or in what party in politics; but at the same time impossible to mistake him for a bigot or a scoffer, an enemy of freedom, or a foe to order and good government. He may be swayed by some lenient biasses, but we are sure that he has no improper partialities, or stiff prejudices. It appears to us that he is more just to Ferdinand than historians generally have been, and if he is ready to break a lance against the world in honor of Isabella, where could a princess be found more worthy of his chivalry? He allows, indeed, that the establishment of the Inquisition, and the exile of the Jews, were "deep blemishes on her administration," but he defends her fully and successfully against the suspicion that these acts implied any cruelty of

disposition or defect of character. "It will be difficult to condemn her," he argues, "without condemning the age; for these very acts are not only excused, but extolled by her contemporaries, as constituting her strongest claims to renown, and to the gratitude of her country." He thus goes on, to make good his case.

"They proceeded from the principle, openly avowed by the court of Rome, that zeal for the purity of the faith could atone for every crime. This immoral maxim, flowing from the head of the church, was echoed in a thousand different forms by the subordinate clergy, and greedily received by a superstitious people. It was not to be expected that a solitary woman, filled with natural diffidence of her own capacity on such subjects, should array herself against those venerated counsellors, whom she had been taught from her cradle to look to as the guides and guardians of her conscience.

"However mischievous the operations of the inquisition may have been in Spain, its establishment, in point of principle, was not worse than many other measures, which have passed with far less censure, though in a much more advanced and civilized age. Where, indeed, during the sixteenth, and the greater part of the seventeenth century, was the principle of persecution abandoned by the dominant party, whether Catholic or Protestant? And where that of toleration asserted, except by the weaker? It is true, to borrow Isabella's own expression in her letter to Talavera, the prevalence of a bad custom cannot constitute its apology. But it should serve much to mitigate our condemnation of the queen, that she fell into no greater error, in the imperfect light in which she lived, than was common to the greatest minds in a later and far riper period." — Vol. III. p. 190.

Sentiments like these meet with our hearty concurrence. They are the sentiments of one, who, though feelingly alive to the horror and dark tyranny of such an institution as the Inquisition, is too well acquainted with the nature of man, and takes too comprehensive a view of man's moral history, to ascribe the establishment of that dread office to one man or woman, to a monarch or a priest, or the whole priesthood. There is evidence enough in these volumes that, whoever may appear as its founder, or be named as its familiars, it never would have obtained its awful ascendancy in Spain, perhaps never would have been introduced there, had it not been for the popular hatred and animosity which was entertained against the Jews and the Moors. In fact the very same spirit which gave power

to the edicts of that secret tribunal, and lit up the fires of its *acts of faith*, is not wholly extinct even in Protestant countries ; even in our own country, where it burns against Catholics, as it did in Spain against Jews, Moors, and heretics ; and where, though in general suppressed by the improved sense of the majority, it will occasionally burst forth into flame in these latter days.

The subject which we have been led to touch upon is of sufficient importance to be considered somewhat more at length. Let us examine the nature of our impressions concerning the kings and priests of old, and see whether we cannot arrive at the same candor in regard to them which is exhibited by our author.

In reading the history of our race, there is nothing which so often moves our indignation and compassion as the manifold oppressions which the people have suffered under their temporal and spiritual rulers. We are even led to forget that both rulers and ruled share a common nature, and suffer ourselves to be possessed with a dim idea or feeling that monarchs are of a separate race, armed with a mysterious influence, which they have exercised over the destinies of our fellow-creatures and brethren, according to their own irresistible will and pleasure. The wars which have desolated so many fair regions, the slaughter of hosts upon hosts, the imprisonments, banishments, executions, numberless miseries, which mark the reigns of kings, we have imputed, with deep execrations, to them and their passions alone. Should reflection succeed this natural impulse, however, we soon begin to wonder whence the mighty power is derived, which, though sometimes beneficially employed, has been so frequently and so terribly abused. Pursuing the investigation which our wonder has prompted, we shall come to perceive that the power of sovereigns and leaders is derived from the people themselves, and is sustained by them ; that its character is essentially dependent on the character of the people over whom it is exercised ; that its abuses are the abuses which are incident to power of almost any kind which is entrusted to mortals ; that the wars of kings are the development of the warlike propensities of their subjects ; that the cruelties committed by kings have their correspondence in the public barbarism. A sovereign would hardly surround himself with show, form, and magnificence, if these were not pleasing and dazzling to the popular eye. He would hardly assume pompous titles, if

these were not grateful to the popular ear. He would not lead his people forth to battles, if they did not delight in battles, and desire him to conduct them to blood, victory, and plunder. The ancient records of Spain tell us of a Visigoth king, Wamba, who was actually deposed by his people because he was too mild and peaceful for them. However widely the acts of a wise and good monarch may differ from the acts of a weak or wicked one, yet the foundation of the power, which enforces the acts of both, lies in the sentiments, prejudices, passions of the people. Whatever abuses of this power, therefore, monarchs may be guilty of, are to be attributed not solely to them, but in due measure and proportion to those from whom the power is borrowed and by whom it is upheld.

A people want a head by whom they may be guided, united together against common foes, protected against aggression, or conducted to conquest. They choose a man to be their head, who, by strength of intellect or arm, is capable of the office. Power thus conferred, is not so easily regulated or resumed by the donors as it was conferred. It is apt to become arbitrary, and is apt to be considered as native and inherent in the individual, who in fact holds it by election and gift. And this abuse is countenanced, and this misapprehension is strengthened by the prejudices, passions, or fears of those from whom the power originally proceeded. They reap what they have sown, and are by no means guiltless of their own sufferings.

A remarkable exemplification of this truth occurs in the early history of the Jews. They had no king till they clamored for one. There was never any one over them invested with that kind of authority which is properly called regal, till they insisted on having such an one appointed. And the motives, which incited them to the demand, were the very motives which have nurtured tyranny and its train of evils in all ages and countries of the world. "Nay," said they, "but we will have a king over us, that we also may be like all the nations, and that our king may judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles." The love of display, the love of arbitrary force, the love of fighting — these were the motives which impelled the Jews to ask for a king. It was in vain that the prophet Samuel warned them of the degrading servitude under which a king, though of their own making, would bring them, and of the privileges which he would assume to himself, in total disregard of their liberties and comforts; he might as well have argued with the

winds, for they would have a king. A king was set over them, the kingly power was fastened upon them, and from that moment till their final dispersion, they were indeed, in many respects, "like all the nations;" sometimes ruled with justice, wisdom, and discretion, but oftener with injustice and folly; sometimes led by their king to virtue and glory, but oftener into idolatry and degradation, and always partaking fully of their monarch's failings and vices, and very seldom setting him an example, as a whole people, of a conduct in any respect more elevated than his own.

After the same manner has it been with all nations. It is fanatically unjust to speak of kings as the enemies and scourges of the human race. They have all belonged to the human race, and though many of them have occasioned wide-spread misery, they have done it in obedience to those human passions which they shared in common with their people, and the ebullitions of which their people lacked the virtue or the courage to prevent or subdue. Their power, growing up from the soil of popular sentiment, imbibes its properties. If they have great advantages, they have also great temptations. They are mortal, and should be looked at, the worst of them, not as individual monsters, but in connexion with their fellow mortals, and with all the circumstances which belong to the age in which they live. As mankind has become more enlightened and civilized, through the operation of many influences, among which the spirit of Christianity has always been the chief, the royal power has been modified accordingly, and they who hold it can no longer perpetrate deeds of tyranny which once were of common occurrence; not because kings are better, but because men are better. But are not monarchs to be reprobated and condemned for their guilty acts and the misery which they have inflicted? Most certainly. This course of reflection does not absolve guilty monarchs from their guilt, it only gives them a hearing as men, and includes them and their people under the general sentence. It is quite as rare for a people to be in moral advance of their monarch, as it is for a monarch to be in moral advance of his people; and if the usurpation of rights is to be held as a crime, the resignation of them is not to be accounted innocent. Kings are not all tigers and wolves, and their people are not all bleeding lambs; and it is the phantasy of a disordered imagination which represents them as such. Kings and

people are men, alike acting and acted upon, forming altogether the character of their time.

The same equitable rule is to be applied to the priesthood, as well as to the monarchy. No well-read man will compromise his dignity and sense of justice, by joining in the cry which is often raised against the priests of former times, by which they are all denounced as impostors, deceivers, and corrupters of mankind. That in ages of ignorance, a large portion of the priesthood were ignorant, is true, though not surprising. That many of the priests cunningly abused the power which superstition gave them over the popular mind, is also true, and also not surprising. But that they were designedly combined as a body against the mental and moral advancement of mankind, is most untrue. That they were not, as a body, sincere in their spiritual duties, is most untrue. That they were, as a body, both more learned and more virtuous, in every age of the Christian church at least, than the whole body of the laity of the same age, comprising kings, nobles, and people, can be as firmly established as any fact in history.

In truth it was not the priests who corrupted the people, but the people who corrupted the priests. Christianity was first preached in simplicity and purity, and by pure and simple men. But as soon as philosophers took it up, they mingled with it the results of their abstruse speculations; and when it became widely spread among the people, they brought into it their love of pomp and ornament, and would not, indeed, have remained faithful to it, unless its appearance had been conformed somewhat to their conceptions. Thus were simple teachers of simple, though sublime truth, converted by degrees into the priests of a mysterious doctrine and a gorgeous ritual. They were infected by the popular and prevailing taste, yielded to it, and at length ministered to it, fostered it, and built their own advantage upon it. But degenerate as the priesthood became from the pure idea of their religion, and the example of its first preachers, and identified as they became with sad forms of extravagance and intolerance, they still contained within their body a principle of Christian vitality, and still performed their part in forwarding human progress. Ignorant as this body was, it was able to instruct a grosser ignorance. Corrupt as it was, it was less unhealthy than the surrounding corruption. And cruel as it often proved itself to be, it caught its temper from the prevailing ferocity. A writer who cannot be accused of partiality



either to Christianity or the clergy, and who seldom misses an opportunity of levelling the shafts of his malicious wit at both, we mean the historian Gibbon, thus speaks, in one of his candid moments, of the priesthood in the middle ages. "The authority of the priests operated in the darker ages as a salutary antidote ; — they prevented the total extinction of letters, mitigated the fierceness of the times, sheltered the poor and defenceless, and preserved or revived the peace and order of civil society. But the independence, rapine, and discord of the feudal lords were unmixed with any semblance of good ; and every hope of industry and improvement was crushed by the iron weight of the martial aristocracy."

We must look on this subject as on all others, comprehensively and fairly, and not suffer ourselves to be blinded even by a righteous indignation. If we find that the priests and monks discouraged learning in some of its forms and directions, we must acknowledge that to them we chiefly owe its preservation when the whole world besides was fighting. The old English reformer, Wickliffe, was a priest. Long after him, when the great reformation commenced, Luther, its leader, marched forth from the cloisters ; and many more from the cloisters, schools, and churches, gathered round him and strengthened him. Ximenes himself, inquisitor general as he was, and zealous to expel or destroy all the Moors and Jews whom he could not convert, was, in the midst of duties of this sort, engaged in founding the splendid university of Alcalá, the scheme of instruction and discipline for which was on a scale of remarkable liberality. In digesting this scheme, "he sought light," says our author, "wherever it was to be found." "His system was of the most enlightened kind, being directed to call all the powers of the student into action, and not to leave him a mere passive recipient in the hands of his teachers." Here was a man, sincere and ardent in persecution, and at the same time sincere and ardent in the advancement of that intellectual and Christian light, by which at length, and alone, persecution, and bigotry, and all birds of night, are to be chased away into congenial darkness.

And what is the lesson ? Truly that we are to be more sparing of our indiscriminate denunciations against kingcraft and priestcraft, and take more care of our own dispositions, and reserve our energies for the instruction of the people — that is, our friends and brethren, and ourselves — from whom more is to be

hoped, aye, and more is to be feared, than from kings and kaisars, priests and popes.

We have given our opinion, summarily, of the history before us. We enter no further into detail, because we might not know where to conclude. Neither is there need; because most of our readers have already possessed themselves of the contents of the work. Authentic and interesting as it is, it has already commanded a rapid sale, and its circulation must increase. One extract more we shall give, on account of its adaptation to our pages, and notwithstanding the facts which it contains, or nearly all of them, may be found elsewhere, as in Marsh's *Michaelis*, and Butler's *Horæ Biblicæ*. It is the history of the great literary undertaking of Cardinal Ximenes, his Complutensian Polyglot.

"In the midst of his pressing duties, Ximenes found time for the execution of another work, which would alone have been sufficient to render his name immortal in the republic of letters. This was his famous Bible, or Complutensian Polyglot, as usually termed, from the place where it was printed. It was on the plan, first conceived by Origen, of exhibiting in one view the Scriptures in their various ancient languages. It was a work of surpassing difficulty, demanding an extensive and critical acquaintance with the most ancient, and consequently the rarest manuscripts. The character and station of the cardinal afforded him, it is true, uncommon facilities. The precious collection of the Vatican was liberally thrown open to him, especially under Leo the Tenth, whose munificent spirit delighted in the undertaking. He obtained copies, in like manner, of whatever was of value in the other libraries of Italy, and indeed, of Europe generally; and Spain supplied him with editions of the Old Testament of great antiquity, which had been treasured up by the banished Israelites. Some idea may be formed of the lavish expenditure in this way, from the fact that four thousand gold crowns were paid for seven foreign manuscripts, which, however, came too late to be of use in the compilation.

"The conduct of the work was intrusted to nine scholars, well skilled in the ancient tongues, as most of them had evinced by works of critical acuteness and erudition. After the labors of the day, these learned sages were accustomed to meet, in order to settle the doubts and difficulties which had arisen in the course of their researches, and, in short, to compare the results of their observations. Ximenes, who, however limited his attainments in general literature, was an excellent biblical critic, frequently presided, and took a prominent part in these delibera-

tions. 'Lose no time, my friends,' he would say, 'in the prosecution of our glorious work; lest, in the casualties of life, you should lose your patron, or I have to lament the loss of those, whose services are of more price in my eyes than wealth and worldly honors.'

"The difficulties of the undertaking were sensibly increased by those of the printing. The art was then in its infancy, and there were no types in Spain, if indeed in any part of Europe, in the oriental character. Ximenes, however, careful to have the whole executed under his own eye, imported artists from Germany, and had types cast in the various languages required, in his founderies at Alcalá.

"The work when completed occupied six volumes folio; the first four devoted to the Old Testament, the fifth to the New; the last containing a Hebrew and Chaldaic vocabulary, with other elementary treatises of singular labor and learning. It was not brought to an end till 1517, fifteen years after its commencement, and a few months only before the death of its illustrious projector. Alvaro Gomez relates, that he had often heard John Broccario, the son of the printer, say, that when the last sheet was struck off, he, then a child, was dressed in his best attire, and sent with a copy to the cardinal. The latter, as he took it, raised his eyes to Heaven, and devoutly offered up his thanks, for being spared to the completion of this good work. Then, turning to his friends who were present, he said, that 'of all the acts which distinguished his administration, there was none, however arduous, better entitled to their congratulation than this.'

"This is not the place, if I were competent, to discuss the merits of this great work, the reputation of which is familiar to every scholar. Critics, indeed, have disputed the antiquity of the manuscripts used in the compilation, as well as the correctness and value of the emendations. Unfortunately, the destruction of the original manuscripts, in a manner which forms one of the most whimsical anecdotes in literary history, makes it impossible to settle the question satisfactorily. Undoubtedly, many blemishes may be charged on it, necessarily incident to an age when the science of criticism was imperfectly understood, and the stock of materials much more limited, or at least more difficult of access, than at the present day. After every deduction, however, the cardinal's Bible has the merit of being the first successful attempt at a polyglot version of the Scriptures, and consequently of facilitating, even by its errors, the execution of more perfect and later works of the kind. Nor can we look at it in connexion with the age, and the auspices

under which it was accomplished, without regarding it as a noble monument of piety, learning, and munificence, which entitles its author to the gratitude of the whole Christian world.

"Such were the gigantic projects which amused the leisure hours of this great prelate. Though gigantic, they were neither beyond his strength to execute, nor beyond the demands of his age and country. They were not like those works, which, forced into being by whim, or transitory impulse, perish with the breath that made them; but, taking deep root, were cherished and invigorated by the national sentiment, so as to bear rich fruit for posterity. This was particularly the case with the institution at Alcalá. It soon became the subject of royal and private benefaction. Its founder bequeathed it, at his death, a clear revenue of fourteen thousand ducats. By the middle of the seventeenth century, this had increased to forty-two thousand, and the colleges had multiplied from ten to thirty-five." — Vol. III. pp. 321–327.

Two of the notes which accompany this account must be given, if only as specimens of the form into which Mr. Prescott has thrown a vast amount of instructive and interesting matter. The first of these notes explains the manner in which the Cardinal's manuscripts were destroyed, which, though familiarly known to biblical scholars, is probably not so to many out of that class. It is proper to say also, that the word "Complutensian" is formed from the Latin name, Complutum, of Alcalá.

"Professor Moldenhawer, of Germany, visited Alcalá in 1784, for the interesting purpose of examining the MSS. used in the Complutensian Polyglot. He there learned that they had all been disposed of, as so much waste paper, (*membranas inútiles*) by the librarian of that time to a rocket-maker of the town, who soon worked them up in the regular way of his vocation! He assigns no reason for doubting the truth of the story. The name of the librarian, unfortunately, is not recorded. It would have been as imperishable as that of Omar. Marsh's *Michaelis*, vol. ii. part 1, chap. 12, sec. 1, note."

The other note contains a just tribute to one of the most thorough works which can be found in the compass of biblical literature.

"The celebrated text of 'the three witnesses,' of such moment in the Trinitarian controversy, and which Porson so completely overturned, rests in part on what Gibbon calls 'the

honest bigotry of the Complutensian editors.' One of the three Greek manuscripts, in which that text is found, is a forgery from the Polyglot of Alcalá, according to Mr. Norton, in his recent work, 'The Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels,' (Boston, 1837, vol. i. Additional Notes, p. xxxix.),—a work which few can be fully competent to criticise, but which no person can peruse without confessing the acuteness and strength of its reasoning, the nice discrimination of its criticism, and the precision and purity of its diction. Whatever difference of opinion may be formed as to some of its conclusions, no one will deny, that the originality and importance of its views make it a substantial accession to theological science; and, that, within the range permitted by the subject, it presents, on the whole, one of the noblest specimens of scholarship, and elegance of composition, to be found in our youthful literature."

We cannot leave this work without expressing our high satisfaction at the moral as well as philosophical spirit, which pervades it. In this respect, it adds evidence to the proposition, that the best philosophy is inseparable from a pure morality, and that a writer is in the strictest sense manly, when he is true to virtue. It plainly gives the author of this history as much pleasure to record, as it does us to learn, the moral excellences of his characters, especially when they transcend the age; to tell, for instance, of the mild and tolerant temper of the good Talavera, archbishop of Granada, of whom we wish he could have told us more; and to testify of the heroic Gonsalvo, that he "was untainted with the coarser vices characteristic of the time," that "he betrayed none of the cruelty and licentiousness, which disgrace the age of chivalry," that "on all occasions he was prompt to protect women from injury or insult," and that "he has left a character, unimpeached by any historian, of unblemished morality in his domestic relations."

The external appearance of these volumes corresponds with their literary value. They take precedence in this respect over all the books of the day, of home manufacture; and sustain, by their accuracy of print, and beauty of page, the high credit of the University press at Cambridge.

F. W. P. G.

---

ART. VII. — *Histoire critique du Gnosticisme et de son influence sur les sectes religieuses et philosophiques des six premiers siècles de l'ère chrétienne.* (Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie royale des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres.)  
PAR M. JACQUES MATTER. 3 voll. 8vo. Paris. 1828.

BEFORE we enter upon an examination of the work above named, let us devote a moment to the writers who have employed their pens upon the prolific topic upon which it treats.

One of the first writers of modern times, who attended to the subject, was Ittig of Leipsic. In his work on the Hæresiarchs of the apostolic and ensuing ages,\* we find a large mass of materials, collected with no small diligence and impartiality; but the total want of criticism, the entire absence of order in the details, and of logic in the inferences, render his work of little value at the present time, however great may have been its worth at its first appearance. Subsequent writers improved upon his plan, and collected materials the more easily after he had prepared the way.

Mosheim, in his great work, upon Ecclesiastical History,† treats of these heretics wisely, and with candor, but not in detail. In a later work, his attempt at an impartial and fundamental history of heresies,‡ he treats of them more fully, and of a single sect of the Gnostics quite in detail. Again they appear in his valuable commentary on the state of Christianity before the time of Constantine.§

Before his time few writers seem to have been aware of the extent or importance of this subject, although it had given birth to some beautiful works. Arnold indeed, in his Ecclesiastical History,|| had bestowed much attention upon the subject, with a large share of critical skill, for his time; but his criticism was

\* De Hæresiarchis ævi apostolici et apostolico proximi, seu primi et secundi a Christo nato sæculi, Dissertatio. Lips. 1690. 4to.

† Institutiones historiæ christianæ majores. (Sæculum primum.) Helmstadii. 1739.

‡ Versuch einer unpartheiischen und gründlichen Ketzergeschichte. Helmst. 1748.

§ De rebus Christianorum ante Constantinum magnum. Helm. 1753.

|| Unpartheiische Kirchen- und Ketzergeschichte. Schaffhausen. 1740. 4to.

not impartial, his method a fair one, nor his point of view sufficiently elevated to enable him to see things in their true proportions. Buddæus\* and Wolf† had contributed their labors, and the illustrious Beausobre‡ had discussed one sect of the Gnostics with impartiality, good sense, and profound learning, not to mention his luminous and interesting style. His work, notwithstanding its errors, is still a classic, and worthy the attention of all serious inquirers into ancient systems of Philosophy and Religion. It served well to prepare the way for the works of Mosheim, who is indebted to him for many useful hints.§

Mosheim in treating of the Gnostics displays that beautiful spirit of candor which everywhere distinguishes him, and has been diligent in his inquiry; but there are two capital deductions to be made from the merit of his work; the one arising from his position in time, the other from himself.

The material for the history of Gnosticism, and more especially of the state of opinions in the East before the time of Jesus, was scanty in measure and uncertain in quality. The state of religion in the East, before the time of Christ, was but imperfectly understood; even that of the Persians|| — though best appreciated — was covered with a cloud of mist. This deficiency of information prevented his understanding the true state of opinions prior to the origin of Gnosticism; therefore not only causes but consequences were misapprehended, various opinions were classed together, and grouped into the same family, though they had no affinity one with the other. The other fault, which, like the preceding, is partly to be attributed to the age he lived in, is that of confounding opinions in an attempt to portray a *common* Gnosticism acknowledged by all. The system which he paints as received by all was, in fact, received by none; though each of the Gnostic sects claimed some part of the "thing of shreds and patches," which he presents us. In this respect he commits the same error which one would be guilty of, who should represent the doctrines of

---

\* *Introductio ad Historiam philosoph. Ebræorum.*

† *Manicheismus ante Manicheos.* Hamburg. 1707. 8vo.

‡ *Histoire critique de Manichée, et du Manichéisme.* Amsterdam. 1734. 2 voll. 4to.

§ See the *Theologische Leitschrift*. 2 Heft. S. 146, et sqq.

|| On the religion of the Persians, see a remarkable work with the title *Die Religion der Feueranbeter in Indien und Persien.* Altona. 1796.

Socrates by amalgamating the opinions of all his pupils. We like not his division of these heretics into three classes, (the *Manicheans*, the *Valentinians*, and the *Marcionites*,) for to us there appears no more reason for making just three schools of Gnosticism than of Christianity. He has besides a certain fondness for particular hypotheses, which sometimes lead him into error.

The work of Neander\* is thorough and profound, but is rather a collection of materials for the history of Gnosticism than a history itself. The work of Ewald† we have never seen. The volumes at the head of this article comprise the best work upon the subject,‡ indeed they contain nearly all that can be desired in such a work. Professor Matter is learned and impartial, profound in his researches, critical in his examination, fair in his decision, and is animated by a chaste enthusiasm, which lends warmth and interest, and often eloquence to his style.

The investigation of this subject is attended with peculiar difficulties, apart from the strangeness of the doctrine, which often amazes, and its obscurity, which perplexes us. We have lost the works of the Gnostics themselves, and must therefore become acquainted with them through the writings of their enemies, never the most impartial witnesses, and at this time especially unfair. Besides, the writers who opposed Gnosticism, and through whose polemical works we become acquainted with it, frequently drew from polluted sources; some of them were not contemporary with their enemies, and others, who were, are evidently so hostile to them, that we must receive their statement with many qualifications and abatements. But, on the other hand, the principal writers are doubtless correct in the details they furnish, since they had the writings of their opponents before their eyes when they wrote, and were men of acknowledged ability and candor. Still it must be

\* *Genetische Entwicklung der vornehmsten gnostischen systeme*. Berlin. 1818. 8vo.

† *Commentatio ad hist. Rel. Vet. illustrandam pertinens de doctrina Gnostica*. Heidelberg. 1818. 8vo.

‡ Since the publication of the work of Professor Matter, Dr. F. C. Baur has published a work upon the same subject with this title, *Die christliche Gnosis, oder Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*. Tübingen. 1835. It is only known to the writer of this article by quotations from it in Ammon's *Fortbildung des christenthum*. 2d Ed. Leipzig. 1836.



confessed, it is always unfortunate that the opinions of a sect should be learned from the mouth of such as despise or persecute them; and apart from this channel of information, we can know little of these heretics except from one or two inscriptions, and some stones, curiously and mysteriously engraved, which were worn as jewels, and prized as amulets and talismans.

Irenæus wrote five books expressly against the Gnostics, but only the first of them has reached us entire. He was contemporary with these heretics, from his local and ecclesiastical station, had abundant opportunity of becoming acquainted with their doctrines, and was, besides, a man of moderation and candor, all whose writings inspire us with the highest respect and confidence in his fairness and accuracy.

Justyn Martyr, who was educated a Platonist, speaks casually of Simon Magus, one of the precursors of Gnosticism; we have still a small fragment of the work of Rhodon against Marcion; and Clement of Alexandria has given us copious details of the Gnostic doctrines. His *Stromata* contain the most valuable information upon the subject. His position at Alexandria, his natural temperament, and favorite studies enabled him to understand and appreciate the doctrines he opposes. Origen likewise has contributed his treasures; and his writings are perhaps the purest source whence we can reproduce the original system. Eusebius and St. Ephraim afford us important aid in this investigation; the former, in his history, draws information from the original documents of the Gnostics, and the latter wrote fifty-two Hymns\* against Manes, Marcion, and Bardesanes!

The writings of Epiphanius and Theodoret contain treatises upon Gnosticism; but, with all due deference to their wisdom and learning, they were too far removed from their opponents to see clearly through the feeble lens of their criticism, and their writings are too full of notorious errors to afford us any assistance.

The Latin fathers must be consulted with still greater caution. Tertullian is too declamatory; indeed, he is the type of Anti-Gnosticism, so that Neander, with unconscious satire and

---

\* It may be thought that Hymns are uncommon weapons in Polemics; but the reader of St. Ephraim knows them to be keen, and all who are familiar with the history of ballads will confess their power.

wit, has called one of his own learned works, *Anti-Gnosticismus*, or *the Spirit of Tertullian*. Augustine and Cyprian, however, afford us some interesting details and exact information ; but in general, it must be confessed, the Latin fathers are of little use in this inquiry.

No one can fail to lament the loss of the works of the Gnostics themselves, for their language is said to have had an inexpressible charm, stealing away men's hearts before they were aware, and worthy of this most beautiful system of ancient Theosophy. Take from Plato the beauty of his language, give a cold display of the bone and muscle of his philosophy, and all men would shrink back from the picture with disgust and fear. But this has been done with Gnosticism heretofore. It has been stripped of the elegant drapery of half transparent language which its creators enrobed it in ; it has been deprived of life, coldly dissected, and the "dry and frightful anatomy" has been labelled "Gnosticism," and held up to the faces of men. It is, as Professor Matter somewhere remarks, impossible completely to reproduce all its faded features, but we can see that it is one of the most beautiful of the ruins of antiquity, and that it deserves as much of admiration and reverence, as it has formerly received of hatred or contempt.

In the following details we shall follow the author above referred to, sometimes giving his own words. The plan of his work is to give an account of the origin of Gnosticism, a history of the principal schools and sects, and to show the influence which it has exerted upon other systems of philosophy and religion.

In tracing the origin of Gnosticism, Professor Matter has avoided the errors of his predecessors who have contented themselves with finding some of its sources, and deducing it entirely from Platonism, or Zoroasterism, or the dark doctrines of the Cabala. A strong family resemblance exists between the doctrines of Gnosticism and some of the fundamental notions of Plato. The similarity is still more exact with some of the oriental systems, from which, no doubt, Plato had drawn largely either directly, or by the medium of others. Aristobulus and Philo exerted a powerful influence in preparing the way for Gnosticism.

Aristobulus, a contemporary of Ptolemy Euergetes second, opened for Judaism this new avenue to immense conquests. Indeed, he adopted a system of interpretation which permitted

him to introduce, among the teachings of his own nation, all which was most beautiful in the doctrines of others. This method consisted in taking all the facts and all the details, in the sacred volume of the Jews, for so many allegories which concealed the most profound truths. In a *spiritual* commentary upon the law, he ascribed to Moses those ideas which most of all won the admiration of the Greeks, because they were the opinions of their greatest writers. In this, Aristobulus did not wish to recommend the philosophy of Greece to his fellow religionists, but merely to defend the Jewish faith from the attacks incessantly made upon it. Far from acknowledging the superiority of Platonism, or of any oriental system, over the religion of his own nation, he was so satisfied of the excellence of the latter, as to pretend that Plato had derived his most beautiful ideas from the sacred books of the Jews. He went still farther; to show his contemporaries and future generations that the authors most venerated by the Greeks taught the same doctrine with Moses, he composed verses under the names of Orpheus and of Linus, of Homer and of Hesiod, in which he inculcated Jewish principles.

Philo exerted an influence still more powerful in extending the peculiar doctrines of his philosophy, and, with little or no originality of thought, he managed, by judicious compilations from the systems of others to exert a deep influence upon his own and subsequent ages. His philosophy (if *his* it can be called) has much in common with Gnosticism, and without a previous knowledge of his system the latter cannot be thoroughly understood.

The Supreme Being, according to Philo, is the primitive light, the source of all other light, the archetype of light, whence emanate all those innumerable rays which enlighten souls. He is the soul of the world, and as such, acts in all parts of it. \* \* He is without beginning; he lives as the prototype of time. His image is the *Logos*, a form more brilliant than fire, since that is not pure light. The *Logos* dwells in God; for it is in his own intelligence that the Supreme Being makes the *types* or the *ideas* of everything which is to be done in the world. \* \* \* The *Logos* being the world of ideas, by means of which God has created all visible things, he is the elder God, in comparison of the world, which is likewise God, but a God of creation, a younger God. \* \* \* God alone is wise; all wisdom emanates from him as its source; human wisdom is only the reflection,

the image of his. His wisdom may be called the *mother of creation*, of which God is the father. \* \* \* Although the world is made after the ideas, the types conceived by the Supreme Being, it cannot procure us a knowledge of that Being. It can prepare the human mind to receive it, but this knowledge itself is the immediate gift of God, for it is a sort of intuition which he only accords to those who detach themselves from corporeal things.

Philo merely attempted to reproduce the ancient *gnosis*, that superior science possessed by the Hebrew patriarchs, by Moses and Aaron and the Council of the Elders. The various nations which visited Alexandria brought each its own doctrines; thus the teachings of Zoroaster and Pythagoras, of Moses, Plato, and the Cabala united in this common receptacle, and was reproduced imperfectly in the writings of Philo, and more beautifully in the mysterious delusions of Gnosticism. It is vain to seek for the origin of this system in the east or the west, the north or the south alone, for like other systems of eclecticism, it is made up from the manifold treasures of a thousand different streams, each bringing the produce of its native mountain, and taking its tinge from the soils it permeates. These waters were filtered and tempered according to the taste of each master of a school.

About 120 before Christ, the first schools of Gnosticism were formed. The fact, that they arose at the same time in Syria, Egypt, Asia Minor, and Italy, shows how widely the seeds of this new sect were scattered, and how ready was the soil for their germination and growth. The sects that arose at this time did not assume the name of *Gnostics*; this belonged only to a single school of them, which was instituted much later. But their antagonists, classing all sects together, gave them this common title.

The various denominations of Gnostians, to use a modern term, held in common the right to profess a science superior to that of the Christian teachers. This science was the *gnosis* which has given them their name. They differed as to the origin of this mysterious *gnosis*, some attributing it to an ancient revelation, handed down among "the children of light" from the earliest times; others professed to obtain it by the *extatic intuition of the superior worlds*, (which is claimed by all mystics,) and a third party attempted to pin their faith to the sleeve of some apostle who had better opportunities than his fellows

of ascertaining the doctrines of Jesus. None of the Gnostics professed to derive his doctrine from his own reason ; indeed, with the idea that *all truth emanated from the Supreme*, and enlightened the mind of the teacher, it became impossible to draw any pure doctrine from the fountain of the individual mind. Possessed of this sublime science, communicated by the highest authority of the universe, and rendered infallible by the inspiration within him, how calmly could the self-collected enthusiast look down from his proud eminence upon the idle show of practical life, upon the keen controversy and perplexing doubt which agitated the schools of speculation ! Scarcely would they allow that even Plato was a theosophist, maintaining that he had but seen the faint glimmering of the ancient doctrines of the East, whose pale and distant rays enlightened Greece, while themselves were born and matured under its meridian beams ! \* \* \* Possessed of a tradition, of an intuition, of a revelation, and of particular writings, which they alone preserved entire, why should not they be better qualified to teach than the apostolic Christians, who possessed only writings and doctrines corrupted by the ignorance of their masters ? And why should not they teach better than the Grecian schools, which in Ionia could not distinguish intelligence from matter, which in Athens dared not profess the existence of one Supreme Being, which in Italy could only express the relation between the two worlds by musical notes, cyphers, and doubts ! \* \* \* Why should not they eclipse all the dogmatism, and all the skepticism of their times, initiated as they were in all the mysteries of cosmogony, pneumatology, theology, eonology, and christology !

Indeed, the great questions upon the eternity or the createdness of matter, upon the origin, utility, and final extinction of evil, on the relations which exist between the intellectual and the material world, between God and man, on the creation, the fall, the redemption, and regeneration of the human race — all the questions which the priests of the sanctuaries, and the chiefs of schools, had so long agitated, without being able to lift the veil which covered them — all these were but sport for Gnosticism ; it hesitated upon none of them, and henceforward the human mind, under the shelter it offers, may find repose from all the anxieties which formerly had tormented its sterile meditations !

Attempts have been made to separate the Gnostics into three

sects, the *Judaizing*, the *Anti-Judaic*, and the *Eclectic*; but this division is faulty, since during the first five centuries of the Christian era we find no Gnostics entirely ignorant of Judaism, and yet no one deserves the title of *Judaizing*, for they all rejected the main doctrine of Judaism, namely, that the world was the work of the Supreme Being; all of the Gnostics were Syncretics.

Professor Matter bases his classification upon history, and divides the Gnostics into three schools, that of Syria, of Egypt, and of Asia Minor.\* This is undoubtedly the best possible division, since these doctrines took a tinge from their native soil, and uniting with the philosophic mysticism of their birth-place, assumed different forms in various lands. In Syria the elements of this system were more widely and anciently diffused than in any other land. From the Ganges to the Euphrates, these mysterious doctrines had so long prevailed that tradition has forgotten their origin, and they have become incorporated with the nature of the people. The doctrine of Emanation and of Dualism has prevailed in this region from time immemorial, and still retains its hold upon the minds of its inhabitants.

The author, at this stage of his progress, enters into a discussion of the ancient philosophy and religion of Syria, whither we are unable to follow him, though it is exceedingly interesting to notice the mingling of the different doctrines of the various people who met on this ancient battle-field of nations, where the Goths, the Persians, the Egyptians, the Jews, the Greeks, and the Romans poured out their blood and diffused their opinions.

The Syrian school of Gnosticism is more ancient than even that of Egypt; for Basilides, the chief of the Egyptian school, was a native of Syria, and both he and Saturninus were pupils of Simon Magus and Menander, who were natives, the one of Palestine, and the other of Syria. Besides, the Syrian school is the most simple in its doctrines.

Its prevailing idea is the Dualism of Central Asia, and here, this Dualism presents itself under the veritable forms of oriental intuition, whilst in Egypt it assumes those of Grecian speculation. In Egypt it is the idea of Matter, in the Platonic sense, which predominates with its attributes of *vacuum*, *darkness*,

---

\* Baur. ut sup. divides them into three classes, but bases the division upon these three principles, namely, Matter, the Demiurgos, and Christ.

and *death*, in such a manner that it is only animated by the communication of a principle of divine life. It is Satan which resists this communication, or, rather, it is matter, that is to say, it is that which does not partake of the Divinity, who is All, is considered negatively and by abstraction, as the limit and outer envelope of all which exists. This reduces *Dualism* to *Pantheism*. But in Syria, Dualism in common with Parsism admits, on the contrary, a second intellectual principle exceedingly active in its empire of darkness, and very audacious in its opposition to the empire of light. \* \* As to the origin of the intellectual and of the inferior world, all the schools of Gnosticism agree in these two principles, namely, the doctrine of Emanation and of the creation by means of the *Demiurgos*. The intellectual world is the display of the faculties of the Supreme Being, the unknown Father, which is effected by a train of emanation. The inferior world, on the contrary, is far from being the work of God; it is that of an inferior power. But, as to the nature of this power, and the mode of its creations, the schools of Syria and Egypt were divided by the influence of Parsism upon one, and of Platonism upon the other.

Like other schools, the Syrian was divided into various branches. Saturninus may be regarded as the head of the first school. He set out with the opinion that there are two principles in nature continually opposed to one another; the one the source of all good, the other of all evil. In this he differs from all the other Gnostics, who wisely regard the principle of evil as a distant emanation from the Supreme. It is doubtful, however, as Professor Matter thinks, whether Saturninus maintained that this principle was naturally bad, or that he had rendered himself depraved. In the lowest part of the superior world, Saturninus places seven angels, who are the least perfect of all that pertains to this sublime sphere. They are the creators of the visible world, and the governors of its various parts. They formed it as a fortress whence they might assail the Spirit of Evil.

They were not pure genii of light, and were therefore found on the very lowest step of the superior world. They had separated themselves entirely from God, and from this source of good had detached all visible *existencies*, in such a manner that only a feeble reflection of light fell upon them. Yet this reflection inspired them with a desire to return into the dominion of light; and not able to succeed individually, they united their

efforts to concentrate these reflections in a work of their own hands, of which they might be masters. They only produced a worm, crawling with difficulty upon the earth, and unable to elevate himself to God. This worm was *man*! Fortunately for this wretched creature, the superior Power, in whose image man was made, took pity upon him, and sent him a ray of divine light which *animated* him. From that moment *man had a soul*.

This Mythos, singular as it may appear, is in fact of great beauty, if truth is beautiful, and if religious truths are more beautiful than others. It is descended from an idea which some predecessor of Saturninus in by-gone days had expressed in an allegorical manner, and which Saturninus had made the foundation of his doctrine of man. The idea is this, that man in his sublimest efforts, as the history of all his brethren attests, never attains that resemblance, that union, that perfect life which he conceives of in his holiest meditations, and incessantly desires to realize, yet never can attain, because when compared with the Supreme, who soars above the worlds, he *is but creeping upon matter*, and whom God alone, by imparting that power which Christianity calls the spirit, can elevate to himself!

“’Tis a thing impossible to frame  
Conceptions equal to the soul’s desires,  
And the most difficult of tasks to *keep*  
Height which the soul is competent to gain.”

The Divine Being, according to Saturninus, having compassion upon the low estate of man, sent his own supreme power into the world. This Savior, Christ, who nevertheless appeared under the form of a man, came to bring more of assistance to man than he had received of injury from the demons, and at the same time to destroy the power of the wicked, of the demons, and of the God of the Jews, whose laws imposed so many bonds and shackles; and finally to furnish the race of light with the means of elevating themselves above his control. This was the object of Jesus Christ and of Christianity, the doctrine of which was to take the place of that of the chief of the angels, and its ascetic principles were to nourish and fortify the ray of light which God had communicated at his birth, in order that it might at length be worthy of returning into his bosom, whence all which is pure and good has emanated,



and whither all emanations must return. \* \* \* Whatsoever may be the judgment which we pronounce upon this opinion, Saturninus was a Christian and a religious man.

We must pass over Bardesanes, the other distinguished chief of the Syrian school.

The school of Asia Minor was cradled in Italy, though its parents were natives of other countries, the one of Syria, the other of Asia Minor. This school is distinguished from the others by a decided opposition to the doctrine of the Millennium, and to Judaism; and by the proud pretence of possessing all the authentic and genuine writings of Christianity, and the only criticism which could separate the false from the true.

Cerdon was one of the founders of this school, and probably added the most to its brilliant and profound teachings. He rejected some portions of the New Testament, but rather in obedience to caprice than to criticism. His, so called, critical labors upon the New Testament were totally worthless.

We cannot thus readily pass over the arch-heretic Marcion. He was one of those rare men whose hearts are as pure as their minds are wise and instructed. Marcion was a sincere Christian, but unused to the figurative and allegorical style of eastern compositions, he could not satisfy himself of the truth of some portions of Scripture. His opinions upon this subject not agreeing with those of his fellow Christians at Rome, he was excommunicated. Then, in self-defence, he carried out his system, and sought followers and friends. Though grieved at departing from orthodoxy and smarting under the censure of the church, he never permits himself to *wander* in the fields of speculation, but only to seek some spot therein where he may rest his religious feelings and hopes. Still persisting that Christianity is the noblest of all religious systems, since this alone recognises a Savior, who reveals the God of justice, truth, and love, he deemed it necessary to restore the Christian revelation to its primitive purity, by freeing it from the mistakes and perversions of its advocates and friends. He maintained that the apostles had been misled by their Jewish prejudices, and therefore they committed many errors in their writings and teachings.\* True to his principles, with a bold hand he seized the knife of criti-

---

\* "Nemesis is never asleep." Marcion scornfully rejected the *Christian* opinion upon the second coming of Christ, but he adopted the *Jewish* theory upon this subject.

cism to separate from the New Testament all which was not authentic. It was a hazardous work at that time, when almost daily new writings were published not only under the names of the philosophers, the priests, and the patriarchs of other times, but under those of the apostles, and even of Christ! We shall not follow Professor Matter in his discussion of Marcion's criticism upon the New Testament, though the subject is one of interest, and has attracted no little attention from the learned of the present day.\* Suffice it to say, his treatment of the sacred books was entirely arbitrary; criticism had no part in forming his canon of Scripture. Inconsistencies abound in his system. The deepest idea which occupied his attention was that life is a battle in which we are to contend with the spirit of evil. With this idea continually present, he dwelt less, with the other Gnostics, in the upper regions of speculation, but sought to apply knowledge to life, to convert wisdom to morality, and thus attain the victory over the bad principle, and fulfil the design of his life.

In Egypt, Gnosticism assumed a form still different. At the time of the formation of the Egyptian school, the Greek philosophy flourished with more vigor on the banks of the Nile than in any other place. Judaism, modified by the Cabala, by Aristobulus, and by Philo, exercised a powerful influence in the schools, and the old mysterious theosophy of Egypt held its place through the agency of immemorial tradition, a pompous ritual, and magnificent monuments. Here Gnosticism is more powerful, more audacious, than in Syria or in Rome, for it reposes upon the primeval faith of the land, while it sends its keen glances upwards and around, and essays to enfold the sacred form of Truth in its arms. It is never the aim of this philosophy to reproduce the old and faded forms of religion, but to create a new, more beautiful, and perfect system; thus it builds on the old foundation of popular, or sacerdotal doctrines; takes possession of ancient monuments, emblems, and symbols, and applies them to its own objects, distant as they might be from those of their original design.

Here arose the famous Basilides, a profound Gnostic, — yet a Christian notwithstanding, — and at the same time declaring that he did but reproduce the original doctrines of Peter, though they differed from those taught in the New Testament. Some

---

\* See De Wette *Einleitung*, in N. T. § 70 – 72, Ed. 4.

of his doctrines occasionally reappear in modern times, perhaps in our own day. He considered the human soul as a spark, struck off from the Supreme Divinity ; it is now surrounded with earthly matter, from which it is to purify itself, and be restored to its oneness with God. To effect this re-union, this at-onement, is the object of this world, which he regards as a place for the purification of souls. Christ came to teach man the nobleness of his nature, and the means of restoring it to its primeval splendor, namely, wisdom of thought, and pureness of life, (Faith and Works.) When one is brought to a knowledge of the divine life, everywhere diffused in the universe, he must love all things, as God loves all. This affection will then become the source of all his thoughts, feelings, and actions, and will give him that "rest for his soul," which all men are seeking.

After abating much on account of his manifold errors of doctrine, we must pronounce him a wise and good man, living amongst violent and often ignorant opposers.

Valentinus may be placed at the head of all the Gnostics, on account of the completeness of his system, and the number of his followers. We have selected him as the best exponent of Gnosticism, and have attempted a short abstract of his system.

Before the world was made or time began to be, the Supreme Being, — who is variously called the *One*, the *Existing*, the *Depth*, the *Infinite*, the *Beautiful*, — had passed infinite ages in silence and repose, at length he resolved to manifest himself. For this purpose he made use of *Thought*, which is not a manifestation of himself, but the mother of all manifestations, and a Being joint with himself. From them emanated various Beings called *Eons*, who manifested the attributes of the Supreme Divinity, surrounded his invisible presence, and filled up the *Pleroma* of his glory. Valentinus enumerated thirty Eons, fifteen male; and fifteen female, who were distributed into three classes, according to their dignity and descent. They were images of the Invisible, names of the Ineffable.\*

The first class, called the Ogdoad, consisted of eight Eons, namely, the Supreme Deity, (*Bythos*, the *Depth*), and his

---

\* Some subsequent paragraphs of this article have previously appeared in the *Scriptural Interpreter*, a work which obtained but a very limited circulation.

partner, (*Ennoia*, Thought, sometimes called Grace, Silence, and the Unspeakable), with their descendants, namely, Intelligence, (*Nous*, called also the Only Begotten), and Truth his wife, (*Aletheia*); the Word, (*Logos*), and the Life, (*Zoe*); Man, (*Anthropos*), and the Church, (*Ecclesia*).

The second class consisted of ten Eons, who were the descendants of Logos and Zoe, of the Word and Life, namely, the Deep and Mixture, (*Bythios* and *Mixis*); the Undecaying and Union, (*Ageratos* and *Henosis*); the Self-subsisting and Pleasure, (*Autophyes* and *Hedone*); the Unmoved and Moderation, (*Akimetos* and *Syncrasis*); the Only Begotten and Felicity, (*Monogenes* and *Makaria*).

The third class consisted of twelve Eons, the offspring of man and the church, (*Anthropos* and *Ecclesia*). They were the Comforter and Faith, (*Parakletos* and *Pistis*); the Paternal and Hope, (*Patrikos* and *Elpis*); the Metrical and Love, (*Metrikos* and *Agapa*); the Perennial and Prudence, (*Aennaios* and *Synesis*); the Ecclesiastical and the Blessed, (*Ecclesiasticos* and *Makariotes*); the Voluntary and Wisdom, (*Theletos* and *Sophia*).

Thus the first class comprised the immediate emanations of the Supreme Being; the second, the descendants of the Logos; and the third those of the Eon, man.

Besides these thirty, there were four other Eons, of peculiar powers, appointed to especial duties. Horus, (a limit,) "kept watch and ward" on the borders of the Pleroma, lest any one of the Eons should unluckily stray out into Chaos and perish. There was also Christ, the Holy Spirit, and Jesus, who was endowed with all possible gifts, and surrounded by a host of angels.

The office of Christ was to instruct the Eons, that they could never find out the nature and essence of the Supreme, while the Holy Spirit taught them to calm the unruly passions of their souls.

Wisdom, the youngest of all the Eons, desired to understand the nature of God; and because she was unable to effect her purpose, she was thrown into a violent commotion, and her daughter, Knowledge, was cast out into Chaos, where she became the mother of Demiurgos, the world-maker. "As an allegory, this recital has great beauty and truth. Intelligence, which would know more than its actual condition permits, runs astray, consumes and destroys itself, especially when Reason

attempts to isolate herself from Will. The Valentinian Sophia (wisdom) is a beautiful type of the religious soul which aspires to the knowledge of God, and to divine felicity. Besides Speculation, a Will and a Limit (*Theletos* and *Horus*) are necessary. Without these two companions she is lost."

From the eternal matter which had been operated upon by the smiles, the tears, and the anxieties of his mother, Demiurgos formed the world. Man was made of the material and animal natures, and Knowledge—without the consent of Demiurgos—added the spiritual soul, which can never die.

The Demiurgos forgot his createdness, and pretended to be the Supreme God. He was the Jehovah of the Jews, who gradually estranged men from the knowledge of the true God, and subjected them to his grievous tyranny. To rescue man from his forlorn condition, the Deity sent Christ from the Pleroma of his glory. He was born as the Evangelists relate, and at his baptism, the nobler Eon, Jesus, descended upon him in the "form of a dove." The Demiurgos was enraged at the success of his preaching, and caused him to be crucified; but before he suffered death, his *superior nature and spiritual soul*, that is, the Eons, Christ and Jesus, fled back to the *Pleroma*, leaving only the material body and animal soul to bear the "shame of the cross." All the Gnostics made a distinction between the *animal* and *rational* souls. Valentinus makes three classes both of *things* and persons, namely; 1. The Spiritual (Pneumatic). 2. The Material (Hylic). 3. The Sensitive (Psychic).

Such souls as obey the directions of Christ, at the death of their bodies will be brought to the region of light, near the *Pleroma*, and enjoy unbounded blessedness, while all others will be destroyed. There all celestial souls will be reunited with God; Knowledge will enter the *Pleroma*. Demiurgos and all the sensitive souls will joyfully take up their abode in the vicinity of it; the latent fire will spring forth from the bosom of the earth, and consume all matter; then shall things be consummated, and the complete harmony of the universe be restored.

The author points out the successors of Valentinus, treats of their peculiar doctrines, and then proceeds to consider the influence of Gnosticism upon the religious and philosophical sects of its time. Before its doctrines sunk into comparative oblivion and impotence, they descended from the pure region of

speculation to the common stage of life, became unholy and grotesque. Doubtless it is melancholy to see these schools degenerating, when their chiefs had established the purest of principles, and had practised the most severe morality; but such, in all ages, has been the march of human nature. From the bosom of a rigorous system proceeds the most effeminate doctrine. Epicurus and Aristippus were disciples of Socrates! If we would reproach the schools of Marcion, Basilides, and Valentinus with the doctrines of the Carpocratians, the Judaites, and the Aggapites, we must, with the same reason, accuse Socrates of the principles of the Cynics, the Epicureans, and the Cyrenaicians. And if we must separate the practical part of the systems, and speak only of their theories, have we not seen—in our own times—pantheism, on the one side, and idealism, on the other, placing their fantastic cradles at the feet of the chair of Kant!

Finally, Gnosticism may need apologies for some of its details, but certainly it needs none as a whole. It is the most perfect expression, which has reached us, of the theosophic opinions and tendencies of the first six centuries of our era.

In passing to an examination of its influence, we pretend not to show that it has been salutary; we only wish to state the fact. The speculations of human reason form the basis of the destiny of mankind, and the hand of man could but feebly hold the balance of, the Supreme Judge to estimate that destiny.

When we determine upon this singular and shifting system of Philosophy and Religion, we are to inquire what has it aimed to effect, and what has it done?

Gnosticism, or its Psychology, has told man that his soul is a ray of the essence of light which constitutes the Divinity; that it is of the same nature with the world of the most sublime intelligences; that the Supreme Being confided it to matter; that even its miseries in this transitory existence are a proof of its condition of exile; and that, if it remembers its celestial origin, if it listens to the Savior, at the term of its terrestrial career, it will recover the rank which its nature and virtues assign it, and will re-enter the bosom of him who is All.

Modern Psychology has not advanced a step further in these great questions, which occupied the attention of the Gnostics. Doubtless it has better observed, analyzed, or at least described, one by one, the faculties of the soul, and far be it from us to

depreciate the works which are the glory of our age; but if we ask of the science of our days, what is the soul? whence does it come? whither go? how is it united with its envelope? how distinct from it? our science, wordy as it is upon little questions, is silent upon these great matters.

It does not allow that the soul is a ray emanated from the Supreme Light, and it is right in not wishing to avail itself of an image; but in proscribing the image, it has no better seized the fact. It knows no better than Gnosticism, whence the soul comes, nor whither it goes, nor why, being good, it is united to matter which is evil. Our philosophy verily maintains that matter is neither good nor bad; but when one asks if it is not bad, why it torments the soul so long as they are united, and dissolves when they separate; our philosophy keeps silence. It is because our philosophy is no philosophy. Philosophy is no more, only doubt survives, and doubt itself is counterfeit to-day. It leads no longer to belief. In rising from terrestrial to celestial spirits, from psychology to *pneumatology*, Gnosticism told man of an innumerable world of intelligences. It distinguished the classes, explained the labors, and analyzed the degree of happiness of all spirits; it revealed to man his degree of affinity with them. It divided men into classes, corresponding to those of the celestial spirits, into pneumatic and *hylic*; the nations themselves it arranged after analogous categories. The earth and heaven were equally explained and illustrated by it, and formed but one grand whole in the eyes of Gnosticism, which penetrated all secrets.

How poor is our pneumatology, in comparison with such a science! The fact is, we have no pneumatology, for all that we know about spirit is only definitions. But do superior spirits really exist or not? If they exist, what is their nature, what are their labors, what their relations with mortal men? Upon this our pneumatology can say nothing.

We must at least allow the Gnostics the merit of teaching an admirable *providence*, and of assigning to men a rank he has reason to be proud of. His destiny indeed is traced in the most seducing manner. He comes into the material world, according to some, in consequence of a great disorder with which he had nothing to do, or as others believe, by means of a fall, which was his own fault. But still, though he is an exile, he finds there a noble mission; he contends there for the

holy cause of light; he is the friend, the co-worker of God; he is aided in his turn and protected by God. At the same time he purifies himself; when he is purified, he is likewise God; when all is purified, the world, the scene of his combats, ceases to be, and evil no where exists.

The morality, which Gnosticism prescribes to man, agrees perfectly with this destiny. To furnish the body with all which is needed; to retrench all which is superfluous; to supply the soul with all which can enlighten it, strengthen it, and render it like God, whose image it is; to unite it with the Deity, from whom it emanated, such is the morality of Gnosticism. Without doubt Gnosticism presents some scandalous deviations from this sublime introduction to immortality, but the sun has likewise its spots, yet is notwithstanding a source of light.

While we smile at the bold and lofty pretensions of this wonderful system of philosophy and religion, and bring down its proud doctrines to their true level, we cannot fail to admire the beauty of its allegories, the profoundness of many of its doctrines, the true expression of many of its striking symbols, and to look upon it as the brightest link in that long chain of philosophy by which man attempted to unite the world of matter and of mind; the universe with its Author.\* From whatever point of view we examine Gnosticism, whether in its doctrines, or its worship; in its influence upon its partisans, or in that which it exercised upon other philosophical and religious sects; Gnosticism has occupied in the annals of the human race, and consequently in the designs of Providence, one of the most remarkable places. He, whose mind loves to rise a little above facts, and to meditate upon the designs which preside over all this vast and rapid succession of events and tendencies which history recalls to us, will find that Gnosticism forms a curious chapter in the works of Humanity.

T. P.

---

\* The third volume contains several beautiful engravings of the gems, medals, &c. of the Gnostics, with explanations of them; and is both curious and valuable.

---



## NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

*Joanna of Naples*, by the AUTHOR OF "MIRIAM." Boston: Hilliard, Gray, & Company. 1838. 12mo. pp. 213. — As a tasteful porch invites us into the dwelling to which it is attached, so did the modest and graceful preface of this volume give us promise of a pleasing interior. After apologizing to the public for "offering them so slight a production, founded on a subject so fertile in materials," the author thus proceeds to give a brief account of the origin of her work.

"Some years since, the writer perused Mrs. Jameson's *Lives of Female Sovereigns* with great pleasure, and the impression was a lasting one, — particularly so with regard to the biography of Joanna. She was led by it to examine all the records of that celebrated Queen, to which she had access. When afterwards deprived of her customary occupations, for two or three years, by partial blindness, one of her chief resources against the weariness of forced idleness was in exercises of the Memory and Invention. She sometimes entertained herself with weaving fictions and planning little works, destined never to come forth from the chambers of her brain; and amid the visionary processions which moved through her darkened apartment, many a time did the majestic figure of the Neapolitan Queen sweep sadly by, the heroine of the unwritten romance. As a memorial of those hours, when the faculties mercifully bestowed on every human mind asserted their power to charm away physical evil, she has, the last summer, committed some of their fruits to paper, and the task has again beguiled a few weeks of ill health. Want of eyesight has prevented her indulging in researches that might have graced her pages with antiquarian lore; but she trusts she has avoided any serious anachronisms. Her narrative is not a work of pure fiction, as most of the leading characters and principal events are historical; and she has endeavored to take no unwarrantable liberties with facts, as recorded by writers, who believed Joanna innocent of the crimes charged upon her by her enemies.

"For a time, the author contemplated attempting a Tragedy, on the subject which is now presented in a less ambitious form; but a strong consciousness of the high nature of the undertaking and of the difficulties to be encountered by any one, who proposes to conform to the rules laid down by the established canons of criticism, deterred her from so hazardous an enterprise.

"In the following Tale, she has remembered a wish often expressed in her hearing by judicious mothers; she has endeavored to discard the machinery usually employed in works of fiction; and to bring strong passions and affections into play, without the coöperation of that, on which the main interest of a romantic story commonly depends. She respectfully waits the decision of the Public, as to the degree of interest excited for a heroine, whose fears and trials are not interwoven with a love-tale. Her little work is published in the hope, that, if it win the approbation of her young readers, they may be lured by it to

the fountains of history, ever pouring forth bright streams of pleasure and instruction. As the current comes gliding down from the urns of dim antiquity, it brings us awful truths, that deserve contemplation, — the insufficiency of human greatness, — the dangers of a blinding prosperity, — the terrible retribution, which so often overtakes guilt, even on this side of the grave." — pp. 1-3.

We particularly approve of Miss Park's determination of not yet attempting a Tragedy. We trust the time will come, when she may not only attempt one, but succeed in the attempt. There are so few really good tragedies, however, in our language, and the highest talents have been so often foiled in the desire of adding to the number, that we are of opinion that the tragedy is a form of literature which should only be approached with the extremest care and the fullest preparation. Even what is called a drama is not always practicable by the best hands. The one or two which Sir Walter Scott published are barely tolerable. The "Miriam" of our author has a deserved reputation among us, which we would not say a word to lessen; and yet we must avow, that we prefer the historic tale which has succeeded it. In our judgment, which, however, we do by no means regard as final and infallible, there is a want of finish, of natural coherence, of maturity of conception and plot in the former, which cannot be charged against the latter. In this tale there is no over-drawing of character, though the sketching is strong and spirited; there is no appearance of effort, though the interest of many of the scenes is absorbing. The language bears out the thought. A sad and dignified pathos pervades the whole, which, without any aid from the passion of love, keeps our attention fixed to the close. We dare to recommend "Joanna of Naples" to the public — high praise as we feel it to be — as an improvement on "Miriam."

---

*A Love Token for Children. Designed for Sunday-School Libraries.* By the Author of "The Linwoods," "Live and Let Live," "Poor Rich Man," &c. &c. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1838. 18mo. pp. 142. — Whether Miss Sedgwick writes a novel in two volumes, a tale in one, or stories so short that it takes eight of them to fill a little book like this same "Love Token," she always mingles amusement and instruction most healthfully together. Of sickly sentiment she has none, and yet of feminine grace and tenderness she is full; and her humor and her pathos are often blended so exquisitely together, that you are doubtful for a moment whether the mixed feeling, which they produce within you, is going to evince itself in a laugh or

a fit of tears. Her observations are sensible, her dialogues easy and natural, her sketches of character capital. And this is equally true with regard to her stories for grown people and for children. No one draws the New England or Yankee character better than she does; few draw it so well. The attempts either of Southerners or Englishmen in this line, are generally coarse and unnatural daubings; her pictures are true.

One of her faults, we think, is a tendency to make her favorites a *little* too perfect and inimitable. They are sometimes too much like the widow Ellis's garden in the present volume, which, consisting of the *tenth* of an acre, supplied her and her son Willie with "plenty of potatoes for breakfast and dinner all the year round, and often a good mess for the cow;" with all other sorts of vegetables and many sorts of fruits beside, and, for a garnish, with rows of medicinal herbs, and quite a choice of flowers — "looking as pleasant among the cabbages, turnips, &c.," as she prettily observes, "as a smile on a laborer's face." Now, though we pretend to no great knowledge of farming, yet we will venture to say, that such a tenth of an acre as that, is enough to put all New England into despair.

And yet the idea of such a wondrous garden may stimulate our horticultural efforts to produce something as like it as possible. And so with a pattern character; — it is a pattern, very delightful to behold, and very profitable to imitate; though at the same time, a dash of imperfection would make it more life-like and probable.

The "Love Token" is a good book for Sunday School Libraries; good for children to read, and good to suggest topics of conversation to teachers.

---

*Sketches of a New England Village, in the Last Century.* Boston: James Munroe & Company. 1838. 18mo. pp. 110. — This little book is also written by a lady, and is made up of Letters, which "were really addressed, as they purport to have been, to a friend." That the writer, however, is old enough to know much of "the last century" through her own experience, we more than doubt; though at the same time we fully believe that the characters she draws are "substantially true," and the scenes she describes, real.

There is no continuous story, action, or interest, which ties these letters together, and therefore the reader of them must not look for that kind of entertainment which is given by a connected narrative. They only profess to contain "Sketches;" but the sketches are pencilled by a delicate hand; and, though

hanging separately, possess individual merits to attract and reward attention. The subjects are those of rural and simple life, drawn with the lines of nature, and colored with warm feeling, which often deepens into sadness.

Here is a picture of the parsonage which was occupied by the writer's father. Is it not distinct and faithful?

"You must remember my often-repeated descriptions of the dear old parsonage. It was a tolerably large, dark, unpainted house, two stories in front, full of windows, to admit all the genial influences of the south, while on the north it sloped down so that one might lay his hand on the roof. These old fashioned houses are fast disappearing from our country. They were admirably calculated to protect us from the severe winters of our climate. The front always turned to the sun, and the long sloping roof, on which the deep snows rested, afforded from that very circumstance, a protecting warmth. Almost the only picturesque object in our unpoetical country, the long well-pole, with its 'mossy, iron-bound bucket,' is disappearing with them.

"Our house was rather irregular in form, and on the outside of a most venerable blackness, stained here and there with spots of moss and decay. We entered a sort of low, wide hall, which had been originally built of logs, by a low portal. A block of unhewn granite, worn smooth and even hollow on the surface by the weary feet of many pilgrims, was the door-step. The rest of the house had been added at a later period. On the right of this low hall a door led to my father's study, and on the opposite side to our little parlor. At the back part were the kitchen, dairy, etc. In the hall stood the spinning-wheels, and it was hung all around with skeins of linen and woollen yarn, and with other productions of rural and domestic labor. This humble dwelling was overshadowed by two giant sycamore trees, while its only ornament, the double white rose, grew profusely about its doors and windows." — pp. 5, 6.

And here is a sketch of one of the stray guests at that same parsonage; with a very sensible remark appended to it, which some of our friends, who are fond of making new definitions of religion, may do well to consider.

"A wounded French soldier passed a whole winter during the war by our kitchen fire. He had lost both legs to the knee, and moved about on the stumps. We pitied him, and loved to hear his broken English, or rather a mixture of French and English. He was a Catholic, and wore a rosary with a crucifix. He always, however, attended our family prayers, crossing himself repeatedly during his devotions. My father took no notice of it, and never allowed the children to question him, or to smile at his ostentation of Catholic observance. All the French, who came to help us through the war, were probably Catholics, and our own people must then have embraced them as brothers. The jealousy and hatred of Catholics is the growth of later times. My father, although a Calvinist, revered this poor man's religion; and never, that I knew of, made any attempt to convert him. He probably

thought, as we are all children of one Father, *he* drew as near in his ignorance to the character of a confiding child, as *we* in our presumption of greater knowledge. This poor Frenchman made wooden spoons and forks, his only tool a sharp knife. He attained such perfection in spoons, that those made of our colored maples were really beautiful. If, according to a late definition, 'religion is manifested in the pursuit of perfection in any direction *whatever*,' he was the most religious man among us, for his wooden spoons were as perfect as wooden spoons could be. Perhaps it would be better to adhere to the old definition, — 'To do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with our God.' — pp. 15 — 17.

We might multiply our extracts from this unpretending volume, and our readers would thank us for doing so; but our purpose will be better answered, if they should be induced by the passages already quoted, to become owners of the volume itself.

We have received the February number of the *American Quarterly Register*, published by the American Education Society. Although the character of its theology is in general not much to our taste, yet we always find in it a great deal of valuable information, in the form of local histories, clerical biographies, and statistical tables. In the last number we were surprised by a portrait and biography of Sir Matthew Hale. As he was neither an American nor a divine, we thought him out of place in this work. In the present number, the portrait and biography of the late Dr. Samuel Gile of Milton, although he was by no means so great a man as Sir Matthew Hale, were yet satisfactory to us, because they were in accordance with the objects of the Register. We can go to Bishop Burnet, and to many a biographical dictionary, for an account of my Lord Chief Justice Hale; but where, except to some repository like the Register, could we go for an account of Dr. Gile, and many other worthy yet not very celebrated divines?

We are glad to find that Mr. Farmer continues in this number his valuable "Memoirs of Ministers, who have been graduated at Harvard College, since the foundation of that Institution." He now gives us notices of Shubael Dummer, John Haynes, John Eliot, John Emerson, Zachariah Symmes, John Cotton, John Hale, and John Whiting, who were graduated in the years 1656, 1657. We copy a part of the notice of John Hale, on account of the reference it contains to Salem Witchcraft and Animal Magnetism.

"In 1692 he was unhappily engaged in defending the prosecutions against those accused of witchcraft in the vicinity of Salem,

and probably contributed his full share of influence in that melancholy tragedy. His course in strengthening the superstition of the times was, however, checked, when his own wife was accused 'of being in covenant with the devil,' and he was led 'to alter his judgment, and to be less active in prosecutions than he had been.' He wrote an account of witchcraft, from which Dr. C. Mather borrowed largely while it was in manuscript, for his account of the 'Wonders of the Invisible World.' The work was published after his death. The title of it is as follows: 'A Modest Enquiry into the nature of Witchcraft, and how persons guilty of the crime may be convicted, and the means used for their discovery discussed, both negatively and affirmatively, according to Scripture and experience. By JOHN HALE, late Pastor of the Church of Christ in Beverley, Anno Domini, 1697.' It has an epistle to the reader by Rev. John Higginson of Salem, dated March 23, 1697-8. The preface is dated December 15th, 1697, and the book, containing 176 pages, was published in 1702. In these days, when the wonders of Animal Magnetism are producing on some minds as great astonishment as did those in the days of witchcraft, it may be discovered that the delusion which an enlightened age has attributed to our ancestors, was a sober reality. Or, perhaps, it may hereafter be found that the wonders now regarded as sober realities, will be classed with the delusions which prevailed in 1692. In either case, the light of reason and philosophy will probably prevent the repetition of the horrid scenes which were enacted in the time of the subject of this notice."— pp. 247, 248.

For ourselves we are inclined to think that the wonders of witchcraft and of animal magnetism, however they may differ in results, are alike in being, for the most part, the delusions of heated imagination, in not unfrequent combination with the delusions of low imposture.

---

The first volume of Professor Palfrey's "*Academical Lectures on the Jewish Scriptures and Antiquities*," has now been for some weeks before the public. It is a large and handsomely printed octavo of 511 pages. Long looked for, it is very welcome. We hope to obtain a review of it for our next number.

---



inquiries, that have agitated the minds of his countrymen for the last fifty years. His charm for us lies in his genial, flowing style, his strong common sense, joined with great poetic sensibility, and giving clearness and beauty to the most perplexing topics, and above all, in that noble heart of his, that beats in every page of his works, and glows for all that is dear to humanity. He avoids the two great errors, that mark the works of so many of his distinguished countrymen. He neither soars away into airy hypothesis, nor grovels in a spiritless, earthborn criticism. He is willing to take his stand with the rest of us, his race, on this fair earth, and look around him and above him with the eye of man. He is not always star-gazing as through a telescope on heavenly things, until earth and common sense are forgotten, nor with face to earth is he prying, as with a microscope, into the minutiae of things around, until their true proportions and perspective vanish away. He views with common sense the world below, and rejoices in the heavenly lights, that cheer it. With kind and earnest heart, he owns and rejoices, that

"The charities, that soothe, and heal, and bless,  
Are scattered at the feet of man like flowers ;"

and yet never forgets, that

"The primal duties shine aloft, like stars."

De Wette accordingly has been quite a favorite with English readers. Translations are at this time announced of three of his works. Even the Orthodox, especially when we consider his many heinous heresies in their view, have treated him with singular gentleness. They are glad to make some exception in his favor, when dealing out their wholesale condemnations of the German neologists, as they are wont indiscriminately to call a class of men of the most opposite opinions and characters, from a low critical Naturalism up to a sublime and spiritual Christian Faith. Hugh James Rose, indeed, who first undertook to frighten the English public with the bugbear of German neology, did not know enough of his subject, as Bretschneider among others has shown, to speak with any discrimination, or make any exceptions from his sweeping charges of infidelity. He could only see, that German theologians had freed themselves from slavery to the old church standards, and, like a good Episcopalian, he called them all infidels, and ascribed the whole "mass of mischievous and evil opinions" to their lack of an



established priesthood and invariable creed, and enlarged on "the necessity of some check or restraint over the human mind in every religious society, and especially over the ministers of religion, who," according to him, "ought not to think their own thoughts, nor form their own plans, but teach what the church commands." He forgot that English Episcopacy could not suppress infidelity, and in Episcopal England, infidelity has shown itself in worse forms than in Germany, and that the writings of English deists were a leading cause of the German skepticism of the last century, and that even in his own boasted land of true belief, the Episcopalian form is continually upon the decrease, and the vital religion of the country is found among the dissenters. But the Rev. E. A. Pusey, a brother Episcopalian, has undertaken to refute Mr. Rose's blunders, and to point out the true causes of the new era, whose errors he deplores in German Theology. Mr. Pusey has said some good things in his two works, but it is about as reasonable to suppose that he can learn the real causes of the progress of thought, by laboriously groping among the musty theologians of the old school and exploring their errors, as it would be to suppose that an ant can form an idea of the compass and beauty of a fine prospect by creeping round among the ant hills. He has shown himself rather a fair-minded man, although too weak to carry out his somewhat liberal ideas to their true results, and too much afraid of the Episcopacy to express his opinions fully, especially after Mr. Rose's answer to his work had frightened him, by sounding in his ears the old cry,

"The church is in danger, alas!"

Mr. Pusey seems to take an especial liking to De Wette. He mentions him in several places, and speaks of him as one, "whose really Christian faith is only obscured by his adherence to the philosophy of Fries."

The Orthodox of our own land also have made honorable mention of De Wette. Professor Stuart, besides making frequent quotations from his works, excepts him from the charge of infidelity, which he passes on so many German theologians; and Dr. Robinson, in introducing to the public Professor Torrey's translation of De Wette's Introduction to the Psalms, calls it and the Commentary, which it precedes, the best extant in a philological point of view, with but a single rival, and declares that the author, "as a writer of taste and poetical susceptibility, stands foremost in the ranks of German theologians."

As to the exact place which De Wette holds among the theologians of his country, the opinion will of course depend much upon the religious creed of him, who is to pass judgment. That he stands in the foremost rank, his opponents cannot deny; not even those backsliding pseudo-evangelicals, who have sought to stigmatize all liberal thought with the brand of infidelity, and to bring back the slavish spirit of the dark ages. The mere fact, that Schleiermacher had but one portrait hung up in his study, and that was De Wette's, shows the estimation in which he, whom many deem the master mind of modern theology, regarded his younger and illustrious compeer. There can be but little doubt, that a majority of the living theologians of Germany would rank De Wette as on the whole the most distinguished of their number, although there are others superior to him in some particular departments.

We shall leave De Wette to choose his own name among the contending parties in theology, and to declare his own position in the procession of minds, who have given such new life to religion since the middle of the last century. We merely remark in the outset, that he appears to be the rightful successor of Herder and Schleiermacher, the third of an illustrious trio, who more than all others have rebuked the dead supernaturalism of the old school, and the skeptical rationalism of the new, and sought to kindle a living faith congenial with the age, and to reconcile science and criticism with religion and revelation. He is the rightful successor of Herder and Schleiermacher, and wears the mantle of them both. He has the poetic susceptibility of the one, and much of the logic and philosophy of the other, and probably more extensive learning, than either. Through him, many of the favorite ideas of both will be more likely to be diffused, than through their original fountains. The order and completeness of his works give him superiority over the fragmentary Herder; and the warmth and flow of his style and his felicity at illustration find for him delighted readers, where the abstract, though singularly logical and acute volumes of Schleiermacher would be thrown down in utter perplexity and despair.

No satisfactory sketch of De Wette's life and mental development has yet reached us. Such a sketch has been published among others in Germany in a work, called "*Living Characters*," but no copy of it, that we know of, has reached this country. So we must make out a meagre outline of

his career from the imperfect notices of him, that are scattered here and there, and from such suggestions as his own works and prefaces give.

William Martin Leberecht De Wette was born in 1780, in the village of Ulla, in Weimar, where his father was minister. At the age of sixteen, he entered the gymnasium of Weimar. He there became acquainted with the illustrious French emigrant Mounier, who figured so conspicuously in the early scenes of the French Revolution, and who with his family sought shelter in Germany in 1795, where he received from the Duke of Weimar the castle of Belvidere. He became tutor to Mounier's son, and accompanied him in a journey to Switzerland, and Grenoble. Perhaps the beautiful descriptions of Swiss scenery which are found in his novel "Theodor," as well as the thoughts with which they inspire the young Theodore, were derived from reminiscences of this journey, performed when he, like his young hero, was a student of theology, and his opinions and faith were not fully fixed. In 1799, at the age of nineteen, he entered the university of Jena, and studied theology. In 1807 he was appointed *professor extraordinarius* of philosophy at Heidelberg, and in 1809 entered the theological faculty of the same university. In 1810 he accepted an appointment in the university of Berlin upon its establishment in that year, and thus became the companion of Schleiermacher, who headed the theological faculty of that university. There he remained until 1819, pursuing his studies with unwearied zeal, and from time to time publishing the fruits of them.

His first efforts were directed to the historical criticism of the Old Testament. While at Jena, in 1805, he published a small academic dissertation on Deuteronomy, in which he undertook to prove, that this book was written by a different author, and at a different time from those of the other books. This dissertation, as republished in his *Opuscula*, (1830,) contains but twenty pages, and is not such as would justify the expectations, which the title, "Treatise on the Mosaic Books," given it by the *Conversations-Lexicon*, would naturally excite. The work, which effectually introduced him to public notice, was his *Contributions to an Introduction to the Old Testament*, (1806, 1807,) which was published before he left Jena. This work gained him great notoriety, and met with warm admiration, and as warm opposition. In the first volume, he examined the

Books of Chronicles in their bearing on the Pentateuch, and undertook to show, that the Chronicles were written after the captivity, and are of course no evidence of the earlier existence of the Pentateuch; and furthermore, that there are no real traces of the Pentateuch before the time of Josiah, and no proofs of its existence, as a whole, before the exile. In the second volume, he criticises the Mosaic books, and applies to them the principle of the first volume, and declares the Pentateuch to consist of many parts, which in course of time were gathered around an original document, which he traces through Genesis and the first part of Exodus, and considers as being purely a national Epic—an Epic poem in celebration of the Hebrew theocracy. He maintains, that there is no ground for placing the origin of any portion of the Pentateuch before the time of David, or four hundred years after Moses, and that we read of a written book of the law first in the time of Josiah, and have no trace of the existence of the Pentateuch in its present form until after the exile, or one thousand years after Moses, whose history it contains.

A singular circumstance, that must have pained the author, while it flattered him, attended the publication of the first volume of this work. The venerable Griesbach states it in a preface, which he kindly wrote for his young friend in order to relieve him from the embarrassment of stating it for himself. He states, that some time before the date (1806) Dr. De Wette had shown him a treatise, in which he undertook to prove, that the Pentateuch must have arisen in its present form at a period, far later even than that which those scholars have fixed upon, who deny Moses to have been its author, and asked his advice about printing the treatise. He (Griesbach) finding that the researches were conducted according to the rules of historic criticism, and without mixture of any airy hypotheses, and thinking the results arrived at worthy the careful attention of scholars, advised the young author to publish the work. During the final preparation of the manuscript and the negotiations with the publisher, the excellent treatise on the Pentateuch in the third part of Vater's valuable Commentary appeared. "Struck with astonishment, my young friend," continues Griesbach, "half rejoiced, half shocked, hastened to communicate to me the honorable misfortune which had befallen his work now ready for the press. It was surely a very happy and flattering circumstance to him, that he, wholly independently of the re-

nowned scholar of Halle, at the same time had hit on the very same path with him in all essential points, and in the main had arrived at the very same results regarding the Pentateuch. But it was very disheartening for the young scholar, of whom the elder had so got the start, that so much time, and labor, and energy, had been used in vain, and that the hope of introducing himself to the learned world by a work, not uninteresting, should be so frustrated; since if De Wette's book were to be published, it could hardly escape the undeserved fate of being taken for a mere echo of Vater's treatise." But since De Wette's work had some points peculiar to itself, Griesbach counselled his friend to revise it, and to make these peculiar secondary points, the main parts of a new work. And since the high-minded Vater, far from any petty jealousy of a young scholar, whom accident had placed in a sort of rivalry with him, not only confirmed Griesbach's advice, but promised to lend a helping hand towards preparing the work for the press, thus the present treatise (Vol. I.) appeared. This first volume was published under the modest title of an Appendix to Vater's *Inquiries concerning the Pentateuch*. The second volume, which appeared the year after, (1807,) appears to contain in a revised form the sum of the originally unpublished work, and is entitled "*Criticism of the Mosaic History*." So much for the history of that famous work, which introduced De Wette to the world, and laid the foundation of his splendid reputation. We have said so much about it, because it holds so important a place among the author's critical labors, and has been so much admired for its originality, and so much condemned for its heresy.

While at Heidelberg, De Wette formed a connexion with Augusti, with a view of preparing a translation of the whole Bible, (Heidelberg 1809—1811, five volumes,) of which competent judges have thought the parts prepared by De Wette the best. We presume that his translation of the Bible, published in 1832, in three parts, consists of a revision of his former translations, and a new rendering of the passages formerly translated by Augusti.

In 1813, he published the first volume of his *Biblical Dogmatics of the Old and New Testaments*, the second volume of which did not appear until 1818. His next work was a *Manual of Hebraico-Jewish Archæology*, which appeared in 1814, and was followed by his *Manual of a Historico-Critical Introduc-*

tion to the Old Testament. Both these works contain essentially the views of his earlier work on the Old Testament, but in greater maturity and fulness. The Introduction to the Old Testament has met with most success, having reached a fourth edition. We trust that the translation, which has lately been put within reach of our public, will meet with sufficient patronage to ensure its publication.

In 1815, his work on Religion and Theology appeared, a book, which gives a complete view of the author's opinions, and is deemed one of the most important contributions to the science of theology. This work, as well as the Dogmatics, to which it is an explanation, and his Christian Morals, (3 vols. 1819-1821,) are strongly marked by the philosophy of Fries, of whom De Wette is a most faithful disciple.

But during the writing of this latter work, a sad change came over the author's fortunes, and he was driven from Berlin, that favored seat of learning, so dear to him, as the abode of so many cherished friends, and the field of so many happy pursuits. In 1818, he had been hospitably entertained at the house of the parents of Charles Louis Sand, and after the murder of Kotzebue by that misguided, but noble-souled young enthusiast, De Wette deemed it his duty to write a letter of consolation to the agonized mother of the youth. The letter contained this passage.

"The spirit of faith and confidence, with which the deed was performed, is a good sign of the times. The deed, considered in a general point of view, is immoral. Evil is not to be overcome by evil, but only by good. No right can be founded on wrong, cunning, or violence, and the good end does not justify the means."

Now a fair-minded man will see nothing wrong in this language, especially in view of the peculiar circumstances, under which it was written, and since all must allow that Sand was actuated by a sense of duty, however mistaken, when he committed the murder. Indeed, we could excuse De Wette for far more decisive language, when we consider the characters of the assassin and of his victim, and compare the young theological student, insane with zeal for German freedom, and willing to be its martyr, with Kotzebue, the traitor to his birthright, the fawning spaniel of Aristocracy, the corrupter of the German Drama, the intriguing enemy of Goethe, the satirist of liberal institutions, and the hireling of the Russian Autocrat. The letter,

moreover, was merely of a private nature, and written to console a distressed mother, as the author rightly alleged, after it was made public; and he wished it to be so considered. All that he asked was to be judged by a competent tribunal. But his plea was all in vain; the ministry of public instruction dismissed him without farther inquiry. Frederic William was probably not sorry to rid his favorite university of a man, whose liberality was as little agreeable to him in religion, as in politics. The senate of the university tried to intercede for him, but instead of obtaining its object, was severely reprimanded for the interference. On leaving his situation, he addressed manly letters to the king, the minister, and the senate. He refused to accept a quarter's salary offered him by the minister, and left Berlin. He received many hearty proofs of the general interest felt in his welfare.

In Weimar he finished his *Christian Morals*, which had been interrupted by his calamity, and prepared a critical edition of the works of Luther, of which the first volume, containing Luther's letters, appeared at Berlin in 1825. At Weimar, he also wrote the work called "*Theodore, or the Sceptic's Consecration*" (Berlin, 1822 and 1828,) which to the general reader is the most interesting of all his productions, since in the form of an engaging romance, it gives his views on the most important subjects in Literature, Art, Morals, and Religion, and with a master hand traces the course of the young sceptic through all his doubts, describes all the various opinions and influences to which a young German of the present age is subject, and finally guides the young Theodore through all his perplexities to a deeply based and happy faith, and fixes him in the Christian ministry to which his parents had destined him, and towards which amid all his troubles his heart had ever fondly yearned. This work affords inestimable aid to all young men, especially such as have thought of making the ministry their profession. It is a guiding star over that sea of doubt, which the author himself probably passed, and which all reflecting minds must pass, before going from the spontaneous, credulous belief of childhood to that manly faith, whose foundation is deep in reason and the heart. The work is also a good guide in matters of taste, music, poetry, and all the fine arts, as well as a useful mentor in regard to social intercourse and knowledge of the world. The whole is pervaded with a heartfelt love and joyous faith, and shows in every page how the writer's mind

had arisen above the grievous difficulties, in the midst of which it was written. Through all Theodore's wanderings and perplexities, a good angel attends him—his own truth-seeking spirit never leaves him desolate. Through all his perplexities of opinion, through all the mazes of subtle and doubting philosophy, through all his despondings before the cold and heartless rationalism of one party, and his disgusts at the narrowness and dogmatism of the other, amid all his temptations from worldly men and worldly women—through all this troublous pathway, a heavenly star hovers over him, and finally leads him to Jesus and to faith. Some of the characters, with whom Theodore comes into contact, are such as are found only in Germany, those for instance, who represent some of the contending schools of German philosophy. But in general, the characters are such as can be well matched in our community. There are indeed among us no Kantian nor Schellingite lecturers to task the mind of the young student. But we have the cold rationalist, who would explain away all the vital truths of religion, the orthodox dogmatist, who alike shocks reason and chills true faith—we have the elegant worldlings like Landeck and Theresa to damp the young man's religious aspirations, and allure him to join in the struggles of worldly vanity and ambition; we have plenty of such exquisites as Narciss, and such voluptuaries as the coquetting Countess O. And on the other hand, the good spirits that surround Theodore are the same that befriend the young student among us. John, that simple and affectionate young minister, whose beautiful and childlike faith had never been perplexed by the scrutinies of critics or the problems of philosophers—the good old-fashioned parson of Schonbeck, Theodore's early tutor and constant friend—the pious mother—the pure and loving sister—the good old statesman, Schonfels—the noble-hearted young Otto, his son—the fair devotee, Otto's sister, Hildegard—the pious and enlightened theologian who taught Theodore to silence his skeptical doubts, to reconcile his head with his heart, science with religion; all these characters have as much meaning for us as for the German reader. The same questions on man and Providence, that inflame the curiosity of the young students in the universities of Germany, are agitated, although perhaps in a different form, in the colleges of our own land. Many a conversation, like that between the cheerful and trusting Theodore and the gloomy Calvinistic Walter among the mountains of



Switzerland, has taken place among the hills of New England. The same spirit that darkened the mind of Walter to the beauties and sublimities of Rossberg and Righi, and reminded him only of the falling avalanche and the buried village, and the wrath of God against a depraved and cursed world, has led the young traveller at Niagara to see in that sublime flood—which, “mighty lyric of nature” as it is, ought to quicken a joyous heavenward faith—only an image of hell, that abyss of the doomed from which the smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever.\*

De Wette now felt the desire to become a preacher, and appeared in the pulpit in several places in his native Weimar. He also published several sermons, by which the congregation of St. Catharine's Church at Brunswick were induced to invite him to become a candidate for the place of assistant clergyman in 1821. He accepted the invitation, and was unanimously elected; but the government refused to confirm his election, although the theological faculties in Jena and Leipsic had declared, that he had not rendered himself unfit for the ministry by his letter to Sand's mother. De Wette therefore accepted the office of professor of theology in the University of Basle, Switzerland, to which he went in the spring of 1822. He soon acquired the highest esteem by his lectures in his new situation, and he has been constantly adding to his reputation by new productions. His lectures on *Morals* (Berlin, 1823, 2 vols.) were delivered before a mixed audience, and received with great delight. He has since published three volumes of sermons, the first of which appeared in 1825; *Andacht'sbuch*, or a spiritual exposition of the Gospels in the same year; a translation and commentary of the *Psalms*, of which the third edition appeared in 1829. In 1829 appeared also Heinrich Melcthal, a philosophical fiction, the counterpart to Theodore, tracing the history and culture of a public character, as the latter traces the history of a clergyman; an *Introduction to the New Testament* (1826–1830); a *Translation of the Bible* in 1832; *Lectures on Religion, its Essence, Manifestations, and Influence on Life* (1827); a collection of his shorter early writings (*Opuscula*, 1830). He has been lately engaged in preparing a commentary on the New Testament of a popular

---

\* This latter sentiment actually stands recorded in the *Diary at the Falls*.

kind, the first part of which, containing the Epistle to the Romans, appeared in 1835, and is to be followed by that containing the Gospels.

We have now told about all we know of the incidents of De Wette's life, and the order of his works. We have omitted to speak of an edition of Griesbach's *Harmony of the Gospels*, which, in conjunction with Dr. Lucke, our author published in 1818. Nor have we spoken particularly, as it would be impossible to do, of his numerous contributions to the periodicals of his day, one of which, the *Theologische Zeitschrift*, he edited at Berlin, in connexion with Lucke and Schleiermacher.

On reviewing De Wette's labors, it appears that there is scarcely a single department of theology, to which he has not made important contributions. There is not a single subject in the whole range of the science, which he has not treated either particularly or generally. In his critical works on the Old and New Testaments, his Contributions to an Introduction to the Old Testament, his Introduction to the New Testament, his *Archæology*, his Introduction to the New Testament, his Translation of the Bible, his Commentary on the Psalms and on the New Testament, he has carried his criticism over the whole field of the Christian Scriptures. On the other hand, in his Christian Dogmatics, his work on Religion and Theology, his Lectures on Religion, his Christian Morals, he has given a complete philosophical view of Christian theology in particular, and of the historical development of religion in general, shown their foundation in man's spiritual nature, and illustrated their actual and due influence on life. It is with his philosophical rather than his critical works, that we have to do in this article. But before going to our especial subject, we will say a few words upon his critical labors.

The most original service, which he has rendered to the criticism of the Old Testament, consists in his view of the origin of the Pentateuch. We have nothing to say in this place of the justness of that view, for the subject is too large to be slightly treated of, and the public are now in possession of the work of Dr. Palfrey, which critically examines our author's theory, and gives a clear argument against the idea of the more recent origin of the Pentateuch. But whatever we may think of the justness of his views, De Wette surely has claims to the merit of originality in his investigations of the Old Testament,

and has given a new impulse to its study. It was not unheard of indeed even among the ancient fathers to doubt the Mosaic origin of the five books attributed to Moses, and the doubt has been continued with more or less definiteness both among unbelievers and Christian theologians to the present age. Most of those, who have doubted the authenticity of the Mosaic books, have attributed their origin to the time of David, but with De Wette the idea originated, that they received their present shape during or after the exile, although, as we have seen, the same idea sprung up in the mind of Vater without De Wette's knowledge. And it is fair to bear in mind, not only that an opinion that has the sanction of a scholar like Gesenius may not be lightly treated, but also that the author, in arriving at his results, did not begin by an hypothesis, with which he forced the facts of the case to conform, but pursued his inquiries according to the laws of a just and patient historical criticism; and even when he arrives at his results, he is content in many things to remain in modest doubt, where other writers would have seen fit to dogmatize. He takes no delight in doing away time-hallowed opinions upon the Scriptures, for he in peculiar deems all things sacred that have been hallowed by sincere faith, and would not wilfully believe that the record, which his childish mind had revered as the word of God, owes its form and even much of its substance to the Levitical prejudices of the Jewish exile. To the question, whether his views of the Pentateuch are not dangerous to our religion, with which it stands in connexion, he replies, that the truth had better be spoken, and that to a sensible and religious mind the Pentateuch will not lose its charm by owning it to be somewhat tinged by poetry, poetic feeling, and mythical fancy. Abraham, Jacob, and Joseph will have the same meaning and interest for the heart, even if it be not sure that all the incidents related of them are strictly and historically true.\* "Even if it were not religiously wrong to leave the people in an error, which may appear beneficial; yet I fear," says he, "that the secret will be betrayed or has already been betrayed. The investigation has been carried on too publicly, and many have obtained an insight, who will not make good use of it, and who will seek to do harm with their views, if the well disposed Christian does not take the matter into his own hands, and

---

\* *Beitrage*, 2d volume, pp. 407, 408.

make the disclosure himself. Happy were our fathers, who, ignorant of critical arts, believed truly and faithfully all they learned. History lost, but religion gained. I have not begun the criticism; but since it has been begun, it must be carried on, since nothing is good in its kind which is not complete. The genius of humanity watches over his race, and will not allow man to be plundered of the noblest of his possessions. Let every one act according to his light and duty, and leave the issue to Providence."

In his critical works on the New Testament, our author has not brought forward any new theory, although a new modification of an old one. He is very modest in all his researches, and seems willing to confess doubt or ignorance wherever he feels either. In his idea of the origin and correspondences of the first three Gospels, he joins the theory of Griesbach, that Mark copied from Matthew and Luke, and that Luke had access to Matthew, with that of Eckerman and Herder, that an oral gospel was the common fountain of all. He explains the correspondences between Matthew and Luke on the ground that both drew from a common oral fountain, and that Luke consulted Matthew's Gospel in order to correct his own; and he explains the resemblances between Mark and the two others, on the ground that he made use of these others in preparation of his own. In so far as belief in an original oral gospel is concerned, our author's view is about the same as that so clearly and exactly stated in Mr. Norton's late work, although of course the other part of the theory, that the three evangelists copied from each other is utterly opposed to Mr. Norton's doctrine of the entirely independent origin of the three gospels. No man can be more opposed than De Wette to such elaborate and artificial theories, concerning the origin of these gospels, as Eichhorn's, and he is not disposed to look with much favor upon Bishop Marsh's improvements upon Eichhorn.

He owns in the preface to his Introduction of the New Testament, that he is far from being satisfied with two main inquiries in the work; that into the history of the text and that upon the origin of the first three gospels; and on account of these, he had long been reluctant to put his hand to the work. He expresses a fear that his work will not answer the expectations that have been raised. "The friends of critical inquiry will not be satisfied with results for the most part indefinite; those on the other hand, who consider our Holy Scriptures only

with the eye of devotion, may feel themselves hurt by the freedom of the investigation. I myself could have wished to arrive at results more decisive, and more in accordance with the received opinions of the church. But truth alone can here decide, and that is no pure love of truth, which cannot sacrifice presumptuous curiosity and pious prejudice. I base the utility of criticism upon its keeping awake an active spirit of inquiry: this spirit of inquiry can do no harm to true Christian piety. Faith indeed ought to be steadfast; but in my opinion faith does not rest upon the conviction whether this or that book had the origin commonly ascribed to it."\*

One remark, that has indeed been already implied may be made of De Wette, as a critic, that places him far above most of the modern German critics. The remark may be applied to all his works from first to last; it is stated in the preface to his first treatise on the Old Testament, and is repeated in his last important treatise on the New. He aims to fall into the meaning and spirit of the writer, whom he criticises, rather than to force the writer into coincidence with him. "The highest thing," he says, "which the historical criticism of the Bible should aim at, and to which it at least should lead the way, is the comprehension of Biblical literature in its pure historical connexions and peculiarities; and for such a comprehension, I have conscientiously striven."† He does not criticise the Biblical writers as if they were modern authors, nor seek a philosophical argument where none was intended. He does not read the first chapter of Genesis, as if the writer had a knowledge of modern geology, nor, on the other hand, does he fall into the equal absurdity of taking the account for rigid historical truth. He does not seek to explain away prophecy by referring all alleged predictions to contemporaneous history, and by finding in every word some secret and forced allusion to the events of the times, but deems many of the alleged prophecies to have been actually inspired anticipations of the future, and thereby explains them without denying their partial reference to contemporaneous events, or giving them superhuman infallibility in all cases whatsoever. He studies the Christian records with a feeling heart, as well as with an acute intellect, and puts far from him that low, meddling criticism, that

---

\* *Einleitung in das Neue Testament*. Preface to first edition, 1826.

† *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*. Preface to first edition, p. 8.

Misshapes the beauteous forms of things,  
And murders to dissect.

He does not force the stories of the Christian miracles into conformity with a preconceived theory, nor explain them away like the school of rationalistic critics, but investigates them as any other matters of history, and judges them upon just historical grounds. He seeks to revive the lives and times of the sacred writers, and throw himself into their feelings, and thus to judge all Scripture by that same spirit in which it was written.

To borrow the phraseology of Dr. Lucke in his recollections of Schleiermacher, De Wette, as a critical interpreter, has more of *abandonment* than *appropriation*; is more disposed to yield his own mind to the author, than to draw the author over to him. Herein he is unlike Schleiermacher, who so "stamped his own individuality upon everything, as to prevent his yielding his mind with the self-oblivion that is necessary in order to reproduce the sense of another in its original form." While Schleiermacher would make Paul "reason with logical precision and write with rhetorical skill," De Wette, although himself too a philosopher, would leave the apostle to reason and write in his own way, and would try to find out that way. De Wette could never have cut up the Gospel of Luke in that ultra logical way in which Schleiermacher has done it in his dissection of that book.

If De Wette ever errs in putting a forced meaning upon the Scriptural writers, it is not so much by a too acute criticism, as by an excess of poetical feeling. He perhaps sometimes sees poetry where there is none. Of course he is a gainer by this, for every flower of poetry, every rose of Sharon, that he finds, charms him by its fragrance, and inspires him to bless the heavenly gale that wafted to him the perfume. In those works, where poetry and exact criticism alike demand the interpreter's attention, our author is unrivalled, as in his Commentary on the Psalms. Those divine poems are bathed in the living waters in his own soul and refreshed with a new life. Again we hear

"The harp the monarch minstrel swept."

The question of the rhythm of the Psalms is solved by our author, as if by intuition. His own poetical soul enters into the very spirit of the Psalmists, and flows forth in their verse as they flowed. While learned critics have disputed for ages upon the subject, and leather-headed philologists have sought to solve

the mystery of the rhythm by poring over Lexicons, and comparing different languages, and changing accents, and lengthening and shortening syllables in every possible way, De Wette throws himself at once into the very motion of the rhythm,\* and so illustrates it, that the wonder is, that the matter should ever have been so dark, and even that Lowth should have been so benighted. If spiritual things must be spiritually discerned, poetical things must be poetically discerned. De Wette's poetical and spiritual mind has gained him the name of the best interpreter of the most inspired of all religious poetry.

We now pass from our author's critical to his philosophical works. They furnish a complete exposition and defence of spiritual religion; and before we turn to them, let it be borne in mind, that a change may be observed in De Wette's character, and that beginning life, as a critic, and confining himself at first to negative, historical criticism, he in time appears as the philosopher and spiritual divine. We may see a great difference between his early and late works, not so much in any points of positive belief, as in religious spirit. In publishing his *Opuscula*, in 1830, he allows that when he wrote his work on the Atonement, (*de Morte Expiatoria*, 1813,) he was not enough aware of the power of the heart in religion, and that an inadequate idea of the nature of sacrifice prevented his rightly treating the doctrine of the atonement; "for," says he, "it escaped me, that in sacrificial rites, there was originally something that nourished the pious sense, which did not degenerate into superstition with the people, except in course of time, and that Christ and the apostles turned to the advantage of their faith the primitive meaning and efficacy of sacrifices."† Although in De Wette's earlier works, there are many things that might shock the feelings of an unlearned pious mind, there is little of the kind in his recent writings. He does not indeed disguise his opinions, and is the foe of all bondage to the letter of creeds; but he writes with a deep faith, and warm love, and a tender regard to the prejudices and feelings of pious people, that must make his works edifying even to a pious Calvinist, whose dogmas would however be contradicted by the spirit of every page.

The three works named at the head of this article give a full view of De Wette's ideas on Religion and Theology. Of

\* *Biblical Repository*, vol. III. p. 493. † *Opuscula*, preface, p. 6.  
VOL. XXIV. — 3D S. VOL. VI. NO. II. 20

his Dogmatics, the first volume gives a history of Christian doctrines from the earliest Hebraism to the latest apostolic Christianity: the second volume gives the creed of the Lutheran Church, and our author's exposition of it. The second work gives the author's idea of Religion in general and of Christian Theology in particular. The third work is an amplification of the first part of the second, and probably presents the best treatise extant upon Religion, its History, and Influences. We shall take the second, the work on Religion and Theology, for the basis of our remarks, since it contains a summary of the author's whole opinions, and shall give such illustrations from his other works, as may serve our purpose. We now proceed to give his views of religion and revelation in general, and their historical manifestations, and shall reserve for a future article his opinions on the main points of Christian Theology.

In order to speak definitely on religious subjects, we must begin with our author's philosophic definition of religion. And lest some of our readers may be fearful, that he makes religion depend on philosophy, and thus confounds with the wisdom of this world's science the doctrine, that babes and simple ones rejoiced in, let it be borne well in mind, that De Wette is the very last man to be accused of chilling the religious spirit by making it rest upon any cold philosophical speculations. Let those who fear his philosophizing spirit, and would have child-like simplicity, only refer to his sermons, and then say, if any sermons can be found more simple in language and thought, and more imbued with earnest piety. If they wish for some stronger meat than his sermons, let them turn to his philosophical works, and they will find, that his philosophy is the constant champion of that religion of the heart, which the simple evangelical mind delights in. To his mind, there is far deeper wisdom in the deep feeling of a pure and pious heart, than in all the proud speculations of wordly philosophers. According to his system, the foundation of religious truth is in the heart, and he would accurately observe this foundation, and build upon it a true philosophy of religion. His philosophy is one of faith and feeling, as well as of the understanding. He has brought out the heart of man from the obscurity and contempt into which a low and false philosophy has thrown it. The stone, which the builders rejected, he has made the head of the corner.

His philosophy is a much more modest one, than the other



prevalent systems in Germany, and has some features of resemblance to the Scotch. It would bear still more resemblance to the latter, had the latter been carried out into a full system of *philosophy*, instead of being rather a collection of "*philosophizings*," De Wette is not satisfied with the cold critical system of Kant, nor the airy idealism of Fichte, nor with the pantheism of Schelling, confounding, as our author thinks it does, good and evil, God and the world. Like his young Theodore, he desires some heartier impulse to duty, than the Categorical Imperative of the reason, and deems the sublimest motive to morality lost by the pantheistic disbelief in a divine will that is exalted above all vicissitude. He adopts the philosophy of Fries, which, while it does full justice to the truths contained in those other systems, yet has a charm for the heart, which the others do not possess. This philosophy may be called, by eminence, the philosophy of faith and feeling.

"It is not long," says De Wette, "since Jacobi, Fries, and Schleiermacher, have discovered this truth; and it is by far from being universally acknowledged, that faith lies originally in feeling, is nothing but feeling brought forth into clear consciousness. These men were the first who pointed out in the human mind an original principle, a faith or religious feeling, which precedes every perception of the understanding, and they therefore assigned to every such perception, a subordinate place. The penetrating Hamann alone had earlier indicated the same principle." \*

"What is religion," he observes, "has always been a controverted question. While pious persons of all ages and nations, amid all outward differences, have agreed upon something, which they call religion, faith, or piety, the ideas of philosophers and scholars have differed upon this important subject; and even those who recognise a common, fixed, and external ground of their faith, even Christian theologians are at this very hour at variance in regard to the essence of religion. It has, therefore, seemed as if they might let the question rest, as belonging to the controversies of the schools; and in fact, men can be pure and devout, without knowing what purity and devotion philosophically consist in, in the same way, that they can think and act virtuously and nobly, without being able to define what nobleness and virtue consist in. But if it is indispensable for philosophers and thinkers, as well as for theologians, to have a clear scientific

---

\* Ueber die Religion. Page 80.

view of the most important concern of humanity, so also it will be highly advantageous for any man, who strives for a harmonious development of his spiritual powers, to be able to rectify his opinions upon this subject. He who has once begun to think cannot place any limit to his thoughts, and must reflect upon religion; if he does this in a wrong way, it will be dangerous to his peace, and he will readily fall into doubt as to that on which the repose of his soul depends, and which should be regarded as exalted above all doubt." \*

"Whatever opinions may be entertained about religion, all will agree upon this, that it is a peculiar conviction of the mind of man. Hence, we cannot decide upon the true idea of religion, before examining the different modes of conviction of which man is capable."

De Wette goes on to consider the several modes of conviction;—first, perception, which is grounded on sensation, or outward experience, or on testimony of outward experience, and he calls the convictions from this source, *historical* knowledge; secondly, *mathematical* knowledge, or that which comes from the notions of size, form, and number, and which is a higher mode of conviction, than the historical; thirdly, we have a mode of conviction, which we call *the understanding*, and which arranges, and classifies, and gives unity to the different phenomena of perception and mathematical calculation.

"These three modes of conviction constitute human *knowledge* in its proper sense, or *the first general mode of conviction*. When we maintain that we *know* any thing, it will be found to belong to our perceptive experience, or our mathematical intuition, or to the conceptions of the understanding, and, at most, the result of all these perceptions together. The common characteristic of this mode of conviction is, that it always refers to the world in time and space, and to their limited conditional relations, and shows us but a mere fragment, while we seek for unity and wholeness. We boast at this day of an extensive and profound knowledge of nature. We understand the laws of the heavens, we measure the motions of the stars, and comprehend the structure and origin of their systems; but we soon reach the limit of our inquiry, and find the eternal fixed necessity of nature presents a barrier against us. We cannot by such knowledge rise above matter, and its fundamental powers; it mocks

all attempt at elucidation. Even when we inquire into our minds, we must rest content with a finite and unsatisfactory knowledge, and cannot truly comprehend our own being. We may observe its actions and changes, and classify them, but the fountain whence these flow is eternally veiled from us. Even if we mount the highest step of philosophical investigation, and seek to comprehend in their purity the laws of our understanding, according to which we judge every thing, we only see the more clearly the limit of our knowledge, and start back with shuddering. We perceive, that within the narrow form of our understanding we cannot grasp the infinite being of things, — that when we expected to grasp a complete whole, we have only touched a part of a higher whole, — that after all our eager pressing into the nature of things, we still remain only upon the surface, and have not penetrated to the central being; and that if we go on forever from condition to condition, we shall never reach the unconditional, never attain to that in which all things have their support."

"Does man possess only this view of things, he becomes the sport of doubt and inward contradictions! he sees himself thrown into a world; to which he must ever remain a stranger, — a world, which he cannot understand, and in which he cannot understand himself. Borne along by the stream of transitory events, which, instead of controlling, he is constrained to follow, he is in danger of losing himself, and becoming the prey of vicissitude. Like all around, he himself appears the work of blind necessity, and sees an abyss of annihilation before him, from which he would shrink with horror."

"But this kind of contemplation, in itself so imperfect and unsatisfactory, leads to a higher, in which the human spirit finds peace and light. If we cannot in the world of the senses find the unity, perfection, and absolute being, which we seek for there according to the laws of our understanding, we resort to another source of illumination, and in our instincts, the depths of our own souls, we find those ideas, the contemplation of which in their purity can secure our inward peace. Even when we regard ourselves in our natural condition, as subjected to the vicissitudes of nature and the law of decay, we cannot but feel, that there is a something independent of vicissitude and decay; the 'feeling infinite' stirs within us, and declares that something *eternal* lives, which is not subject to the changes of time and chance. We feel also, that there is a spiritual law higher than the law of natural necessity, — we feel that the rational will, *free*, can control natural necessity, and govern the lower impulses of the flesh; and that our life has an eternal worth, to which we can sacrifice

every transitory possession and enjoyment, and even earthly existence itself. Raised by the consciousness of a free immortal spirit into a world of eternity and freedom, we cannot exclude from it other beings like ourselves; and we ascribe to them a free eternal life, we find ourselves united to them in a moral and spiritual kingdom, in which only the free spirit gives laws, which we obey with that subjection, which is perfect freedom. Even the dead nature around us, which, according to a sensual view, obeys merely the lifeless law of necessity, is glorified and quickened by this view, and seems to obey a higher law, and serve a higher purpose, than before. And above all this, we behold with the eye of *faith* the original fountain of all being, the lawgiver and governor of the world, on whose almighty power all things depend, and whose holy will leads all things to the best issue; by faith in this highest idea of human reason, we find the firm support that stops all unhappy wavering, the sacred peace of soul, that cannot otherwise be ours." \*

This second mode of conviction is *faith*, and cannot like the first be called knowledge, without confounding terms, and designating things opposite by the same name. It is by rising above worldly knowledge that cannot satisfy us, that we soar to this lofty faith; while we feel the insufficiency of the laws of outward nature, the idea springs up within us of the eternal and free, the idea of an immortal soul, and an unconditional being; and since we rise above the manifold and casual appearances which the outward world presents, we gain the idea of the unity and perfection of God.

"But by this opposition between faith and knowledge, man will not find full satisfaction, because the two are opposed to each other. What is the use to him of believing in God, freedom, and eternity, if these remain mere abstract ideas, and he cannot find them in the real world around him, and cannot by them solve its problems? Will the thought of God and his holy providence console him in the battles and storms of life, if he cannot see in its events the hand of God, and revere his almighty power therein? Despite his faith in a true being of things, would not the world with its thousand contradictions strike him with astonishment, if he cannot see the eternal light glimmer through all its phenomena, and feel from all around an intimation of the great, first, and enduring cause? Would faith in an eternal purpose of the world secure him from doubts at the manifold de-

---

\* Ueber die Religion und Theologie. Page 7, et seq.

ceptions of life and history, if he could not discover above the lower aims of mankind a higher aim of human nature? And would not all around him seem cold and dumb, if he did not know how to acquaint himself with individuals, and to recognise in them the expression of eternal and spiritual things? But even all this power is given to man, only it does not reside in his understanding, but in *feeling*,—it is not a deduction of his intellect, but an instinct of his heart. In the beauty and sublimity of nature, and in the spiritual aspects of human life, the religious sentiment beholds the shining forth of the great true Being, and of the eternal purpose of things; from the lovely flower up to the sublime mountain summit, clad in eternal snows, from the smiling suckling up to the mighty souls of a Cato and Socrates, both nature and the spirit reveal to us the truth and reality of eternal ideas, and that something higher lives in things, than what we can pursue and reach with the eye and the rule. Yes, there are holy moments, in which we behold a ray of the divine majesty itself, the traces of almighty power and goodness in the world, whether in the grand spectacles of nature, or in the mighty issues of fate."

If we scrutinize more narrowly this third mode of conviction, we find that with feeling or sentiment, as well as with the understanding, we pass judgment, and arrange the particular under the universal, reduce the manifold parts to their fit unity; but that the rules, according to which we judge matters of sentiment cannot be expressed in such propositions as those of the understanding. To reduce the several parts of a figure to mathematical unity is something very different from recognising in it the harmonious accordance of beauty. And the natural philosopher, who considers the thunder-storm according to the theory of electricity, is engaged in an entirely different occupation from him, who with pious sentiment shudders before this spectacle of nature, and beholds in it the lightning-flashing arm of the Almighty. As soon as this holy sentiment is excited, the reign of actual *knowledge* ceases, the critical intellect should hold reverent silence. The spirit of man then mounts a higher pathway, where this world's empty knowledge cannot follow it, and which if it obtrusively pursues, it can only bewilder and destroy.

These are the three modes of conviction of which man is capable,—*Knowledge, Faith, Sentiment*. All three are guides equally certain in their proper spheres. The veracity of all three is based upon the mind's necessary confidence in its own powers.

We can now easily settle the question, which of these modes of conviction belong especially to religion. The great subjects of religion are ideas of eternity. However manifold its forms may be, it will be found always to revolve around the ideas of a soul, a supernatural law of the world, and a Deity. Accordingly, *faith* and *sentiment* belong to it, but positive knowledge is a stranger to it. Knowledge, history for instance, may acquaint us with the outward forms of religion, but without faith and feeling we remain strangers to its inner spirit. History may tell us how Jesus loved the world, and how he trusted ever in his Heavenly Father, and was victor over the grave, but without something of his love, and his trust, and his immortal faith, the Christian record is but a sealed book to us. Knowledge may lead us to the portal of the temple of Christ, but without faith and feeling we cannot enter. This is the view not only of the spiritual philosopher, but of pious hearts in the holy church throughout the world. "No man can say, that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Spirit."

"Faith constitutes that firm structure of religion, upon which all else rests, and the foundation of it is in the recognition of the temporality, perishableness, and imperfection of the world of the senses, and trust in an eternal and perfect being beyond. This is the great truth, which, if not first introduced into the world by Christianity, has at least been made universal by it, and which is simply expressed in the contrast of earth and heaven, time and eternity. 'Our conversation is in Heaven,' is the pious man's motto."

The first idea of faith is of a something, which is eternal, and which the heart feels not subject to the law of vicissitude and decay, that prevails throughout the material world. Feeling something of this eternal principle within him, even while he contemplates in pious sense the world's changes, man calls this his soul. And connected with this feeling of an immortal soul is the idea of a power or law within him, — a law of the spirit of life, — not subject to natural necessity. These two ideas, the idea of an immortal soul and a free spiritual law cannot be contemplated without the idea of a supreme, free, eternal being, or God. And we cannot with our moral nature contemplate these three speculative ideas of soul, freedom, and God, without connecting with them a moral aim, and without associating with them, respectively, three practical ideas, an eternal

destiny or aim of the individual soul,—the idea of good and evil, as connected with free will,—and the idea of Providence as connected with God.

Corresponding to these three speculative and three practical ideas of faith are three analogous classes of religious feelings. In view of the great aim of life, man feels *inspired* or animated with the feeling of the high purpose of his being, and with a hopeful, glad view of life—in view of the good and evil in the world, he feels himself moved to an humble trust or *resignation*, that serves to reconcile the sad contradiction and restore peace of mind ; and, finally, by the feeling of *devotion*, faith in God becomes living, and exerts its blessed influences on the soul. These three sentiments, *inspiration*, or enthusiasm, *resignation*, and *devotion*, enable us to regard the whole world in a religious light, and to have the true joy and life of religion, and solve the problem of existence.

Such are the essential elements of religion in the soul of man, according to the system of De Wette and his master Fries. And whatever we may think of the merits and logic of their system, we must certainly grant, that their classification of religious ideas and feelings is such as to leave out of view no important element of religious truth.

So much for the essential elements of religion ; but what does our author say about revelation ? No man has higher or more reverential ideas of revelation than he has, however much ignorant dogmatists may talk about what they are pleased to call his wild theory of inspiration. He believes in revelation in its fullest sense,—not in that sort of revelation, which is passed mechanically through the mind of the revealer, as through a lifeless tube, but in the revelation made by the holy spirit of God in the living soul,—the revelation made through the law and the prophets, and above all, in the fulness of its divine glory by Jesus, the Son of God.

The great truths and sentiments of religion lie indeed in every human soul, but only in the germ ; and without revelation, without the beams of the Sun of Righteousness shining from without, the germs would generally lie dormant, and the tree of life not spring heavenward.

De Wette's view of the foundation of religion in faith and feeling has of course met with much opposition.

“ There are two parties of theologians, who oppose it upon  
VOL. XXIV. — 3D S. VOL. VI. NO. II. 21

different grounds ; the party of strict anxious champions of revelation, or supernaturalists, and that of the champions of reason, or rationalists. The former regard the foundation of religion, as being in the literal revealed doctrine of Christ, which they consider, and treat as a statement to be comprehended by the memory and understanding, and which they defend by arguments, arrange in scientific order, and seek to make enlightening to the understanding only. We can avail ourselves of feeling, they say, only in so far as to awaken trust and love towards Christ and God, by means of the knowledge of the person and doctrine of the Savior, and thereby fill the heart with pious emotions. The view that religion springs from feeling appears to these theologians to derogate from the dignity and significance of revelation. Feeling, they say, is something internal, but revelation must come from without ; the former is a wavering and changeable thing ; the latter sure and immovable. But these objections may be very easily removed. Certainly the historical knowledge of Christ is for Christians the necessary occasion and introduction to faith in him ; but historical knowledge or belief is not faith ; this latter arises only when the former is embraced with feeling, reliance, and love, and man regards Christ as possessing the supreme truth and the full grace of God, which can be done only by *feeling*. It was nothing but the inspiring feeling of trust and resignation, which the disciples of Jesus expressed in the words, 'to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life; thou art the Son of the living God.' They had known Christ personally, they had heard his words, and beheld his deeds ; this was only the outward knowledge of him, which was not faith in him ; many who had the outward knowledge, had no faith ; this arose only from the union of outer knowledge with inward feeling. We allow to revelation all its importance, as an outward testimony, which was given us to enlighten our spirits, and waken our hearts ; but the feeling with which we receive it makes it, for the first time, truly our own. We would not take away its security and certainty ; we would rather recognise it cordially, as that which gives firm foothold to our wavering and changing feelings ; but unless it enters into our feelings, and in them becomes a living principle, it has no efficacy. These theologians err in this, that they regard the Christian religion as a thing given, to be received drily and coldly with little emotion of soul, and that from unacquaintance with the nature of the human spirit, they do not understand the relation between faith and revelation. Their own religious life for the most part corresponds to this, their view of religion. They may conduct as conscientious, well-meaning, well-disposed men.



But living inspiration, deep feeling, sweep of imagination, freedom of thought are not by any means their prominent characteristics, and in them Christianity can never appear in its deep and entire nature."

"The opposite party, the rationalists, most violently oppose the doctrine of the origin of religion in feeling, and on the ground that they deduce every thing in religion from the understanding, and judge all truths by the understanding merely. They mark our doctrine with the opprobrious name of Mysticism. We are very well satisfied with this name, if it is taken in its original signification. Mystic means mysterious, sacred to or significant of him initiated into mysteries, belonging to mystery. According to what we deem the just view, there is in the human mind something dark and mysterious, accessible only to the faithful heart, and from which the clear light of the understanding is excluded; this view may be called Mysticism. In general, every feeling is mystical, because, that as such it cannot be clearly conceived of; a doctrine, therefore, which places religion in feeling may be well called mystical. But if those are called Mystics, who, disinclined to clearness of understanding, withdraw religion from all free investigation and scientific treatment, and would surrender themselves utterly to obscure feelings, then we justly refuse this epithet, since we, quite as much as the boasted rationalists, are champions of free thinking on all subjects of faith. We distinguish ourselves from these theologians, in that we do not like them regard the perceptive understanding or critical intellect, as the fountain of religion, nor as the highest aim of religious culture, but deem it subordinate to feeling. Their view we must accuse of shallowness and oneness; of shallowness, because they do not press into the depth of the matter, and they regard religion only in its immediate comprehension by the understanding; of oneness, because they busy themselves solely with the culture of the understanding, and since he does not deserve the name of a pious man, who has just and clear conceptions of religion, but whose heart remains cold and empty. As a rule it will be found that those ministers, who entertain this view in their oral and written productions, treat religious truths coldly and heartlessly, at least without the true moving inspiration. They have not experienced in their own hearts the power of pious emotion, otherwise they could not deny its weight and significance in religion. Yet many, in spite of their better nature and disposition, are led astray by a false philosophy in regard to religion, so that they mistake the feeling in which religion has its root, and stand in direct contradiction with themselves. The truth that religion has its fountain in feeling is connected with

other important views and doctrines of human knowledge, which even to this day have not been able to supplant the old dead system of philosophy. He who confines himself to notions that are learned by mere memory, and have no life, cannot press into the living depth of spiritual life, and remains only on the surface. But he who has a living sense of the whole spiritual life, and above all presses into the depth of it, he will discover the inner, secret, living fountain of religion, and cannot seek it in the dependent brook, or marshy lake of the critical understanding."

We have now given a view of our author's opinions of the religious nature of man, and of the relation of revelation to the elements of religious life in the human soul. Our sketch, although given as much as possible in his words, is lamentably meagre, when we remember the fulness and beauty of the author's elucidation of his system. Could we follow our inclination, we would translate his two discourses on the religious life in its different steps and relations in the mind of a fully developed and educated man. These would present a full and living idea of the whole subject of religion in the three gradations of religious life; first, the universal and fundamental truths and feelings of the religious nature; secondly, the faith derived from history and the church, and all the influences of art, poetry, and life, which tend to breathe into man the spirit of revelation; thirdly, the properly personal and individual religious life, in all its dispositions of heart and views of the world, and in its civil, moral, and religious activity. But we have not space for these discourses here, and must console our readers, who do not understand the German, with the prospect of reading them in all their important connexions in Mr. Ripley's promised translation of the *Lectures on Religion*.

Nowhere can so concise and full an account of the development of religious ideas or of historical religion be found, as in those lectures. His last fourteen lectures give a more complete and interesting view of the subject, even than that celebrated work, Benjamin Constant's five volumes on the history of the religious principle. He indeed acknowledges himself indebted to Constant's excellent work; but he has not only enlarged upon Constant's plan, but has made some important corrections. Unlike Constant's, moreover, De Wette's work is complete, and extends to the present time. Seen in the light of the author's philosophy and faith, the religious history of the world, instead of showing us a picture of the vain struggles of the human

mind after what it can never reach, and an array of mutually contradictory dogmas, presents us with a view of the gradual development of the great elemental ideas of religion in various degrees of perfection, according to the progress of society. Even amid the dry records of dogmatic history he reveals to us some living truth, struggling half unconsciously in the minds of the dogmatists, that led them even in trifling points to advocate this or that apparently indifferent doctrine so zealously. He teaches us to see a meaning and to trace a progress in religious ideas. He thus gives us a far more edifying and cheering view of church history, than we usually have. He redeems it from that witty condemnation from Goethe, which such history as commonly written justly deserves:—

Zwei Gegner sind es, die sich boxen  
Die Arianer und Orthodoxen  
Durch viele saecula, dasselbe geschicht  
Es dauert bis an das jungste Gericht.

He traces the development of the religious spirit, which we have been considering, through all nations and ages, and seeks to define accurately the state of religion in its inner and outward character, and its relations to morality, society, science, and art in each nation. He presumes the religious spirit to have existed in its simple, spontaneous, childlike form among the very earliest men, according to the oldest tradition contained in the book of Genesis. In the light of positive history, he traces its course as it appeared successively in the grovelling Fetichism of the early Egyptians and Asiatics, and of all such barbarous races, as most tribes of Africans—the more elevated worship of the elements of nature, which afterwards sprung up among the former of those people—the more refined and beautiful polytheism of the Greeks—and finally in that pure theism which, although perhaps believed by the more enlightened priests of the old religions, was not proclaimed until Moses, and did not appear in all its spiritual freedom and beauty, until the coming of the Son of God.

The three great eras in the emancipation of the religious spirit are marked in our author's view by the appearing of Moses, Christ, and the Protestant Reformation. Moses declared the unity of God, which, if before recognised, had been confined to a few priests and sages, and he proclaimed the moral law, and established a religious community, of whose worship the one supreme and invisible God was the sole object.

But God, as declared by Moses, was rather the hierarch of a nation, than the Father of men; the law that he proclaimed was a law of negations, and the religious community which he founded was a kingdom of this world, not of heaven. A freer and more spiritual religion indeed broke forth from time to time among the prophets, but this was ere long almost extinguished; and after the captivity, the people sank down into a dead traditional faith in the laws and ceremonies of their fathers, and an anticipation of its reëstablishment.

"Then Christ appeared and brought back the free living spirit of religion, and in higher power and purity. He came in the footsteps of Moses, as declarer of divine truth, as the founder of a worship in spirit and in truth. But how much higher and self-sustaining appears his aspiration for truth. Moses had cast aside the old mythic veils, but had put in their place new symbolic veils; but Christ took away these also; in his own free thought, in the power of his own mind, must every man now aspire towards the throne of God; no temple, no sacrifice, no ceremony need now control him in his worship of the Most High. Here, first in the whole history of the world, we behold the human spirit attained to the full consciousness of itself, and its high dignity; here it first learned to feel itself the Son of God, and capable of a likeness to the Divine Father. In Christ himself, as the *first born Son of God*, the worth of the human soul appeared in its true majesty, and in this deification of man, and this humanity of God, all former problems and enigmas were solved."

Christ was not only the teacher of truth and reconciliation with God, but also the inspirer. All his actions are expressions of the eternal truths and sentiments of religion. His power over nature shone forth in his miracles, and was the sublime symbol of the free spirit of man, that outward necessity cannot subdue. His life was a constant and inspiring lesson of faith and love; his death was the final seal of the atonement between God and man; the resurrection, the great emblem of the eternal life. In him all eternal ideas are brought to living consciousness; and he founded a community, which should transmit them in their living power to coming ages, till the end of time.\*

---

\* In some passages we have been obliged to abridge our author's language, but always aim to be true to its spirit.

But the followers of Christ soon began to corrupt his pure doctrine with old Jewish prejudices, until finally the imperial power was incorporated with the Christian church ; and Catholicism presents to us the religion of Jesus degraded to Judaism, and in some respects even to heathenism.

But Catholicism, with its material rigidity, and torpor, and impurity, could not always control the people, who had been inwardly moved by the Christian spirit. After long fruitless attempts, this spirit broke forth in the Protestant Reformation, whose spiritual character we can best characterize, as the genuine Christian love of truth and the independence of religious opinion. If we examine the spirit and doctrine of the Reformation, we discover in it the repetition of the original Christian revelation ; and if we regard it as the summit in the progress from Mosaism, we shall recognise it as the *third great epoch in the history of the freedom of the religious spirit*. Like Moses and Jesus, it cast off the chains of superstition and tyranny. The Reformers vindicated the rights of conscience from the oppression of spiritual despotism ; human decrees and authority availed them nothing in religion, but only a living faith was of avail. As Christ strove against the Pharisaical ceremonies, they struggled against the arbitrarily computed good works and all the abominations of a sacrilegious and desecrating superstition.

But Protestantism was not perfection. It has had a progress. Its first point consisted in the employment of *historical criticism in the service of living faith*. This criticism was only negative, and regarded rather the letter, than the spirit of the Christian records, and therefore stood a step lower than primitive Christianity. Moreover, the true spirit of Christian toleration was not felt, and the persecutions of heretics raged as in the Catholic hierarchy. The doctrine of justification by faith was so exclusively dwelt upon, that morality was too much forgotten. A scholastic philosophy prevailed, which oppressed all free investigation, by its empty forms. A free spirit showed itself among some. Arminianism and Socinianism, notwithstanding their partial errors, served to awaken the life of religious freedom. Calixtus gave an important impulse to moral science, which was furthered by the practical turn of the school of Spener.

“ In the middle of the last century, the Protestant spirit awoke with fresh might, and broke a new path for itself. Having origi-

nally sprung up in historical investigation, it came forward again in this form. Semler and Ernesti, the one by his historical acuteness, the other by his clear, thorough, scriptural interpretation, were the originators of a revolution in Theology and the Church, which is still in course of development. The doctrines of the Canon, and of Inspiration, and thereby the whole structure of Protestant dogmatics, and the old prejudices inherited from Catholicism, were exposed in all their nakedness. The Bible was subjected to the principles of interpretation, applied to other ancient writings, and thereby placed more in a pure historic light, and a pure historic investigation of primitive Christianity introduced. All this we may regard as a progress of the work of the Reformation."

"But now came the *second great point of the development of Protestantism through the critical philosophical examination of religious truth*. It appears as if Christianity could not be purified by historical criticism alone; the tendency was to introduce by exposition dogmatic ideas, that were foreign from the true sense of Scripture, and to deaden the true sense. It was therefore necessary to refer to the universal truths of reason and the religious nature. Already in accordance with this spirit of historical investigation, there appeared in Germany a popular philosophy, spread here from France, which was satisfied only with clear, simple notions, such as the common understanding can comprehend, and which had a decided aversion to everything supernatural and incomprehensible. According to this naturalist view, the most of the dogmas of the Protestant theology, especially the doctrines of Revelation and Inspiration, must appear as the offspring of superstition and of dogmatic subtility — an opinion to which the practical view diffused by Pietism, which referred everything in religion to the promotion of practical Christianity, contributed exceedingly. And thus the time seemed to be near, which would do away all dogmatic faith, and trust solely to the dictates of conscience. There was no depth of Idea in these anti-dogmatic movements; yet that sense of freedom, which strove to cast off the old fetters, was purely Protestant, and as a point of transition, this empty, negative rejection, was useful and necessary. This philosophic sharpness attained to greater depth by the critical philosophy, which subjected all human knowledge to a new revision, and turning the eye of proof inward, strove to measure and explore the spiritual powers of man and the sources of his knowledge. In reference to religion, this attempt had no success; it gave such a preponderance to morality in men, as to deduce from it the foundation and significance of religion, and it almost entirely mistook the office of re-

ligious feeling in men; yet it was the true Protestant spirit of self-dependence, that animated this philosophy. Self-dependence, the trust of reason in itself, appears in the position that all truth lies within ourselves, in the effort to measure the whole field of human knowledge, and to subject religion to criticism, as if it were the property of reason only; self-dependence also was expressed in the sublime view of the moral power of man. That this philosophy should strive for universal sway, and should withdraw from Christ, laid in the problem to make reason wholly capable of self-dependence. But the most fatal consequences speedily attended this course."

"The historical criticism, with which Protestantism began, was soon followed by a fruitful, warm religious life; but the philosophic criticism, as being more difficult and far-sighted, began on that account to exert a chilling, destructive influence on the religious life. A spirit of universal nationality prevailed, which scorned the Christian Church and the peculiar historical faith in Christ, and proudly resorted to its own wisdom. A pretended natural religion appeared, which contained nothing but an abstraction of Christianity, and was preferred to the Christian faith. To this the preponderance of the moral view added, which the speculative understanding maintained. The spiritual view of religion, that of Faith, was almost wholly driven from the church, morality was ranked highest, and Christianity, which indeed entered into the world in a moral form, was almost dissipated into a moral code. Especially the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith was thrown by into the repository of old superstitions, as being irreconcilable with this pretended moral view. Man, they taught, could and must merit the approbation of God by an earnest effort to do his duty, and to perfect himself continually. The lofty, spiritual signification of the doctrine of justification was entirely mistaken. In this error of over-estimating morality, the Arminians and Socinians and earlier the Pelagians fell, and the source of it, in these as other cases, lay in the want of faith or spiritual ideas. And since men so resigned themselves to the common understanding, it could not fail to happen, especially in such as had embraced the letter, rather than the spirit of Kant's philosophy, that a low, material, empirical view of morality should prevail. The doctrine of duty was an aggregate of precepts, which, abstracted from a common experience and custom, were enjoined on each man, and extolled, as universally necessary and commendable. The motive was little regarded if good actions were only done. Certain standards of utility and propriety had an almost universal recognition. In short a kind of refined Pharisaism, or Cath-

olic work-righteousness was formed, under which all spiritual ideas were buried. The life of man was so enclosed, and narrowed by a host of rules and precepts, that he could not make a single step without stumbling. A vapid public life devoid alike of ideas and inspiration, a selfish luxurious tendency towards pleasure and gain, tastelessness and indifference towards the fine arts, completed the spiritual degradation and wretchedness, and the misery of a time of universal prostration and commotion sunk everything to a still more abject condition."

"But this onesided direction could not long govern an age like ours. Soon after Kant, other philosophers came, who brought faith and spiritual ideas again into repute, and especially brought to light the ideal significance of Art and Religion. The latter was placed in a more universal and human point of view, and in connexion with the former and with history, more than in its ecclesiastical positive form; even this in itself was decidedly a great gain. This philosophical school certainly ran into the error of abandoning the Kantian Critical Philosophy and bringing it into discredit, instead of prosecuting and perfecting it; so that the advantage at hand was to be considered as lost. Men fell into a mystic, mythological obscurity, which bore itself proudly towards the critical clearness, as if it were scientific depth. It was a new kind of onesidedness that men thus ran into. But the history of human culture always moves in contrasts and extremes, and it remains to be hoped, that the right medium will be gained, and that true unity with Christian revelation be found, which consists in the free consciousness of religious ideas and the living view of Christian history, in which reason and church faith meet one another. Great and wonderful events and commotions have of late turned the world towards devotion and a sense of the purpose of life. Men feel the emptiness of their former life, and the eternal worth and strengthening and elevating power of Christian faith. All long and press after a fresh and higher religious life. But the clearness of consciousness is not in it, and the most opposite views and endeavors are proclaimed. Many would lead us back to the old, others would create an entirely new order of things. There is a want of a consistent, firm, thoroughly formed theology; everything in it lies yet in chaos, it cannot govern itself, not to say anything of its being able to point out to the age the path of religious life, as it should do. The idea and spirit of a true Protestant theology must be determined in our view in the manner which we will now develope."

De Wette's view of a true Protestant theology, and an estimate of his influence upon theology, and the bearing of his doc-



trines especially upon the religious parties of our country will be the subject of a future notice. As he says of his country, so it may be said of ours, and of the church throughout the world. The idea and spirit of a true Protestant theology remains to be developed, or at least to be propagated.

We have now sought to give some idea of De Wette's position in the literary and religious world, — his life and the order of his works, — his services as a critic, — his philosophy of religion, and his views of its historical development. Enough has been shown of his life and works to make us love the man and respect his industry, his learning, his fine critical powers, his beautiful poetic, as well as moral sensibility; and above all, the deep religious spirit that pervades his productions, and seems the very life of his life. We shall know him better, and love him more, when we have examined his views of Christian theology, and seen the mode in which he rears the whole and beautiful form of holy truth from the scattered fragments into which dogmatists have broken it.

S. O.

---

## ART. II. — THE PRESENCE OF GOD.

AN attempt to prove the *existence* of God by a process of reasoning, from the very nature of the subject, is always unsatisfactory. It more frequently disturbs than settles the faith; its effect is rather to perplex the mind than to deepen its convictions of the truth. The impression made is of man's weakness, not of God's strength, — of man's blindness, not of God's everlasting presence. It is sending forth the vision into the cloud-wreath, there to behold Him whose image is in our very selves.

We hold the existence of God to be a self-evident truth, lying at the foundation of all reasoning. To examine this, and other propositions of the same nature logically, is to darken counsel by the multiplicity of words. We cannot dissect the proposition, — we cannot examine it in detail, or resolve it into more simple, more intelligible principles. As a whole only, as one and indivisible in its freshness and strength, it comes over the mind and makes its own impression there.

What is human reason? It is but the experience of the mind; the looking to the future from the past; the belief that the unknown will be as the known; and conviction rests in our confidence in the permanence of the laws of Nature. And what, we would ask, what confidence can we place in the laws of Nature, without a supreme intelligence? What connexion is there between principle and deduction, antecedent and consequent, on which we can safely rest, if we dethrone that Being who binds together all things into one harmonious system, one glorious whole? Take from the universe its controlling mind, there is no law, no rule, no principle, no truth. All is doubt and confusion; our very perceptions may be illusive, our dearest hopes but chimeras of the brain.

It is only by the assumption of a God, a supreme intelligence who gives to our faculties the right rule of action, that we can attain to any confidence in the result of mental inquiry. We do not form our own minds, nor can we adapt them to the perception of truth. If truth be discoverable, it is because the mind has been so created, so fashioned, that its impressions conform to outer things. On the Father of our spirits, therefore, we rest for truth, on His wisdom do we rely for all we know, and all we believe. For an illustration. The sun is too bright for the naked eye to contend with. The instrument with which we attempt to examine it, as it rides triumphantly through the heavens, may be defective; it may distort its shape, reduce or increase its apparent magnitude, or veil it entirely from the sight; but if skilfully formed and wisely adapted for this use, it brings the luminary within the power of the vision. It is thus when we attempt to discover God. He is sought through the medium of the mind as the instrument. Is this instrument adapted to the discovery of truth? It is so if a wise and powerful being has formed it to this end. On the belief, therefore, that God has adapted the mind for the perception of truth, depends our confidence in its deductions; the very commencement of the reasoning process is the admission of His existence, who so formed us, that we can rely upon that which appeareth as truth, — that we grasp as certainty the honest convictions of an unsophisticated mind.

If there be any thing certain, it is certain that there is a God; yet how little do we regard this, the very foundation stone of the temple of truth. Were the mind so closely shut up in its material home, that the light of the outer spirit could break

through only in a solitary gleam, striking would be the pencil of light upon the walls of the prison-house ! The prisoner would watch its radiance and exclaim, oh ! that I could be set free and bask in the full beams of the glorious source of this light and joy. Now, satiated, and gorged may we say, with the grand, the beautiful, the merciful, we languidly exclaim, "show us something new !" Miracles are asked for, — miracles, which are but the suspension of those laws now operating for our peace and happiness. Change only would move us, — change, which would be the withdrawal only of a portion of the good. The writing must be on the wall as a judgment upon us, that we may tremble, for we will not read that truth of God's existence as inscribed above, beyond, around, and within us, in living characters of mercy.

Can we not escape from the power of habit ? Can we not break up this lethargy of soul ? Shall we dream away our life without distinct impressions, each succeeding day binding us more closely to listlessness of mind ? Must we be always inattentive to that which gives existence its value, to that which is to the soul its chief good ? Are the seeds of religious faith to remain dormant, until it may please God to water them with the bitter waters of affliction ? Must death enter our circle and take the beloved ones, or point with his icy hand to us ; must the fruits of the earth be blasted, the storm sweep through the air, earthquakes convulse the land, or we forget the fountain of every blessing ?

We need no arguments for the existence of God, no upholding of His character, for His love is the light of our lives ; but we need to have our attention called to the light, that we may shake off the dreamy tissue of thought, escape from the spectra of the shut eye, and be fully awake to the bright and beautiful morning of our life. We need more distinct impressions, a more definite faith. We need to *bring home* the acknowledged truth, that God is not far from each of us, so that it may influence the character. A mere speculative faith, a cold acquiescence, an assuming of the tone of the world on this subject, leaves the life untouched. It is practical infidelity ; — it is the bowing of the head, and stubbornness of the will ; — it is the admission of the lips, and the denial of the heart.

With how many is the doctrine of the Omnipresence of God a mere Sabbath-day dress of the mind, of gauze-like texture, graceful and becoming enough, but altogether unfit for every-

day life, as a protection against the chilling influences of this religiously cold world. Omnipresence is a word for a prayer, and sometimes for a wrangle in sectarian controversy, but it seems seldom to convey a definite meaning. We want ideas tangible and distinct on this subject; we want a full and efficient faith, to believe that God is present to us as we are to each other, that He addresses us in an intelligible language, that His power is now as manifest as it was at the creation of the world. We need to feel the full force of the expression, "in Him we live and move and have our being."

I cannot, it is observed, believe that God is present as man is to man, for man can be seen, but the Deity is invisible. Could I but see Him as I see my fellow-beings, all doubt on the subject must pass away. Friend, if by man thou meanest that which thinks, perceives, and wills, as thou thinkest, and perceivest, and willest, then thou seest God as thou seest a man. Further, what gives thee the power of discerning a fellow-spirit? Thy mind is distinct and separate from His. Sense takes no cognizance of aught but matter. There must be some medium of intercourse, some bond of connexion. God is this medium, — the ever-present stream, in which the colorless spirits must bathe to become visible to each other. This is not mere transcendentalism, or a metaphysical subtlety. The intercourse between men is upheld by the present power of God. It is His light by which we see, it is His air which vibrates from ear to ear, it is His presence which is our bond of union; for if the human mind could exist without God, it could not reach out beyond itself to its kindred spirits. It could know nothing but its own thoughts. Independent spirits without an Almighty God! — conscious beings, and to each all else annihilated!

When I look around me, I see myself surrounded by those who stand to me in the relation of friends and associates. My eye gives me the form, the feature, the limb, the clothing. But sense can go no farther. It is the body alone which is palpably sensible before me. But is this all which is *present*? There is knowledge here, there are affections here, there is love and truth around me; there is that with which my mind feels a direct communion. It operates on my will, — it sways my purposes; it has consoled me in affliction, it has added a new zest to my joys. The body I perceive through the senses, but the spirit by direct perception, mind with mind.

Even so is the presence of God perceived. The outer eye takes in the material creation. Its form, its color, its music are known by sense. But the *soul* of the universe makes its presence known directly to the human soul. It rests not upon the eye, it floats not upon the ear, it presses not upon the touch, but directly and immediately penetrates to the inner man. It requires no avenue, it follows no winding path, but rushes to the very soul.

I know full well that the communion, the immediate presence of God with the soul, is seldom felt, and more seldom adverted to. "Men discern what they look for, they find that which they seek." They look to sense only, and therefore feel only the impressions made by the material world. Often forgetting that they are spirits, they do not discern that which can only be spiritually discerned. Filled as our minds usually are, we seek in vain for the assurance of God's presence; but there have been times when every one has known that the place where he stood was holy ground. If we go back into the history of our lives, moments will occur to each, seared into the memory, — points in our paths to which the affections are continually throwing us back, — consecrated altars where the heart worshipped, where a direct communion with the Father was felt, — a holy radiant influence from the presence of God, pervading Nature, as love lights up the face of a friend. We were then ready to acknowledge that he, who maketh his heart a tabernacle for the living God, will not find it untenanted and forsaken. Who has not felt, as he looked abroad upon the face of Nature, when the air was balm, when each breath was delight, when the eye glanced over a happy earth, when the hills rejoiced and the valleys were glad, when the ear took in the full chorus of song bursting from all that had life, — who has not felt even then the mind to expand, to look over and above these blessings to Him from whom they proceeded, acknowledging it to be His love which consecrated the gift; as little children throw by their beloved treasures to pluck the skirts of their father's garments, that they may meet his eye of love, now filled with delight, as his gifts have drawn out their affections to the giver.

Such influences need not to be rare, if we would be true to ourselves; if we would but use the eye of the mind, which God has given us, that we might look through Nature to His very throne. But alas! we are utilitarians in the worst sense

of the word. We have worldly objects to attain, and matter to us is but the tool with which we strive to accomplish the purposes of animal life. The breeze is to waft the ship, the sun to ripen the grain; the summer's heat, the winter's cold, and all the changes of nature are to serve us for gain. Even our fellow-man is looked upon as the sinew and muscle which is to toil in our service, and is estimated at an auction price. With such views, with such feelings, can spiritual existences manifest themselves to us? Oh no! we must look through the vestments of creation, we must draw aside the veil of sense, and seek a Father, now, even now with us, ready to meet our eye, to smile upon us, to bless us.

Again; God speaks to us. If we but listen, we can hear His voice in language as intelligible, as direct, as we speak to each other.

Can man give vent to his feelings, commune with his brother man, spirit operating upon its fellow spirit, receiving and imparting kindly influences by language, and cannot God, the eternal Spirit, thus directly manifest his power and love? Has He debarred Himself from all communion with His creatures on earth? No! He speaks in the voice of Nature in tones which need not be misunderstood. The peal of thunder, as it echoes and reëchoes through the vault of Heaven, proclaims His power, and the summer breeze, as it waves the tall grass, as it rustles through the corn, as it breathes through the forest, whispers His love. The appeal from His spirit is direct, all can understand it so as to feel its power; and as little children before they know the force of words, by the very tone of their parents' voices are hushed in their griefs, soothed in their sufferings, strengthened in their affections, so may we all open our ears to His voice, which will add to our joys, support us in our trials, spread over our afflicted hearts a holy calm; for though we may not know the full significance of this language, yet its very tone is peace and joy and hope.

Further than this. God not only speaks in the voice of Nature, but also directly and immediately by a language addressed to the senses, by signs and characters standing for the ideas conveyed.

What is language? Arbitrary signs of the feelings and ideas. *Words* have no resemblance to that which they signify. They may be written, or they may be spoken, they may be addressed to the eye, pour themselves on the ear, or be traced out by the

blind with the touch. They are but vibrations of thin air, or stamps upon paper. They are but signs of ideas, in themselves nothing. How numerous the dialects, how various the means of conveying to each other our wants and feelings! The language, whatever it may be, once learned, establishes the connexion of mind with mind, makes truth a common treasure, and manifests to all the feelings and affections of our nature. Words, we repeat, are but arbitrary characters, which, in a certain position, by common consent, by uniform usage, stand for the thing signified. In reading, therefore, we take into the eye certain marks, which call up and impress certain thoughts, the connecting bond between the signs and ideas being habit formed by education. In learning to read another language, we substitute a different course of characters for the same object.

The point we desire to establish is, that language is that which by characters impresses ideas. It becomes an intelligible language, when definite signs are affixed to definite ideas, so as to lead to a communion of mind with mind. Whenever signs represent ideas, whenever marks and characters excite each their own thought, that is language, whether these signs are written by man, or impressed by the power of God. The only question is, are these signs thus made for the purpose of communicating ideas, and do they reach and effect their object. If so, that is language, by whomsoever used, to whomsoever addressed.

Let us now look about us on the works of God, and read one of the characters from the page which He has written in letters of light upon the arch of Heaven.

That noted star, which leads the mariner aright upon the trackless ocean, that mark in the Heavens round which the firmament rolls on forever, the light of which has poured itself into millions of minds, what is it to him who has not learned the language of God? Imagine some one to behold it for the first time, apart from the glittering host which surround it, it would be to him but a point of light, less than the glowworm's ray, less than the glitter of a particle of dust in the sunbeam, too minute to engage his attention for a moment, for it is a *little* character, a minute sign. But oh! how full of truth is that little star to those, who have been accustomed to read the writing-marks of the living God. It speaks of His power, it speaks of His wisdom, it speaks of His love, — all conveyed to us by a mere point, which the night-bird sees as we see, while unto us

alone is the key given to unlock the riches of His truth. That point in the mid heavens marks a world; its flickering beams mark that it is a sign to other worlds,—a sign of wonders, in itself a point upon the retina of the eye.

It may be observed, that the star is not an arbitrary character representing a world, but it is itself actually a world. We admit this, for God makes not a distinct creation on which to impress His truth, but all must acknowledge that to us it would have remained but a point forever, if God had not revealed the truth by the significance of His other works. It may also be said that the lesson, which the sight of this star suggests, is but the bringing up in the mind the discoveries of science by the law of association. We admit this too to be correct. The very basis, on which language rests, is the association of ideas with signs. Surely a mere point of light is an arbitrary sign with no significancy in itself, no resemblance to the ideas it gives. But God himself has given to the mind its law of association, so that when the eye looks up to this sign, the mind takes in those ideas which it has pleased our Father in Heaven thus to communicate.

Consider still further. The light which the mind receives is from without. We are so much accustomed to watch the transmission of truth from one to the other; we are so much inclined to draw our ideas indirectly from the schools of philosophy, that we regard the stream of knowledge as of human origin, and as impelled by human strength. We forget that God is the origin of all truth, and that it continually flows towards us from His throne. When we look in upon our own minds, we find there the power to originate to a certain extent only. Chimeras float within the brain, the imagination is full of indistinct sketching, and shadowy outline. Incompleteness, the reaching upward without the power to rise, the want of method, of soundness, characterizes the offspring of our own bounded and hemmed-in spirits. But we open our view upon the world, then rush in upon us the ideas which God, the Infinite Spirit, conveys to us. His world presents itself as a bold and finished work; on order established by His power time has no effect; system supported by His wisdom is supreme. Beauty and harmony, strength and distinctness, mark the language He addresses to our senses.

Our fathers were instructed, we have been taught, and all that we know of valuable truth comes from without. All our



distinct ideas have been conveyed to us through some medium. This medium is the language of God. We require connexion and intercourse with man; He furnishes the bond which unites us. We need knowledge of outer things and communion with our Father in Heaven; He has bestowed this information, upholds this communion; He continues to fill our hearts with His light and truth and love.

But we hasten to our third illustration of the Presence of God. The power which He manifested at the creation of this world is now equally manifested to us.

We are cheated and imposed upon by the use of words. *Nature*, it is said, upholds all we see around us, and she, as a kind step-mother, has the guardianship of the children of God while on earth. If *Nature* means some being distinct from the Deity, it is an empty sound, it has no significancy whatever. "The Lord, *He* causeth the vapors to ascend, *He* maketh the lightning with rain, *He* bringeth forth the wind out of His treasures." This is the constant language of the Scriptures. "Yet," says a forcible writer, "we have, I know not why, a strong aversion to believing that God concerns himself in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute some blind, unthinking Deputy in His stead."

God said "Let there be light, and there was light." Had this annunciation of his will sounded through our ears, standing afar off had we observed the gloomy void throw off its mantle of thick darkness, and become fitted for the abode of man, could the sudden change have struck us with any more force, than when even now the bright morning rolls in victorious over the stormy night of winter? Aye, but the one was the act of God, the other but the established order of *Nature*. Strike, we beseech you, from your vocabulary this empty name, that usurps the power and attributes of God. It is foul idolatry to set up a *word* for the object of our worship!

Again, the same power, which He exercised in the creation of the world, is now operating before our eyes in its preservation. What causes the particles of the earth to adhere as a whole? Why do the planets retain their orbits, and rolling through space preserve their order and their accustomed course? It is gravitation, the attraction which one body has for another. Has gravitation power and wisdom? Can it call down the rain upon the earth to refresh its parched surface, and then relax its hold, and permit the water as vapor to roll up to the

summit of the ragged mountain? Has gravitation the freedom of choice to incline this piece of iron to the centre, and another towards the pole? It is a mere word, well enough in scientific inquiries, but it too often turns the attention from that Being, who sustains with His own hands the universe which He has created.

God in His wisdom operates with regularity. A fixed law is seen to govern every movement of the parts of His creation. Each division of His kingdom has its own law, yet all together form a combination of harmony, beauty, and sublimity. Were it otherwise, the earth would be a chaos to man; he could neither foresee nor foreknow any future occurrence; there would be no exercise of his will, no truth for his guide; his limited faculties would be overwhelmed by the apparent confusion, borne down by the uncertainty of all events. The laws of God, the everlasting bounds and metes, the landmarks and partitions, the regulated succession, give him all of his moral and intellectual power. Let us not forget that what appears to us thus fixed, as if ordained from the beginning, is but the present ministering of God to man's wants, to his character. Let us not deify the laws of God, that we may forget the daily exercise of His power for our good. Of what value is the written parchment which is human law, if there be no strength for its execution; what are the laws of God but His rule of action, the prescribed form in which He is manifested to man.

Again, we know not but that matter is the very manifestation of God to us His creatures in the infancy of our being, the living characters He has traced out as exhibiting His truth, His direct operation on our minds. But if matter be not God, if it be an entity or existence in itself, it hath none of the power and attributes of Him who created it. It is inert and passive; it has no power to change and modify itself. If then we observe rising from the earth a tender plant, unfolding its leaves, growing gradually towards the sky, increasing in bulk until the sturdy oak in its majesty and beauty stands before us—is it matter or God, who before our eyes thus again reacts the process of creation which Moses describes, “and God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree bringing forth fruit after its kind.”

But it may be said, such is the disposition to escape from a belief in the presence of God, that the seed sown produced the tree, and not His direct power as at the creation of the world.

There is no manifestation of His goodness more striking, none more beautiful, than the creation of the seed, which is to produce of its kind as long as the wants of man shall require this provision. The seed is not a tree, it is not the towering elm or the majestic oak, nor does it resemble it; nor does it contain the plant in embryo, for after circumstances of soil and climate shall vary its product. What is it then? The nucleus round which God has promised the plant shall be called forth—an arbitrary sign conveying the promise of future blessing—the key of creative power entrusted to man—the seal of the compact with the worm of the dust, connecting him with the Deity in the work of beautifying the earth, of making the desert to smile, and the waste places to rejoice.

The seed placed in the earth, moistened by the rains, swells its tiny bosom, shoots down into the soil to form the root, and upward for the branches. The plant draws to it its nutriment. It spreads open its green leaves to the sunshine; year after year it steadily progresses, until it showers down its fruits for the support of man.

Is this seed endowed with knowledge and foresight? Can it reason and decide? Has it power in itself? The plant, can it command other particles of matter to unite with it? can it draw up the waters through its pores? does it invariably know what is to be the form of its leaves, the color of its blossoms, and the flavor of its fruit? It has knowledge and power then; it does thus know; it does thus decide! The herbage of the valley possesses the attributes of a God. The Creator of all things has shorn himself of His power, has conveyed away His attributes. — Then let us worship and adore, for not a seed swells in the earth, not a plant springs from its bosom, not a tree waves its branches over its surface, where God is not.

We have thus endeavored to present some illustrations of the presence of God, of His communion with our minds, and of the continued exercise of his creative power. We have selected such views as would bring up the subject in somewhat a new light, that it may impress us strongly and deeply. It is not the truth that we lack, but, to repeat the idea previously given, we need to have our attention waked up to these old truths. Listlessness of mind, an inveterate habit of inattention to the existence of the Eternal Spirit, needs to be broken in upon. We need to help each other to escape a fatuity of mind on this

subject, that we may feel that God's ark still rides over the world's waves, and that the burning bush has not gone out.

Oh how lacking is man in faith towards God, even while our minds are so constituted as to feel the truth of His existence, would we but consider. And yet how credulous in matters relating to ourselves. The hardly perceptible echo of a foot-step proclaims a friend, — the ink-trace upon paper appeals directly to our hearts; but the foot-prints of God upon earth, His attributes, inscribed throughout the immense creation, call not up a passing thought. We believe that the sun will to-morrow rise, nay, will continue in future years to ripen the fruits of the earth, for this is His promise; yet we forget Him who gave this promise. We see man in the works of his hands, yet in God's works we see nothing but the results. Such is education, such is habit! As it were, leaning over the cataract of Niagara we hear not the roar of its waters, for we are intently watching the straw carried onwards by its foam; yet those at a distance hear its thunder, — if they listen!

S. E. C.

---

ART. III. — 1. *The Sabbath School Teacher; designed to aid in elevating and perfecting the Sabbath School System.*

By Rev. JOHN TODD. Northampton: J. H. Butler. 1837. 12mo. pp. 432.

2. *The Sunday School Guide, and Parent's Manual.* By A. B. MUZZEY. Boston: J. Munroe & Co., and B. H. Greene. 1838. 18mo. pp. 216.

THE subject of these books is one of leading concern at the present time. The Sunday School has become one of the established institutions of religion in connexion with the church, and the character and progress of religion is henceforth to depend, in no small degree, on the wisdom with which it shall be administered. All denominations have adopted it, and thus expressed their faith in its value and power. In all denominations some have been disposed to regard it as, on the whole, the most important of the general means yet devised for the advancement of the religious character of the community, and have urged its claims in a tone of confidence which has

bordered on extravagance. On the other hand, many have been inclined to look upon it doubtfully, and have taken but a feeble interest in what they believed to be a questionable experiment. Even of those who are willing to hope most from judicious plans of religious education, there have been many who saw too much imperfection in the present apparatus of the Sunday School, to warrant any confident expectation that it would accomplish what its friends propose.

In this state of divided opinion between the sanguine and the doubting, efforts have been continually made to elevate the character of the institution, and to secure greater efficiency to its operation. To this end, books and manuals have been multiplied, with increasing experience a wiser and more thorough method has been advocated, and the whole idea of the institution and its purposes has taken a more liberal form. Nothing has occurred more encouraging to its friends, than the palpable and regular improvement which has consequently taken place in the methods of instruction, and the higher aims of those engaged in imparting it. The school is not now what it was twelve years ago; a management, which then was esteemed wise, would now be thought essentially defective. The day, when rewards were distributed, and lessons recited "for places," is gone by, as well as making instruction a mere exercise of memory. This past growth of the institution is the best guarantee for its future progress, and the best encouragement to those who anticipate from it the most extensive benefits.

Two of the most recent works of this character are now before us; both demanding respectful notice on account of their own intrinsic, though very different merits, and because the authors of both have previously made themselves known by valuable books addressed to the young. In taking up the present subject, they seem to be in the way of their vocation, and they give proof of such an acquaintance with its merits, and such a hearty interest in its character and welfare, as to give them a claim to be respectfully heard.

The work of Mr. Todd is formed on the model of Mr. Jacob Abbot's books, and may be regarded as a successful imitation of the illustrative method of that ingenious and popular writer. It will doubtless be thought by many that the matter of illustrations is overdone, and that the neglect of the wholesome rule, *ne quid nimis*, has somewhat diminished the value and point of the work. This is the besetting danger of this

mode of composition. The anecdotes cited in illustration of a single thought are often too numerous, and sometimes stretched out with an injurious minuteness. The quotations, admirable though many of them be, are too frequent; and the author has contrived to adduce them in such a manner as to puzzle us not a little. He introduces long passages, without saying whence they are taken, and with no intimation of their origin, other than the printer's marks, and of these he sometimes employs the single and sometimes the double. Doubtless he means something by this distinction; but what, we have in vain attempted to guess; perhaps he will wonder at our ignorance; but we are not aware of any usage among authors which interprets his intention. For ourselves, too, we think that much of the pleasure of a fine quotation is lost, by not being able to associate it with the image of its author; we want to know who it is that is delighting and instructing us; and we feel that when his name is concealed, we are deprived of the privilege of bestowing gratitude on a benefactor.

The work is characterized by clearness and strength, without any grace, both of thought and diction, and leaves a strong impression of the earnestness of the writer, and his thorough acquaintance with the subjects he is discussing. Many of them are treated with uncommon power, and no one can read the work without a fresh persuasion of the value of the Sunday school system, and the solemn obligations of those to whom it is entrusted. It would be easy to point out some views which in our judgment are erroneous, and some advice of doubtful propriety; but the instances are not very numerous, and they do not essentially affect the value of the work, which we esteem worthy of the careful perusal of all interested in the subject. It is divided into fourteen chapters. After an introductory chapter, which contains some striking statements respecting the object in view and the necessity of laboring for it, it proceeds to point out those first principles of a Christian education, which should form the groundwork and guide of all religious instruction. The character and duties of the superintendent and the qualifications of the teachers are the next topics, and are treated with great practical good sense. Under a conviction that the success of the whole system depends on the competency and fidelity of those who are its active managers, the author insists on a high standard of intellectual and religious fitness. He would have the superintendent elected annually by the teachers,

"the very best man in the church, — a man of age;" — for, he adds, "under the present system, the office of the superintendent is the most important office in the church, next to that of the pastor." The teachers should, in like manner, be elected annually by the church, — so that the school may be under the supervision of the church, and in no degree independent of it. The pastor especially should have an intimate knowledge of all its affairs, oversee and watch its progress, and be the weekly indefatigable instructor of the teachers.

The fifth chapter is entitled, "other means of doing good besides teaching." These are, visiting the families to which the scholars belong, and the use of the library and books. This last topic is particularly well treated. It is followed by a few remarks, not without meaning, on the duty of a teacher to "try to make it a part of his means of usefulness, to increase the usefulness and influence of the pastor." Then come two chapters on the important subjects of the method to be taken by the teacher in fitting himself for his duty, and in communicating instruction. Some of this we do not like; but the following we like greatly. Who can estimate the amount of ill impression made, and of suffering inflicted, by the thoughtless consideration which is here so properly rebuked!

"In order to gain and retain the confidence of your class, let there be no lightness of conduct, no trifling, no laughing, no undue familiarity. This is not necessary. Be careful, too, not to wound the feelings of the child by smiling at his ignorance or mistakes. 'The teacher,' says one who has had great experience, 'should have great command over his risibilities. I have often had replies to questions put to poor, ignorant boys, almost irresistibly ludicrous. In one instance there was something so exceedingly ludicrous, that I lost self-command and laughed heartily. I at once saw that I had lowered myself in the estimation of my pupils. I was letting myself down to a level with them. I had laughed in God's house, on his day, and in his presence, when sixty immortal souls were influenced by my conduct. I have too frequently seen teachers guilty of similar conduct.' No child *intends* to give a ludicrous answer to your question, and if it strikes you in that light and you laugh at him, you injure his feelings, and leave a sting which will not be soon extracted."

"If the child fears lest what he says will strike his teacher as ludicrous, or that he will throw the least ridicule upon his an-

swers, his heart will be frozen, and the fountain of his sympathies will be dried up."

"Be careful, so far as possible, not to doubt the veracity and the good intentions of the child. Nothing will so soon check, and kill the growth of confidence and love between the child and yourself, as imputing things to him in the name of crimes, when he is innocent. I once knew a fatherless child have his veracity doubted by one who ought to have known better. All he could say to prove his innocence was turned against him, and he was treated as if no proof of innocence would be satisfactory. The child colored, sobbed, and retired; but ten thousand kindnesses, and ten thousand good opinions, afterwards, could never erase the cruel wound from his bosom." — pp. 231–233.

This is a fair average sample of the book, so far as an extract containing none of the illustrations can give it. One of these we will borrow from the next chapter on infant schools. He is speaking of the importance of early discipline of the mind.

"I will adduce an example to the point. There were two little boys who were twins, whose names were James and John. They were just six years old. One day their teacher had been telling them about God, — how great, and wise, and good he is. Among other things he said that 'God was so great, that he filled all heaven.' After their teacher had left them, they began to talk about what they had heard from their instructor.

"'John,' said James, 'did not our teacher say that God was so great that he filled all heaven?' — 'Yes.' — 'And he said that the heaven of heavens, which is the greatest heaven of all, could not hold him?' — 'Yes.' — 'Well, John, if God is so very great that he fills *all* heaven, I don't see how there will be *room* enough for us, and so we can't go there.' — 'Come to the window,' said John. 'Do you see that man yonder coming down the street, and walking this way towards us?' — 'Yes.' — 'Well, James, you can *think* all the way to him, so that your *think* reaches all the way to him.' — 'Yes.' — 'Well, then, James, does your *think stop* the man from walking towards us?' — 'Why, no.' — 'Well, now, God is just like our *think*; and if our *think* does not stop the man from walking towards us, neither will God stop us from going to heaven. He fills heaven, I suppose, just as your *think* fills all along up the street.'

"Here then was reasoning, sound, correct, unanswerable reasoning. It was natural too; the first object seen, a man walking, served for an illustration, — it is easy, simple, and yet as correct as a learned Professor could have given. But nothing but a very early discipline of mind could have given such power. It



is this very discipline which the child acquires in the infant class." — pp. 260–262.

The subject of singing occupies the ninth chapter; then comes the connexion of the missionary cause with the Sabbath School; and the duty of the church and pastors, — to his doctrine concerning which we have already adverted. "The duties of teachers in regard to the Sabbath" is the title of a chapter, a large portion of which can be regarded as little else than a digression. The thirteenth chapter treats of the Sunday School as a nursery for the ministry, and offers many wise hints to those who are asking "how we shall know whether it is the duty of a young man, hopefully pious and in indigent circumstances, to seek an education with the gospel ministry in view." The volume closes with a survey of the encouragements to fidelity which animate the labors of the teacher.

The work of Mr. Muzzey is a much smaller book, of more modest pretensions, having precisely the same object, and therefore occupying for the most part the same ground. He begins with the connexion of the Sunday School with domestic education, and the aid it may furnish to parents in the discharge of their duty. He looks upon the teacher and the parent as mutually helpers of each other, and as each needing the other, in order to his own most satisfactory success. With that moderation of view which characterizes the whole work, he forbears to claim for the school the rank of an authoritative institution, as has been done by some of its over-ardent advocates, but rests its claim to patronage on its utility.

"There is nothing essentially obligatory, on the part of every individual, to join in sustaining this Institution. Every Christian is under obligation, it is true, to contribute, according to his ability, to the great cause of the moral and religious education of the young. But, whether he shall do it in this very form, is a point to be decided by his own judgment and conscience.

"This view is of vital moment. For it affects the main principle on which the institution depends for its best influences, and indeed its perpetuity. I refer to its being a *voluntary* system. If you in any manner, by exaggerated or false representations, induce the father to send his child to a Sunday School, or the teacher to take a class in it, you inevitably injure the cause. The parent will then think he has done all that is needful to prepare his sons and daughters for the duties of life and the joys of

Heaven. And the Teacher, allured or pressed into the School, in the belief, that, let him teach what or how he might, there was a talismanic power in his mere bodily presence, will miserably fail in his otherwise glorious task. Be studiously cautious then, to set forth these Schools precisely as they are. — pp. 6, 7.

We like this mode of stating the matter. It is unexceptionable and distinct. Starting from this idea, with great directness and plainness of manner, the author goes on to explain its signal use to parents in the discharge of their obligations, and its value as a supplement to the common schools, which are almost wholly negligent of moral and religious instruction. On this point he speaks well, and presents a few facts in contrast with what is taking place in some states of Europe, which are not very flattering to our country.

“The nations of the old world are awaking to the importance of introducing Christianity into day schools. In Holland, Germany, and Prussia, this is already done. ‘*The technicalities of Christian sects are not taught. By especial statute they are prohibited.*’ But those great and eternal principles of moral truth, which all sects allow to be indispensable in the grown-up Christian, are carefully imbedded in every youthful heart.” England is already alive to this subject. ‘British schools,’ says the last report of the British and Foreign School Society, ‘are intended to unite with every other salutary influence, whether of a private or public kind, in training up youth to be dutiful and affectionate in the family; sincere and generous in their dealings with each other; industrious, honest, and contented in business; loyal and peaceable as citizens and subjects, and *consistent and devout as professors of the Christian name.*’ Would that republican America could say thus of her public schools. Ought we to fall behind the despotic governments of Europe in this respect?” — pp. 29, 30.

“The truth however is, that so far from encouraging, we distinctly discourage, as a community, the introduction of religion, in any form, into our public schools. A late statistical document, presented to a literary convention at Vermont, shows that of one hundred schools in that State, the New Testament is used on an average in but forty-eight, either as a reading book or for devotional purposes. One would hardly credit the statement, yet so great is the dread among some individuals of any connexion whatever between church and state, and of all sectarianism; that teachers have even been forbidden to offer prayers before

the children in our schools! In the interior of Massachusetts, not long since, the Chairman of a School Committee actually addressed a letter to a teacher, requiring him, in peremptory and offensive terms, to desist forthwith from the practice of opening and closing his school with prayer. Legislation also, we fear, is opposed to all religious instruction at these seminaries."— pp. 32, 33.

While the whole system of secular education in the common schools is thus tending to divorce religion from the company of learning, it becomes of essential importance that some counter-acting influence be set up; and this may be found in the Sunday School. The efficient management of this seminary becomes then a topic of serious inquiry; and as this must depend mainly on the character of the instructors, that topic is next discussed in a very capital chapter on the "Qualifications of Teachers;" after which are treated in a similar style the objects and the method of teaching, and the duty and means of improvement in the teacher.

The chapter on the office of the Superintendent is a mere sketch or outline, very satisfactory as far it goes, but we could not help wishing that our author's limits had allowed him to develop it more in detail. Several of the topics are of a nature to demand much elucidation; to instance no other, that of the preferableness in school of prayer by liturgy or by extemporaneous speech, is one involving so many considerations, perhaps to be decided only by much experience, and not by any reasoning from principles, that scarcely any light is thrown upon it by the few paragraphs which a brief chapter affords room for. We should like to see the subject treated elaborately and at large. The practice varies in different schools, and we suppose that a comparison of the experience of wise and devout men might lead to some certain conclusions.

The library is the subject of another chapter;—not one of the least important; and the author very justly protests, he might have done it in even more urgent tones, against the too frequent introduction of fictitious stories of an exciting and sentimental character. There is great danger in that class of books. A fiction for a child should always have the gravity and moderation of truth, should never falsify human nature and real life, nor encourage sickly and morbid expectations. Some of the stories written for children are mere novels in miniature, exaggerated, stimulating, suited to create an unnatural craving for ex-

citement, to destroy the taste for sober truth, and to train up our pupils to be devourers of the circulating library. This should be seen to in the selection of books. Very truly does Mr. Muzzey say, that "they are not a necessary good; everything depends on the character of their contents; they have done some evil from our disregard of this point."

The catalogue of books for teachers, appended to this chapter, seems to us on the whole a useful and judicious selection. But its value is greatly abridged by a fault in the manner of designating many of the works; the titles are often stated too briefly, and often without the name of the author; the number of volumes, or their size, is never given; and there is no uniformity in this respect. What are we to do with articles like these? "Bible Companion." "Evidences of Christianity." "Harmony of the Gospels." "Palestine." "Pestalozzi," &c. These titles, and there are more such, give no idea of the works intended, and afford no help to him who would purchase. A list to be useful should state the author's name, all that is characteristic in the title page, the size and number of the volumes, and the year when printed. Then one who never saw the work can ask for it, and be sure that he gets the book he is seeking.

"The claim of Sunday Schools on Pastors" is the title of the next chapter, a topic, which will demand some observations from us in the sequel. The book closes with remarks on the discouragements of the teacher, and his motives to fidelity and perseverance.

It will be perceived that this little volume, like that already remarked upon, touches nearly all the questions which belong to the subject. In so limited a space, it, of course, must dispose of some of them more briefly than their importance demands. But the good judgment that is used in selecting the thoughts and illustrations, and the care which is taken to avoid prolixity of expression, are such as to remove all reasonable ground of complaint. A greater quantity of good matter could not easily be brought into the same compass; there is nothing irrelevant or wordy; and the book will be found by those for whom it is written, and who will read it in a serious spirit with the purpose of self-improvement, full of wise and profitable matter. It is a seasonable publication at the present moment, and may do much to help in circulating and fixing right views on a subject which is every day growing in importance. The hesitation

and neutrality of the doubting are operating to clog the activity of those devoted to the work, especially where the minister is one of the doubters. But there is one view, very fairly urged by Mr. Muzzey, which should lead such to inquire whether they ought not to put aside their own skepticism on the subject, and for the sake of the public join heartily in causing the utmost to be made of an experiment which is going on and cannot be stopped.

“And now comes this important consideration. The Sunday School is established in our churches, and it is evidently gaining favor with the community. The prospect seems clear, that, during our lives at least, it will continue in existence. What does wisdom dictate, under these circumstances? Does it not bid us do all in our power to elevate the system, and to aid and incite Teachers, Parents, and Children to carry it into the best possible execution? Is it wise to give our influence against, or to view with indifference and coldness, an institution firmly established, and purporting to do much good to our children, until we have matured a more perfect one?” — p 173.

There is sound sense here. This thing is established. We cannot prevent its existence. Is it not our duty to do what we may to render it an absolute and not a doubtful good? If, when inadequately managed, it may become an evil, should not the utmost be done to avert that evil and to ensure the highest benefit? There are imperfections at present attending its structure and its modes of action; is it not a duty rather to suggest remedies and improvements than to stand by and do nothing, or to abandon the cause as irremediable? How can it ever be otherwise than a feeble and unsatisfactory instrument, if the clergy and the leading men look on it with doubt and treat it with neglect,—if it be left to accident to select and qualify the teachers, and if the instruction be given at random, without regard to any systematic plan of improvement? To these points, as it seems to us, attention should especially be given; and it is only by such attention that the institution can be raised to the respectability and power which its friends claim for it. This we hope to make evident by a few plain remarks.

We look upon the Sunday School as an instrument designed to aid the pastor in that part of his charge which concerns the lambs of the flock. These are as much entrusted to his oversight as the elder members of the congregation, and he is as responsible for the manner in which the invitations of Christ

reach them, as for that in which they reach the public assembly. So far indeed as he may be regarded responsible for the character of the church with which he is connected, it is probable that his action is on none so important as on the children. He who looks back upon a ministry of twenty years, finds himself in the midst of a community which has grown up beneath his auspices, and whose condition bears distinctly the impress of his cares or his neglect. He cannot refuse to feel, that it is in some most essential points what he has made it. The young people, who are then taking the active places of society and managing its affairs, bring to their stations opinions, manners, culture of mind and heart, that have been very much determined by the character of his general intercourse with his society, and the pains he has taken for its improvement. If he had done less, they would have made less progress; if he had done more, they might have reached a higher standard.

Now if the position of the minister be such as to render his influence on society thus inevitable, his obligation is great to use it as diligently, systematically, and thoroughly as possible. He will be anxious to avail himself of every instrument which may aid him in discharging this great function. He cannot abandon to others this chief trust; it is too vital, too personal, too delicate a charge to be executed by proxy. Too much depends upon it. Whatever else may be turned over to other hands, his children he must not lose sight of; he must see that they are taught, and must know where and how. Assistants he may welcome; but the responsibility is his own, and he cannot rid himself of it. The Sunday School is an assistant; he welcomes it gratefully as such. But he may not surrender to it his privilege and duty; he may not substitute it for his own pastoral care. He must regard it and use it as an instrument of aid; as an expedient for helping him; as providing him, in a manner, with more heads, more hands, more voices, more time, in order that he may the more completely perform his own great work for the children entrusted to him.

We are inclined to lay great stress on this view, and do not understand how this institution can do what it proposes in any place, where the pastor is not virtually its head and superintendent. The Sunday School is his: if not, whose is it? Does it belong to the church? This does not alter the case. All the religious means of the church are his to direct and employ. The church has appointed him for that very end, and has as-

signed them to him. He is the responsible person. If unsuccessful, who is blamed, who suffers, but he? If successful, whose the honor, whose the reward, but his? Let him at the end of twenty years find himself encompassed by a congregation rudely taught, indifferent to religion, alien from spiritual things, will he not reprove himself that he entrusted the teaching of their early years to incompetent hands? Will not he, and will not others, lay the failure to the account of his neglect, and say that nothing better could be expected from a ministry which abandoned the most precious years of life, in which character is formed, to the undirected and possibly injudicious culture of a few young men and women,—whose unadaptedness for their vocation has been proved by their having marred rather than promoted the growth of infant piety.

We do not mean that the pastor should be the actual superintendent. For the burden of this office he has not the time, and the class of superintendents is on many accounts so valuable a body of men, that we would no more have the ministry crowd it aside, than we would have it crowd aside the ministry. But we do apprehend that the highest prosperity of the institution, (here and there may be found a rare exception, but so rare as only to make our statement the stronger,) can only be reached where it is virtually under the direction and control of the minister. His heart must be in it, and from the beating of his heart it must have its life; else it will languish; who will burn, if he burn not? who will keep up a fervent interest in it, if he be cool toward it? He must plan for it, labor for it, point out the process of teaching, select the books, be acquainted with the whole routine of duty, familiar with the children, often speaking to them in their classes, as well as by a general address, and assiduous in teaching their teachers,—teaching them, not only what they are to impart, but how they are to impart it. Every such institution must have one soul thus pervading it; if it be not that of the minister, whose shall it be? How often will any other in a parish be found competent to it? And if he decline the labor and pleasure, can it be hoped that the school will flourish?

We are aware that a different view is taken by some, and that instances of admirable success can be quoted against us. But we say in reply, that we are speaking of the thing in general. Instances there are in which men are seen standing by the side of the pastor, every way fitted to take from him not

only this duty, but his whole charge ; and in such cases doubtless he may safely and thankfully surrender this to their hands. Perhaps it may be true that in such instances a more eminent success may be reached, through some peculiar advantages which a layman is supposed to possess. But these instances are few, and they stand by themselves. The great majority of religious societies are far from being thus blessed, and to introduce into them a practice suited only to the few, would infallibly ruin the cause. If it be true that certain schools have specially prospered when surrendered by the minister into other hands, then there is only so much the greater reason for ministers elsewhere to redouble their personal devotion, that they may equal the efficiency of those gifted laymen.

Next in importance to the devotedness of the pastor is the character of the teachers. If they are his assistants, if their duty be to take a part of the work of the ministry, a portion of the spirit of the ministry should be theirs also. This is essentially and distinctively a religious spirit. If the young people of his community come up to aid him in any other spirit, they bring him no real help. He might as well do his own work in an irreligious and secular frame of mind, as have them in such a frame do it for him. It must be from a religious motive, in the action of a religious heart, that they address themselves to the duty, or it will be a cold and ineffective task, no pleasure to themselves and no profit to the pupils. And is there not reason to apprehend that many amiable, well informed, well meaning young persons have been brought to this work, who yet are in no proper sense religious persons, and are therefore not likely to give a decidedly and impressively religious tone to their instructions ? They can hear the lessons recited from the manuals ; they can read to the class entertaining stories ; they can talk of natural history and natural theology ; but they are not so accustomed to regard it all in a spiritual point of view, as to give a spiritual turn to what they do, and solicitously make all bear on the heart and character of their pupils. They have not that personal experience of the deep and various feelings pertaining to the Christian life, and that devotion to duty and God as the one thing needful, which would make them earnest to direct every word to the heart and conscience, and to count the growth of the spiritual character the single object to be attained. Yet so it should be, and until so it actually be, it is vain to expect those magnificent results of which



we hear so much. The very instruments, by which we think to attain them, are in fact preventing their arrival. Here is a great want. This is *the* great want. We do not know how it is to be supplied, except, first, by ministers making themselves responsible for their schools to a degree that few are now, and by so throwing their whole souls into them, as to quicken the spiritual life of all the souls that are engaged ; then, by exercising decidedly their responsibility in the selection and the training of the teachers ; so that religious attainment shall be more and more the one and the indispensable thing ; and then again, by a little change in the system itself, which we are disposed to think of some importance, but which we at the same time would diffidently suggest rather than boldly urge ; it is, namely, a diminution in the number of the teachers. We would ask, is it necessary that so many should be employed ? Would not the work be better done by a smaller number ?

As we have no experience to guide us in the answer to these questions, we can only pretend to offer in relation to them such remarks as have been suggested by the reason of the thing, in connexion with some observation on the working of the present plan. The reasons on which this plan was founded and is continued are very obvious. The school can be open but one or two, or at most three, hours ; and it is apparent that a large number of pupils can in that brief time gain little personal attention, unless divided into many classes. That important part of the plan also, which contemplates the visiting of the children at their houses, is to be more easily effected when parcelled out among a numerous company, each entrusted with a small number. But it is worth considering, whether, allowing the whole weight to these reasons, the practice on them has not been carried to an unnecessary extreme. In dividing the classes down to six and four children in each, has not the subdivision gone further than the reason called for ? A lesson can be recited in less than an hour, sufficiently to answer the purpose of ascertaining that it has been learned, by a class of twelve ; and the greater matter of imparting religious impressions may as well be accomplished for twenty at once as for five. In point of fact, do we not find that many of the classes get through their work long before the allotted time has expired, proving thus that a larger number might have been attended to ? Then if we look a little further, is it not plain that by diminishing the number of the classes, we diminish the risk of incompetent

teachers — the most serious of all risks. We cut off the number of those who have come in reluctantly, merely to fill up, and those who are unpunctual, sluggish, uninterested, or uninteresting, and we put the important work into the hands of a more select company of those whose education and zeal make them adequate to it. Might we not hope better and more satisfactory results from placing the whole school under the teaching of half a dozen truly spiritual teachers, whose whole souls were in it, and who possessed the gift of attracting and impressing, than from dividing it amongst forty or fifty, who in a bodily sense would come nearer to them, but many of whom would have no power of affecting the soul at all, while the few, who are gifted with power, would be wasting on small classes the light and influence that might regenerate the whole? And as to the good to be done by visiting at the houses, it is plain that the few would do it with more efficiency and punctuality, as well as with greater ease and pleasure, because they would know how to do it and be equal to it, than the larger number who are conscious of their less ability, and are prompted by less zeal.

Perhaps it may still be said, that this would overthrow one of the chief advantages of the Sunday School system; that, namely, which is derived from it by the teachers themselves; that it is the young men and women employed in the work of instruction who are principally benefited, and that a great evil would be done by depriving them of this admirable seminary of moral improvement. We readily admit the worth of the system to them, and should esteem it a serious evil to deprive them of it, unless an efficient substitute could be found. We cannot doubt that such a substitute might be found. In some way the pastor and elders of the church might provide for their religious advancement as effectually, without putting in jeopardy, for their sakes, the religious impressions of the younger generation. If so, it ought to be done, and then we do not perceive that any considerable objection remains to the proposition we have made. We commend it to the consideration of all interested in the subject; we hope it will not be passed by without an experiment being somewhere made in relation to it. Let it be remembered, that this minute division of the school has been a part of the plan from the very outset, when the schools were first formed, and that none other has been tried. It is right that some other should be tried. We must not assume that the plan

first suggested was perfect and cannot be improved on. And if there be impediments to the best efficiency of the system, as all must allow, how can it be decided, without further trial, that the cause, or one of the causes, does not lie here? Let not the contrary be taken for granted, but let the trial be fairly made.

We have implied, in all that has been said, that the instruction of the Sunday School should be exclusively directed to the formation of the religious character. On this point we cannot but think that great stress should be laid. The teaching of religious truth, and whatever pertains to the Christian Scriptures and the works and providence of God is for no end, as we conceive, except that of inculcating Christian principle, and bringing the conscience and life into subjection to the divine law. If natural religion, natural history, Jewish antiquities, sacred geography, and church history are taught merely as lessons for the memory and intellect, the hour might just as well be passed in lessons of arithmetic and grammar. The time is thrown away in which something is not done to show the application of this knowledge to the advancement of the character. When the objection is vehemently urged against the study of the classics, that they are full of false moral and religious sentiments, and that their pictures of life and manners tend to corrupt,—the sufficient reply is, that, being taught simply as lessons of language and prosody, the sentiment finds no lodging in a boy's mind, and does nothing to taint his heart. But on precisely the same principle the admirable sentiments of the Bible and of nature, if taught merely as exercises of memory and intellect, may pass through the mind and over the heart without affecting them; the miracles and sufferings of Christ, and all the most momentous truths of revelation may be recited, and recited well; yet so long as recitation is the object, and no moral application is made by the teacher, every heart may be untouched, and not a breath of moral life breathed upon the soul. This is a matter of constant experience. Let this method of teaching prevail in our Sunday Schools, through the mistaken judgment or the incompetency of the teachers, and they will become anything but nurseries of spiritual life. They will have the very opposite character. They will be little else than expedients for hardening young hearts against future impressions by an early unmeaning familiarity with the most awful things, and wearing out the sensibility of the conscience and

affections by the long habit of seeing without perceiving, and hearing without understanding, and receiving the full knowledge of divine things without being converted. The great impediment to religious progress throughout Christendom is the dullness of soul, which springs from the extreme familiarity from early life with religious forms and words, begetting a mechanical and thoughtless intimacy with spiritual truth. It is only by great effort that it can ever afterward be made real. Now every scheme of religious education should have especially for its object to correct this evil, to renew the susceptibility of conscience, to restore or keep alive the sensibility of the heart, to associate feeling with the familiar, and to make the old and well known fresh, impressive, and real. This can only be accomplished by great care in the teachers directed to this very end. If it be neglected, our boasted system of Sunday Schools may prove in the end only a more formal and certain method of searing the conscience against the action of truth, and quenching the spiritual life in the coming generations.

A single remark remains to be made on the plan of instruction that should be pursued. We may be in an error; but we suppose that in very few of these institutions is there anything like a system, well considered and well connected, by which pupils are led on in regular steps from the beginning to the close of an appointed course. We suppose that, in most instances, one book follows another, and one process another, without much regard to their mutual relation, or to any plan for accomplishing a perfect scheme in the whole. Hence there may be long attendance and little progress; as Robert Hall said of Chalmers's mode of preaching, it is perpetual motion but no advance. So far as this is the case, it is an evil, and to a certain extent it must be the case, wherever the plan of the school does not point out strictly a succession of books and subjects. Religious knowledge lies in disorder in the mind, and the pupil, forever learning, never comes to the knowledge of the truth. The chief infelicity which attends public preaching is its want of method, its disregard of system; an infelicity, which will be best counteracted by strictness of order in early instruction. By this means, the hearers, being already prepared with the requisite arrangement, will be enabled to refer to its proper place whatever is brought forward to their attention in after life, and thus to remove it from the disconnected position in which the pulpit has placed it, into the regular order of their own minds.

We do not enlarge on this suggestion at present ; we trust that its importance is sufficiently obvious ; and there can be no well grounded expectation of great permanent good from this institution, until its importance shall be acknowledged, and it shall be as carefully acted upon, as it is in the teaching of any other science or branch of knowledge. What the order should be, where it should begin and where end, by what steps it should proceed and what books should be employed in it, it would require much experience and great deliberation fitly to determine. But the general idea is plain. The whole of a congregation, from the earliest age to the latest, should be considered as members of the great congregational school, for whom education is to be provided. The adult portion are to be taught in the public assembly, by the appointed preaching of the word. The younger portion should be receiving preliminary and elementary instruction in the Sunday School. From the earliest age up to incipient manhood, all should be members, led on from year to year, from class to class, through such a series of books, and by the voice of such teachers, as shall conduct them from the simplest alphabet of Christian knowledge to a somewhat perfect acquaintance with whatever a well informed believer should know. If this were done, might we not hope to retain the attendance of our boys and girls to a later period ? It might be made to appear less a childish thing than it now is in the view of the majority ; and instead of quitting the school at the age of twelve because of that reason, they then would naturally move up into a higher department and enter a more elevated class. Thus they would be led onward, as their minds opened, to subjects and thoughts of increasing interest. Instead of quitting the whole study just as they are beginning to be enough advanced to derive from it the greatest pleasure and profit, and thus hazarding the possession of all they have gained, they would proceed in a steady progress onward, every day gaining something new, while they confirmed and secured all they had previously gained. There is need of some well digested plan for effecting this object. We fear that what is so laboriously done for children under the age of twelve, is, in the great proportion of instances, thrown away, because after that age they are suffered to remit their attention and be cast upon the casual influences of the world. Why should it be so ? Is it not proved, by the perseverance of here and there a class with its teacher through the years of youth, till their minds are informed and pervaded

by the knowledge and love of religious things, and by the happy results of this perseverance on themselves and on the church; is it not thus proved, how great an advantage must belong to the universal adoption of the practice? Let it not be found casually and occasionally existing; let it be the established and expected order; let it be the understood system in our congregations. One step toward it has already been made in the frequent institution of Bible classes; let the scheme be completed by filling up all the intervals, and enlisting in its ranks all the young members of the society. Let these things be done, and who can doubt that the thorough universal discipline would elevate the character of our congregations, and the tone of thought and morality throughout the community; that it would multiply the members of the professing communicants, give strength and encouragement to the pulpit, and be in every way propitious to the growth and stability of the institutions of the gospel.

Our idea respecting the course to be taken at the present moment for perfecting the institution in question has, we trust, been made sufficiently evident by the course of our remarks. They comprise four principal points. First, that the ministry take the control of it as a part of the duty of the pastoral office; second, that the instruction be given by a small number of skilful and devout teachers; third, that the great object be to infuse the spirit and habits of personal religion, rather than merely the knowledge of religious things; fourth, that a systematic course be introduced, embracing all the members of a congregation from the earliest age up to manhood, and imparting to all a thorough Christian education. These comprise, as we think, the essential points. If our churches would faithfully carry such a scheme into execution, and parents do their duty in domestic life, there could no fear remain on account of the coming generations. They would be safe in character and in fortune. All apprehensions for them vanish, the moment that their spiritual education is seen to be thoroughly provided for. That thorough provision may easily be made, if we will take the means which are in our hands, and apply them zealously with the requisite modifications. Sluggishness and neglect are what we have to fear, indifference on one part, and mismanagement on the other. The friends of Sunday Schools must array themselves against these, or their beautiful idea of a universal religious condition of society will be found, as we suggested

above and as cannot be too solemnly repeated, to do nothing better than the establishment throughout Christendom of a formal acquaintance with the vocabulary and the superficial history of religion, instead of that living sense of duty and that affectionate devotion to purity and God, which are the result of the true Christian tuition. Thus their delightful visions of a new order of society, wholly spiritual and heavenly, will end in a merely mechanical adherence to outside truth, in knowledge that puffs up without charity which edifies, and wisdom in the letter with nothing of its spirit in practice. If they would prevent this disastrous disappointment, they must come up zealously to the business of improvement and progress; they must be willing to study and adopt higher and yet higher methods. They must ally their favorite institution more inseparably with the ministry; they must be more solicitous about the qualification than the number of teachers, and about the spiritual character than the intellectual knowledge of the pupils; and they must carry forward their plan, till it reaches and accomplishes a systematic scheme for the culture of all the members of the congregation. Let this be done, we repeat, and let domestic instruction be what it should be, and then the reasonable anticipations of the most hopeful philanthropist will not fail to be realized. Christianity, thus urged forward by the united efforts of its friends, will assume its rightful dominion in society. Faith having done its duty, the work is accomplished. Religion becomes the atmosphere and aliment of mankind. The words of the prophet are fulfilled: **ALL THY CHILDREN SHALL BE TAUGHT OF GOD, AND GREAT SHALL BE THE PEACE OF THY CHILDREN.**

H. W., JR.

---

**ART. IV.**—*Influence of Christianity and of the Progress of Civilization on Epic Poetry.*

THE poets of the present day who would raise the epic song cry out, like Archimedes of old, "give us a place to stand on and we will move the world." This is, as we conceive, the true difficulty. Glancing for a moment at the progress of epic poetry, we shall see that the obscurity of fabulous times could be adapted to the earliest development only of the heroic char-

acter. There is an obvious incongruity in making times so far remote the theatre on which to represent the heroism of a civilized age ; and it adds still more to the difficulty, that, although the darkness of fable still invests them, reason will no longer perceive the beings which the infant credulity of man once saw there.

To men in the early stages of society their physical existence must seem almost without end, and they live on through life with as little reference to another state of being as we ourselves do in childhood. To minds in this state there was a remoteness in an event which had taken place one or two centuries before, of which we cannot conceive, and which rendered the time that Homer had chosen for his subject, though not materially differing in character, sufficiently remote for his purpose. If to these advantages possessed by Homer we add those which belonged to him from the religion of his times and from tradition, whose voice is to the poet more friendly than the plain written records of history, we must confess that the spot on which he built up his scenes of heroic wonder was peculiarly favorable. The advance, which the human mind had made towards civilization, prevented Virgil from making a like impression on his own age. To awaken admiration, he too was obliged to break from the bonds of the present, and soar beyond the bounds of history, before he could throw his spell of power over the mind. Why had he less influence ? Because he could not, like Homer, carry into the past the spirit of his times. To the enlarged minds of Virgil's day the interval between the siege of Troy and their own time did not seem wider than it did to those who lived in the time of Homer. The true distance in time was chosen by each, but the character of Æneas did not possess those great attributes which could render it the Achilles of the Romans. Lucan, while his characters exhibit the true heroic spirit of his age, fails of giving to them their due influence from the want of some region of fiction beyond the dominion of history in which to place them, he cannot break from the present without violating every law of probability. To escape this thralldom and reach a point from which the heroic character of their age might be seen dilated to its full height, modern poets have fled beyond the bounds of time and woke the echoes of eternity. It was only from this point that the Christian world could be moved ; it is only in that region without bounds, that the heroism of immortality can be shown in visible action. Milton and Dante chose



this spot, on which with almost creative power they might show to mankind worlds of their own, "won from the void and formless Infinite," and from which their own heroic spirits might be reflected back upon their own times in all their gigantic proportions. But such has been the progress of the human mind since their time, that it would seem to have reached already another stage in its development, to have unfolded a new form of the heroic character, one which finds no paradise, nay, no heaven, for itself in the creations of Milton, and for which the frowns of Dante's hell have no terror. This new page of the heroic character naturally leads us to inquire, whether we are to have no great representation of it, no embodying of this spirit in some gigantic form of action, which shall stalk before the age, and by the contemplation of which our minds may be fired to nobler deeds.

In considering this question, we shall endeavor to show what reasons there are for not expecting another great epic poem, drawn from the principles of epic poetry and the human mind, and that these present an insuperable barrier to the choice of a subject, which shall exhibit the present development of the heroic character in action.

In doing this I shall exhibit, by an analysis of the *Iliad*, — the true model of an Epic poem, — its origin and peculiarities, and in what manner those peculiarities have been changed, and, at last, lost by succeeding poets, according to the development of the heroic character in their several eras.

I shall thus be led to show that the taking away of the peculiarities of *epic* interest, and the final merging of that interest in the *dramatic*, is the natural result of the influences to which the human mind in its progress is subjected; and that that influence, while it precludes all former subjects from representing the present development of the heroic character, throws, at the same time, an insuperable barrier in the way of any subject.

Looking upon Homer, at least as regards the *Iliad*, as a single man speaking throughout with one accent of voice, one form of language, and one expression of feeling, we leave to the framers of modern paradoxes the question, whether this name is a type or not, and proceed to consider what might be the probable origin of the *Iliad*, and what it is which constitutes it the true model of an epic poem, a more perfect visible manifestation of the heroic character than can be again presented to the eyes of man. In a philosophical analysis of such a poem

as the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*, made with reference to its epic peculiarities, there is great danger of misconceiving the history and character of early heroic poetry, thus giving to the poet a plan which he never formed, or a moral which he never conceived. The simplest conception of the origin and plan of the *Iliad* must, we think, prove the most correct. It originated, doubtless, in that desire, which every great poet must especially feel, of revealing to his age forms of nobler beauty and heroism than dwell in the minds of those around him. Wandering, as his active imagination must have led him to do, in the days of the past, Homer must have been led by the fitness of the materials presented to him in the siege of Troy, by their remoteness from his own time, and the interest with which they would be viewed by the mass of his countrymen, as descendants of the Grecian heroes, to the choice of a subject, which seemed to present a worthy form in which to manifest the workings of his soul. His enthusiasm would doubtless prompt him to the execution of detached parts before he had completed his general plan, and the various incidents, which constitute so much of the charm and interest of his poem as they suggested themselves to his mind, would also direct him to the great point round which they all revolved. The influence upon the several parts, resulting from the contemplation of the chief character, would thus give all the unity to the subject which we find in fact to belong to the earliest forms of a nation's poetry. "Passion to excite sympathy, variety to prevent disgust flowing in a free stream of narrative verse, not the intricacy and dove-tailing of modern epics, is to be looked for in the *Iliad*; for it was not made like a modern epic to be read in our closets, but to be presented only in fragments before the minds of an audience. Thus the single combats of Menelaus and Paris, the funeral games of Patroclus, and the restitution and burial of the body of Hector are generally complete in themselves, yet having an obvious connexion as still telling the same great tale of Troy." So much for the origin and fable of the *Iliad*.

The genius displayed in its grand and comprehensive design is only equalled by the judgment manifested in confining the action to the busiest and most interesting period of the Trojan war, in thus uniting in his plan and bringing forward in his details everything which could lay hold of the affections, the prejudices, and vanity of his countrymen. Of his characters we need only say that, like those of Shakspeare, they are

stamped with nature's own image and superscription. Though all are possessed of valor and courage, yet they are so distinguished from one another by certain peculiarities of disposition and manners, that to distinguish them it is hardly necessary to hear their names. Achilles is brave, and Hector is brave, so are Ajax, Menelaus, and Diomedes; but the bravery of Hector is not of the same kind with that of Ajax, and no one will mistake the battle-shout of the son of Atreus for the war-cry of Tydides.

Homer's machinery, as all epic machinery must be, was founded on the popular belief in the visible appearance of the gods; and on account of this belief he was not less favored by the circumstances under which he introduced them, than he was by those which enabled him to represent his heroes. It cast around his whole subject a sublimity which it could not otherwise have had, giving occasion to noble description, and tending to excite that admiration which is the leading aim of the epic.

We have made this analysis of the Iliad, to show in what way all things combined in Homer's age to assist him in giving a perfect outward manifestation of the heroic character of his times. He wrote in that stage of society when man's physical existence assumed an importance in the mind, like that of our immortality, and gave to all without a power and dignity not their own. This it was which imparted an heroic greatness to war which cannot now be seen in it. That far-reaching idea of time, which seems to expand our thoughts with limitless existence, gives to our mental struggles a greatness they could not have before had. We each of us feel within our own bosoms a great, an immortal foe, which, if we have subdued, we may meet with calmness every other, knowing that earth contains no greater; but which, if we have not, it will continually appear in those petty contests with others by which we do but show our own cowardice. The Greeks, on the contrary, lived only for their country, and drew everything within the sphere of their national views; their highest exemplification of morality was patriotism. Of Homer's heroes it may with peculiar propriety be said that they were but children of a larger growth, and they could have no conception of power that was not perceived in its visible effects. "The world," as Milton says of our first parents, "was all *before* them," and not *within* them, and their mission was to go forth and make a material

impression on the material world. The soul of Homer was the mirror of this outward world, and in his verse we have it shown to us with the distinctness and reality of the painter's page. Lucan calls him the prince of painters, and with him Cicero agrees, when he says, "Quæ species ac forma pugnae, quæ acies, quod remigium, qui motus hominum, qui ferarum non ita expictus est, ut quæ ipse non viderit, nos ut videremus effecerit?" It is needless perhaps to say that this state of the mind gives both a reason and excuse for those many epithets, which a false criticism and a false delicacy of taste is so fond of censuring. Such critics would blame the poet for praising the physical strength of his heroes, in short for representing his gods such as they were believed to be, and painting his warriors such as they were. When we look back upon the pages of their history, we cannot contemplate the greatness there exhibited, without a feeling of sorrow that they had not lived under influences as favorable as our own, without a sense of unworthiness at not having exhibited characters corresponding with the high privileges we enjoy. We respect that grandeur of mind in the heroes of Homer which led them to sacrifice a mere earthly existence for the praise of all coming ages. They have not been disappointed. Worlds to them unknown have read of their deeds, and generations yet unborn shall honor them. They live on a page which the finger of time strives in vain to efface, which shall ever remain an eternal monument of disgrace to those of after times, who, though gifted with higher views of excellence, have yet striven to erect a character on deeds like theirs. We reverence not in Hector and Achilles the mere display of physical power, we reverence not the manners of their times which but too often call forth our horror and disgust; but we do reverence and honor those motives which even in the infancy of the human mind served to raise it above the dominion of sense, and taught it to grasp at a life beyond the narrow limits of its earthly vision.

This state of things gave to the Iliad and Odyssey that intense epic interest, which we fail to find in later heroic poems. As the mind advances, a stronger sympathy with the inner man of the heart is more and more felt, and becomes more and more the characteristic of literature. In the expanded mind and cultivated affections, a new interest is awakened, *dramatic* poetry succeeds the *epic*, thus satisfying the want produced by the farther development of our nature. For the interest of the

*epic* consists in that character of greatness that in the infancy of the mind is given to physical action and the objects associated with it ; but the interest of the *drama* consists in those mental struggles which precede physical action, and to which in the progress of man the greatness of the other becomes subordinate. For as the mind expands and the moral power is developed, the mightiest conflicts are born within, — outward actions lose their grandeur, except to the eye, for the soul looks upon them but as results of former battles won and lost, upon whose decision, and upon whose alone, its destiny hung. This is the mystery of that calm, more awful than the roar of battle, which rests on the spirits of the mighty, and which the hand of the Grecian sculptor strove to fix on the brow of his god. Though Homer has given variety to his poem by the introduction of dialogue, and thus rendered it, in one sense, often dramatic ; yet we find it is the mere transferring of the *narrative* from his own lips to those of others. The interest is still *without*, it is not the interest of sentiment, but of description. This character of the Greeks, as might be supposed, is shown in their language ; and illustrates their tendency in early times to look upon themselves in all reflex acts, whether external or internal, as patients rather than agents ; a tendency, to use the words of another, which is exemplified in every page of the Homeric poems, and which belongs more or less to every people in an early stage of civilization, before the nation comes of age, and acquires the consciousness along with the free use of its powers. This seems to be the reason why so many of the verbs, employed by the Greeks to denote states of mind or of feeling, have a passive form, such as *Φράζομαι, Ολομαι, Αισθάνομαι, Σκέπτομαι, Ἐπιτομαι, Βούλομαι*, &c. “Men’s minds,” as Shakspeare has somewhere said, “are parcel of their fortunes,” and his age was necessary and alone suited to the mind of Homer. Man viewed himself with reference to the world ; not, as in the present day, the world in reference to himself, and it was this state of the mind which then made the taking of Troy the point of epic interest.

We have thus endeavored to show that the manifestation of the heroic character in the time of Homer was perfectly exhibited in outward visible action, and that this reflected from the soul of the poet addressed to a seeing and listening, rather than a reading people, was the poetry of fancy rather than sentiment. Events, characters, superstitions, customs, and traditions, all combined in rendering the *Iliad* a perfect embodying

of the perfect outward manifestation of the heroic character of that period. The poetry of the senses, the reflection merely of nature and of heroic achievements, is not susceptible of indefinite progress ; it must evidently be most perfect when the objects of visible action are noblest, and we view all else only with reference to those actions. The epic poetry of the Greeks corresponds to sculpture, and in the one, as in the other, the outward forms of life and action live and will ever live unrivalled.

It is not our purpose to show the adaptation of the rules of Aristotle to the *Iliad*, since from this those rules were drawn, — we would only say that according to the spirit of those rules every true epic must be formed. They are not the arbitrary decisions of a critic, but the voice of nature herself speaking through her interpreter. Aristotle studied nature in Homer ; he gave no arbitrary rules, he did but trace the pleasing effects produced on the mind, and taught upon what those effects depended. He may have erred in drawing his rules from one development of the heroic character ; but this was the fault of his times not of his judgment. He did not mean that succeeding poets should bow to him, but should reverence those great principles to which he had shown that nature herself had conformed in her noblest work. The true poet will look without for no rules drawn from others ; he feels within himself the living standard of the great and beautiful, and bows to that alone : as far as it has become changed by human error or imperfection, he would gladly restore it to its original purity, by a conformity to those universal laws of sublimity and beauty, which the critic has shown to be followed by nature herself.

When Aristotle tells us that the action of an epic should be one and entire, and that it should be a great action, he tells us of what constitutes its essence, and of that without which it ceases to be such a poem. It must be one and entire that the interest may not be distracted, and that the mind may feel the harmony of all its proportions. It is not the poet of fancy who can bind by his spell the parts of such a fabric, it is the poet who has felt more strongly than any other the great moral wants of his age, that can give to such a work its unity and power. It has been well said that in reading the gay creations of Aristotle, — of his fairy bowers and castles and palaces, — we are for a moment charmed and wrapt in pleasant reveries, but they are but dreams ; the impression is soon shaken off ; we are con-

scious of no master-feeling round which they gather, and which alone could render his poem an epic, the noblest of harmonious creations. But in reading the Iliad or a tragedy like Lear or Macbeth, or in looking sometime at a painting on which the moral sentiment of the artist is as strongly impressed as his imagination, instead of being obliged to humor the fancy that the charm may be kept alive, we shall with difficulty shake off the impression, when it is necessary to return to the real business of life. It is in the greatness of the epic action that the poets succeeding Homer, if we except Milton, have failed; and the causes, which have operated against them, will always operate with increasing force against every attempt to represent the present or future development of the heroic character in action. It is in the childhood of the human mind alone, that the interval between thought and action is the widest, and therefore it is then alone that the events occupying that interval can be best described. The great struggle of the epic poets since the time of Homer has been against this narrowing of their field of action, and making the instruments there employed less visible, less tangible. The wonder and interest of the world is now transferred to the mind, whose thought is action, and whose word is power. Lord Kames therefore erred, when he said "that it was the *familiarity* of modern manners that unqualified them for epic poetry, and that the dignity of present manners would be better understood in future ages, when they are no longer familiar." The fact is, our manners, or the manners and actions of any intellectual nation, can never become the representatives of greatness, — they have fallen from the high sphere which they occupied in a less advanced stage of the human mind, never to regain it. This will account for the appearance among us of such works as the "*Sartor Resartus*," whose object is to impress the forms of physical life with a greatness no longer belonging to them, and which we recognise only in spiritual action.

These remarks will show why it was that Virgil failed in making the same impression on his age, that was made by his great model. His poem is but a lunar reflection of the Iliad; and it was perhaps from a deep consciousness of this, that he ordered it in his will to be burned. That poem, which was the natural expression of the early features of society, could only be faintly copied by the mimic hand of art. Virgil's subject is well chosen, and would not have shone with reflected light had

it been treated of in the early days of Rome. He summoned again from their long sleep the heroes and gods of Troy, but they appeared with dimmed glory amid the brightness of another age. He had, as we have before observed, chosen the right point in time for his action, a time of tradition, affording him all the advantages possessed by Homer, but not to transgress the laws of probability, he could not give his hero the character of another age, he could not make *Æneas* the *Achilles* of the Romans. Virgil as well as Lucan has been blamed by the critics; the one, for not giving to his hero the dignity of thought becoming the heroic character of his own time; the other, for not placing his action beyond the strict bounds of history. In regard to each we think the critics have erred; for neither the time nor the characters could have been changed without producing a strange incongruity.

Thus the epic poets of Greece and Rome, who succeeded Homer, must have labored under peculiar disadvantages to which those of modern times are not subjected. If, like Virgil, they had chosen the same time for their action with Homer, they could not transfer to it the heroic spirit of their own day, at least, in its noblest development, — they could not make a Cato or a Brutus cotemporary with an *Achilles* or an *Ajax*; — they must evoke the heroic spirits of other days, spirits reluctant to obey the spells employed by the magicians of another age. Virgil, as well as every other poet whose action lies in times very far distant from his own, has not the greatest difficulty to overcome, in exhibiting characters moved by those same affections and sympathies which unite the ceaseless generations of men, in giving to the slumbering past the emotions of the present; but in *adapting* to the story of a *former* age, and perhaps foreign nation, that peculiar system of manners which constitutes the outward development of the heroic spirit, and of which no mind, but such as has been subjected to its actual influence, can either strongly feel or vividly describe. These manners perish with their age, — there is no hand of enchantment to wave over them and convert them, like the fabled city of Arabian romance, into living stone; no convulsion of nature, like that which covered Pompeii, to wrap them in a veil which future ages might withdraw, and permit them, untouched by the hand of time, to stand unimpaired amid the ruins of the past and gaze with wonder on the new-risen generations of men. But if, like Lucan, they took their subject from the hands of



History, the skepticism of a more advanced age deprived them of the use of machinery, and consequently of the power of exciting that admiration, which is the leading aim of the epic poem. We need not stop to show how ridiculous Iris would have appeared on the plains of Pharsalia bringing a sword to Pompey, or Venus coming to snatch him away in a cloud. It is evident that the poet, forced to follow in the same path with the historian, must feel the bonds of reality continually restraining and checking his native energies.

These difficulties the influence of Christianity overcame, but subjected the epic poet to others still more discouraging, as I shall endeavor to show by a brief reference to Tasso, Dante, and Milton.

The subject chosen by Tasso, and the time of the action of his poem, bore the same relation to Christian civilization as Homer's did to Grecian. It was the only age in which the heroic Christian character could be fully manifested in outward action. This resulted from a peculiar state of the mind which, as we have said in regard to heroic manners, perishes with its age, with the circumstances that call it forth. It was a new development of the Homeric spirit, modified by Christianity. The interest as in the *Iliad* and *Æneid* is all *without*, and this it is which gives to the poem of Tasso, as to the other two, the true epic interest, and adds a dignity to the manners of these poems belonging to no other, where the subject is taken from the common events of life. The subject, too, as it presented a scene for the display of action resulting from a purer faith, possesses a dignity far surpassing that of his two great predecessors. Thus fortunate in his subject and the time of his action, he was equally favored by the popular belief of his age. By the superstition of his own time he was enabled to oppose with success the light of reality which was thrown around his subject by history, and give to it that supernatural interest, which is found so capable of exciting admiration. However, in our cooler moments, we may laugh at his magicians and their incantations, as they are not mere embodied abstractions, like Voltaire's agents, but founded on the actual belief of his day, they will always possess a reality to the mind; and, when in reading we have yielded for a time to our feelings, will again assert their power. We have placed Tasso before Dante, in order of time, because he has given an earlier development of the heroic character. He would, doubtless, have possessed as

well as Virgil, whom he has so closely followed, greater originality, and more strongly exhibited that development, had he lived nearer the age he endeavored to portray.

The effect of Christianity was to make the individual mind the great object of regard, the centre of eternal interest, and transferring the scene of action from the outward world to the world within, to give to all modern literature the dramatic tendency, — and as the mind of Homer led him to sing of the physical conflicts of his heroes with *visible* gods *without*; so the soul of the modern poet, feeling itself contending with motives of god-like power *within*, must express that conflict in the dramatic form, in the poetry of sentiment. Were the present a fit opportunity, Shakspeare might afford us still farther illustrations of this truth, and especially in the character of Hamlet, of whom a critic has truly said, “we love him not, we think of him not, because he is witty, because he was melancholy, because he was filial; but we love him because he existed, and was himself. This is the sum total of the impression. I believe that of every other character, either in tragic or epic poetry, the story makes part of the conception; but of Hamlet the deep and permanent interest is the conception of himself. This seems to belong not to the character being more perfectly drawn, but to there being a more intense conception of individual human life, than perhaps in any other human composition.” The *Sartor Resartus*, Lamartine’s *Pilgrimage*, Wordsworth’s poem on the growth of an individual mind, all obey the same law, — which is, that as Christianity influences us, we shall lay open to the world what has been long hidden, what has before been done in the secret corners of our own bosoms; the knowledge of which can alone make our intercourse with those about us different from what it is too fast becoming, an intercourse of the eye and the ear and the hand and the tongue. This may serve to reveal to us more clearly the principle which led to the selection of the subjects of all the great epic poems of modern times; for it was only by making man the subject, around which might be gathered the material forms of grandeur and beauty, that an interest could be imparted to the epic corresponding to that of the drama. The poem of Tasso forms the only exception to this remark, and this, as we have shown, does but confirm our observation; for it represents the mind essentially pagan, yet moved by Christianity, and finding like the Greek all its motive for action without. Our interest in the

poem is consequently much less than in those which exhibit the later developments of the Christian heroic character.

By removing the bounds of time, Christianity has, I think, rendered every finite subject unsuited for an epic poem. The Christian creed, in opening the vista of eternity before the poet's view, and leaving him unrestrained by prescriptive forms, while it freed him from the bonds of history, by giving him a place beyond its limits where he might transfer the heroic spirit of his age, and surround his heroes with supernatural agents, capable of raising for his action the highest admiration, subjected him to a far greater difficulty than any yet experienced by former poets; that of finding a subject, an action to fill those boundless realms of space, and call forth the energies of the spirits that people it. In considering the efforts which Christian poets have made to overcome this difficulty and bridge the space between time and eternity, we shall find the great reason for not expecting another attempt, so successful as that made by Milton, arising from circumstances which have rendered the difficulty far more formidable since his time.

If we consider Tasso as having chosen a subject exhibiting the first development of the Christian heroic character, the poem of Dante will exhibit to us the second. Though not an epic, if viewed with reference to classical models whose aim and spirit were intrinsically different from any produced since, it will serve to show how the genius of Dante overcame the difficulty we have mentioned. His poem is unique, but produced under circumstances which would have rendered it, if the obstacles we have alluded to had not opposed, a regular epic poem. It had its origin like other sublime works of genius, in that desire, which is continually felt by the greatest minds, of giving to their age a copy of their own souls, and embodied the vague but universal spirit of the times when it was written. His foundations were the popular creed of all Christendom, its supports the deep reasonings and curious subtilties of countless theologians, and the scenes it represents, such as had long formed the dreams of many a monk on Vallombrosa, and perhaps entered into the sermon of every preacher in Europe.

Thus, although the circumstances which gave birth to Dante's poem, were, if we may so say, epic, yet the form, which that poem took, shows the hostility which the Christian influence has towards the strictly classical model. That influence had already divested of its greatness every subject like that of

Homer's or Virgil's, and turned upon himself, as an individual, the interest which man in their times had given to the outward world. It is in Dante's poem that we find man, as a physical being, first made the great point of epic interest. He is the first epic poet that exhibits the tendency we have so often alluded to. Favored beyond succeeding poets by the belief of his age, he was enabled to gather around man beings which his ignorance and fear shrouded in a sublimity not their own. That strange world of beings, which the spirit creates for itself, have fled before the light of science, their forms no longer float in the fairy halls of earth, nor through the untravelled regions of space. Their foot-prints, which our infant eyes saw impressed on this strange world of ours, and which once conjured up so many and wondrous shapes of beauty or terror, tell us now but of one creative spirit in whom we recognise our Father.

"The intelligible forms of ancient poets,  
The fair humanities of old religion,  
The powers, the beauty, and the majesty  
That had their haunts in dale, or piny mountain,  
Or forest by slow stream, or pebbly spring,  
Or chasms or watery depths, — all these have vanished;  
They live no longer in the faith of reason."

In Dante's time, Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven had long been considered as the separate states in which vice and virtue would meet their fitting reward. This belief had been taught by signs and emblems; and those of his day had been made to learn rather through the medium of their senses, than the silent arguments of conscience "accusing or excusing itself," what were the rewards and punishments of the future world. This material development of Christianity it was Dante's mission to hold up to his age, and upon that age it must have had and did have its greatest influence; for it was produced by the power of materiality which is lessened with every advance of the Christian character. His poem plainly shows that the tendency which Christianity gave to poetry was not to the epic but to the dramatic form, and if it freed the heroic poet from difficulties to which he was before liable, it also exposed him to another, which, although evaded by Milton, must in the end prove fatal.

The next and highest development of the heroic character, yet shown in action, was that exhibited by the sublime genius

of Milton. The mind had taken a flight above the materiality of Dante, and resting between that and the pure spirituality of the present day, afforded him a foundation for his action. He could not adopt altogether the material or the immaterial system, and he therefore raised his structure on the then debatable ground. The greatest objection, which our minds urge against his agents, is the incongruity between their spiritual properties and the human modes of existence, he was obliged to ascribe to them. But this is an objection of our own times, of men requiring a more spiritual representation of the mind's action, which, if it cannot be given, must preclude the possibility of another great epic. In fact, Milton's poem but confirms more strongly the conclusion we drew from Dante's, that *dramatic* is supplying the place of epic interest. His long deliberation in the choice of a subject, suited to his conceptions, shows the *difficulty then* lying in the way of an epic, and his first intention of making *Paradise Lost* a *tragedy*, shows *whence* this difficulty originated. The tendency of the mind, to which we have before alluded, and which had grown yet stronger in Milton's time than before, compelled him to make choice of the *Fall of Man* as his subject; a subject exclusive in its nature, being the only one which to our minds possesses a great epic interest. The interest of his poem depends upon the strong feeling we have of our own free agency, and of the almost infinite power it is capable of exercising. An intense feeling of this kind seems to have pervaded Milton's whole life, and by this he was probably directed in the choice of his theme. We find in his "Speech for the Liberty of unlicensed Printing," written many years before the conception of his poem, a sentence confirming this supposition. "Many," says he, "there be that complain of Divine Providence for suffering Adam to transgress. Foolish tongues! When God gave him reason, he gave him freedom to choose; for reason is but choosing. He had been else a mere artificial Adam, such an Adam as he is in the motions. We ourselves esteem not of that obedience or love or gift which is of force." This feeling becomes stronger the more the mind is influenced by Christianity, and this it is which has transferred the interest from the outward manifestation of the passions exhibited in the *Iliad*, to those inward struggles made by a power greater than they to control them, and cause them, instead of bursting forth like lava-torrents to devour and blast the face of nature, to flow on like meadow-

streams of life and joy. Why then it may be asked do we take an interest in Homer's heroes, whom the gods are ready every moment to shield or snatch from the dubious fight? Not, I answer, because we consider them mere machines acting but from others' impulses, for *then* we could take no interest in them; but because when

"Arms on armor clashing bray  
Horrible discord, and the madding wheels  
Of brazen chariots rage,"

we give to them our own freedom; or because the gods themselves, whom Homer has called down to swell the fight, and embodied in his heroes; because *these* create the interest and make what were before mere puppets free agents. When in our cooler moments we reflect on his Jove-protected warriors, his invulnerable Achilles, they dwindle into insignificance, and we are ready to exclaim in the quaint language of another, "Bully Dawson would have fought the devil with such advantages."

This sense of free agency is what constitutes Adam the hero of *Paradise Lost*, and makes him capable of sustaining the immense weight of interest, which in this poem is made to rest upon him. But that which renders Adam the hero of the poem makes Satan still more so; for Milton has opened to our gaze, within his breast of flame, passions of almost infinite growth, burning with intensest rage. *There* is seen a conflict of "those thoughts that wander through eternity," at the sight of which we lose all sense of the material terrors of that fiery hell around him, and compared with which the physical conflict of the archangels is a mockery. It is not so much that battles present less a subject for description than they did in the time of Homer, that they fail to awaken those feelings of admiration they then did, but because we have become sensible of a power within which bids the tide of war roll back upon its fountains. For the same reason it is that the *manners* of civilized nations are unsuited for heroic song. They are no longer the representatives of greatness; for the heroism of Christianity is not seen so much in the outward act, as in the struggle of the will to control the springs of action. It is this which gives to tragedy its superiority over the epic at the present day; it strikes off the chains of wonder by which man has been so long fettered to the objects of sense, and, instead of calling upon him to admire the torrent-streams of war, it bids the bosom open whence they

rushed, and points him downward to their source, the ocean  
might of the soul,

“Dark — heaving — boundless, endless, and sublime —  
The image of eternity — the throne  
Of the Invisible.”

Thus Milton's poem is the most favorable model we can have of a Christian epic — the subject of it afforded him the only field of great epic interest, where the greatest power could be shown engaged in bringing about the greatest results. Adam is not so much the Achilles as the Troy of the poem. And there is no better proof that greatness has left the material throne, which she has so long held, for a spiritual one, than that Milton, in putting in motion that vast machinery which he did to effect his purpose, seems as if he made, like Ptolemy, the sun and all the innumerable hosts of heaven again to revolve about this little spot of earth. Though he has not made the Fall of Man a tragedy in *form*, as he first designed, he has yet made it tragic in *spirit*; and the epic form it has taken seems but the drapery of another interest. This proves that, however favored by his subject the epic poet of our day may be, he must by the laws of his own being possess an introspective mind, and give that which Bacon calls an inwardness of meaning to his characters, which, in proportion as the mind advances, must diminish that greatness once shown in visible action. The Christian Knights might well exclaim, when they first saw gunpowder used in war, as Plutarch tells us the king of Sparta did, when he saw a machine for the casting of stones and darts, that it was “the grave of valor.” They were the graves of that personal valor which is shown in its perfection in the infancy of the mind, and which is imaged in the pages of Homer. In modern battles, the individuality of early times is lost and merged in one great head, with reference to which we view all results. The men upon whom the superior mind acts are mere mechanical instruments of its power, and the deeds seen by the outward eye are thus dimmed by the soul's quicker perception of spiritual action. Thus the intellectual power wielded by the commander seems already to have decided the battle, and we look with less interest upon his army's incursions into the territory of an enemy. As Sallust says of Jugurtha, “totum regnum animo jam invaserat.”

To complain of this tendency of the human mind and its influence on literature, to sigh that we cannot have another

Homeric poem, is like weeping for the feeble days of childhood, and shows an insensibility to the ever-increasing beauty and grandeur developed by the spirit in its endless progress, a forgetfulness of those powers of soul which result from this very progress, which enable it, while enjoying the present, to add to that joy by the remembrance of the past, and to grasp at a higher from the anticipations of the future. With the progress of the arts, power is manifested by an agency almost as invisible as itself; it almost speaks and it is done, it almost commands and it stands fast. Man needs no longer a vast array of physical means to effect his loftiest purpose; he seizes the quill, the mere toy of a child, and stamps on the glowing page the copy of his own mind, his thoughts pregnant with celestial fire, and sends them forth, wherever the winds of heaven blow or its light penetrates, the winged messengers of his pleasure. The narrow walls of patriotism are broken down, and he is a brother on whom the same sun shines, and who holds the same heritage, the earth. He is learning to reverse the order in which the ancients looked at the outward creation, he looks at the world with reference to himself, and not at himself with reference to the world. How different the view which Virgil takes of his country from that of the Christian poet; yet each how worthy of its age!

“Sed neque Medorum silvæ, ditissima terra,  
Nec pulcher Ganges, atque auro turbidus Hermus,  
Laudibus Italiæ certent; non Bactra, neque Indi,  
Totaque thuriferis Panchaia pinguis arenis.  
Hæc loca non tauri spirantes naribus ignem  
Invertère, satis immanis dentibus hydri;  
Nec galeis densisque virûm seges horruit hastis:  
Sed gravidæ fruges et Bacchi Massicus humor  
Implevère; tenent oleæ, armentaque læta.  
Hinc bellator equus campo sese arduus infert;  
Hinc albi, Clitumne, greges, et maxima taurus  
Victima, sæpe tuo perfusi flumine sacro,  
Romanos ad templa deûm duxère triumphos.  
Hic ver assiduum, atque alienis mensibus æstas;  
Bis gravidæ pecudes, bis pomis utilis arbor.”

“O my mother isle!

Needs must thou prove a name most dear and holy  
To me, a son, a brother, and a friend,  
A husband, and a father! who revere  
All bonds of natural love, and find them all



Within the limits of thy rocky shores.  
O native Britain ! O my mother isle !  
How shouldst thou prove aught else but dear and holy  
To me, who from thy lakes, and mountain-hills,  
Thy clouds, thy quiet dales, thy rocks, and seas  
Have drunk in all my intellectual life,  
All sweet sensations, all ennobling thoughts,  
All adoration of the God in nature,  
All lovely and all honorable things,  
Whatever makes this mortal spirit feel  
The joy and greatness of its future being ? ”

We cannot sympathize with that spirit of criticism, which censures modern poetry for being the portraiture of individual characteristics and passions, and not the reflection of the general features of society and the outward man. If we want such poetry as Homer's, we must not only evoke him from the shades, but also his times. Purely objective poetry is the most perfect, and possesses the most interest only in the childhood of the human mind. In the poetry of the Hindoos, the Israelites, as well as the Greeks, the epic is the prevailing element. But that page of the heroic character is turned forever—another element is developing itself in the soul, and breathing into the materiality of the past a spiritual life and beauty. It is in vain we echo the words of other days and call it poetry ; it is in vain we collect the scattered dust of the past, and attempt to give it form and life by that same principle which once animated it. We can only give a brighter and more joyous existence to the cold forms of departed days by bowing down, like the prophet of old, and breathing into them a purer and more ennobling faith, the brighter flame of our own bosoms. To stir the secret depths of *our* hearts, writers must have penetrated deeply into their own. Homer found conflicts *without* to describe ; shall the poets of our day be blamed because they would exhibit to us those they feel *within* ? Milton gives us the philosophy of Christian epic poets, when he says, “ that he who would not be frustrate of his hope to write well hereafter in laudable things, ought himself to be a true poem ; that is, a composition and pattern of the best and honorablest things ; not presuming to sing of high praises of heroic men or famous cities, unless he have in himself the experience and practice of all that which is praiseworthy.” What, indeed, are the writings of the great poets of our own times but epics ; the description of

those internal conflicts, the interest in which has so far superseded those of the outward world? A sufficient answer to the charge of egotism and selfishness, to which they are exposed, is given in the words of Coleridge. "In the *Paradise Lost*, indeed in every one of his poems, it is Milton himself whom you see; his Satan, his Adam, his Raphael, almost his Eve, are all John Milton; and it is a sense of this intense egotism that gives me the greatest pleasure in reading Milton's works. The egotism of such a man is a revelation of spirit." Lamartine, when he complains so often at not being able to give to the world an epic embodying the present development of the heroic character, seems not to have dreamt that, unless he could represent objectively the action of one mind on another, he was by the expression of his feelings giving us the only epic poem the mind in its present stage is capable of giving.

The truth of the principles, that we have laid down, may be still farther tested by their application to the projected epic of Coleridge on the destruction of Jerusalem, of which he said that it "was the only subject *now* remaining for an epic poem, a subject which, like Milton's Fall of Man, should interest all Christendom, as the Homeric war of Troy interested all Greece." He farther observes, that "the subject with all its great capabilities has this one grand defect, that whereas a poem to be epic must have a *personal* interest in the destruction of Jerusalem, no genius or skill could possibly preserve the interest for the hero from being merged in the interest for the event." We will not touch upon other objections which he himself has urged, such as mythology and manners, to which what we have already said on other poems, will as well apply; but will only remark, that the subject itself is incapable of exhibiting the present development of the heroic character, and cannot therefore be made the great epic of this age, or of any to come. This may be seen from what has been already said; what made Milton's subject great, and what can *now* alone make any subject for epic interest great, was the action made *visible* of a superior intellect on an inferior. Could intellectual power be represented with the same objectiveness as physical power, there might be as many epics now as there are great minds. The reason is obvious. It is this manner of representing power which alone possesses a corresponding interest with tragedy, by which alone there can be a *hero* capable of sustaining the interest. The poem of Coleridge, even if feasible, must have

been more similar to Tasso's than Milton's, and consequently when compared with the latter, not great.

Schiller's plan of an epic poem, founded on Frederick the Great of Prussia as the hero, must, if the principles advanced are correct, have proved far more futile than the one last mentioned; and it strongly confirms, as we think, the remarks before made on the hostility of the dramatic to the epic interest, that two of the greatest poets of our age should each have schemed an epic yet neither completed one.

Of such attempts at the epic, as Monte's in Italian and Pollok's in our own language, we will only say, that they are as much wanting in the spirit of an epic as in its true form, and that they are as remote from the merit of Dante, whom they have taken as their model, as near him in plan. Their poems resemble those Spanish epics which suddenly appeared in the reign of Philip the Second, the whole series of which were nothing but chronicles, and differed but little from histories. Of Wilkie, and a host of others, we might say as Giraldis Canticus said of Trissino, who employed twenty years on his "*Italia Liberata*," that they do but select the refuse from the gold of Homer, imitate his vices, and gather together all that which good judges would wish to be rid of, by which they show little wisdom.

We have thus endeavored to show the inability of the human mind, at the present day, to represent objectively its own action on another mind, and that the power to do this could alone enable the poet to embody in his hero the present development of the heroic character, and give to his poem a universal interest. We rejoice at this inability; it is the high privilege of our age, the greatest proof of the progress of the soul, and of its approach to that state of being where its thought is action, its word power.

J. V.

---

ART. V. — *Introduction to American Law, designed as a First Book for Students.* By TIMOTHY WALKER, one of the Professors in the Law Department of the Cincinnati College. Philadelphia: P. H. Nicklin and T. Johnson. 1837. 8vo. pp. 679.

IN Professor Walker's *Introduction to American Law*, we notice a paragraph (p. 17) upon the "Dignity of the Profes-

sion." The views of this paragraph we find developed and extended in an "Introductory Lecture," delivered by the same gentleman, November 4, 1837. As we believe Mr. Walker able, and destined to exert a strong influence over the young men of his profession, and as we differ from him not so much respecting the views he expresses, as the omission of others, we shall first state his ideas, as we understand them, and then the additions which we would make.

Mr. Walker lays before his pupils the extent of their professional studies, the difficulties they have to overcome, and the rewards to which they may finally attain. "The difficulties to be overcome," he says, "are what preëminently give dignity and importance to this profession. If reward is to be commensurate with toil, we deserve, at least, as much as any other profession." (Introductory Lecture, p. 15.) And again, "the leading impression I desire to leave upon your minds is, that lawyers, as a class, deserve all they obtain, whether of honor or emolument." (p. 25.) If we do not misconceive these expressions, the author means by the dignity of the law, the deserts of the law; the study of the law is laborious, therefore the lawyer is worthy (*dignus digne*) of his hire, compensation, "honor or emolument," and thence comes the dignity of the law.

It is not our purpose to quarrel with this view, but to present another, which we wish were oftener laid before law students and practising lawyers, and by some means carried to their hearts.

To our mind, the dignity of a profession does not result from its deserving reward, respect, or honor; but it deserves these things because it has the dignity, and that dignity it derives from its connexion with man's highest interests; his immortality, his perfectness, his regeneration.

Mr. Walker tells us that jurisprudence has no concern with eternity; "Its proper scope would have been the same that it now is, had no voice from heaven, or from the depths of the human soul, proclaimed another world beyond the present." How far this is true of law, we will not now discuss; but that the lawyer derives his chief distinctive dignity, that which marks him from the shoemaker or pinmaker, from the fact that his calling, like the clergyman's and teacher's, is connected with what we mean by salvation, is, to us, undoubted.

Consider the clergyman; what gives dignity to his profes-

sion? Is it the necessity for mastering Hebrew, Greek, and Latin; the dark sayings of Paul, and the mysteries of St. Augustine? Is it because he must labor hard to write two sermons a week, beside visiting his parish? Or, is it because he addresses man as an heir of eternal life, and labors to make him worthy of that life? Does the labor, or the object of that labor, give him dignity?

And, when we look at the lawyer, do we hold his calling dignified because it requires study, research, labor? Why, in Ohio, Mr. Walker tells us, two years of moderate labor will make a man a lawyer; but a good joiner or cabinet-maker cannot be thus made; he must labor longer than two years; but will this entitle him to more dignity than the lawyer? Are we told of the previous education, the school and college? We answer, a common free school education is all that any man need have, in order to become a member of the Ohio bar.

No; the truth is, it is the nature of the thing studied, not the difficulties overcome, which gives the lawyer's profession a standing more dignified than the pinmaker's. The furtherance of justice, the overcoming of evil, as this writer himself says, "to vindicate rights and redress wrongs," this it is which entitles the lawyer to claim to rank among the teachers of mankind, with the clergyman, the schoolmaster, the statesman, and the true literary man; and this is the point of view in which we would present the legal profession, but in which it is not presented in the introduction and lecture before us.

The dignity of any earthly vocation depends, as we think, upon its fitness to develope the soul of the professor, and the opportunities offered by it to develope the souls of others. If the soul be a phantasma, and immortality a dream, the most dignified callings, (that is, the most worthy—not of reward, but of man's devotion, he being but a wonderful mound of dust,) are those of the butcher, baker, and tailor. But if Jesus came from God, and spoke the words of soberness and truth, that profession is most dignified (by which we mean most worthy of a son of God, such as man is,) which tends most to bring many minds to a sight of, and faith in, the truth as Jesus declared it. The preacher thus stands foremost, then the conscientious schoolmaster, and then the legislator, lawyer, and physician. For this cause these are the liberal professions, and rank high; and not because their members have diplomas, or are learned men.

But how is the lawyer a teacher? How has he any concern with man's soul?

In the first place, by the laws which he helps to frame; for, as Mr. Walker says, "it is a well known fact, that from the days of the Revolution down to the present time, no single class of the community has performed so much of the public service of the country, as the members of this profession." And here it may not be amiss to say a few words upon a proposition of our author, already referred to, that "they commit an egregious error who consider jurisprudence as looking forward into eternity," that "it begins and ends with this world," &c. (p. 5.) If by this be meant, what is afterwards expressed, that law should not unite church and state, we agree with the writer; but the terms mean much more, and would, for instance, go to this extent. In a community of slaveholders, in which the slaves were as well off as mere man-brutes ever need be, it would not be the province of law to liberate them on the ground that immortal beings need freedom in order to that progress which is their life; for, if it could with propriety act on this ground, then it is not true that the scope of law would have been the same that it is now, "had no voice from heaven, or from the depths of the human soul, proclaimed another world beyond the present."

The lawyer is also a teacher whenever he rises at the bar, either "to convince the court," "persuade the jury," or charm "the listening crowd that are hanging upon his accents." Many a sermon preached, of a week day, in the court-house, goes farther, and remains longer with its hearers, than those which come on Sunday from the pulpit. The lawyer teaches the witnesses that come before him; the twelve sworn men that watch every movement, and listen to every word; and the client that trusts in him, learns from him as from one that should "vindicate rights, and redress wrongs." By the wink of his eye, or the covert turn of his question, a vain juryman, or wavering witness may be led to acts that will have a fearful effect upon his eternal well being. As the bar is more or less high-minded, strict, and pure, so will that great class of the community, which is ever in contact with it, be made noble and pure, or shuffling and foul. In no way, at no spot, can a body of men, acting professionally, exert more moral influence than through legal proceedings in courts of justice. Let the bar be corrupt, and the bench, which is influenced by, or comes

directly from it, will be corrupt too ; and let this take place, and that corruption of the people, which would allow it, will be increased by it tenfold. Agriculturists, mechanics, and even merchants, as such, have no like power, and therefore is the lawyer preëminently a teacher, and so clothed with dignity.

But the lawyer is a teacher in his office, as much as, or more than, in public. "To him," says our author, come "the guilty and innocent, the upright and the dishonest, the wronging and the wronged, the knave and the dupe ; all alike consult him, and with the same unreserved confidence." What more interesting or varied learners could any teacher ask ? Again, this writer tells us, that, although "it is not given to man to see the human heart completely unveiled before him, the lawyer perhaps comes more nearly to this than any other ; for there is no aspect in which the character does not present itself, in his secret consultations. All the passions, all the vices, and all the virtues are by turns subjected to his scrutiny." What nobler normal school does Prussia throw open to the moral teacher than this ? But do our lawyers become students and instructors in this wonderful institution ? Do "the guilty, the dishonest, the wronging, and the knave" leave the attorney's office better men than they entered it ? We rejoice in the knowledge that very often they do ; there are many of the profession whose hearts outrun their heads ; never dreaming the theory of a lawyer's life to be the moral advancement of himself and others, they still labor to that end,

" They will the right, and do the right,  
But know not why they do it ! "

There are others again who see the whole truth, and knowing their mission labor therein manfully. In the light of that truth stood Blackstone when he said, that "the law employs in its theory the noblest faculties of the soul ; and exerts in its practice the cardinal virtues of the heart." In its theory the law is the earthly representative of God's justice ; and in the study of perfect justice the noblest faculties of the soul are indeed employed, and in its practice the cardinal virtues of the heart applied. The theory of law, thus looked at, is not composed of mere earthly customs and statutes, but the whole moral law, in its Christian length, breadth, and depth, forms a part of it, and its basis. Wherever human rules contradict that code of Christ, they are, therefore, without base, and it is the lawyer's duty as

legislator to labor for their repeal. Wherever the application of a good but imperfect provision of man's law works injustice, there it is the lawyer's duty to resist the application in private and in public, by persuasion and argument, through good report and evil report; not by acting upon the court or the jury, for they do not make the application, but only declare the facts and the law; whereas the client and his attorney apply the rule to the circumstances; and therefore, they, if any, are guilty, and in our view, they are equally guilty; or, if there be any difference, the lawyer is the greatest wrong-doer. Upon this point we differ from Mr. Walker; and as he is upheld by many of the best and wisest of his profession, we hope to be excused for entering at some length into the question.

"How is it," says our author, (Introduction, p. 661,) "where we believe right and justice to be against our client, though the law may be with him? Even here," he continues, "I have come to the conclusion, that no principle of moral obligation prohibits me from prosecuting his cause." Why? "In the first place, I am not an infallible judge of right and wrong, and possibly may be mistaken." This rule of action, for aught we see, would excuse client as well as lawyer. If the lawyer is bound to reject the suit which he is informed by a voice from heaven is wrong, then is he bound to reject it, if it is to his imperfect reason wrong; or else the robber may plead that he is no infallible judge of right, and so go free of guilt. "At any rate," continues our author, "I am not his conscience-keeper." A man is, we conceive, his neighbor's conscience-keeper, as far as he is so situated as to be enabled to enlighten that conscience, and help its action; but even were he not, the question is, whether the lawyer's own conscience is not concerned in this matter. Mr. Walker thinks not. "I undertake," he says, "only to assert his legal rights. The question of abstract justice is with him, and not with me; and I am as much justified in conducting his cause, as the judge is in deciding it for him."

In examining this question, we must look first at the client's position in the eye of Christian justice. We will take the instance of the man and wife joining in a deed of her real estate. Under the Ohio law the person before whom they acknowledge their deed must explain it to the wife, and certify that he did so. A deed is made, a full price received, and all parties think the matter settled. Some years afterwards, some hunter-up of flaws in titles discovers that in the certificate of the person



before whom the deed was acknowledged, it is not stated that it was explained to the wife ; he informs her, and they commence a suit in her name. What is her position ? She sold her property, received payment, and was content ; but she finds that under the law made for her protection, but which a third person did not strictly follow, she can recover the property she sold. Can any one doubt that it is as unjust for her to use the perverted law to get what is another's, as it would be to rob him by brute force ?

Next, what is the position of the friend, who for hire gives his time, his talents, his weight of character, and his power of eloquence toward helping the unjust act of the claimant ? Is the aider of an unjust attempt less guilty than the originator or principal ? Does not the moral law of Jesus prohibit the woman's friend from assisting her ?

But the friend is a lawyer ; he is a man whose business it is to present cases to a court and jury, and to attempt to show that the law is in favor of his client. But by becoming an attorney has he got beyond the reach of that principle which should govern the friend ? Can we by assuming a profession escape the moral law ?

But then, it is said, the judge is wrong too. We are at a loss to understand the mind which confounds the passage of a law, which may be misapplied, or the declaration of the law, which may also be misapplied, with the misapplication itself ; the action of the judge, who decides that the statute or custom is this or that, with the action of the lawyer, who voluntarily gives his time, talents, and learning to work injustice by that decision.

Thus much for the degree in which the lawyer's own conscience is concerned. But the view that we are taking of the profession gives the matter a wider interest. Every day suits are prosecuted obviously unjust. But let us suppose a bar, every member of which should refuse to present such suits ; what would be the effect upon the community ? The client would be deprived of no legal right, for he may always present his own case. But who can doubt that the temple of justice would cease to be profaned by those iniquitous causes, which now swarm around the footstool of her blind majesty ?

We regard the lawyer as a great moral teacher, therefore ; leading the mass toward good or evil, as he is governed by Christian or worldly views. From this position he derives in

our eyes his dignity. In this country, especially, do we regard him as important in this point of view. Schools will do much, and the pulpit will do much to give the mass of our nation high principles of action ; but in a popular government, one of the mightiest means for teaching morality is for the prominent to practise it. Let our politicians act on high and Christian principles, and the mass will learn to apply those principles to every day's work. On this account, we rejoice to see Channing and others in the political field, inculcating and carrying out such laws of action, as man need not blush, nor fear conscience twinges, for using at all times. These men are educating the nation, and may the spirit of God work with them. The lawyer is, with the politician, preëminently prominent in this country ; and here, more than elsewhere, is a teacher ; here, more than elsewhere, he needs to feel his responsibility, and to be actuated by high, open, pure motives. If he be so, his reward will be proportionate ; his dignity more true, and more abiding.

But this dignity will appertain to the individual professor, not to the whole profession. No tendency of our times is clearer than that which will refuse to pay that homage to birth, class, and profession which is due only to individual talent and worth. In some lands, family has been held the best evidence of true excellence, (for, be it observed, the *theory* of mankind has ever been to revere excellence ;) elsewhere social standing has been the test ; and in other places, wealth, talent, or profession. In this country, however, each man will have to rest upon his own worth and true power. Riches may give prominence, and for a time, authority ; but the feeling of the world against the undue influence of money is every day growing stronger. Men may be called agrarians, loco-focos, destructives ; but though still groping in the dark, they begin to catch glimpses of the truth, that while property must be inviolable, the man of property need have none of that moral power, and social standing, which their natures tell them he has no claim to on that ground ; that while the law deserves reverence, not every one that writes himself her minister need be respected. Let him prove himself worthy of his calling, and the dignity of that calling will descend upon him ; but if unworthy, like the immoral clergyman, he will be the more degraded the higher he has assumed to aim.

There is one great danger, however, resulting from the union of the feeling spoken of, and that classifying tendency which

still remains active. If many of the legal profession are low, selfish, unjust, the public will lose confidence in the whole class ; and this loss will still farther lower the class. Every lawyer, therefore, who falls far short of his obvious duty, is a traitor to his calling, and should be expelled from among his brethren. At almost every bar the right of expelling evil members is sometimes exercised, and it would be well if it were exercised oftener.

We have thus slightly sketched some of those views, which we would were present more often to the minds, and active in the hearts of that great class to whom our remarks apply. Were it laid before law-students, that their profession was to be exercised upon the great principles of Christian right as a basis ; and that, whenever they swerved from those principles, they were untrue not only to their duty as men, but to their duty as lawyers ; though some might sneer, and many might deny, and most doubt, here and there one might receive the truth, and bring forth an hundred-fold. The sower, that goes forth to sow in this field, must expect to find stony places, and brambles, and to lose much good seed by the way-side, where it will be trodden down.

Before closing, we would say, that, with the exception of the passage referred to by us, we do not know a paragraph in Mr. Walker's "Introduction," to which we should object. The work is one of great value ; clear, condensed, comprehensive. No work on law better deserves a place in every private library in this country ; no one is more worthy of a place among college class-books. Blackstone still remains unapproached ; but his work is of little practical assistance to the American, who wishes to learn the law on any subject ; and that before us is, in many respects, more useful than the similar publications of Kent, Hoffman, and others. Mr. Walker has an uncommon power of clear arrangement, and a happy medium between copiousness and nakedness of expression. We hope soon to see other works of a like character, but more detail, from his pen.

J. H. P.

---

ART. VI. — *The True Christian Religion, containing the Universal Theology of the New Church, foretold by the Lord in Daniel vii. 13, 14, and in Revelations xxi, 1, 2.* By EMANUEL SWEDENBORG, Servant of the Lord Jesus Christ. A New Translation from the original Latin Edition, printed at Amsterdam, in the year 1771. Boston: published by John Allen, 1833.

THE doctrines of Swedenborg are comprised in the following works: The New Jerusalem and its Heavenly Doctrines; Treatises upon the four principal Doctrines, — that concerning the Lord, the Sacred Scripture Faith and Life, with a Treatise on the White Horse in the Revelation, and a Brief Exposition of the Doctrines of the New Church. This was the precursor of the work, the title of which stands at the head of this article, the last and most important publication of the author. It contains a general and regular summary of his doctrines, was written in Latin, and published at Amsterdam in 1771, the year before Swedenborg died. It was first translated into English by the Rev. John Clowes, and printed in 1781. Several editions were published in England, and one in this country. The copy before us is a new translation by the Rev. Mr. Worcester.

We shall attempt to give as fair and as intelligible an exposition of the general character of this work, as we have been able with our own comprehension to obtain for ourselves, by first analyzing its contents, exhibiting the opinions which it expresses upon prominent religious doctrines, as far as they are to any degree original, and then by considering more at length the general principles upon which it proceeds. We trust that if there should be any disciple of Swedenborg among our readers, he will pardon any misapprehension, and any uncharitable judgment with which he may think us chargeable. We are well aware how hard it is for any one to reject a system, and at the same time to give a fair exhibition of its character and evidence. But we must be allowed to say that our pre-judgement was in favor of the doctrines of the New Church. There was an indefinite, but a most attractive idea of beauty and spirituality associated with them in our mind. Our inquiry has dispelled it, and left us much disappointed; but it has not excited in us anything of unwillingness, while denying much to allow much.

We proceed to analyze the contents of the work before us.

Chapter I. treats of God, the Creator, His Being, Nature, and Attributes. The proofs of His existence are drawn from the teachings of Nature, the internal consciousness of men, which Swedenborg calls the Divine Influx from God into the soul, and from the Scriptures. The mysticism, which pervades all the author's works, is manifest in the first pages of this discussion. Thus the Scriptures teach that there is a God, he says, because they are themselves God, that is, in their inmost sense, they proceed from and treat of God. There is one striking characteristic in his writings, to which it may be well to draw attention now, as a remarkable exhibition of it occurs in this connexion. Swedenborg often makes a statement the truth of which all will admit ; but he connects it in such a manner with his own alleged inspiration, that some readers would be at a loss to make a distinction. Of course, we do not now assert that this inspiration is only alleged, that question remains for examination. We refer to what appears to be an artful mixture of truth with that which as yet is not known to be so. Many readers may perhaps be ignorant of the common truths of religion and philosophy, which are to be met with in his writings ; and as their minds are struck with an approbation of some of his statements, they may receive all that they find connected with them. Thus while stating the capacity of human reason to discover the Being and Unity of God, Swedenborg adduces many striking arguments from the visible universe, from the wonderful instincts of animals, from plants, &c., the same as are to be found in all the books on natural theology. But he states that these arguments were expounded by him, in one of his conversations with angels, when he illustrated the great doctrine to some newly arrived spirits from the natural world.

God's essence, he says, is made up of love and wisdom. He exists in a human form, that is, in the words of Hindmarsh, (letters to Priestley,) "he is truly and properly a Divine male man, and the angelic heaven created by Him is a grand female man." This chapter contains some very good reasoning against the common doctrine of the Trinity. Swedenborg says he exposed its inconsistencies to three church dignitaries in the spiritual world. A bishop had a conversation there concerning it with him, and endeavored to explain it. Swedenborg objected that it made three Gods. As the Bishop and the dignitaries retired, "the Bishop turned round and endeavored to exclaim, — 'There

is one God;' but as his thought drew back his tongue, he could not, and then with open mouth he breathed out 'three Gods.' Those who were standing by laughed at the strange sight and departed." (16\*) The angels told Swedenborg that they could not even utter the word "gods," for the celestial *aura* in which they live opposes it. What he says of the absurdity of the doctrine is very plain and very true; but there is not a particle of novelty or of inspiration apparent in his language.

Chapter II. is concerning the Lord, the Redeemer, and Redemption. Swedenborg says that a Trinity of *persons* was not the faith of the primitive church. He insists on the unity of God, though he acknowledges a trinity which did not exist until after the mission of Christ. Jehovah descended from heaven and assumed the human form, that he might save men. This God incarnate is Jesus Christ. Redemption is "a battle with the hells, a subjugation of them, and afterwards an establishment of order in the heavens." To God belongs Creation, to the Lord Redemption, and to the Holy Spirit Divine Operation. The Lord the Redeemer is Jehovah in the human form. These are the different names in the Old and New Testaments for the same being. The godhead does not consist of three distinct persons exercising separate offices and operations, but the true scriptural idea of the Trinity of the Father, Son, and Spirit is this. By Father is understood the essential divine principle in the Lord Jesus, by Son, the human principle united therewith, and by Spirit, the Divine, proceeding, operating principle, formed from the union of the other two, and constituting one God man—as the soul, body, and operation form one human man. God sent himself into the world in the human form, that is, as the son of God. He made himself righteousness by acts of redemption. We have then a symbolical illustration of some points in the history of Jesus. For instance, his betrayal by Judas signifies his rejection by the Jewish nation, for Judas represented that nation.

Chapter III. is concerning the Holy Spirit, and the Divine Operation. His views on this subject are similar to those which prevail among Unitarians. The spirit, or the internal man, is the mind, which is within the external man. Respecting the end to be attained by the Atonement or Reconciliation, Sweden-

---

\* The numbers connected with the extracts refer to the sections into which the book is divided.

borg's views are scriptural, that is, reasonable; but the same cannot be said of the means by which that end was to be obtained. The diseases and disorders occasioned by sin needed to be removed; a return to virtue was all the atonement or satisfaction which God required. How then was this to be obtained? It was necessary that God himself should come down among men, by taking upon him the human nature, and thus procure for himself the satisfaction he required. Swedenborg thus describes the process. (23.) "The Lord from eternity, who is Jehovah, came into the world that he might subdue the hells and glorify his humanity." God satisfied himself, and himself made atonement for the sin of man, by taking upon him the infirmities of human nature, and suffering in the flesh in order to remove the powers of evil from man, and to make himself visible by the humanity which he assumed. Swedenborg is exceedingly scandalized at the Calvinistic doctrines, and in one of his visits to the spiritual world he found the stern reformer himself suffering severe duration for having preached predestination. But it would seem that his objections to these doctrines were not founded on their unreasonableness.

Chapter IV. is concerning the sacred Scripture or the Word of the Lord. Chapter V. is an explanation of the internal and external sense of the decalogue. Of the latter chapter we shall presently speak at large.

Chapter VI. is concerning faith. The sum of faith is, that he, who lives well and believes aright, is saved by the Lord. Faith and charity cannot exist together unless they make one. There is much good sense in this chapter, but there is some little nonsense; as, for instance, the statement which he undertakes to prove, (362,) "That the Lord, Charity, and Faith make one, like life, will, and understanding in man; and that if they are divided each perishes, like a pearl reduced to powder."

Chapter VII., Charity, Love towards the Neighbor, and Good Works. "There are three universal loves; the love of heaven, the love of the world, and the love of self." There is in every man an internal man and an external man while he is on earth. The external of each man is here; the internal of the good is in heaven with angels, of the bad in hell, though they do not know it. After enumerating the various kinds of love, Swedenborg comes to "the Recreations of Charity," which are dinners, suppers, and parties. (433.) Loves and

friendships formed on earth are detrimental after death, because they tie people together. The whole amounts to this, (458.) "That there is an influx of the love of God towards men, and that the reception of it by man, and coöperation with him, is love towards the neighbor."

Chapter VIII., Free Agency. Chapter IX., Repentance. Chapter X., Reformation and Regeneration. Swedenborg first cites the Augsburg Confession and refutes its doctrines on free agency, &c., and then explains his own doctrine, thus — "Man, while he lives in the world, is held in the middle, between heaven and hell, and there in spiritual equilibrium, which is free agency." (475.) Predestination, he says, is the "fœtus of the old doctrine." He sets out with the very sensible remark, that "Repentance is the first thing of the church with man." Contrition is not repentance. It is begun by the knowledge of sin, and it is the restoration of order in man. The same idea in almost the same words is to be found in one of Massillon's sermons. "Penitence is only the reëstablishment of order in man, and man is only in order when he loves the Lord."\* The whole chapter on repentance is certainly reasonable, exposing the common errors which prevail concerning it, and showing that it is sincere only when it comes from the depths of the heart, and effectual only when it leads to immediate amendment. The doctrine of election makes no part of the creed of the new church. As far as we are able to understand what he says concerning reformation and regeneration, we should think his philosophy very reasonable, though it prevailed before he taught it. All men may be regenerated, because all have been redeemed. God in coöperation with man effects the new birth by charity and faith. The first act in the process is reformation, and this is of the understanding; the second is regeneration, which is of the will. (587.) The internal man is reformed first, and by it the external; this gives rise to a contest between the two. A man when regenerate, has a new will and a new understanding, and is in communion with the angels in heaven. Swedenborg says, — "Regeneration is effected comparatively as man is conceived, carried in the womb, born, and educated." He constantly refers to the correspondence between what is done naturally and what is done spiritually; consequently he gives us here the correspondence between

---

\* Sermon, "On the Woman who was a Sinner."



natural generations and spiritual generations. His remarks go too far into the internals to bear repetition. He gives us analogical reasoning drawn from the generation of seeds, trees, and shrubs, male and female. When we separate the great rule, that improvement must be gradual, we have the pith of the whole matter.

Chapter XI., he sets forth the absurdity of the doctrine of Imputation, and explodes it.

Chapters XII. and XIII., Baptism and the Lord's Supper. No one can understand the meaning and effect of the two sacraments, without knowing the spiritual sense of the Word. Baptism signifies a spiritual washing; it was instituted in the place of circumcision. It has three uses;—1, an introduction into the Christian church, and an insertion among Christians in the spiritual world; 2, that the Christian may know, acknowledge, and follow the Lord Jesus; 3, that man may be regenerated. We do not understand this sentence, (688,) "That by means of the baptism of John, a way was prepared that Jehovah the Lord might be able to come down into the world and perform redemption." Of the Supper, he says, (702,) "That from correspondences being known, it may be known what is meant by the flesh and blood of the Lord, and that the like is meant by bread and wine; namely, that by the flesh of the Lord and by bread is meant the divine good of his love, and also all the good of charity; and that by the blood of the Lord and by wine is meant the divine truth of his wisdom, and also all the truth of faith; and by eating, appropriation."

Chapter XIV., and last, is upon the consummation of the age, the coming of the Lord, and the new heaven, and the new church. He says, "Four churches have existed on this earth since the day of its creation; the first, which was called the Adamic, the second the Noahitic, the third the Israelitish, and the fourth the Christian. Each church passed through four successive states or periods, which are meant by the morning, day, evening, and night." As the light and truth have died out of these churches, they have severally been consummated. (760.) This is the case now with the Christian church; it has passed through its several states, has been desolated, corrupted, and consummated. "It can know nothing of this until the divine truths revealed by the Lord in the work, entitled *True Christian Religion*, are seen in the light and acknowledged. The word is so darkened and changed, that no truth any longer

appears therein. The new church will not be established like the former by miracles; instead of these, the spiritual sense of the word is revealed, and the spiritual world disclosed, and the nature of heaven and hell is manifested; also that man lives after death as a man as before. This new and true Christian church, which the Lord is establishing at this day, will exist to all eternity. It will be the crown of the four preceding churches; it has been foreseen from the creation of the world, and confirmed from the word of both Testaments."

Those passages of the Bible, (and particularly those in the New Testament spoken by Jesus Christ,) which are generally understood by Christians as referring to the consummation of the Jewish institutions, Swedenborg interprets of the Christian, and he says they are proved to have that reference in the Apocalypse. By the second coming of the Lord is not meant the final consummation of all things, but the substitution of the new church for the old, in all its forms, Catholic and Protestant. This substitution occurred in the spiritual world when the last judgment took place, which was in 1757. This is the date of the Lord's second advent. This second coming is effected by means of Swedenborg, to whom he has manifested himself, and whom he has filled with his spirit to teach the doctrines of the new church through the world. The Lord is at this day forming a new heaven out of the Christians who rightly acknowledge him. On the 19th of June, 1770, the Lord called the twelve disciples and sent them to preach the Gospel in the spiritual world. At the close of this large work is a supplement concerning the spiritual world. Swedenborg gives us very minute descriptions of heaven and hell. The whole spiritual world, he says, resembles the natural in its objects and gradations. Yet the two worlds are perfectly distinct; there is no communication between them, save that when spiritual beings are seen by the natural beings, the latter have their faculties enlarged. The happiness of heaven consists in a man's loving and aiding his neighbor, not in constant devotion. The misery of hell does not consist in external fires, nor in a guilty conscience, but in a voluntary choice of the company of evil spirits. There is an intermediate state between heaven and hell called the world of spirits. This was the place where the last judgment occurred, and no one has since been allowed to remain there more than thirty years. Swedenborg ridicules the notion that man, after death, is only spirit, air, or ether. He says death is not an

extinction, but a transition. Man is equally a man after death. He walks, runs, sits, sleeps, eats, drinks, and enjoys conjugal delight the same as in this world. That such is man's shape after death, he adduces as proof the Old Testament angels, those at the tomb of Jesus, and the shape in which the Savior himself reappeared. The only difference is, that in the spiritual world man is clothed in a substantial body, but here in a material which envelopes the substantial.

All these discussions are most abundantly illustrated from every kingdom of nature and every branch of science. Some of these illustrations are very homely. For instance, he says, (125,) "that Jehovah God could not have operated and effected these things [redemption, &c.] except by his human, may be illustrated by various comparisons. No one can scale a fish without a knife, nor pick the feathers from a crow without fingers, nor descend to the bottom of a lake without a diving bell."

Of course we shall not be understood as having designed to give even a sketch of all of Swedenborg's opinions, or of the many elevated and worthy views by which he enforces them. We are considering Swedenborg in his alleged character of an inspired teacher, and must therefore seek for what is new and strange in his doctrines. Those opinions which he holds in common with all Christians are foreign to our purpose.

The book before us closes with a description of the spiritual world, and of the situations of its various occupants. Swedenborg says he has been there so often that he will describe the state of the people, not only Europeans, but Asiatics and Africans. He then gives us minute relations of the state of Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, the Dutch, English, Germans, Papists, the Popish saints, the Mahometans, Africans, and Jews. He has often conversed with Luther, Melancthon, and Calvin. Luther had a house in the spiritual world like that which he had occupied at Eisleben, and there he used to teach his doctrines until the last judgment in 1757; then his residence was changed successively to other houses. Hearing once that Swedenborg was in the spiritual world, he came to visit him. He was very angry when he heard of the changes in doctrine which had taken place on the earth; but he soon began to laugh at his own, and to look with more favor on those of Swedenborg. So it was with Calvin and Melancthon. Poor Calvin has taken up his abode in a cave, where he has to work hard for his

food. Swedenborg had a most pervading dislike to the doctrine of justification by faith, and he never omits an opportunity to deny it and to rebuke its supporters. (796, 797, 798.)

Interspersed through the whole book, at the close of the discussion of each doctrine, are "Relations," so called, being minute conversations, discoveries, and occurrences in the spiritual world, illustrative of the contents of the several chapters. Swedenborg seems to have been a prophet in the other world as well as in this, for many of his relations are made up of conversations which he held there for the purpose of detecting errors. We will give the substance of some of these "Relations," premising, however, that our selection has not been made in accordance with Shaftesbury's doctrine of testing truth by ridicule. There are but few of the "Relations" which do not contain something ludicrous.

(112.) Once, when he was in the spiritual world, Swedenborg heard a discussion concerning a certain "innovator, who had thrown an apple of contention among the rulers of the church."

"By that apple they meant a little pamphlet, entitled, 'A Brief Exposition of the Doctrine of the New Church,' and they said, 'it is indeed a schismatical thing, which no one ever before conceived.' And I heard then one of them exclaiming, 'What! schismatical? It is heretical!' But some at his side replied, 'Hush, hold your tongue, it is not heretical; he quotes a great many passages of the Word, to which our strangers, by whom we mean the laity, attend and assent.' When I heard these things, because I was in the spirit, I went to them and said, 'Here I am; what is the subject?' And presently one of them, who, as I afterwards heard was a German, a native of Saxony, speaking in a tone of authority, said, 'Whence had you the audacity to change the worship in the Christian world, established for so many ages, which was that God the Father should be invoked as the Creator of the universe, and his Son as the mediator, and the Holy Ghost as the operator,' " &c.

(696.) "Once I prayed to the Lord that it might be given to me to speak to the disciples of Aristotle, Descartes, and Leibnitz, in order that I might learn the opinions of their mind concerning the intercourse of the soul and the body. After I had prayed, nine men were present, three Aristotelians, three Cartesians, and three Leibnitzians, and stood around me. Behind Leibnitz there stood one, holding in his hand the skirt of his garment, and it was said that it was Wolfius. And they took three pieces of

paper, and on one of them they wrote physical influx, on another spiritual influx, and on the third, preëstablished harmony, and they put these three into the crown of a cap, and chose one to take them out. And this one put in his hand and took hold of that on which was written, spiritual influx, which being seen and read, they all said, yet some with a clear, flowing sound, some with an obscure and stifled one, 'Let us favor this, because it came out first.' But an angel then suddenly stood by and said, 'Do not suppose that the piece of paper in favor of spiritual influx came out by chance, but providentially ; for you do not see the truth of it, because you are in confused ideas ; but the truth offered itself to the hand, that you might favor it.' "

The following is from Swedenborg's Vision concerning Heaven.

" During my meditation I was transported in spirit into a celestial society, placed at the left, towards the east, of which Pope Sixtus Quintus is the chief. In our conversation, he told me that his society was composed of the most judicious and reasonable among the Catholics, and that he had been placed at their head in the heavens for having believed, six months before he died, that the pretence of the Pope being vicar of Jesus Christ was an invention of the Pontiffs, to gratify their lust of domination. He told me that those, who maintained a faith contrary to that he had now declared, would become dolts in the world of spirits ; they would fall into hells where they would become maniacs. I did not conceal from him that these things appeared to me very hard to be published. Write them, he replied, I will transcribe them, because it is the truth. Immediately rejoining his society, he subscribed a paper containing those assertions, and sent it as a bull to those of his former communion on earth." We are told, (801,) that "the Dutch have the best place in the spiritual world, being in the centre whence the light emanates." (804.) "The Dutch are easily distinguished from others, in the spiritual world, because they appear in garments like those which they wore in the natural world, with the distinction, that those appear in finer ones who have received faith and spiritual life. The reason why they are clothed in the like garments is, because they remain constantly in the principles of their religion, and all in the spiritual world are clothed according to them ; wherefore those who are in divine truths have white garments and of fine linen." Poetic justice is done to one class of our fellow beings, as we are told, (805,) "Wives, who affect dominion over their husbands, live at one side of the city, and do not meet their husbands, except when they are invited, which is done in a civil manner," &c.

(809.) "There are two great cities like London, into which most of the English come after death. It has been given me to see the former city, and also to walk over it. The middle of that city is where the merchants meet in London, which is called the exchange, there the moderators dwell," &c.

Concerning the internal and external man, Swedenborg says, (401, (5).)

"Man is so created that he is at the same time in the spiritual world and in the natural world. The spiritual world is where angels are, and the natural world is where men are. And because man is so created, therefore there is given to him an internal and an external; an internal by which he is in the spiritual world, and an external by which he is in the natural world. This internal is either in the heaven or the hell of the spiritual world, according as the man is good or bad."

The deductions from these last statements are, as might be supposed, of a useful and practical nature. And in general, we would be understood as allowing that, if Swedenborg's philosophy and morals were divested of their peculiar dress, and considered by themselves, as in the former part of our remarks we quoted his friend, Count Hopken, as asserting, they would deserve in many respects high commendation, as partaking of a true Christian spirit. We leave it for the present to be decided by our readers how far the assumption, that he went out of the world to learn them, affects their authority. The relations which we have specified must bear the same character, and excite the same impressions at first view, in the minds of the great mass of men. Yet the receivers of the doctrines tell us, that these impressions are wholly false, that we must read on until the external man is enlightened, and that then we shall understand and appreciate them. We will then bespeak the patience of our readers in searching farther for the key to these mysteries.

We trust that we have made quotations enough to exhibit the more manifest peculiarities of the new church, though we have yet to specify the fundamental principle on which its doctrines are based. We have found that the whole evidence of the truth of these doctrines is placed in their internal recommendations, their conformity to the principles of revealed truth, and to the dictates of sound reason, common sense, and sober conviction. The evidence of the faith therefore being found in its doctrines, if we ask for the evidence of the doctrines, we are referred to the Scriptures.

The theological tenets of the new church may be comprised under three main doctrines, namely, a life of charity and faith, the acknowledgment of the sole and supreme deity of Jesus Christ, and the internal sense of the sacred writings. These then are the doctrines to which we are to apply the tests of reason and the word of God.

As it regards the first doctrine, that of a life of charity and faith, we need but observe that this doctrine is to be found on every page of the New Testament. It is then as old, at least, as that book. It has been written about and preached about, and here and there, in some few instances, enough indeed to show that it is not a mere dream, it has been put into practice. The discovery of it does not belong to Swedenborg. As far as it was exhibited in his character, so far was he a Christian. As far as it pervades his system, so far does that harmonize with Christianity. If there be anything in his system to exhibit this doctrine of Christianity in a brighter light, or to increase its influence in the world, he is entitled to the full credit of it. But it will be time to decide this point, when we have examined his original doctrines.

As for the second tenet, that of the sole and supreme deity of Jesus Christ, whatever there may be of novelty in the statement or the proof of it, might so far claim for it an investigation. But whether it be true or false, the proof and even the knowledge of it is made to depend upon the last of the three doctrines which we have specified, that of an internal or spiritual sense in the words of the Sacred Writings. This then is the fundamental and all important doctrine of the new church. We shall give a very full statement of it in the words of Swedenborg, and for this purpose we return to the fourth and fifth chapters of the work before us.

"The Word," he says, "is the divine truth itself; in it there is a spiritual sense, hitherto unknown, but now revealed to me (192, 193.) That the Word in its bosom is spiritual, is because it descended from the Lord Jehovah, and passed through the angelic heavens; and the Divine, which in itself is ineffable and imperceptible, became in its descent adequate to the perception of angels, and at last to the perception of men."

Swedenborg then explains what the spiritual sense is, by adducing some of the parabolic, or symbolical, or figurative passages of Scripture, and asserting very pertinently that if they

do not mean anything more than the outward sense or letter conveys, they are foolish, &c. We shall presently extract some illustrations of his doctrine. He speaks of some sacred books, now lost, which were more ancient than any which we possess.

"Concerning that ancient Word which was in Asia, before the Israelitish Word, I am at liberty to give this information, that it is still reserved amongst the people who live in Great Tartary. I have conversed with spirits and angels in the spiritual world, who came from that country, and who informed me that they are in possession of that Word, and that they have possessed it from time immemorial, and that according to this Word they celebrate their Divine Worship, and that it consists of mere correspondences. They said likewise that it contains the book of Jasher, mentioned in Josh. x. 12, 13, and in 2 Sam. i. 17, 18; and that they are also in possession of the book called the Wars of Jehovah and the Enunciations, which are mentioned by Moses, Numb. xxi. 14, 15, 27, &c., and when I read before them the words which Moses had quoted from those books, they examined whether they were in the original, and they found them; from which circumstances it is evident to me that they are still in possession of the ancient Word. \* \* \* I have further been informed by the angels, that the first chapters of Genesis, which treat of the creation of Adam and Eve, of the garden of Eden, of the children and posterity of the first pair until the flood, and likewise of Noah and his children, are contained in that Word, and so were copied from it by Moses."

For the real existence of such books, Swedenborg offers no other proof than the citations in our canonical writings. These citations have tasked the ingenuity of the learned, and are at best of very doubtful meaning. That there were historical annals, brief records of important transactions, or triumphal songs, for some time preserved and referred to among the Jews, but now lost, is very probable. The references in our Scriptures may be to compositions of either of these three characters. Indeed the three names may have belonged to one and the same composition; and the opinion prevails among the learned, that the names used in Scripture are but other designations of the book of Numbers, or of some two or three of the Psalms. This question, however, is of very little importance at this time, as we cannot decide upon the sense of the books until we have them in our hands.



Swedenborg does not attribute an internal sense to all of our canonical books. The Chronicles, Proverbs, and some of the minor prophets in the Old Testament, and the Acts and Epistles in the New, are exceptions from the general rule.

The Word is written in four different styles.

"The first is that which was used in the most ancient church. Whenever the men of that church made mention of earthly things, they thought of the spiritual and celestial things to which they corresponded. They reduced their thoughts into a kind of historical series or arrangement. Of this character are the chapters of Genesis, down to the time of Abraham. The second style is historical, occurring in the books of Moses from the time of Abraham until the time of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and the Kings; in which books the historical facts are such as appear in the letter; but the relations contain an internal sense in a series. The third style is prophetic, which took its rise from the style of the most ancient church that was held in high esteem; this style, however, is not connected, and in appearance historical, like that of the most ancient church, being broken and interrupted, being scarce ever intelligible but in its internal sense, wherein are contained the greatest arcana, which succeed each other in a beautiful and orderly connexion, having relation to the internal and external man, to the various states of the church, to heaven itself, and in their inmost sense to the Lord. The fourth style is that of the Psalms of David, which is between the prophetic style and that of common speech, in which under the person of David as a king, the Lord is treated of in the internal sense." (Life of Swedenborg, &c. Boston, p. 58.) "The style of the Word," says Swedenborg, "is such, that there is holiness in every sentence and in every word, yea, in some instances, in the very letters. Thence the Word conjoins man to the Lord, and opens heaven. Lest mankind should be in doubt concerning the divinity and sanctity of the Word, its internal sense has been revealed to me." (191.) "The spiritual sense does not appear in the sense of the letter; it is inwardly in it, as the soul in the body, as the thought of the understanding in the eyes, and as the affection of love in the face. It is principally that sense which makes the Word spiritual, by which the Word communicates with the heavens." (195.) "In its ultimate sense the Word is natural, in its interior sense it is spiritual, in its inmost sense celestial, and in every part divine; wherefore it is accommodated to the angels of the three heavens, and also to man. This spiritual sense is in all and in every part of the Word [as before limited]. For instance, in Revelation, xix. 11

— 18, no one can see what this signifies except from the spiritual sense of the Word ; and no one can know this except from the science of correspondences. The Lord is there described. By his eyes, which were as a flame of fire, is meant the divine wisdom of his divine love ; by the vesture tinged with blood, is meant the natural sense of the Word, which is the sense of its letter, to which violence has been done." (196.)

Such is the statement of the doctrine of an internal sense, in the words of Swedenborg. He says it was never known before he taught it. If he means by this, that the doctrine was never before known to be true, we grant it. But this doctrine, or one very much like it, has been an old occupant of certain treatises and brains, and whatever pretensions it may make to truth, has none on the score of its novelty as set forth by Swedenborg. The old Jewish Rabbins said that the Scripture had seventy-two faces ; they seem to have been familiar with all of them, except one. The practice of allegorizing and mystifying the Sacred Writings is of uncertain origin, though it has been of general prevalence. Le Clerc says the heathen invented allegories to veil the literal absurdities of their mythology, and to render their fables plausible ; and that when the Jews became acquainted with them, they learned from them to allegorize the Scriptures. Philo embodied it into a perfect system, and Clemens of Alexandria seems to have adopted it from him. That bishop favored this obscure conveyance of wisdom, because, as he said, the Egyptians and the Greeks had represented the secrets of their philosophy in emblems. Origen has been styled the father of the mystical interpreters. He with Jerome contended for a threefold, while Augustin maintained even a fourfold sense of Scripture. Jerome afterwards abandoned the mystical interpretations of what he called his childish wit, and betook himself to learning something of the true sense of the prophetic writings which he had once paraphrased at such length. The book mentioned in Ezekiel, (ii. 10,) and in Revelation, (v. 1,) which was said to have been written withinside and withoutside, was formerly a favorite illustration of the double sense. This idea, absurd in its foundation, produced its natural issue of absurdities when carried out in practice. Sometimes it was of great convenience in surmounting the difficulties of criticism ; for it was not unusual when by the omission of a particle an affirmative sentence was invested with one meaning in the text, and with a directly opposite one in a marginal note,

to say that both sentiments were dictated by the inspired penman, that both were equally true and equally holy. As might have been expected, the common people began to doubt whether the Scriptures had any sense at all, as they were made to consist of nothing but indirect and typical allusions. It was probably owing as much to this, as to any other single cause, that the clergy were induced to forbid, and the people were willing to resign the common use of the Scriptures.

Cocceius, who originated a very numerous sect in Holland in the seventeenth century, maintained that all Scripture had a mystical sense, indeed, that it might have any sense that one should choose to put upon it. A wider range for superstition and fancy could not have been elsewhere afforded.

So far from having any claims to novelty in stating this doctrine, Swedenborg does but class himself with a most strange and heterogeneous multitude who have been among its supporters. It may even boast of the famous *free thinker*, Anthony Collins. For he, in order to destroy the original authority of Christianity, maintained that it was wholly contained in the Old Testament, not literally, but mystically or allegorically, and that Christianity therefore is the allegorized sense of the Old Testament.\*

It is very easy to go to the bottom of the error which has deluded so many. Like all the other vagaries of the human intellect, it is based upon a well-established truth, which at the same time points out one of the deficiencies in our means and faculties. All language is arbitrary, conventional, and indefinite in its signification, and upon this fact, that it has no one meaning definite in all its limitations, was based the opinion that it might have several meanings of equal distinctness. Critics have specified lines in Homer which may be interpreted in three or four different senses, without violating a rule of grammar, or the truth of the sentiment conveyed.† Alexander Ross evangelized the lines of Virgil, and found there a history of Jesus Christ, and George Fox quakerized Saint Paul.‡ Yet we know that as when we speak in common conversation, unless with the express purpose of conveying innuendoes, our words

---

\* Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion, Chapter VI.

† Iliad, B. IV. 306, 307, B. V. 150.

‡ Dr. Jeffrey's Tracts, Vol. I. p. 342

have one intended meaning ; so, in written language, the intended sentiment is designed to be as fixed and distinct as the characters chiselled deep in marble.

Locke has distinguished the two uses of words and their consequent significations, as civil and philosophical ; and the attempt among philosophers to retain and employ such a distinction has done more than even the darkness of the middle ages to make philosophy unintelligible, unmeaning, and restricted in its good effects. Hence have arisen many paper wars which would never have inflicted their mortal wounds, if men had been as well agreed about sounds and shapes as about substances. Language is of little value unless it conveys the same meaning through a thousand years. Scripture language, like all other language, can have but one meaning, whatever it may be ; whether an historical narration, a description of character, a doctrine, parable, simile, or allegory. If the lesson is conveyed in a parable, the truth is the same ; the dress is chosen to set it forth ; if it is conveyed in an allegory, this is to enliven and illustrate it. The meaning may be as deep and as dark as that of the Sphinx's countenance, but it is likewise as fixed and unchanging. If Scripture is not to be thus interpreted, its contents become as ambiguous as a heathen oracle. As Croesus was about to invade the Medes, he consulted the Delphic oracle on his probable success. The answer was that if he crossed the river Halys, he would ruin a great empire. But should it be his own or that of his enemies ? It was his own, but in either event the oracle would have been true. Equally convertible would be the language of Scripture, if it had a double signification.

From these considerations, it would appear at first sight that we should interpret Scripture as we would other written documents ; we should render it into the vernacular and affix to each word, phrase, and sentence its conventional force and acceptance. If Swedenborg tells us this is not the way, there are two modes by one of which he must prove his assertion. The matter stands thus. A man receives a letter from his friend, and is about to read it as he reads his newspaper, his books, &c. But if he cannot thus obtain its purport, if its signification is couched in ciphers, figures, or emblems, or if the apparent meaning is not the true one, he may be assured of the propriety of an allegorical interpretation of it in one of two ways. Either such a mode of correspondence may have been

previously agreed upon, or the internal fitness and evidence of an allegorical interpretation must appear on the face of the letter. Applying the same principle to the explanation of the Scriptures, Swedenborg does not prove, or even assert, that there was any previous understanding that the records of our faith should be delivered in mystical signs, in language of a spiritual signification; he must therefore refer us to the internal evidence of the fact, and prove that such an interpretation is both warrantable and necessary. This he has attempted to do by proving the fitness of an allegorical interpretation to the Scriptures, and thus we are brought to his remarkable doctrine of spiritual and natural correspondences.

To give our readers his own idea of this doctrine, we shall make some more extracts from the chapter on the Sacred Scripture.

(198.) "Where the Lord speaks to his disciples of the consummation of the age, which is the last time of the church at the end of the predictions concerning its successive changes, he uses the words in Matthew xxiv. 29, 30, 31. By these words, in the spiritual sense, is not meant that the sun and moon would be darkened, that the stars would fall from heaven, and that the sign of the Lord would appear in the heavens, and that they would see him in the clouds, and, at the same time, the angels with trumpets; but by every one of the words there are meant spiritual things which are of the church, concerning the state of which, at the end, those things are said; for, in the spiritual sense, by the *sun*, which will be *darkened*, is meant love to the Lord; by the *moon* which *will not give her light*, is meant faith in him; by the *stars* which will *fall from heaven*, are meant the knowledges of truth and good; by the *sign of the Son of Man in heaven*, is meant the appearing of divine truth in the Word from him; by the *tribes of the earth* which shall *mourn*, is meant the want of all truth, which is of faith, and of all good which is of love; by the *coming of the Son of Man in the clouds of heaven with power and glory*, is meant the presence of the Lord in the Word and revelation; by the *clouds of heaven*, is signified the sense of the letter of the Word, and by *glory*, the spiritual sense of the Word," &c.

(199.) "That the Lord, when he was in the world, spoke by correspondences, thus also spiritually, when naturally, may be evident from his parables, in every word of which there is a spiritual sense. Let the parable of the ten virgins be for an example. (Matthew xxv.) That in every one of these words there

is a spiritual sense, and thence a holy divine, no one sees but he who knows that there is a spiritual sense, and what it is. The spiritual sense, by the *kingdom of the heavens*, is meant heaven and the church ; by the *bridegroom*, the Lord ; by the *wedding*, the marriage of the Lord with them, by the good of love and the truth of faith ; by *oil*, those things which are of the good of love ; by *sleeping* and *awaking*, the life of man in the world, which is natural, and his life after death, which is spiritual ; by *buying*, to procure for themselves," &c.

The simplicity of the letter of the Word might lead some to ask,

(200.) "Is this holy ? Is this divine ? Lest therefore such a thought should flow in with many, and afterwards be confirmed, and thence the Word should be rejected as a worthless writing, and the conjunction of the Lord with man by means of it should perish, it has pleased the Lord now to reveal its spiritual sense, in order that it may be known where in it the divine holiness is concealed. But let examples illustrate this. In the Word we sometimes read of Egypt, of Assyria, of Edom, of Moab, of the sons of Ammon, of the Philistines, of Tyre and Zidon, and of Gog. He, who does not know that by the names of those are signified the things of heaven and the church, may be led into the error that the Word treats much of people and nations, and but little of heaven and the church ; thus, much of worldly and little of heavenly things ; but when he knows what is signified by them or by their names, he may be led back from error into the truth. In like manner, while he sees in the Word that there are so often mentioned gardens, groves, forests, and their trees, as the olive, the vine, the cedar, the poplar, and the oak ; and that so often a lamb, a sheep, a goat, a calf, an ox, and also mountains, hills, valleys, and their fountains, rivers, waters, and many such things ; he, who knows nothing of the spiritual sense of the Word, cannot think otherwise than that it is only those things which are meant ; for he does not know that by a garden, grove, and forest, are meant wisdom, intelligence, and science ; that by an olive, vine, cedar, poplar, and oak, are meant the good and truth of the church, celestial, spiritual, rational, natural, and sensual ; that by a lamb, a sheep, a goat, a calf, an ox, are meant innocence, charity, and natural affection ; that by mountains, hills, and valleys, are meant the higher, lower, and lowest things of the church ; also that by Egypt is signified the scientific ; by Assyria, the rational ; by Edom, the natural ; by Moab, the adulteration of good ; by the sons of Ammon, the adulteration of truth ; by the Philistines, faith without charity ; by Tyre

and Zidon, the knowledges of good and truth; by Gog, external worship without the internal. In general, by Jacob, in the Word, is meant the natural church; by Israel, the spiritual church; and by Judah, the celestial church. When a man knows all these things, he may then think that the Word treats only of heavenly things, and that those worldly things are only the subjects in which these are.

(201.) "That all and everything, which is in nature, corresponds to spiritual things, in like manner, all and everything, in the human body, has been shown in a work concerning Heaven and Hell, page 87 to 105. But what correspondence is, has been hitherto unknown; but in the most ancient times it was very well known; for to those who then lived, the science of correspondences was the science of sciences, and so universal, that all their tracts and books were written by correspondences. The book of Job, which is a book of the ancient church, is full of correspondences. The hieroglyphics of the Egyptians, and also the fables of the ancients were no other. All the ancient churches were churches representative of spiritual things. Their rites, and also the statutes according to which their worship was instituted, consisted of mere correspondences. Now because divine things in the world present themselves in correspondences, therefore the Word was written by mere correspondences; wherefore the Lord, because he spoke from the divine, spoke by correspondences.

(202.) "I have been instructed, that the men of the most ancient church, which was before the flood, were of so heavenly a genius, that they conversed with the angels of heaven, and that they could converse with them by correspondences. Moreover, I have been informed that Enoch, of whom mention is made in Genesis v. 21 to 24, with his companions, collected correspondences from their mouth, and transmitted the science of them to posterity, in consequence of which the science of correspondences was not only known, but also cultivated in many kingdoms of Asia, &c., and that thence it was transferred into Greece, but there it was turned into fables."

Swedenborg then proceeds to illustrate this science with a great deal of beauty and power. Notwithstanding the truth of the common maxim, that every system or doctrine which is based on a falsity becomes absurd when carried out into deductions and consequences, it is none the less true, that if we pursue any fanciful speculation through all reason or nature, its consistency with itself will present us with numberless plausibilities and striking coincidences. Such was the case with the

beautiful theory of the signatures in plants which once prevailed among speculative botanists — “a theory which supposed that every healing plant bears, in some part of its structure, the type or signature of its peculiar virtues, by a resemblance to that part of the human frame for which its remedial uses were intended.” Thus walnuts were said to have the perfect signature of the head; the outer husk, or green covering, represents the *pericranium*, or outward skin of the skull, and therefore salt made of those husks is exceedingly good for wounds in the head. The “kernel hath the very figure of the brain, and therefore it is very profitable to the brain, and resists poisons.” It is almost time for this bewitching study to come up again. It must certainly be attractive, and it cannot be said to be fruitless.\*

Swedenborg proceeds to tell us that the science of correspondences was lost; that it was not disclosed to the early Christians on account of their simplicity. Afterwards, heresies and corruptions concealed it. It is to be disclosed now because the divine truths of the church have come forth into light. (206, 207.) That it will now be made known, “is meant by John seeing heaven open, and then a white horse.” “The spiritual sense, hereafter, is not to be given to any but to those who are in genuine truths from the Lord.” (208.) There is a spiritual sense, a celestial sense, and a natural sense. (236.) They have the Word in heaven, with temples and preaching. A copy of the same ancient Word, which as before said was lost, and now exists entire in Great Tartary, is preserved among the angels who lived at the time it was composed. Swedenborg tells us, (209.)

“The wonderful things, which exist in the spiritual world from the Word, are many. The Word itself, in the inmost recesses of the temples there, shines before the eyes of the angels, like a great star, and sometimes like the sun. That all and every one of the truths of the Word shine, was made evident to me from this, that when any single verse of the Word is written out upon paper, and the paper is thrown into the air, the paper itself shines in such a form as it was cut into; wherefore spirits are able to produce by the Word various shining forms, and also those of birds and fishes. And what is still more wonderful, when any one rubs the face, the hands, or the clothes which he has on, with the Word open, applying the writing of it to them,

---

\* For an account of this theory, see the “Doctor,” Vol. I. ch. 24; and *Encyclopedia Britannica*.



the face itself, the hands and the clothes shine as if he were standing in a star, surrounded with its light. This I have often seen and wondered at."

We might multiply such extracts and present statements which, though relating to the most holy subjects, would nevertheless excite a smile, even if they did not give rise to contempt for their apparent absurdity. We have mentioned one supposed advantage suggested by Swedenborg for the existence of a double sense, namely, that it makes the otherwise simple narratives of the Scriptures more dignified and heavenly. Another advantage which it is said to offer is its aid in resolving historical difficulties. Swedenborg refers to the statement in Exodus xii. 40, where it is said that the children of Israel sojourned in Egypt four hundred and thirty years, when, as a nation, they were there but half of the time. On this point various suggestions have been made. The prevailing opinion among biblical critics is, that the reckoning should be commenced with the descent of Abraham, which will set the matter right. Swedenborg adopts this course, but he says it was signified by the internal sense, (*Arcana Coelestia*.) This may or it may not be; the interpretation, at least, was made known before his internals were opened. Some singular relations are annexed to the chapter on the Scripture. In one of them we are told that the angels pointed out to Swedenborg the curves of some old fashioned Hebrew letters, on a paper dropped from heaven, and showed him by them the entire sense. They told him that the *H* added to the words Abram and Sarai signified infinite and eternal. They also informed him of the inflections, the curves, and the vowels of the writing which was used in the third heaven. (278.)

Such is the doctrine of correspondences. Its author is certainly very faithful in its application, not only to the interpretation of Scripture, but to every natural object. In the spiritual world, he says, there are things similar to those which are upon the earth. Heaven is divided into three parts, the heavenly, the spiritual, and the inferior; and these, in the whole, represent man. For the upper heaven is the head, the second heaven occupies from the neck to the knees, the third forms the arms and the legs. There are in heaven woods and leaves, gardens, palaces, cities, gold, diamonds, &c., indeed, everything that is to be seen upon the earth; but it is all spiritual. There

are governments and trades; the language, writing, and books are different from our own. The male and female angels are married, they have a human form and wear clothing, except those who live in the upper heaven. The husband performs the functions of intelligence, and the wife those of the will. Everything in the material world is a counterpart or representative of something in the spiritual. The angels, when talking of love and innocence, may point to pleasant fields, to lambs, and to children. Hell, which is continually striving against heaven, is constituted by a fire emanating from the same principle as the heavenly light, and is made infernal to those who receive it with impure dispositions. This kingdom likewise has its correspondences, in poisonous gases and plants, in dangerous animals, fierce elements, and the bad passions of men. In fine, there is such a perfect similarity between our world and the other, that Swedenborg himself conversed with deceased persons who were ignorant that they had ever died. Swedenborg however denied the resurrection of the body, and supposed, or rather asserted, that at death each one would be invested with a spiritual body, which in life is enclosed in the natural.

To return to the doctrine of Scripture correspondences. After the statement which we have read concerning it, the question occurs, does it appear sufficiently reasonable to support the doctrine of the internal or spiritual sense? If we did not know that many had received it as a true and valuable principle, we should at once pronounce it absolutely preposterous. As it is, an overwhelming mass of objections must rise up against it.

As regards the history of the doctrine of correspondences, its alleged existence and use among the Egyptians and other ancients, if Swedenborg thought he was stating what was new, when he said that the signs upon the pyramids were intended to convey certain facts, and to indicate certain events, he was mistaken. It is true that symbols and emblems, in all ages, have corresponded to certain truths which they expressed. Even the form of an idol, and the nature of the offerings which were presented to it, indicated certain states of mind in the worshipper. A sacrificial rite, a religious ceremony, a statute requiring stated observances, were imperfect, though the best means which could be devised for expressing moral affections. So among the Jews, their laws and institutions were designed to convey certain truths to the heart, infinitely more important

than a literal observance. This, however, is no discovery of Swedenborg, and it will not do to make it the foundation of a pretended novel doctrine.

Again, his doctrine, if it were ever known to be true, was by his own confession lost, at the time of Job ; how then shall we know that it is rightly restored ? Supposing it granted that to each letter and word of Scripture language there belongs a spiritual signification, who shall distribute and affix these significations ? If men wrangle about the literal sense, it would be impossible for them to agree in the spiritual sense. We will not undertake by any arguing of this matter to add to the spontaneous suggestions which must arise in the minds of our readers. The foundation of this doctrine is evidently based upon the figurative use of language ; on this simple fact that intellectual expressions borrow form and coloring from the material world, Swedenborg builds up his science, which is nothing more than an indefinite extension of the figurative language of Scripture. He draws in to its support the most lawless and heterogeneous devices, gathered from all the realms of fiction, types, illustration, emblems, and allegories. If the reader of his writings were to sift out some of his fanciful analogies, he would find that Swedenborg, starting with some fact or conception which all might admit, immediately deduces from it the wildest conceits and fancies. So it is in the writings of his disciples. Thus Dr. Hartley, in his notes to Swedenborg's treatise on *Influx* (p. 114) says, that "divine truth is expressed in John iv. 10, by 'living water.' Hence we may infer that when water is used in an inferior sense, it may signify natural truth, or truths of a lower kind." Thus upon the fact, that some expressions in Scripture require a metaphorical interpretation, is built up the monstrous doctrine, that the whole of it requires the same. Swedenborg makes the internal sense of the Word to be the spiritual signification of the "White Horse" in the Apocalypse. "So *horse* everywhere signifies *intellection* and *understanding*."

The writer first quoted says, "The horse was a significant emblem among the Egyptians and Asiatics, and was from them adopted by the Greeks, as a symbol of wisdom. Hence the 'equus alatus,' or Pegasus, which their poets converted into a fable ; now wings added to a horse elevate the iconism to spiritual or divine wisdom."

With these statements before us, we cannot admit that

Swedenborg has at all advanced the attempts, which others have made before him, to support the doctrine of another than the plain literal sense of Scripture. There is a very good reason why he should have failed. The supposition or the proof of the doctrine of an internal, spiritual, or double sense would destroy the very object which he intends to gain by it. There is indeed what may be called a spiritual sense in all language, both written and oral, particularly so in the embodied conceptions of an oriental mind. The Scriptures, as containing the statement of moral truth and great principles, possess it in an eminent degree. How widely different are the effects produced by the same sentence, phrase, or word upon different minds. The characters and sounds are the same, the idea arbitrarily attached to them is the same, but the impressions made by them are infinitely varied. This capacity to touch such an infinite variety of sensibilities within us is the true internal meaning, the double sense, the spiritual power of language. He, then, who would attach one and only one definite idea to a word or sentence, would produce an effect upon the mind, equally deadening with the removal of all diversity in the outward universe from the eye. Some objects would lose their power to please and to instruct.

Thus Swedenborg's main doctrine, so far from adding to the spirituality of the Scriptures, tends to lessen and destroy it. We have endeavored to give a fair and explicit statement of his opinions. The pillar and ground of his peculiar faith seem to be a fable and a dream. As his whole system, as far as it differs from commonly received Christianity, is built upon his doctrine of correspondences, it must share the same character; and thus we have the conclusion, that as Swedenborg offered neither external, nor satisfactory internal evidence of his claims, he was not commissioned as an inspired expounder of the Scriptures. How then are we to explain the wonders of his life, and the extraordinary character of his doctrine? Any opinion unfavorable to his alleged office must meet, with a fair discussion, two considerations which are strongly and prominently set up in his defence. The first is, his own pure and truly Christian character, so utterly inconsistent with anything like voluntary deception, and his well trained and philosophical mind, a seeming guard against self-delusion.

The second is the spiritual tendency of his doctrines, as exhibited among the receivers of them.

We will allow to these considerations their full weight, and inquire to what they amount. Respecting the first, which relates to Swedenborg's mind and character, we would by no means deny to him the great excellence which he deserves. As might have been supposed, however, opinions in this respect unfavorable to him have been entertained. The air of mystery, which he threw around him, has been thought inconsistent with sincerity; and the apparent puerility of much of his writings has been taken as sufficient proof of imbecility of mind. On the other hand, it has been as warmly contested that he challenged the freest scrutiny, that he was on terms of intimacy with men who could not be blinded, and from his attainments in philosophy must have had an unusually well balanced mind. The proper arguments for estimating these opposite opinions will occur to every one, and the weight and character of each must depend entirely upon subsequent considerations. As far as we have been able to discover the estimation in which Swedenborg was held by his contemporaries, from the periodical literature of the time, the general opinion was that he was an honest enthusiast, a visionary. Such, too, has been the prevalent view of his character since. Herder has given a psychological explanation of his life and wonders, on this estimate, which, did our limits permit, we should be glad to quote.\* Heinroth has drawn a parallel between him and Don Quixote, which we must lay before our readers.

"If the existence of such a man as Swedenborg were not an historical fact, we could easily conceive that a second Cervantes had wished to do us the same service in relation to the spiritual world of our time, as the witty Spaniard had before done for his countrymen in the realm of chivalry. So close a resemblance do we find between the noble and valiant, but crackbrained Don Quixote, and the religious and learned, but, to speak plainly, the no less crackbrained Swedenborg. For, in fact, in Don Quixote's visions, we hold the key to those of Swedenborg, and we need not perplex ourselves with the question, how Swedenborg could have the most irrefragable evidence of the reality of his visions, and even have all his senses familiarized in the spiritual world; since the hero of Cervantes was equally well convinced of the reality of his visions, and saw and heard with his bodily eyes and ears, what no man besides himself saw and heard.

---

\* Herder, *Philo. und Geschichte*. 9 T. *Wissenschaftliche Ereignisse und Charaktere*, &c., S. 478, &c.

And as with him, the power of spiritual vision had been aroused by the books over which he brooded day and night, so likewise with Swedenborg. Finally, the honest Don Quixote, when out of the realm of his world of wonders, was likewise discreet and wise, so was the equally honest Swedenborg, when out of his: and the former could give excellent moral lessons to his trusty squire, as Swedenborg did to his believing public. In short, after our inspection, we can find between the two no other point of difference, than between the world of chivalry and the world of spirits." \*

But it was not in the spirit of ridicule that we quoted this parallel. There is an explanation of the character of Swedenborg, which accounts for all its eccentricities, and allows it the most favorable construction. In the first place, no one will presume to say that pretensions in all respects like his may not be set up without the least foundation in truth. Any person, at all conversant with the religious history of his race, knows that it is full of intellectual vagaries, of the wildest revellings of enthusiasm, fanaticism, imposition, and of every species of infatuation. There is no possible conception of a frenzied intellect, nor any imaginable excess of spiritual extravagance, which has not left its traces in that history. As we know that different degrees of moral and mental excellence have been combined in the characters of such religionists, we know that it would be impossible to suppose that any union of intellectual and moral traits would be free from danger. And thus it may be that those very features of Swedenborg's character, upon which his admirers base his security, may have formed the best possible combination of means for his delusion. We shall presently recur to this point.

Again, we know that claims precisely similar to those of Swedenborg have been advanced, founded on the same principles, and appealing to like evidence. The authors of them, it is true, could not in all cases boast of the same literary attainments; but when they have appealed to religious institutions and doctrines, their lessons have often appeared more reasonable than those of Swedenborg. Zoroaster, Minos, Pythagoras, Lycurgus, and Numa are instances among the ancients of successful appeals to supernatural light. Mahomet affords an example still more in point, especially when we consider his rea-

---

\* Heinroth's *Geschichte und Kritik des Mysticismus*, S. 502.

soning in respect to miracles, his definition of internal evidence, and his pretended mission to carry out a design begun by former prophets. The Christian church has at no period been without its illuminated expounders of the spiritual sense of its records. The whole of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth, when Swedenborg was beholding the wonders of heaven and hell, were rich in metaphysical religionists and mystical interpreters. "Who," says Howel, in a letter dated 1644, "would have held it possible, that to avoid superstition, some people should be brought to belch out such a horrid profaneness, as to call the temples of God the tabernacles of Satan; the Lord's supper, a two penny ordinary; to make the communion table a manger, and the font, a trough to water their horses in; to term the white, decent robe of the Presbyter, the whore's smock; the pipes through which nothing came but anthems and hymns, the devil's bagpipes?" But so it was, that in the heat and frenzy of the civil wars, — the grievances which preceded them, and the wild fancies which they had generated, no possible conception of a religious spirit has failed to leave its history for our amusement or our contempt, as well as in a few instances, for our reverence. There was Jacob Behmen and his fancies. There was Madame Bourignon, the Flemish prophetess, who travelled about boasting of her communications with the Deity. Her religious philosophy was very similar to that which Swedenborg afterwards taught. She was born at Lisle in 1620, and in 1696 she published a treatise, entitled "the Light of the World," which was answered by the famous Charles Leslie, and by Dr. Cockburn. She had many followers even among the learned and the prudent, and she seems likewise to have been a very voluminous writer, as twenty-one volumes of her authentic works have already been published at Amsterdam. Her wild doctrines were digested into a system, and published by the famous mystical philosopher Poirer. Then there were the extravagances of the early Quakers which will not bear repetition; the spiritual utterances of Fox and Nayler, and of some of their followers, who, as a matter of course, in the words of Sewel, "thought themselves further enlightened than George Fox." From these again, sprung the Muggletonians, in the time of Cromwell, the founder of which sect, with his companion Reeves, maintained that they were the two last witnesses spoken of in the Revelation. There was also the famous John Hutchinson, the founder of the sect of the

Hutchinsonians, who was born in 1674. He was likewise a distinguished natural philosopher and a voluminous writer. It is very probable that Swedenborg may have had his opinions influenced by this author; and their views, though they cannot be called precisely the same in their details, are remarkably similar in their general character, as made up of mystical interpretations of Scripture, and a strange mixture of science, fancy, and mental illumination. The confidence which Hutchinson had in his own system will appear from an anecdote related of him. He had published a work called "*Moses' Principia*," containing the principles of his Scripture Philosophy. A short time before his death, his physician urged him to allow himself to be bled, saying in jest, "I will soon send you to Moses," meaning, back to his studies. Hutchinson understood him to be in earnest, and replying, "Doctor, I believe you will," dismissed him for another physician.

Ann Lee, the Elect Lady, the mother of the Shakers, likewise claimed an honorable mention in Rev. xii. 1, 2, &c. She could speak seventy-two tongues, unintelligible to the living indeed, but perfectly known to the dead. But neither Mother Lee nor Joanna Southcot pretended to any literary distinction.

These are a few of the most noted religious enthusiasts of modern times. They have attracted notice and found their ready followers. We cannot dispute the sincerity of any one of them. Many writers have ranked Swedenborg and his doctrines under the same class with them. By one it has been asserted that his impressions "were the effect, though somewhat extraordinary, of excessive indulgence of appetite after an unusual interval of fasting, and while, perhaps, neither the body nor the mind were sufficiently composed. Certain nervous symptoms, not unlike those described by him, sometimes occur in cases of dyspepsia or sudden indigestion.\*" Another writer supposes "that a gentle purgative with cataplasms applied to the feet, would have put an end to his visions."

By adducing this list of eccentric religionists, we do not intend to class Swedenborg with common enthusiasts and fanatics; he must be rated higher. We intend merely to suggest, what a multitude of materials for religious extravagances do exist, and how faithfully they have been used by men and women of eccentric temperament. Still Swedenborg was one of the great class; a philosopher of the most perfect sincerity, and a de-

---

\* North American Review, Vol. XII.



ceiver of no one so much as himself. This may be sustained in perfect consistency with all that can fairly be claimed for the superiority of his mind and character. There can certainly be no difficulty in accounting for the natural cause and effect of his delusion. His dreams and visions, his spiritual conversations, his divine impressions, as far as the bodily organs are concerned, may be most satisfactorily explained upon the simple principles of physiology. Drs. Hibbert, Reid, and Abercrombie have explained greater marvels than these. It is the intellectual effects of his delusion, the subjection to it of a strong, well disciplined, and scientific mind, the outrages committed against his own reason, and the singular consequences of his conviction, which need an explanation. Nor need we look far for it. In giving a sketch of his life, we spoke of the mysticism by which his early education and youth were characterized. The following extract is from a letter in his own words. "I was prohibited reading dogmatic and systematic theology before heaven was opened to me, by reason that unfounded opinions and inventions might thereby easily have insinuated themselves, which with difficulty could afterwards have been extirpated." Now if he was ignorant of all principles of interpretation, he was certainly ignorant of the true principles; and when sitting in his study with no other book than the Bible, he might readily apply to its elucidation such rules as he should see fit. He was educated in the strictest doctrines of Lutheranism; and if with the impatience, the dread, and the superstition which we may readily suppose these would engender, we unite the inquiring disposition of his mind, we might safely predict the result of their combined action. He himself tells us that he was an ardent admirer of natural, metaphysical, and philosophical studies. When he enumerates, in his chapter "on the Being of a God," the proofs which animal instinct and the vegetable creation offer in support of that truth, he says he had been for twenty-six years an attentive observer of the works of Providence. We read in his eulogy, that "he applied the whole force of his mind to penetrate the most hidden things. From the time when he first began to think for himself, he was animated by a secret fire, an ardent desire to attain to the discovery of the most abstract things, and he thought he had attained a glimpse of the means of arriving at his end." Now let a man once be persuaded of the possibility of resolving mysteries, once set him on the quest, furnished with a capacious imagination,

and a character compounded of simplicity and credulity, — two traits much more to be coveted than their opposites, — and you may be sure that, if he returns at all, he will be laden with a very dubious burden. We traced the progress of Swedenborg's inquiries, from numbers to metals, from metals to the animal kingdom, from beasts to men, from the human body to its mysterious occupant. Having reached this point, it was more reasonable that he should go on than that he should stop. The tendency of natural science is to spiritualize the mind, and to form an amiable character. When Swedenborg adopted the notion that the soul was enclosed in the body, in such a manner that its corresponding members ran out beneath the integuments into all the limbs and fibres, other imagined correspondences between spiritual and material things would be suggested to him as a matter of course. A taste was engendered by his inquiries most admirably adapted to his subsequent pursuits. He had a belief in the marvellous, and a love for it; he longed for a knowledge of the secret mechanism of the soul and body, and of the spirit's converse with its Maker; and he believed he could attain it. The very simplicity of his character, which would prevent him from wilfully deceiving others, would most readily expose him to self-delusion. His philosophical habits and acquisitions would be a seemingly safe foundation for higher investigations. Thus the very traits of mind and character, alleged to prove his sincerity and safety, would be most likely to lead him beyond his depth. If he had had less honesty, he would have been an impostor, if less discretion, a fool. As it is, his most honorable designation is that of an elevated mystic. If we add to the natural effect of his inquiries his probable belief in the reality of his visions, all the mystery is unravelled.

M. Gregoire, in his history of religious sects, (Vol. I. p. 223,) calls Swedenborg's dreams, strange psychological phenomena, told in good faith, and not mistrusted as the illusions of the senses. He then cites the example of a scholar at Berlin, who had experienced the same phenomena in the course of a malady, but who, when afterwards master of his reason, studied them as an observer. As for the imaginary sights and conversations which make up Swedenborg's wonderful relations, they seem to be nothing more than the creations of reverie. They are the dreamy visions which we suppose would pass through the mind, both when wearied and excited by such speculations, such

strange alternations of sobriety and enthusiasm. It is remarkable that Swedenborg in all his visits to the spiritual world has brought back only earthly shapes. We naturally revert to those feelings with which, when a child, we listened to ghost-stories. The beating heart was always quieted when the uniform garb of the ghost was mentioned, for we supposed that anything that went about beneath the cover of such an honest and familiar fabric as a sheet, could not be wholly destitute of humanity. The truth was the story always began then to smell of the earth. So it was with Swedenborg. He invented no new shapes, clothing, or language. He even leans to some popular superstitions, as in peopling hell with bats, dragons, owls, &c. (True Christian Religion, 78.) His doctrine of heavenly marriage is the same with the strange conceit in Dr. Donne's poem, "The Good Morrow." For a striking delineation of the power which the fancy may acquire over the reason, and the manner in which fictions begin to operate as realities, we refer our readers to Dr. Johnson.\*

The spiritual pride and the valueless results, attending such speculations, are well illustrated in an indifferent pun of Baxter. He is speaking of the disciples of Sir Henry Vane's undigested religious tenets—who are sometimes called Vanists.—"Mr. Sterry," he says, "was thought to be of Vane's mind, as he was his intimate friend; but was so famous for obscurity in preaching, being, said Sir Benjamin Rudiard, too high for this world, and too low for the other, that he thereby proved almost barren also; and *vanity* and *sterility* were never more happily conjoined."†

So much for the objection that an opinion unfavorable to Swedenborg's claims is inconsistent with his intellectual and moral character.

To come to the second consideration, which relates to the alleged spirituality of his doctrines, and the receivers of them; of course, our remarks must be confined to the doctrines themselves, their philosophical character, operations, and effects. We cannot criticise the depth or the fervor of the devotion which may belong to any particular body of men. The receivers of Swedenborg's doctrines, as far as we have been personally acquainted with them, have seemed to us to be eminently

---

\* Rasselas, Chap. 44.

† Orme's Baxter, Vol. I. p. 82.

pure and Christian characters. Something about spiritual pride was stealing down our pen, but we exorcised the uncharitable thought. We must, however, drop one hint on this subject. The disciples of Swedenborg may be eminently spiritual, and yet they may not be made so by his doctrines, but may be led to embrace these by finding in them something in accordance with cherished views of their own, derived from other sources. It is well to regard this relation between cause and effect, for there are many instances where they are inverted, as is shown in the "Merry Toy" set forth by Master Hugh Latimer.

Is there anything, then, in Swedenborg's peculiar doctrines or system, which tends in an eminent degree to originate or to promote spirituality? That he was a mystic, and that his theology is fairly designated by the term mystical theology, cannot be disputed. Is mysticism spirituality? Heavenly mindedness is enjoined by Christianity, as the foundation and utterance of all religious feeling. We might compare the two habits of mind by examining both their internal principles and their outward manifestation. But if it be denied that the peculiarities of mysticism are confined entirely to its inward operation, it must still be confessed that they are for the most part so restricted, and therefore we may waive for the present the consideration of the outward exhibitions of mysticism and spirituality, and confine ourselves to their influence on the mind and heart. The fundamental idea of all the shades and varieties of mysticism is something like this. That a portion of the Divine Nature is the constituent element of all human souls; and that the principle thus diffused, as an emanation from God himself, comprehends the elements of all truth, human and divine. Proceeding upon this idea, the thoughts are ever turned inward; religion assumes the form of contemplation; dreams are analyzed as realities; and the soul is content to act upon itself, without making any use of the outward world, except in endeavoring to invest it with its own properties. Mysticism is thus, in theory, the extreme opposite of materialism; it makes everything spirit. Now that the frame of mind engendered by contemplation on these principles has its beneficial effects, will not be denied. When from the distracting scenes of the world the mind retires to its own quiet, to resume its proper superiority, and to meditate on its higher interest, no danger may be incurred by its deepest absorption. It may spiritualize even the frame with which it is united, if it will, and become lost in its supposed

reunion with the One Great Intelligence. If it resumes its individual failings by a gradual return to the earth, it may not suffer by its short freedom. Nature may offer more secret tones, more emblematic instruction, the invisible power which pervades it may be more fully recognised, and the heart may be made more devout. This is allowing the most favorable influences to the contemplations of the mystic, and such as experience has not often seen fulfilled. But here their possible good is restricted; only the individual can receive any benefit from them. When the dreams of one man have been taken as the bond of union for a sect, harmless speculation becomes a visionary and barren piety, or leads to a troublesome and disorganizing spirit. The dreams of the mystic can be of possible advantage only to himself. They are strictly and entirely his own; visioned in his own mind, warmed by his own passions, and colored by his own fancy; they can instruct or benefit only that heart in which their impressions live. The mystic cannot invest the mind of another with his own ideas. Every proselyte he obtains must either mistake the views which he receives, or yield his assent to what admits of no possible proof. The mystic may paint his visions with all the freshness of a scene just witnessed, but no one, who has not been with him in his dreams, can feel an honest sympathy in their reality. Here is the great distinction between the fundamental principles of mysticism and spirituality. Mysticism is based upon individual, spirituality upon universal convictions. The vagaries of one mind are the elements of mysticism, the eternal attributes of the all-comprehending and pervading mind are the inexhaustible sources of spirituality. The former are in no proper sense communicable, the latter are the perpetual bonds which unite all souls.

This distinction admits of a very simple illustration. We may listen to the vivid descriptions of one whose imagination has been disturbed by a vision of the night. The hair of our heads may rise in horror at the delineation of the pale forms, the flowing blood, the awful groans, and the ghastly countenances, by which the quick utterance of the narrator attempts to transfer the fearful picture of his own fancy to the minds of his hearers. Yet how different will be our most excited feelings from his. The utmost extent of his influence over us cannot affect our own consciousness. Such a narration differs in no respect from those of the mystic, when he attempts to invest his contemplations with the living power of truth. It is widely

different, however, with the proper statement of the realities and relations of spiritual things. Here the appeal is made directly to our own consciousness, and we may weigh its truth.

There being this wide difference between the foundations of mysticism and spirituality within the mind, it is equally observable in their outward manifestations. There are certainly bad tendencies in mystical contemplations. The frame of mind engendered by them is not adapted to the trials of humanity. Our duty is not to spiritualize matter, but to surmount its meaner influences; not to reason our pains into air, but to wring a purifying power from their bitterness. We need not confine ourselves to the theory of mysticism to weigh its good and evil tendencies; long experience has taught them. Its history leads us back to the shores of the Red Sea, where from remote antiquity there lived a large community, sending forth branches into the neighboring regions, and laboring with what aid it could derive from perverting the doctrines and records of revelation, to establish a system of contemplative philosophy. They did what they could to forget that they had bodies; and, of course, the excessive mortifications and inflictions to which they subjected them, constantly kept in vivid presence the misused sensual frame. They too allegorized the Scriptures of the Old Testament; and whether they possessed Job's key to them or not, they were obstinately confident in the spiritual sense which they affixed. Mysticism then crept into the Christian Church by means of partial converts. Origen, at the beginning of the third century, gave a form to the mystical theology. The spurious writings attributed to Dionysius, the disciple of Paul, did much to circulate it after the fifth century. From that time we are able to trace its progress in forms more or less defined through the succeeding ages of the Church.

In the years that immediately preceded the Reformation, mysticism prevailed throughout Christendom; and then indeed it exercised its best influence. The circumstances of the times were favorable to the development of all its effects, which could ever be positively beneficial; but even then it had but a redeeming value. The absurdity and worthlessness of the scholastic theology, the division of the virtues into moral and theological, the fantastic disquisitions and refinements in philosophy, had left the heart and the conscience utterly unaided, to be improved by whatever else should offer. Then mystical theology began to spread itself. The spiritual principle had

been aroused, even by the perverted lessons of revelation, it was therefore known, but not understood. When an individual adopted the idea that his own soul was a part of the Deity, and knew not the mode of culture which that Being had designed for it, it was but natural that he should suppose it to be debased and polluted by the body. If this spirit was to be glorified, the body was to be mortified; sensual objects must be destroyed, that sensual influences might be surmounted. The deeper the solitude of the soul, the nearer would it be to God. The proper exercise of our sensual and spiritual faculties, an harmonious coöperation between them, is the perfect state of man as a religious being. But there is a perpetual contest between these faculties, and this, the probationary, the trial state of man, is the perpetual cause of his errors. The spirit and the flesh encroach upon each other's rights, and amid the endless varieties of wrong thus originated, are the two great classes of religious extravagances, the multiplication and sole regard of forms, and the opposite superstition of annihilating all sensual influences. Hence it was that the mystical theology was productive of its good effects, at a time when religion was made to consist altogether of outward forms. In the year 1675, a book had been published at Rome by a Spanish priest named Molinos, entitled a "Guide to a Spiritual or Contemplative Life." It maintained the doctrine of the Quietists, that all religion consists in a certain quietude of the soul, withdrawn from external objects and fixed upon God. His system spread rapidly over the continent of Europe, and was supported by Madame Guion, whose spiritual poems are known to most readers through the translations of Cowper. Bossuet, with other learned men, declared their principles to be unsound, and he was thus led into a controversy with Fenelon, who approved them. The philosophical principles of Quakerism include it under the same general class of speculations.

We must assign the doctrines of Swedenborg to this same class. It is true of these, as of all the forms of mysticism, that they make strong appeals to the heart and none to the reason. Their design too is similar to that of the other attempts of mystics. They would elucidate some of the most elevated truths of our religion, but they have never succeeded; the result has always been that the plainer ones have been involved in philosophic obscurity. Religion is made a most heterogeneous mixture of dreams and rhapsodies. These then are objections

which in our view hold with equal force against the doctrines of Swedenborg. But we have graver ones yet to offer. Swedenborg claimed the possession of the highest powers, with which we can conceive even a disembodied spirit to be endowed. Without the clouded vision or the ravished senses of the ancient prophets, he professes to have beheld God face to face, and to have revealed all the mysteries of the past, the present, and the future. We will not deny that even human faculties might admit of this vast enlargement, if God so willed it; but the evidence to us, that he has so willed it, must lie in the worthiness of the object; the end to be attained must demand, or at least justify, the stupendous means. And this would lead us to ask, what did Swedenborg accomplish, or even purpose, which is worthy of the powers he claimed? We do not hazard anything in asserting that Swedenborg did nothing worthy of his pretended powers. His most devoted disciple cannot point to a single question in dispute among men which he has settled, nor to any moral doctrine which he has made more clear. We have already adverted to the remarkable fact that all the shapes and incidents, which he brought back from the spiritual world, are but constructions or distortions of earthly scenes and objects, as the imagination of the dreamer tortures the objects of his vision into being, out of the well known forms of daily experience. It is true that Swedenborg exposed many prevalent errors and abuses in dogmatic theology; but all his arguments had been before stated even with greater force, by men who never pretended to inspiration. The weight of this objection to the claims of Swedenborg, which is founded on the absence of all results which could be worthy of them, will appear to every one who reflects, that the only solid argument to justify the interposition of supernatural means consists in the necessity and dignity of the proposed end.

So much for the objection which reason offers to the claims of Swedenborg. The law and the testimony give to us another standard. We said in the beginning of our inquiry, that as Swedenborg professed to build upon a foundation already laid, to carry out a system, by authority derived from its author, we had a right to look for symmetry in the new part; the whole plan, if it have one originator, must be consistent. We might expect in the Christian scheme itself a provision, and in its records a prediction of any purposed alteration of it. Evidence of this kind, however, independent of the figurative passage in



the Apocalypse, is not pretended. We are then to look for internal harmony, for a progressive development, for thorough consistency, between the latter part of an alleged revelation, and its former part. But some one may dispute the propriety of considering Christianity as the whole statement of a final and enduring scheme. Are we justified in viewing it as an ultimatum, a criterion by which we are to estimate all future claims to inspiration? We reply that we are certainly justified in demanding equal evidence of the authorized extension or modification of a plan, as we have of the plan itself. The stupendous preparations with which Christianity was ushered into the world have not as yet been sufficiently honored in their results, to allow us to suppose that it has accomplished the purpose intended in its original form. The influence of the Savior's character, as the man best approved of God, has not yet exhausted the study or the emulation of men. The labors of the apostles, the sacrifices of the martyrs, ought not yet to be set aside for the words of a more honored prophet. The true interpreters of the life and doctrine of Jesus Christ, as God shall send them one by one into the world at long intervals, have yet treasures of truth to unfold. But the claims of Swedenborg are of a different character. He was not content with the office of an interpreter, but claimed that of the most exalted prophet. Hindmarsh draws an argument for the principles of Swedenborg from their conformity to Christianity. He uses the simile of several travellers coming from a foreign country and agreeing in their accounts. There is a harmony, he says, between the revelations of Swedenborg and those of the ancient prophets and apostles. In our opinion he could not have made a statement more directly the reverse of the truth.

The great fundamental principle of Swedenborg's system, we mean his pretended revelations of the spiritual world, is utterly at variance with the teachings, and even with the silence of Christianity on the same subject. The scenes which, as our Savior said, no mortal eye or ear had knowledge of, which even an apostle could conceive of but darkly, the abode of spiritual existences, the distributions of the last judgment, are unveiled with a most ready hand by Swedenborg. He makes them the subjects of ludicrous tales, and of sillier conversations than ever employed a tea table group. To say nothing of the gross deformities of his wonderful relations, the principle upon which they proceed is utterly inconsistent with Christianity.

Swedenborg says that "ignorance of God arises from the fact that no one has been to, or taught of, the spiritual world." The assertion is not true. Foulter deeds were never committed, than in the presence — yes, upon the very body of him who gave to man the brightest ray of light which has shone from that world, and who was himself the most perfect manifestation of all the attributes of the Deity which are the subjects of human knowledge. Nor is it true that religion will have its effect upon men in proportion to the clearness with which the future world is made known. If so, why should the simple teaching of the apostles, or the less simple, but effective preaching of Whitefield and Wesley, have so infinitely surpassed the minute revelations of Swedenborg? Nothing can so much demean the spiritual world, or so utterly destroy its influence over us, as the representations of Swedenborg. Some of his eulogists assert that he has spiritualized the material world; but, in our opinion, he has invested the spiritual world with the grossest materialism. The reality, the very definition of spiritual, implies something which is but partially comprehended by a finite being. The knowledge, as well as the experience of it, is held out to man as the reward of his faith, while in his probationary state it is beyond the highest effort of his faculties.

The effects of what we consider Swedenborg's erroneous principles upon this subject, are manifest throughout his whole system. He indeed makes much of faith; but the spirit engendered by his writings partakes much more of that vain longing, that pretended wisdom, the gnosis of the ancient philosophy which the apostle Paul so strikingly contrasts with faith. He has left nothing for the spirit to attain in all its future progress. The landmarks of its future habitation are known; the materials of its knowledge as it shall advance in its infinite duration are already spread before it; and therefore it must follow, as Swedenborg says that it does to some, that death will make no change in the matter of our consciousness, for we shall not know that our state has been changed. It is for each one to answer to himself, if such a doctrine will satisfy his desires; if its poor and meagre consolations are at all worthy, either of the hopes which Christianity inspires, or of the solemn consequences annexed to the probation of life. This fundamental error deprives his doctrines of all claims to peculiar spirituality. A knowledge of the spiritual world can come to us only when we enter upon it.

It may be asked in conclusion, if there is nothing in the writings of Swedenborg which entitles them to our respect? There certainly is much of true wisdom and of a religious spirit. Swedenborg says that man's true life consists in his love and wisdom. This is a worthy statement of a great principle, yet it is neither so beautiful nor so true as the Savior's precept, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God," &c.; for here wisdom is made the necessary consequence of love, one of those many acquisitions which man must make when he views himself as the subject of a moral government. There is no truth in the writings of Swedenborg which is not to be found in the New Testament. And this is the moral of our whole inquiry. Christians do not know their own religion. If they knew it, they would never attribute miraculous aid to any one of the numerous impostors or enthusiasts, which from time to time have rivalled the authority and honor of the Savior. The most notorious and successful leaders of religious sects, whether they have confessed it or not, whether they themselves have been aware of it or not, have been indebted for all that has given a real life to their systems, to the influence of one or more of the truths of Christianity. Some principle which had hitherto escaped observation has presented itself to their minds, and the joy of its possession, or the effect of its disclosure, has exalted them to the character of prophets. This is a lesson which has been taught us by many examples; and if we have taken a right view of our subject, Swedenborg offers us another. While we reject his puerile errors, we may be grateful to him for any light or any illustration which he has given to Christian truth. And we must learn to value and study more that volume of infinite truths, which, even when disjoined and individually enforced, have acquired for their interpreters the honor of prophets. It is because they have spoken in the name, and with some of the authority of Christ, that they have deceived many.

G. E. E.

---

## NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

*Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature.* Edited by GEORGE RIPLEY. Volumes I. and II. *Containing Philosophical Miscellanies from the French of Cousin, Jouffroy, and Benjamin Constant.* 12mo. Boston: Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1838.

— We are glad to learn that this series of translations from "Foreign Standard Literature," here in every respect so creditably begun, meets with encouragement to a degree beyond the expectations of its projectors. Had it been otherwise, we should have been disappointed and mortified; disappointed, because it would have been to reject and throw away the only good opportunity we are likely soon to have of general and familiar access to the best continental writers; and mortified, because it would imply that the reproach is not unfounded which represents us, notwithstanding our political separation, as being still in the higher matters of thought and taste but little better than a dependency on the mother country. Such dependence is less and less worthy of us, in proportion as our means and facilities of intellectual intercourse with other nations are multiplied, and in proportion as our peculiar circumstances, both natural and artificial, are giving to us a distinctive character as a people, and moulding our literature, so far as we really have any of our own, into a character as distinctive. Though we boast, with good reason, of our descent from England, and of a common property in her noble language, it is not to be denied that our national character has been diverging from hers ever since the first settlement of this country, under the operation of different social and political influences, until at length we cannot be said to have much more affinity to the English than to the French mind as it is. At any rate we have, or ought to have, a mind of our own, and avail ourselves of the literature not of one nation only, but of all nations, so far, and only so far, as it will help us to build up a literature for ourselves in harmony with our institutions, and suitable to our destiny. It is in this sense that we heartily respond to the sentiment so well expressed by Milton, and which Mr. Ripley has made the motto of his undertaking: "As wine and oil are imported to us from abroad, so must ripe understanding, and many civil virtues, be imported into our minds from foreign writings; we shall else miscarry still, and come short in the attempts of any great enterprise."

Our readers are familiar with the names of the three distinguished philosophers from whose works these miscellanies have been selected; and as their respective merits, and the nature and

value of their several contributions to the intellect of the age, have already been considered at much length in this journal, nothing on this subject is left for us to do but to refer to those articles.\* One thing, however, has struck us as particularly deserving of notice and commendation in a work like ours, we mean the decidedly religious tone and tendency of their speculations, respecting which Mr. Ripley expresses himself thus :

"I have already alluded to the religious character of the philosophy in question. I will add that it seems to me to contain more fully, than any other system which is likely to gain adherents in this country, the principles which lie at the foundation of an elevated and spiritual philosophy of religion. Its accordance with Christianity, in the view of its author, is probably too well known to the reader, for me to enlarge upon it in this place. It may be remarked, however, that it tends to justify no sectarian views of Christianity, whether manifested in the form of attachment to traditionary ideas, or of love to extravagant innovations ; but it serves to confirm those broad and indestructible elements of spiritual life, which in the estimation of all believers form the essence of Christianity, and the reception of which is deemed necessary to the salvation of the soul.

"It is with reference to another department of theology, that I have referred to the religious influence of the philosophy of Cousin. In the opinion of many individuals, — and I own myself to be one of the number, — the prevailing philosophical theories in this country are not completely adequate, to say the least, to the scientific grounding of a spiritual religion. The wedded union of philosophy and religion, so essential to the peace of the meditative mind, has not yet been consummated in the sanctuary of our holiest thoughts. This is the true cause of the ominous fact, that an open dread of philosophy and a secret doubt of religion are not unfrequent in the midst of us. This is the most candid, and probably the most just, explanation that can be given of the strange aversion to inquiry, the morbid sensitiveness to new manifestations of truth, which is sometimes exhibited by well-meaning and excellent individuals. If we felt the ground firm beneath us, we should not fear the consequences of the most searching scrutiny into the foundation on which we stand. There is a repose, a quietness, a cheerful trust, a blessed assurance in the mind which has passed from unreflecting dogmatism to enlightened faith, in the enjoyment of which it looks calmly on every free and earnest working of the intellect in pursuit of truth, — confident that truth is always consistent with itself, and that no genuine expression of the Deity or of the human soul can be set aside by any new discovery. But this state of mind can be produced only by establishing an unbroken harmony between feeling and speculation, between the spontaneous impulses of the heart and the profound results of reflection. I should be glad to believe that we have a philosophy among us which is capable of doing this. The experience of several years, with some opportunities for observation, has convinced

---

\* For a notice of Constant, see Volume xvii. p. 63 ; of Cousin, see Volume xxi. p. 33 ; and of Jouffroy, see Volume xxii. p. 196.

me, however, that this is not the case. There is an interruption in the continuity of our thought. We are believers in a spiritual religion; but we are not masters of a spiritual philosophy. There is little danger in this condition of things to those, with whom piety is such a strong natural sentiment, that no force can pluck it out of their hearts. They will never feel the burden of doubt, or need the aid of philosophy to explain the mysteries of their being. On those virgin souls no blight can fall; their robes are always white; and they will pass upward unstained by the breath of unbelief. But our world, in this country, at the present age, is not composed of such beautiful spirits as these.

There are few who have not been called to test the validity of their dearest convictions, either by the assaults of skepticism from without, or the course of their own reflections. It must be a mind of extraordinary construction which has not felt the need of comprehending its own instincts more clearly; of looking into the foundation of the primitive truths on which the well-being of man reposes; and of settling the lofty spiritual faith in which it has grown up on the firm ground of a broad and clear philosophy. A sense of this want is widely spread in almost every circle of society into which we enter. A deep conviction of the reality of spiritual truth, and, at the same time, a strong desire for a philosophical system which shall explain and legitimate it, are everywhere found among contemplative individuals. Too often, however, the clearness and strength of the former are impaired, by failing to meet with the latter. More than one young man has told me, in sadness of spirit, of the struggle which was going on in the very depths of his being, between reflection and faith, between the convictions to which he clung, and the theories by which they were sustained."—Vol. 1. pp. 36–39.

It is from the new Eclectic School, of which Cousin is the acknowledged head, that materialism and atheism in France, so far as they depend on philosophy, have received their death blow. Degerando, Maine de Biran, Cousin, and many other leading minds of that country were trained in infidelity, but have given or are now giving the maturity of their powers to the establishment and propagation of juster and more elevating views of the nature and destiny of man. It is a singular fact that Constant began his great work on Religion with the design, and in the expectation of being able, by an appeal to history, to resolve the religious sentiment in man into the product of a delusive superstition; but his own mind underwent a change as he proceeded which he alludes to as follows, in a letter to an intimate friend.

"I have continued to labor as well as I could in the midst of so many sad ideas. For the first time, I shall see, as I hope, in a few days my History of Religion completely brought into order. I have changed the whole plan of it, and rewritten more than three quarters of the chapters. This was necessary, to succeed in the order which I had in my mind and which I trust I have attained; it was necessary, moreover,

because, as you are aware, I am no longer that intrepid philosopher, who is certain that there is nothing after the present life, and so well satisfied with this world, as to rejoice that there is no other. My work is a singular proof of the remark of Bacon, that a little philosophy leads a man to atheism, but a great deal to religion. It is positively in the profound investigation of facts, in my researches in every quarter, and in struggling with the difficulties without number which they bring against incredulity, that I have found myself forced to return to religious ideas."—Vol. II. pp. 272, 273.

Jouffroy is the favorite pupil of Cousin, inclining however more to the Scotch and less to the German philosophy than his master. With his strong common sense, the moderation and sobriety of all his views, the singular clearness of his apprehensions and illustrations, and his extraordinary powers of cautious and exact analysis, he promises, in our judgment, to do more for the advancement of mental science than any other living author. We do not think that any of the selections here given from this writer do full justice to his merits; but his great work on Moral Philosophy is announced as part of the intended series, and with that we must be content, hoping that it will find an early insertion. In looking indeed at the variety and sterling worth of the treatises, histories, and works of art which are promised in this collection, it would seem that the taste and wants of every class of readers have been consulted, and we cannot doubt, therefore, but that scholars and men of intelligence throughout the land, without regard to religious or political distinctions, will be eager to welcome and encourage an enterprise which bids fair effectually to supply at last a deficiency long felt and deplored in the literature of this country.

"Among the writers from whom it is proposed to give translations, are Cousin, Jouffroy, Guizot, and Benjamin Constant, in French; and Herder, Schiller, Goethe, Wieland, Lessing, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, Richter, Novalis, Uhland, Körner, Hölty, Menzel, Neander, Schleiermacher, De Wette, Olshausen, Ammon, Hase, and Twisten, in German.

"The following works, which are either already in preparation, or whose translation is engaged, it is expected will compose a part of the series.

Select Minor Poems of Goethe and Schiller.

Menzel's History of German Literature.

Benjamin Constant on Religion.

Benjamin Constant's Roman Polytheism.

Cousin's Lectures on the History of Philosophy. First Volume.

De Wette's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.

Goethe's Correspondence with Schiller, Zelter, &c.

Life of Goethe, (in preparation for this Work, from original documents.)

Goethe's Conversations with Eckermann.

VOL. XXIV. — 3D S. VOL. VI. NO. II.

Lyric Poems from Körner, Novalis, Uhland, &c.  
 Jouffroy's Moral Philosophy.  
 Fichte's Destiny of Man; and Character of the True Scholar.  
 Life of Jean Paul Richter; with Selections from his Works.  
 Herder's Select Religious Writings.  
 Schelling on the Philosophy of Art; and Miscellanies.  
 Selections from Lessing.  
 De Wette's Theodore, or the Consecration of a Doubter.  
 Ammon's Progressive Development of Christianity.  
 Guizot's History of Civilization."

---

*An Elementary Treatise on Algebra: to which are added Experimental Equations and Logarithms.* By BENJAMIN PEIRCE, A. M., University Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy in Harvard University. 12mo. pp. 276. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1837. — We have had occasion to notice in former numbers of the Examiner the treatises of Professor Peirce on Mathematics and Natural Philosophy, and now we have been presented with a new Algebra from the same industrious hand. In all his books Mr. Peirce has shown his decided preference for the French Analysis; and although men of an earlier school, who have become wedded to a different method, express their dislike of the new instrument, we are glad to see the French mathematicians wrestling with the high parts of their science, and by their profound analysis exhausting the subject. Professor Peirce follows them with all his soul, and the great merit of his books consists in the introduction of their processes into elementary treatises. We can say nothing better for the book than that he prepared it, and that it fully sustains the reputation for science which he has already won. Those who are interested in the subject will find many new things in this treatise deserving their attention; particularly the polynomial theorem of Arbogast. We leave the book, trusting that those who are engaged in the study will buy it and read it.

---

1. *The Law of Honor. A Discourse occasioned by the recent Duel in Washington; delivered March 4, 1838, in the Chapel of Harvard University, and in the West Church, Boston.* By HENRY WARE, Jr., Professor in the University. Published by request. Cambridge: 1838. — 2. "Thou shalt not kill." *A Sermon preached in the Twelfth Congregational Church, Boston, Sunday, March 4, 1838, in consequence of the late Duel in Washington.* By SAMUEL BARRETT, Minister of that Church. Printed [not published] by request. 1838. — We presume that



several other discourses besides the above named have been printed, out of the many which were delivered on account of the late duel between two members of our national Congress; but we notice these only, because they were sent to us, and are on the table before us. We are glad that the sentiments of that portion of the community, we trust a large portion, which was outraged by the murderous meeting at Washington, have been not only expressed with eloquence, but put upon record. Posterity should know that such an event was not passed over in silence,—should know that an indignant appeal went up from many hearts and lips against the false and cruel principle which led to this duel, and which men of the world persist in calling honor. We hope that few more exhibitions of the nature and workings of this principle will be needed, before it is banished and silenced by common consent. When such a consummation is effected, true honor will rejoice, and put off her mourning. We acknowledge, however, that the parade which was made by our rulers and lawgivers at the interment of the fallen duellist, forbids our being sanguine in our anticipations. That all the great men in Washington, with the really honorable exception of the judges of the Supreme Court, should have turned out on that occasion, as if at the funeral of one who had fallen nobly in a noble station, was the most melancholy feature in the whole dark affair. We could have worn crape, if not *with* that train of mourners, at least *for* them.

---

*The Sacred Offering; a Poetical Gift.* Boston: Joseph Dowe. 12mo. pp. 216.—In a former number we noticed a previous volume of the *Sacred Offering*. The present volume consists of selections from the same source, the little books which have been issued under the same title by Mrs. Jevons, of Liverpool, the eldest daughter of Roscoe, by whom, and by other members of her family, the volumes were for the most part composed. The poems contained in this second American compilation are of a similar tone and character with those which met with so much favor in the first,—a pure and sweet tone, a holy character. Of their class, the two volumes form a better poetical collection than any which we know. From among their contents we copy almost at random the following lines.

“THE JOURNEY OF LIFE.

“Beneath the waning moon I walk at night,  
And muse on human life; for all around  
Are dim, uncertain forms that cheat the sight,  
And pitfalls lurk in shade along the ground,

And broken gleams of brightness, here and there  
Glance through, and leave unwarmed the death-like air.

"The trampled earth returns a sound of fear —  
A hollow sound, as if I walked on tombs;  
And lights that tell of cheerful homes, appear  
Far off, and die, like hope, amid the glooms.  
A mournful wind across the landscape flies,  
And the wide atmosphere is full of sighs.

"And I, with faltering footsteps, journey on,  
Watching the stars that roll the hours away,  
Till the faint ray that guides me now is gone,  
And, like another life, the glorious day  
Shall open o'er me from the empyreal height,  
With certainty, and joy, and boundless light."

---

Copies of the following works have lately been received from England, and may be had at the bookstore of James Munroe & Co.

*A Legend of the Puritans; or the Influence of Poetry and Religion on the Female Character: with other Poems.* By SUSAN FISHER. London: 1837. 12mo. pp. 92.

*Four Lectures on the Evidences and Doctrines of the Christian Religion.* By THOMAS WOOD, Minister of Stamford Street Chapel. London: 1836. 8vo. pp. 77.

*One God the Father; or the Unitarian Doctrine briefly stated.* By T. F. BARHAM, M. B. &c. Third Edition enlarged. London: 1835. 12mo. pp. 120.

*A History of the Presbyterian and General Baptist Churches in the West of England; with Memoirs of some of their Pastors.* By JEROM MURCH, Minister of Trim Street Chapel, Bath. London: 1835. 8vo. pp. 579.

---

THE  
CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

N<sup>o</sup>. LXXXVII.

THIRD SERIES — N<sup>o</sup>. XVIII.

---

JULY, 1838.

---

ART. I. — *The Limitations of Human Responsibility.* By  
FRANCIS WAYLAND. Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lin-  
coln. 1838. 12mo. pp. 188.

THIS little work has already excited much attention. We hope that it is destined to excite still more. We are anxious to do our part to make such a book more widely known. It is written in a remarkably calm and natural tone, and is particularly seasonable, at this period not only of mental excitement, but excess. Its topics are various; but they all have direct bearings upon the great object of the writer, which is to ascertain and settle "the limitations of human responsibility." In the introductory section, he unfolds "the nature of the subject," and in the two sections which follow, he states and illustrates "some of the principles by which we may decide whether we are, or are not, responsible for a particular result." These principles have, and were intended to have, an obvious application to the existing state of things in the community; and to many of the notions which are popularly urged upon the subject of moral responsibility.

"Almost every attempt," says Dr. Wayland, "made for the purpose of binding men together in masses, and thus of subjecting them to the dominion of leaders, is made under the solemn sanctions of moral obligation. Men plead the authority of God whilst they violate law, and whilst they sustain law against this very violation; whilst they infringe the rights of their neighbor,

and whilst they defend the rights of their neighbor against infringement; whilst the individual takes the power of society into his own hands, and whilst society punishes him for the transgression. It seems to be frequently taken for granted, that all duties belong to all men; that matters of right recognise no distinction either of age, or sex, of civil office, or ecclesiastical function; that all men, and all women, and all children, are equally responsible for all possible things; that there is no peculiar and special duty assigned to a magistrate or legislator, a people, or a clergyman; but that every man, woman, and child, is responsible for the discharge of every possible duty, and that every human being may urge this responsibility upon every other human being, under penalty of the infinite displeasure of the eternal God." — pp. 10, 11.

Now, on the contrary, the author holds, and we believe justly, that individual responsibility is subject to numerous restrictions; and that these of necessity result from our relations to God. Hence, generally,

"Our responsibility to the Creator is a responsibility to obey his commands, to do the very thing that he has told us, and to do nothing either more, or less, or different from, what he has told us. To assume any other principle would be to usurp the prerogative of the Creator, and to assume that instead of being subjects, we were ourselves the governors of his universe." — p. 17.

But "so far as our relations to God are *essentially* concerned, his commands have respect simply to *temper of mind*." While in this view "the command of God is unlimited and unrestricted," yet

"When we come to decide upon any particular action, which that temper of mind involves, and which, under ordinary circumstances, is its appropriate fruit, the circumstances under which the Providence of God has placed the individual actor, are as much to be taken into consideration as the original command itself. The circumstances under which we are placed, the relation which we sustain, the other obligations by which we are bound, were all ordained by God just as much as the general injunction. They form the language in which he, in this particular instance, reveals to us his will. And the command, uttered in this manner, is as much to be heeded, and we are as much responsible to hear and to obey it, as we are to hear and to obey the other. It is only by the clear consideration of both

of these that we can learn what God requires of each one of us, that is, what that is for which we are individually responsible. And, if it be so, it is evident that we have no right to plead the authority of God for our actions, nor urge particular actions upon others, on his authority, until we have shewn, not only that the *general* temper of mind is required of us, but that there is no other manifestation of the will of God, limiting and restraining this particular manner of putting this temper into action."—pp. 20, 21.

Under the head of "Limitation to our Responsibility" arising from want of "physical power" to perform a prescribed duty, Dr. Wayland is led to remark somewhat upon the nature of human power. This he conceives to consist chiefly in "the ability to use certain means;" and although, when faithfully used, those means may be followed commonly by a given result, yet, in many cases, "the result is to us contingent." Hence "man is, in general, responsible not for the *result*, but for the use of those means which are the best known antecedents of that result." The following quotation is worthy the notice of the religious community.

"If I mistake not, there has sometimes arisen theological error, from a mistake on this point. Men seem to have supposed that they were responsible for men's *conversion*, and not for *employing those means* which God has appointed for their conversion. Hence, supposing that they would be held guilty *if men were not converted*, they have considered themselves at liberty to use any means which seemed to them most likely to produce the result; and to enjoin, as general and as obligatory upon *all*, means which they supposed to have been beneficial in *particular instances*. Hence has arisen the strife in the church at various times, respecting new measures and old measures. And these measures have too often been attacked or defended on the ground that they were or were not *appropriate*, or that they have or have not been attended by *success*. Now it seems to me that on neither of these grounds can any course of measures be properly either attacked or defended. If we are not responsible for the *conversion* of men, but only for the *employment* of those *means for converting them* which God has appointed, the simple question for us to decide is, what are the *means* which he has appointed? It may be safely taken for granted that the truths which he has put into our hands, and the motives which he has directed us to employ, are the truths and the motives which in their nature are best adapted to accom-

plish his purposes. At any rate, it would require no greater attainment in humility than falls to the lot of ordinary men, to teach us, that whether any better did or did not exist, it is at least doubtful, since God has not revealed them, whether we should be likely to discover them." — pp. 25, 26.

In section 4, "Persecution on Account of Religious Opinions" is considered at length. The whole section is pervaded by an air and tone of liberality, well worthy of one who holds so distinguished a position in the literary and Christian world. After glancing at several forms in which the persecuting spirit has in various ages displayed itself, and tracing them all to that fatal mistake as to the limits of human responsibility, which makes men feel that they are responsible for the correctness of the religious belief of others, he alludes to the animosities subsisting "between the various sects of professing Christians," as springing from the same source.

"The principle," he says, "is in both cases the same. If I have a right to interfere with the happiness of my fellow men, on account of difference in religious opinions in one way, I have the same right to interfere in another way. If I have *no right at all*, then, interference with his happiness, for this cause, *in any way*, is a crime.

"Suppose my Christian brother to be in error. Suppose that he also propagates error. For this, he is accountable to God and not to me. I have a right to endeavor to convince him, if he be willing to hear me; and he enjoys the correspondent right. When this is done, my responsibility ceases, and here, our whole relation, *so far as this matter is concerned*, terminates. He has the same *right* to propagate his *error*, that I have to propagate my *truth*. The only weapons, which I am authorized to use, are considerations addressed to his understanding and conscience. To use any other is persecution. A frank and manly attachment to our opinions, combined with a willingness to look upon our own sentiments and those of others, in the light of reason, is, everywhere, honorable. But to rely upon anything else for the propagation of our sentiments, betrays either a consciousness of the weakness of our cause, or else a selfish disposition to invade the rights of our neighbor.

"Let us bear in mind the principle which I have endeavored to illustrate, and see whether it will not tend greatly to allay these unchristian animosities. If I have no right to contend with erroneous religious opinion, except by an appeal to the reason and conscience of men; if, having done this in fairness and in

love, all my responsibility for the progress of that error ceases, then, surely, every other mode of effort to oppose it must be persecution. It is giving pain for the cause of religious opinions, when I have no right to give pain. If this be so, while it is allowable, nay, while it may be commendable, to support what we believe, by as strong *arguments* as we please, it is wrong to say or do anything which would give the least unnecessary pain to the feelings of an opponent. It is equally wrong to misstate the opinions of another, or to draw inferences from his opinions which he has not drawn, for the sake of fixing upon him the odium of the public. What excuse can be framed for him, who, not satisfied with establishing what he believes to be right, shall strive to bind together the sect to which he belongs, by cherishing jealousy against other Christian sects, and teaching his own adherents to believe that every other sect in Christendom is leagued together for their destruction. All these petty modes of guerilla warfare are, as it seems to me, vastly contemptible. — pp. 60, 61.

The "Propagation of Truth" forms the topic of the 5th section, which is full of wise and timely suggestions, deserving the sober consideration of multitudes of officious however well-disposed persons, who, in their zeal to be reformers, seem determined at all events to press their peculiar views upon the various subjects which are agitating society, upon all within their reach, whether they wish it or not. The *will* of God, and the *commands* of God, as they profess to understand both, are urged with all the confidence of men to whom these had been specially revealed, in order to impress more deeply the public mind, and thus accomplish their ends. But, as Dr. Wayland well says,

"I have no right, for the sake of carrying a measure, or stirring up an excitement, or swaying the popular opinion, to urge, as a matter of universal obligation, what God has left as a matter to be decided by every man's conscience; to make that out a crime, in *every instance*, which God has made a crime only under *special circumstances*; or to urge as a duty by *command*, what can only be made out to be a duty *by inference*."

\* \* \* \* \*

"This inference may bind my conscience, but it can, as my inference, bind the conscience of no one else. Every one must in such a case be left to his own judgment; and I have no right to accuse another of disobedience to God, unless he admit that he is for himself convinced of the duty, and then disobey it.

Thus, God has commanded all men to repent. This is an universal duty, and I may urge it upon all men. God commands all men to use the things of this world as not abusing them. This I may also urge on the same authority. I infer that a particular kind of meat or drink is forbidden. Then this inference will bind me, but I have no right to demand that the conscience of my neighbor be bound *by my inference*. Mahomet forbade wine, under all circumstances. A Mahomedan may therefore in the same manner forbid it, on the authority of *his* master. A disciple of Christ cannot so forbid it, on the authority of *his* master, unless he can show that Christ himself or his apostles thus forbade it. If he infer, from some other precept, that it is to be abstained from, then the moral obligation is contingent, or accidental; that is, it binds, in those cases, where the use of wine would conflict with obedience to that precept, and it binds in no other; and of such case, every individual is to be the judge for himself.

"It may be said that we cannot carry forward the temperance reformation if we adopt this principle. To this I have very little to reply. If we cannot carry forward the temperance, or any other reformation, without making God say what he has not said, and assuming a different moral standard from that which he has established, I think the cause must, at the outset, be desperate."—pp. 81–83.

And yet again;

"It is a fact, that a drunkard comes to poverty and contempt; but this is no reason why we should take it *upon ourselves* to render him poor and contemptible. He who is engaged in any immoral traffic will, in a healthy state of the community, lose the estimation in which he would otherwise be held by his fellow citizens. We may do all in our power to elevate the purity of the public morals; but we have no right, by our direct act, to destroy the estimation in which this or any other man is held. We may tell a man that such consequences will follow, and thus urge him to act virtuously; but we have no right to bring in our own efforts in aid of the authority of God, and tell the man, that, if he do not obey God, we will ruin his reputation."—p. 89.

In section 6, the author passes to the subject of "Voluntary Associations;" but our remarks upon this we reserve for the close of this article.

The next topic is "Ecclesiastical Associations." And here, as the lovers of true religious liberty and a generous catholicism,



we are glad to observe the truly liberal spirit which pervades the section. It is a spirit which we had a right indeed to expect, in an inhabitant of "the land of Roger Williams." Our pages have so often been employed in the advocacy of the principles which Dr. Wayland maintains upon this subject, that none of our readers will wonder at our commendation. We confess ourselves not a little pleased at his avowal of principles, which not many years ago were held to be very bold even in our own denomination. So far as church government is concerned, he declares himself in a note, not only a Baptist, but "an Independent." He sets forth the doctrine of "Independency" in the organization of churches in its utmost extent. This is not, however, the thing to which we particularly allude; but his views upon the nature of a Christian church, the qualifications for church membership, and the rights and powers of churches. He considers that a church of Christ, is "manifestly, a voluntary association;" but

"Though each man enters it voluntarily, and all are under law, yet they have no right whatever to make laws for themselves; they must both form and govern the association, by the laws which *Christ has made for them.*"

\* \* \* \* \*

"Hence, no church has any right to make anything a qualification for membership which Christ has not made such, or to demand of a candidate any promise which Christ has not demanded. It is in vain to say that, in this manner, we may greatly facilitate various important and useful designs. This may or may not be. I shall neither admit nor deny it, for it has nothing to do with the question. The question is simply this: Has Christ himself made *this* a qualification for membership? If he have not, we have no right to make it. It is *Christ's* church, and not *ours*. We have no more *right* to assume his power for a good purpose than for a bad one."—pp. 123, 125.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Nor is this all. If we surrender the doctrine that Christ is the *sole* legislator for every individual of his church, and allow that the church may itself make laws binding on the conscience of the individual, what is the result? We become Catholics at once. This is the very essence of the Romish error. That corrupt church assumes that it has the power and the right to bind the conscience in all matters both of faith and of practice; and, upon this assumption, all the superstructure of her hideous

superstition has been reared. But the principle is the same in both cases. If my conscience is to be bound by my fellow men, it matters not whether these men be a conclave of bishops and cardinals, or whether they be my brethren whom I meet every day, and with whom I sit down around the same communion table. My brethren will, I doubt not, use this usurped authority more mildly; but this alters not the fact, that the authority is usurped, nor does it offer any guarantee that it may not, in the end, become as oppressive as the other."— pp. 129, 130.

All this, we of course esteem very good Protestantism, and very sound truth. It strikes at the root of all intolerance and spiritual pride; and amid "the division of the church into different sects," itself, as Dr. Wayland well remarks, "the natural and healthy result of that freedom of opinion, which springs from Protestantism," provides for the most extensive culture and growth of that charity, which St. Paul styles "the end of the commandment."

The 8th section, treats briefly of "Official Responsibility." We have not space for remarks or extracts. There are points in it, as in every part of the book, which have been already we observe, largely controverted; but on the whole, we believe the principles sound. The discussion closes with a consideration of "the Slavery Question," so far only, however, and this we think in justice to the author should be kept distinctly in mind, as "to inquire what are the limits, within which our efforts, for the accomplishment of this purpose, are to be restricted." We repeat that this should be kept distinctly in mind; because we have heard the article unsparingly condemned, as though the author were a decided pro-slavery man; when in his admirable section on "Violation of Personal Liberty" in his "Elements of Moral Science" he has shown himself to be anything else.

There is another point which should be kept distinctly in mind. In his consideration of our duty "as *citizens* of the United States," and his remarks upon "the power conferred upon us by the Constitution," he is speaking of course of that Constitution *as it is*. Whether it can, or ought to be amended in regard to this subject, and if the latter to what extent, formed no part of his plan to consider. He is obviously looking at the question, just as it presents itself in the existing state of things, and with the limits which the existing state of things set to our efforts: although we are free to say, that, as we understand his

reasoning, any proposition for such an amendment must in equity and justice come, if it come at all, from the slave-holding States. We do not believe, as we have heard suggested, that he *overlooked* this point.

From the point of view, then, which he has chosen, he proceeds to look at our duty on this subject, first "as *citizens* of the United States;" secondly, "as *human beings*, under law to God." He argues that, under the existing Constitution of the United States, each State is, in regard to the powers "reserved" by the tenth amendment, entirely independent of all the others; that as citizens, therefore, we have no power, and no responsibility touching the slavery of the South, this being among the matters "reserved"; that by that Constitution we are virtually pledged, as *citizens* of the United States, to *let it alone*; and not only the *letter* but the *spirit* of the *compact* binds us, so that we have no right "to do anything for the purpose of changing the relation of master and slave, except with the consent of the master."

He then proceeds to the question of abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia: and while he grants that Congress has all powers necessary to that work, and that no legal obstacle is in the way of putting those powers into exercise; yet, in so far as the object of seeking such abolition is not "ultimate within itself," but to create "such a state of things in the slave-holding States" as will oblige *them*, "whether they approve of it or not, to abolish slavery," he holds that the spirit of the constitutional compact forbids the exercise of those powers. He draws a like conclusion from what he supposes to have been the intention of the parties to the act of cession. The District was ceded indeed unconditionally, as regards the *letter* of the act; but justice and honor forbid one party to use, even for a good purpose, a power which it has obtained by the *letter*, but which clearly the other party never intended to convey. He thinks "whenever the District would have become free, if it had remained part of the States, by which it was originally ceded, then it will be not only the right, but the duty of Congress to abolish slavery." We would that the stirring and eloquent appeal which he makes to the South, to take the lead in this work of ridding the land of "a national disgrace," "to make this offering on the altar of frank, generous, fraternal patriotism," might reach the eye and the heart of every slave-holder in the Union.

In concluding this part of the argument Dr. Wayland contends, that the annexation of Texas should be decided on "general principles of statesmanship," and not either by the slaveholding or the free States by any reference to the system of slavery:—and he thinks that upon such "general principles" the question must be settled in the negative.

While we have no doubt upon the point, that all sound interpretation of the powers of Congress, and the Constitution itself, forbids such annexation, we are free to confess that the danger of extending and perpetuating slavery is to us, and ever will be, a cogent reason for opposing it. We do not believe that, in the admission of new states into this Union, it is no part of our duty to look at the existing character of their internal institutions, especially at one so glaringly offensive as this to the adopted, chosen policy, the political and moral creed, of the free States. Nor even, as regards the District of Columbia, are we quite sure that the principle which binds us, in construing the Constitution of the United States, not only sacredly to respect the "reserved" powers of each member of the Union, but the *spirit*, as well as *letter*, of the reservation, obliges us in construing the act of cession, made unconditionally, unrestrictedly, to maintain the domestic institutions of that District, just at the point at which from time to time the States which ceded it keep theirs. We would have it, we would keep it, if possible, the purest spot in the land. When it became the property of the United States, of the whole country, we cannot deem it either right or just, that the moral sentiment of the majority of the Union should be longer outraged by the presence of slavery there. And whenever that moral sentiment demands it, it must be left to the States, who ceded the District, to guard in all constitutional ways their peculiar institutions against the influence of an act, which, at the very moment of cession, their own observation of the irresistible tendencies of the whole moral feeling of the civilized Christian world might have enabled them to foresee, must sooner or later be done. We agree with Dr. Wayland, "that the subject of slavery has been discussed at the North, in a manner decidedly at variance with Constitutional liberty of speech and of the press. On the other hand, at the South it has been held, that the discussion of this subject, in all *manners*, and in any *spirit*, was to be *forbidden*. The right of petition has been abused; topics have been introduced into petitions which have no constitutional right to be

introduced, and petitions have been multiplied for the sake of effect, in such numbers as to threaten to exclude every other subject of discussion. On the other hand, this has been met by measures, which seem at variance with the very existence of the right of petition." The mere multiplication of petitions, however, in any case where the right of petition itself is clear, even though for the time they should exclude every other subject, would not, we think, warrant *their* exclusion. It might happen, that, in a most undoubted and crying case of wrong, a corrupt legislature could in no other way be moved to its duty.

Under the second head of discussion, viz. our duty in regard to slavery arising from our relations as men, Dr. Wayland thinks that "we are in this case under the common obligation to make known to our fellow men that truth, which we believe to be conducive to their happiness, and to the happiness of men in general." And he adds: "we are bound, then, I apprehend, in all our efforts on this subject, most scrupulously to avoid all measures, which could justly be construed into an attempt to infringe the right of the South. We have a right to attempt to change Southern opinions on this question, and to show the master, by argument, that it is for his interest, and that it is his duty, to liberate his slave. But we have no right to take any measures, of which the natural tendency is to excite the slaves to insubordination and civil war. We have a right to change the purpose of the master by *argument*, but we have no right either to oblige him by our own *physical* force to change it, or to excite another person thus to oblige him. I here only speak of the question of *right* to do the act, and not at all of the *practical result* of the act. It is my firm belief, that a general insurrection at the South would end in the almost entire annihilation of the colored population."

He is then led to speak of "the utility of a system of societies, affiliated, not for the sake of circulating truth at the South, but for the sake of exciting and agitating the people at the North." Their "utility" he cannot "perceive." And looking at the results thus far, we are quite prepared to think with him in the main. Some good they have done by this "agitation" at the North; leading the present generation to a closer view, and quickening it to a greater dread and more determined aversion to this gross wrong to humanity; and so far arraying the moral sentiment of this portion of the land more conspicuously against it. But we cannot doubt, that they "have em-

bittered the feelings of the South. They have, for the present, at least, rendered any open and calm discussion of this subject in the slave-holding States utterly impossible. They have rivetted indefinitely the bonds of the slave, in those very States in which they were, a few years since, falling off; and, everywhere throughout the South, they have rendered the servitude of the enslaved vastly more rigorous than it ever was before."

We do not think that Dr. Wayland has overstated these results. They alone are sufficient to deter us from uniting with such associations. We think with him, that "their efforts must be unwisely directed, or else they would have led to a more salutary result." We believe *the cause of emancipation* is destined, for it is too holy and just a cause to fail, is destined ultimately and gloriously to triumph. We believe that these associations have been gaining in popularity and importance. We believe, imperfect a means as we certainly deem them, that they will accomplish for the end a certain amount of success. We believe that they hold in their ranks many most estimable men, men actuated by the noblest and purest principle, and whose hearts, with none the less firmness and courage, are filled also with the gentle spirit of Christ. But we have seen too much of the difficulties, perhaps unavoidable difficulties, in their management, their decided tendencies to excess and extravagance in language and measures, the wide field they throw open to intemperate zeal, a spirit of fierce denunciation, and the action of coarse and violent minds, for all which things we have neither fancy nor relish.

Let it not be thought by any, that we are indifferent to the momentous subject to which these associations are devoted. We share with all the friends of freedom a deep sympathy for the oppressed, wherever they are. We well know that the cry for liberty falls like the voice of thunder upon the American ear! No cry appeals with such power to the sympathies of the millions who walk this land. Those sympathies followed Napoleon with enthusiasm from battle-field to battle-field, amid all the horrors of carnage and war, because they hoped in him, and long trusted in him, as the instrument for breaking the bondage of Europe, and enfranchising the old world. The same sympathies have hovered over unhappy Spain, over unfortunate Poland, over the Isles of Greece, over our sister republics of the southern continent. To seem deaf to that cry, whencesoever it comes, we are well aware, appears at first

sight to all like recreancy to the first principles of our own Revolution, and the obvious spirit of our institutions. It is now raised in behalf of the poor slave; and some of us seem to our anti-slavery brethren to turn away from it, simply because we differ from them as to the true mode of relief, and do not in all things take ground with them. We protest against all such judgment. It is neither fair nor authorized. Strong as are our New-England feelings upon the general subject, and we yield to none either for their strength or their sincerity, there are yet reasons existing in the minds of many of us, which are in our judgment sufficient to hold us back; nay, which make us think those brethren wrong and unwise in their measures. We cannot, therefore, go with them. We distrust the alleged right; we distrust the alleged duty; we distrust even more the spirit.

Having thus called attention to the leading topics of this little work, we purpose, as we before said, to occupy the remainder of this article with some remarks applicable to various associations of the day, called forth by the Sixth Section upon "Voluntary Associations." Now, though it may well be questioned whether some of the author's statements be not rather too broad, — as for example when he says, that "as means for the propagation of truth," he does "not perceive that they profess *any* special advantages," — the section is one of great interest. It very clearly unfolds some of the true principles which should govern us in forming, joining, and conducting such associations; and many of the evils and disadvantages which distinguish and attend them. At a period when such high claims are set forth in their behalf, when for every object they are so immensely multiplied, we are particularly glad to welcome a temperate discussion of the topic. We shall offer our readers no further quotations from the work before us; but we desire to express some of our own thoughts upon the tendency of these associations to destroy the exercise of that individual, independent power of thought, which is one of the noblest prerogatives of man. The developments of the last few years have made some of the opinions, advanced some time since in the pages of this Journal upon this subject, seem almost like prophecy fulfilled.

The tendency among men at the present day to act in masses upon almost every subject, and the wonderful extent to which the principle and power of associated effort has been carried into effect and illustrated, is a topic of common remark.

But at the same time that every great and good object, to say nothing of those of a contrary character, is thus attempted to be compassed by the union and organization of numbers, how liable have individuals been, through the influence direct or indirect of these associations, to forget the duty of thinking and acting for themselves; and to permit themselves to be hurried on to extreme and doubtful measures, against their own sober and better judgment. We are far from denying, or shutting our eyes to the amount of good, which has been effected by various associations for various high and worthy objects. But we have not encouraged, or partaken in the doings of any, without having had frequently and painfully forced upon us the dangers to individual freedom and independence of thought and mind. Lauded and popular as they have been, and are, they are nevertheless, like all other human institutions and instruments, necessarily imperfect. And now that they are so numerous and powerful, it may be especially well to pause and reflect anew upon their possible influences and effects upon some of the noblest elements of human character.

Let us, however, say at the outset, that there is a marked distinction to be made between associations for mutual improvement in general or specific knowledge; for the advancement of science in any of its departments; for the cultivation and encouragement of the arts; for the carrying forward a particular undertaking, whether of a literary, scientific, or charitable character, which of necessity involve a large outlay of ingenuity, money, time, and labor; and those, which, while they point ultimately perhaps to some specific action, do at first seek to operate chiefly by oral discussion, and through the instrumentality of the press upon public opinion, in regard generally to some great moral questions, or subjects involving weighty moral considerations; questions and subjects, about which especially each mind should think and judge for itself; upon which each man should act for himself; and which there is a manifest absurdity, and a direct or virtual wrong, in attempting to decide by vote, by majorities however large. In associations for the former objects, we scarce know any dangers to be apprehended, but recognise almost unmingled good as the result. While in the latter, there are many dangers to which it is high time that all had begun to look. Men of remarkably ardent or passionate temperament may not see them, or may not acknowledge them; but those of a calmer and soberer mould will.



And while we thank Dr. Wayland for what he has done in the Sixth Section of the work before us, we wish to look a little more closely at some of those dangers ourselves.

That we may not be charged with vagueness, or be misunderstood, we wish to add, that we refer to all such associations of the day as have for their object the promotion of temperance, the abolition of slavery, or any of the various departments of moral reform. We must necessarily be brief, but we mean to be plain.

The first danger to which we advert, connected with such associations, is their tendency to excess. They have each some specific object in view; and they all start with the very inoffensive and amiable profession of intending to compass it by moral means. Now, what, we ask, are these moral means? Argument and persuasion, will be the ready reply. At first they may be; but ere long, as numbers are drawn in, and influence, that is, power, is gained, these must be followed up by more direct, and, as it is termed, efficient action. Then, tests, and pledges, and a system of espionage more and more strict, by which to secure the fidelity of those who take them, are instituted: till by and by, and in general quite early, a jealous eye is turned on all who are deemed lukewarm and indifferent, and especially all who decline coming into the association, or into all the measures which it proposes. Finally, open and public denunciation and threatenings of whole classes of men, with other coercive measures, are resorted to; having the avowed or obvious design of driving and compelling them into conformity with the principles which are advocated, by turning upon them, as far as possible, the current of public censure. In the progress of all this the coarsest minds have usually the largest share; and in the heat and excitement of debate, language is heard, and passions excited and manifested, which shock not only the gentlest, but often the noblest and most generous feelings of our nature.

No man, who has had much to do with, or much opportunity to observe the proceedings of such associations, can reasonably doubt the existence of this danger to which we refer. The danger, however, does not apply merely to the association, as such, but to the individuals who compose it. It is an injury to any man's moral sense, thus to be tempted or hurried into excess. It blunts that nice sensibility to wrong, which can never be too keen. It leads him to abuse for the particular end, on

some one occasion, an instrument good to a certain degree in itself; and thus prepares him for a repetition the more readily of a like abuse, for some other end, on some other occasion.

But, in the next place, the very efforts of these associations, to mould and carry with them public opinion, of themselves involve great danger. What is public opinion? It is, without doubt, the general, the prevailing, not the universal sentiment; the opinion of a major part, not of the whole of the community. Now, supposing public opinion to be clearly wrong on some particular subject; these associated efforts to set it right may drive it almost to frenzy, by their tendency to excess; and then the minority, who may all the while assent to the principle, and dissent only from the measures, may be exposed to as ruthless and reckless a tyranny as the world has known. Such indeed may public opinion become. Such indeed was it, when Jesus Christ stood before Pilate; and it hurried his judge into condemnation of a confessedly innocent prisoner. It is idle to pretend, that the majority is necessarily and always right. It may be best, it is best, that, in matters of government or order, the majority should decide; but in matters of moral judgment, or moral duty, nothing is more preposterous. The very fact, that any question of moral duty is put to vote, and decided by votes, involves an absurdity or an impossibility. Is it not absurd, — is it not impossible, that a majority, so large even that I am alone in the minority, should bind my conscience, control my sense of right, regulate my modes of thought and judgment? Better, infinitely better, by reason of my accountability to God, to be single and alone in adherence to an honest sense of right, than be swerved for one instant on any subject therefrom, by any array of numbers! Yet, how many are there, who cannot resist the contagion of example in such cases; who watch the setting of the popular current, and float with it; who yield, passively yield, to the opinions of the majority around them. We have no fears for the strong-minded, the high-minded, the reflecting; though even they may be made sometimes to waver. Generally, they will stand aside, and pause. But how many such are there, in any, even a numerous, assembly? How many, on the contrary, who have no mind of their own; who are awed by opposing numbers; who keep back or conceal their real opinions, in presence of a superior host; who being timid, or time-serving, or ambitious, will hazard no thoughts of their own, which they fear will be overruled; or

who, however dissatisfied with what has been done, or is proposed to be done, will not have the courage or the principle to avow it!

What has been already said, reveals another danger; that these associations have a strong tendency to destroy or diminish the legitimate influence of the individual, in cases where he may honestly differ from the majority of those engaged. And just in proportion to the exciting character of the object proposed, and the incidents connected with it, is the degree of danger to be apprehended. There will always be, in all such associations, some men of more ardent or ambitious minds than others, who will aspire to be leaders. The object for which they have united becomes a hobby; enlists the strongest feelings; by being dwelt upon continually, assumes a factitious importance, and in some cases even a paramount importance over all things else. Strong appeals to the passions, rather than the calmer judgment and reason, follow; and but little observation is required to show that in all popular assemblies such appeals, for immediate effect at least, are the most powerful, and may entirely drown or neutralize the soberer views which the more considerate and judicious may present. The latter, indeed, overborne by the sweeping torrent of passion or fanaticism, are either awed into silence, or compelled to withdraw themselves by their honest convictions of duty.

But the evil is not confined to those who compose the particular association. For that undertakes first or last to pass judgment upon, or to visit with its own censures, or to direct those of the community against individuals, professions, or other entire classes of men, who stand aloof from its doings, or honestly dissent from its doctrines or measures;—or, to teach and prescribe to them their duty, touching the particular subjects about which itself is engaged. And there will always be found in every class, in every profession, some, who from constitutional timidity, or a want of true personal self-respect or independence of character, will be alarmed into compliance. Instead of claiming, as in the particular case perhaps they might well claim, to be responsible not to that, but to a far higher tribunal,—instead of thinking and acting for themselves according to their own sober sense of duty, they may be induced, by outward influence thus brought to bear upon them, to do just what an irresponsible, self-constituted, unauthorized association presumes to dictate or direct.

Of all forms of usurpation we know none more deserving of prompt resistance and rebuke, especially in a country like ours. In such a country, where so long as even the semblance of free institutions exists, no visible power of the government even can safely venture to control individual opinion by any overt action; these associated bodies of private men and women, by assuming to themselves the right to instruct those, who, with no connexion with, nor accountableness to them, please to withhold themselves from any coöperation in their various measures, and moreover on that account to direct against them the full force of public odium, are, we must think, guilty of most flagrant, high-handed, arbitrary usurpation.\* No conduct would be more despicable, none more unworthy, none more seriously to be deprecated for the sake of truth, consistency, order, religion, than a passive acquiescence in, and subserviency to, such preposterous claims.

We have seen these things with extreme pain. We have dreaded their effects. Especially have we felt, as it was natural we should feel, anxious for their effects upon the clergy. Of all men we would have them to think for themselves on all subjects which may address their minds; to have opinions of their own; to hold them, and to maintain them, with whatever ability God may have bestowed, and with all the discretion and true Christian spirit which in their frailty they can command; but in all cases, and on all occasions, without fear, without favor, without affection, with no hope of human reward. The last thing to which they should ever consent, is, to be dictated to as to what doctrines they shall preach or refrain from preaching; what particular cause of moral reform they shall advocate or oppose; or what particular course of ministerial duty they shall pursue or avoid, by any; least of all by any association foreign to the corporate religious body which has elected them to their high and responsible office. No qualities are

---

\* For examples of the abuse complained of, the resolutions of some of the Temperance and Anti-Slavery Societies, within a year or two, may be consulted. One at hand is the following, actually adopted by one of the latter in a neighboring city, viz: "Resolved, That it is the sense of this Society, that any bishop, minister, priest, rector, or deacon, who neglects his duty in declaring from the pulpit the whole truth, and especially that which condemns the slave-holder, is recreant to the high responsibilities that he has assumed, and deserves the most solemn admonition and righteous rebuke from all friends to true religion."

more honorable in the minister of Christ, none should he pray God more devoutly to help him to maintain, than a perfectly free, untrammelled spirit, entire independence of thought and inquiry. To the particular church and society with which he happens to be immediately connected, he is in some sense responsible as to these matters; thus far at least, that when *they* shall come to think that he has in any way failed in his duty to *them*, that connexion shall cease. But not, surely, to any other body on earth, whether largely or the contrary composed in part of his own parishioners, and in part to a greater or less degree of others; of some, perhaps, who would hesitate to avow themselves Christians even in belief, in any form.

Let the clergy, then, in the fear of God, pursue the great ends of the ministry which is laid upon them, with single-heartedness, with a free spirit, with independence of thought, with a sincere devotion to the truth, with no awe of numbers or majorities on any question, where their own sober convictions of duty go not with them. Let the people cherish a like spirit for themselves; test all questions submitted to their judgment by a sole regard to the truth; whatever God commands, that let them obey to the veriest strictness of the letter, at every hazard; but in all matters of mere human judgment, opinion, or wisdom, let them be specially careful not to trench a hair's breadth on the rights of their brethren, be their calling or condition in life what it may. We would not, if we could, induce one of our readers against his own deliberate sense of duty, to withdraw or withhold himself from any association which exists, having for its object any great moral reform either for individuals or communities. But we would conjure all to be prudent and sober in all things; considerate of the inalienable, God-given rights of others; cautious lest they transcend in the least tittle the power which of right belongs to all as members of society; scrupulous against countenancing attempts to array the tyranny of public opinion, or to direct public odium against those who will not come into their measures, either by exaggerated conceptions or representations of the evil against which they contend, or the authority vested in themselves to originate means for its extirpation, or, by inflaming the passions of others, or unduly enlisting their own. We solemnly believe that the moment has arrived, — there are too many signs of it to admit of mistake, — when in the universal rush of men into masses for the purpose of accomplishing any

and every object, bad as well as good, it seriously behoves every man, who would possess himself as a true man, to pause amid the whirl, if yet he may be able, and consider what individually he shall do. As eminently calculated to help him to sound conclusions as to his duty and his responsibility, we welcome the work before us.

F. A. F.

---

ART. II.—*The Americans, in their Moral, Social, and Political Relations*. By FRANCIS J. GRUND. From the London edition of Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green and Longman. Boston: Marsh, Capen & Lyon. 2 vols. in 1. 12mo. pp. 423. 1837.

CONCURRING generally in the estimate of Mr. Grund's book contained in the January Number of the North American Review, we are induced to bestow some notice on two or three extraordinary paragraphs, in which the author states his views of *Unitarianism* in America. Why he has singled out the Unitarians from all other religious denominations, to confer on them the honor of his animadversions, we cannot easily imagine. Could he have intended, by disparaging them, to add another popular feature to his book? Or, could he have supposed that Unitarianism was too prominent an element in the Moral, Social, and Political Relations of the Americans, to be omitted in his survey? However this may be, we do not remember to have seen within so short a compass, so many errors, inconsistencies, and careless asseverations, as in the few passages which we shall here cite, and accompany with a rapid commentary.

The following extracts contain all which the author presents us on the subject.

"The Unitarians, who are forming large congregations in the Northern and Eastern States, taking for their motto the words of St. Paul, "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good," are, perhaps without knowing it, as nearly as possible, on the verge of pure Deism; but as long as they conform to the usual form of prayers, to the regular sabbath service and evening lectures, and partake of the sacrament, they will be considered as good Christians, and enjoy the same consideration as any other sect in

existence. But their creed is far from being universally popular, especially in the Southern States, where it is almost wholly confined to the trading classes, composed of emigrants from New England.

"The inhabitants of the South are principally Episcopalians, and as much attached to authority in religion as they dislike it in politics. They consider Unitarianism as a religious democracy; because it relies less on the authority of the Scriptures, than on the manner in which the understanding of the clergy expounds them, and retains too little mysticism in its form of worship, to strike the multitude with awe. I have listened to many excellent sermons preached by Unitarian clergymen, containing the most sublime morals which I ever knew to flow from the pulpit; but I hardly ever perceived a close connexion between the text and the sermon; and whenever they entered upon theological doctrines, I have always found them at variance with themselves and each other. I write this with the fullest conviction that I do not, myself, belong to any orthodox persuasion; but, as far as logical reasoning and consequence of argument go, I think the Unitarians more deficient than any other denomination of Christians. I do not see how they can hold the ground which they have assumed: they must, in my opinion, go either further on the road to Deism, or retrace their steps, and become once more dogmatical Christians. The greatest objection I would make to Unitarianism is the absence of *love* in many of its doctrines; and the substitution of ratiocination in most cases, where the heart alone would speak louder than all the demands of a sedate, reasonable, modest morality. When I hear an argumentative sermon, I always remember the words of our Saviour:

"'Happy are the poor in spirit; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven'

"And when I hear stoic virtues preached, I remember poor Magdalen,

"'To whom much was forgiven; because she loved much.'

"Two reasons there are for the spreading of Unitarian doctrines in the United States. First, because its ministers are among the most highly gifted, and the more eloquent as they belong to a sect which is yet in the minority; and, secondly, because there is a class of people in America, who, aware of the moral and political necessity of religion, in order to restrain the vices of human nature, would do all in their power to preserve the text and practical applications of Christianity; while, at the same time, they would willingly dispense with certain ceremonies and popular beliefs, which, in their opinion, are not essential to religious worship. They call themselves 'Unitarians;' because

they dare not call themselves more, or rather less; and are better known by their opposition to orthodoxy, or what they think the extravagances of the Christian faith, than by any positive tenets of their own. They agree, as far as I am acquainted, on but one point, which is the denial of the Trinity, by denying the divinity of Christ; but as to the *authority* for their belief, it is too nearly related to a certain branch of the applied mathematics, to require a particular comment.

"Many Unitarian preachers have published excellent sermons, which have become popular, even in England; and as long as they refrain from attacking other sects, and retain their purity of style, I can see no reason why they should not be read by all denominations of Christians, as containing a concise, intelligible, and even eloquent code of morals.

"I ought to observe, moreover, that the Unitarians in New England form a highly respectable and intellectual class of society, whose private lives and virtues offer but little room either for moral or religious criticism. This is probably the reason why Unitarianism is supposed to become popular in the United States; though it is, by the great majority of the people, still looked upon as a doctrine incompatible with pure Christianity. But then we ought to distinguish between cause and effect, and not ascribe exclusively to the doctrine, what may perhaps be more easily explained by the peculiar position of its followers.

"The Unitarians in the United States are not numerous: they are, for the most part, in tolerable circumstances; and at the head of their persuasion is the oldest and best university in the country. No other religious denomination in America enjoys the same advantages; and we might, therefore, naturally expect some moral distinction in favor of its adherents. But if Unitarianism should ever become the creed of the great mass of the people, it is more than probable those advantages would cease, or, at least, be confined to a small number.

"Religion gains more from the heart than from the abstract understanding; and is more accessible through the medium of the feelings, than through the most logical course of demonstrative reasoning. Man is naturally a sophist, and ever ready to adapt his creed to his actions, or at least to allow his conscience a certain latitude, incompatible with moral and religious justice.

"The Christian religion addresses itself particularly to the heart, and is, on that account, accessible to all capacities, and adapted to every condition of life. Love and charity are its basis; and Christ himself has set the divine example in dying for the sins of this world. To strip religion of its awful mysteries, to explain the creation and redemption of man like a phe-



nomenon in natural philosophy, and to make human intellect the ultimate judge of its truth and applications, is to deprive it of its sanctity, and thereby of its influence on the majority of mankind.

"I do not believe that the spreading of Unitarianism will serve to increase the respect for the Christian religion, or that its moral consequences will benefit society in general. Neither do I think it capable of becoming the universal religion of the people, whose affections and hopes require a stronger prop than the cold dictates of human morality.

Venture then to hope; and fondly dream:  
Yonder world shall ev'ry pledge redeem,  
Of your true and faithful sentiment.

"Thus far, it does not appear that Unitarianism has made very rapid progress in the United States. The number of its congregations is still small when compared to those of other denominations of Christians, and, as far as I am acquainted, is not on the increase. This, however, is not owing to the want of zeal in their clergymen, but principally to the doctrine itself; which does not seem to captivate the feelings and sympathies of the great mass of Americans, however it may please and accord with the argumentative disposition of its followers."— pp. 158 – 161.

The first error which occurs in this long passage is the assertion that Unitarians are on the verge of pure Deism. Their distance from it may be said to be infinitely great. The Deist maintains that God has never communicated a revelation to mankind; whereas the whole system and belief of the Unitarian are founded on the fact that he *has* made a revelation to mankind. No doubt, there are to be found Deists among the attendants of all the churches in our country and in Christendom. If they abound more among Unitarians than among other denominations, (though the fact is questionable,) the reason is, that they are not denounced or insulted by the ministers of that sect for a difference of opinion; they find themselves addressed in the language of intelligible argument or affectionate persuasion; and it is far more probable that they attend the preaching of Unitarians on these grounds, than on that of an identity in their speculative views.

What is it, which this writer imagines to approach the verge of Deism? It is, to believe Jesus Christ when he says, that his Father is greater than himself, and that of his own self he could do nothing. It is, to believe St. Paul, when he says that

there is one God, the Father, and one Lord, or spiritual sovereign, Jesus Christ. It is, to pray unto the Father, to whom the Savior prayed, and taught and commanded us to pray. If this be Deism, what then is Christianity; and where can we find it, unless we abandon the Scriptures as the foundation of our faith, and go to the authority, the creeds, and the councils of fallible men?

Mr. Grund remarks, that our creed is far from being "universally popular." But he has suppressed a fact, with which we are persuaded he must have become acquainted during his long residence in this country, viz. that in the bosom of every denomination, we had almost said of every congregation in the United States, there exist considerable numbers of professed Unitarians; and further, that the number of persons is still more imposing, who, on learning what Unitarianism really is, immediately confess that they never entertained any other opinion of the nature of the Deity and of Christ. Neither does Mr. Grund seem to be aware of the tenets of that large and increasing sect denominated "Christians," who prevail in many parts of the country. Could a general ballot be taken in the United States, which should put to the test the popularity of the leading doctrine of Unitarians, we might not indeed be found to be *universally* popular, (in fact we know not what sect is universally popular,) but we certainly should appear in no contemptible minority. These remarks are made rather to correct an erroneous impression, than as laying any especial stress on the advantages or desirableness of mere popularity. We hope no Unitarian will ever be biassed by a consideration of that kind. There was a time when Christianity, in every form, was unpopular. All the most flourishing denominations in this, or any other country, had their season of unpopularity. Believing that our religion is pure and primitive Christianity, what miserable recreants must we be, if we shrink from inculcating and defending it to the utmost of our power? We believe that it possesses an inherent energy, not only sufficient to make men wise unto salvation, but that in God's own due time, for which we are willing patiently to wait, it will break out with an electric vigor, and spread rapidly over the whole church. In the mean time, we are willing to labor and incur sacrifices, and to perform our parts in effecting so desirable a consummation.

Another error immediately succeeds, which we do not point

out as at all important, but simply to show how easily a foreigner who writes on these subjects may be led into a mistake. Mr. Grund says that Unitarianism in the Southern States is almost wholly confined to the trading classes, composed of emigrants from New England. Whereas, to our certain knowledge, among the Southern Unitarian congregations generally, as large a proportion as two thirds is composed of natives of the South and professional men, planters, and others not engaged in trade.

The very next sentence contains even a wider error than this, and should cause every reader to hesitate before yielding to this author an implicit confidence on religious subjects. He says that the inhabitants of the South are *principally Episcopalians*. Surely he must have been strangely misled by the sources of his information. The Episcopalians in that region constitute almost an insignificant minority, the overwhelming preponderance belongs to Baptists and Methodists.

The charge of Unitarianism being a *religious democracy*, we trust, is no objection to it in a country like ours, whose very life-blood is republican. The Apostle bids *every* man to stand fast in the *liberty* wherewith Christ hath made him free.

With respect to our form of worship containing too little mysticism to strike the multitude with awe, it may be observed that it is the same general form of worship with that of the Baptists, the same with that of the Methodists, and the same with that of the Presbyterians, consisting, that is to say, of extemporaneous prayers, of singing, and of preaching. These three denominations are the most numerous in this country, and a more mystical form of worship than theirs would hardly suit the plainness and simplicity of Americans.

The next charge against Unitarian preachers is that they hardly ever preserve a close connexion between the text and the sermon. We were never before aware that they were peculiarly liable to this charge, but have, on the contrary, heard them commended for the very quality here denied them. And the reason assigned appears to us very obvious, namely, that Unitarian preachers do not, like many of the Orthodox, deem it necessary to introduce into every discourse the whole system of their divinity. This leaves them more at liberty to discuss the particular subject in hand. It is again said, that Unitarian preachers are at variance with each other. Let the members of any congregation in Boston or its vicinity, who for the last thirty years have enjoyed the opportunity, by means of ministerial

exchanges, of becoming acquainted with the opinions of Unitarian divines, decide how far such an assertion is correct. Let the same decision also be pronounced in reference to the *tracts* issued by the American Unitarian Association, presenting the recorded and deliberate views of nearly a hundred of our most prominent writers. Did the same number of men, under similar circumstances, ever exhibit a greater unity of sentiment, of spirit, and of doctrine? Besides, the "variance" which Mr. Grund has occasionally witnessed may be fairly ascribed to one or two obvious and honorable causes. It should be remembered that Unitarian preachers are not bound down to any formal creeds; that they are allowed a wide range of discussion; that each of them fearlessly propounds his own opinions and the results of his studies, whatever they may be; and therefore it is naturally to be expected that they might, at times, differ from their brethren in the conclusions at which they arrive. But the author goes still further, and says that he has heard *individual* Unitarian preachers at variance with *themselves*. Now it were to be wished that he had specified some instances of this self-contradiction; for it is hard to rebut so vague and sweeping an assertion. As it now stands, it must rest solely on the authority of this writer. But it should be observed, that if those preachers, who are thus charged with inconsistency, could but obtain a hearing, and become acquainted with the particular instances of inconsistency thus charged upon them, they might easily explain them to the satisfaction of every unprejudiced mind. At all events, would the objection in question be any more likely to be obviated, by their adoption of Trinitarian or Orthodox views? Are preachers of that persuasion less liable to the charge of inconsistency than ours are? Could men make their discourses more consistent by first speaking of the Deity as if he were a single being, and then representing him as three; or, by describing him in one part of their discourses as essentially just and merciful, and in another as demanding the everlasting torment of all mankind for the single transgression of Adam; a torment to be escaped from only by the punishment of an infinite and innocent Being? Surely such palpable self-contradictions as these belong not to the *nature* of Unitarian doctrines, however feeble and inefficient may be the mode by which individual advocates defend them. We should gain then nothing in point of consistency by becoming what the author calls *dogmatical* Christians; that is, Christians who profess a

code of mysterious doctrines, which must never be questioned or disputed. Nor, on the other hand, could we any better secure consistency by adopting the alternative proposed by the author, namely, to go further on the road to Deism. As the author professes to belong to no Orthodox persuasion, and is evidently no friend to Unitarianism, there is reason to apprehend that he would indeed urge us to accept of Deism. But how could we accept of Deism, believing as we do in the truth of the New Testament; and believing, as we do, that it is entirely worthy of the character of the Deity that he should reveal his will to mankind? How could we deny and set aside the immense mass of evidences in favor of the truth of Christianity? To profess ourselves Deists would be to exhibit, if possible, a still more glaring inconsistency than by the adoption of the other alternative. We must first erase many a long-cherished conclusion from the tablet of our understanding, and many a deep-seated affection from the sanctuary of our heart. We see in Unitarianism alone a system corresponding to the clearest and soundest deductions of reason, and appealing to all our better feelings.

Mr. Grund observes that as far as logical reasoning and consequence of argument go, he thinks the Unitarians more deficient than any other denomination of Christians. Now remark, first, that this strange assertion is made of a body of men, whom, in this very passage, the author compliments as being among the most highly gifted ministers of the country; a body of men, whose sermons, as he says, are worthy to be read by all denominations, as containing a concise and intelligible code of morals, and who belong to a highly respectable and *intellectual* class of society. And yet these highly gifted, highly intellectual, and intelligible men, when they come to reason, are inferior to all other denominations in logical reasoning and consequence of argument! Besides, if Unitarians are so feeble in their reasoning, where is the force of Mr. Grund's remark in another part of the passage, when, contrasting their preaching with that of the Orthodox, he says, that religion is more accessible through the medium of the feelings than through the most logical course of demonstrative reasoning? If there be not much carelessness and inconsistency in all these statements, something surely blinds our perception. And remark, next, that the inconsistency appears still more glaring, when it is remembered that Trinitarians violently *disclaim* the use of reason altogether in elucidating and

defending their doctrines; they do not ask its assistance; they even denounce it for its alleged mingled pride and weakness, and rest the strength of their cause on authority, assertion, or the claim of superior illumination. And such persons Mr. Grund imagines to be more *rational* in their conclusions than those who endeavor to employ their understandings in the best manner in their power. Is there not something in all this like a concealed *sarcasm* against the Christian religion? Does it not too palpably imply, that Christianity itself is not to be defended by reason, but must be taken upon trust and dictation, instead of deliberate conviction? And, in the third place, let us do what Mr. Grund never does throughout this whole passage, that is, come to the very point, the fact, the actual *principle* and *substance* of the Unitarian doctrine, and see if it *be* so illogical and inconsequential, in comparison with Trinitarianism, as this author would mistakenly represent. Now, one leading principle of Unitarians in the interpretation of Scripture is, to explain all difficult and abstruse passages by the help of those which are intelligible and clear. Trinitarians, on the contrary, insist that those which are plain and easy to understand shall be interpreted so as to conform with the perplexed and unintelligible. Which of these two principles is the most rational — the most logical? Again, Trinitarians speak of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost being each of them very God, and yet assert that there are not three Gods, but one God. The Unitarian maintains that the Father alone is God, the Son being his consecrated instrument and agent, and the Holy Spirit but an expression of his exerted power. Which of these forms of belief appears to involve the greatest violation of logic? We need not allude to the peculiarities of Calvinism, such as denying that man has any moral power, and yet denouncing him for not using it, and the like; for many Trinitarians reject such doctrines equally with ourselves. Enough has been said to destroy the force of Mr. Grund's very gratuitous assertion on this subject, at least until he condescends to specify some instances of the bad reasoning of Unitarians, and to lay aside the shroud of generalities in which he has been pleased to wrap himself.

The next charge, however, is a little more specific and tangible, and consequently is a little more easy to answer. "The greatest objection," he says, "he would make to Unitarianism, is the absence of *love* in many of its doctrines." But even

here, how vague and elusive he is! *The absence of love in many of its doctrines!* In *which* of its doctrines, we should be glad to know. Is there an absence of love in its leading doctrine, that God is the common and impartial *Father* of all mankind? Do not our preachers perpetually press home upon their hearers all the truths and consequences involved in this most endearing relation? If they do not, we know nothing yet of Unitarian preaching. Is it not one among the common charges against them, that they preach too much of love, and not enough of terror? But in what way would Mr. Grund have them infuse more of *love* into their doctrines? Would he have them preach that the Father was from eternity implacably *angry* with all the generations of mankind for the commission of one single sin by one of their number, and that for that sin he doomed them all to everlasting torment, unless another infinite but perfectly innocent Being would suffer in their stead? No doubt this doctrine, if true, should cause us to love the Being who suffered in our stead; but it would excite in us no love for the Father. Now Unitarians believe that God was originally merciful, and that he did not *require* so awful and disproportioned a penalty for the sins of mankind. But further, can Mr. Grund or any other man charge Unitarian ministers with neglecting to inculcate a love for the *Savior* upon their hearers? Is not his character constantly proposed by them as an assemblage of all lovely perfections; and are not his exertions, sufferings, and death not only commemorated among Unitarians by the public and punctual celebration of the communion, but shown to be connected with all our highest hopes, privileges, enjoyments, and blessings? There cannot then be an absence of love in their doctrines upon *this* point. Again, in their inculcation of the duties of man to man, is there generally lacking the principle of love? Where else than in Unitarian pulpits are heard stronger, more earnest, or more constant recommendations of *Christian charity*, and expostulations against the spirit of bigotry, exclusiveness, and intolerance? In fact, how could Unitarians ever preach that sublime *morality*, for which this author so generously compliments them, and yet be destitute of the spirit of love? We cannot conceive that any morality is truly "*sublime*" which is not founded upon that basis. In a work recently published by the Rev. Dr. Adams of Charleston, S. C., entitled *Elements of Moral Philosophy*, the author, although a conscientious Trinitarian, when treating

upon some of the most *affectionate duties* of domestic life, draws largely for his reflections and illustrations upon the published discourses of an Unitarian divine. It is a singular coincidence that this work was going through the press at the same moment with Mr. Grund's, which complains of an absense of *love* in Unitarian preaching! The more we dwell on this unfortunate passage, the more we perceive the extremely superficial knowledge of the author on the subject which he professes to treat. Could he but have known and heard the great and good Noah Worcester, one of the fathers and apostles of American Unitarianism, a man who could forgive his most injurious enemies, and talk of them even as Jesus did; a man who has mingled up in his numerous controversial writings of thirty years the most enlarged spirit of charity, without one single expression of bitterness; a man, who has rendered his name famous throughout Europe by his exertions and publications in the cause of *Peace*, Mr. Grund might have paused before venturing to characterize Unitarianism as being destitute of the purest, warmest, widest impulses of Christian love. Could he have known very many other Unitarian preachers, both among the living and the dead, whose names now rush to our memories, and awaken affectionate pride in our bosoms, he would have acknowledged that this world needed no brighter impersonations of Christian love and charity. Having mentioned the name of one of the departed, we will venture, in this connexion, to allude to one who is still among us, and who, by his enlightened and faithful exertions in the cause of the *poor*, both in this country and abroad, has rightly acquired for himself the title of the American Howard. Nor has the great body of Unitarians in our country ever discredited the lustre shed upon their ranks by these and other distinguished names. In what work of benevolence did they ever refuse largely to concur? Who ever appealed, in a good cause, to their charities in vain? Is Boston, the head-quarters of Unitarianism, deficient in its hospitalities, its donations to sufferers of every description, or the establishment of institutions adapted to the relief and improvement of mankind? The first public movement in the Temperance Reformation was set on foot by a number of individuals in that city, a majority of whom were Unitarians. The establishment of what is called the Ministry at Large for the poor in cities, and the appointment of Dr. Tuckerman to the office, which has since been imitated by several denominations in England and America, was entirely



the work of Unitarians. The foundation of Peace-Societies must be ascribed to the same denomination. Let it no longer be said, then, that either in their doctrines or practices there is a disproportioned absense of love. If their ministers have ever seemed, as Mr. Grund asserts of them, to substitute ratiocination for more direct appeals to the heart, it is because they have been compelled, by the charges of their ignorant and mistaken adversaries, to defend their peculiar views of truth.

Mr. Grund affects to plan an argumentative sermon in opposition to the beautiful declaration of our Savior; "Happy are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom." Now he must have forgotten that a great many of our Savior's discourses were themselves purely argumentative, and that Jesus, as well as his apostles, seemed to aim quite as much at enlightening the understanding, and reasoning away errors, as at immediately imparting good impulses to the heart. In fact, the very instances which Mr. Grund here quotes from the New Testament are nothing but pure *arguments*. Blessed are the pure in spirit. Why? *For* theirs is the kingdom of heaven. And again; Much was forgiven to Mary Magdalen. Why? *Because* she loved much. Here surely is nothing but ratiocination; that very ratiocination for which this author in the same breath condemns Unitarians. In fact, to separate reasoning from religion, will soon set us down in a wild ocean of impulse, confusion, and fanaticism.

Unitarians are charged with preaching *stoic* virtues. But what virtues do they ever inculcate, without appealing to the example of Jesus and the sanction of his religion? If this be stoicism, what is Christianity?

Mr. Grund next insinuates that one cause of the spread of Unitarianism in this country is a conviction in its professors of the moral and political *necessity* of religion, in order to restrain the vices of human nature. But an uncandid insinuation like this may be made with equal propriety against all other denominations. No doubt there are hollow and incincere professors in the bosom of all sects. No doubt every form of religion in this country has been encouraged by politicians and lovers of good order, and has prevailed to a greater or less degree, simply on account of its excellent temporal effects. But he, who imagines such motives to operate more among Unitarians than others, is miserably deficient in a knowledge not only of that, but also of the other denominations in the country. But

why does not Mr. Grund enumerate other causes of the prevalence of our views? Why does he not frankly acknowledge that there are innumerable passages of Scripture which distinctly teach the unity of God, and the inferiority of his Son; and that thousands of true believers in Christianity, deep reverers of the Bible, and sincere worshippers of Jehovah, have really no other alternative than to separate themselves from those whom they regard as mistaking the purport of the Scriptures? This would have been the part of true candor, as well as of an observing philosophy, and an acquaintance with actual facts.

The author's insinuation, that Unitarians *dare* not call themselves more nor less than by that name, must appear almost ludicrous to those who know how much they have braved and sacrificed everywhere in the face of bigotry and unpopularity.

We now approach the most remarkable portion of the long passage under examination. It is one which singularly exhibits the incompetency of the author to interfere, as a theological arbitrator, on points of which he is profoundly ignorant. He takes the liberty of sneering at Unitarians for entertaining *mathematical* objections against the doctrine of the Trinity, and for disputing it on the ground that three are not one; *as if*, he continues, "*any denomination of Christians considered the Trinity of God as more or less than three different manifestations of the same principle!*" Is this, then, the true doctrine of the Trinity? Three different manifestations of the same principle? Had Mr. Grund but accidentally opened the *Encyclopedia Americana* of his friend Dr. Lieber, at the article Sabellius, he might have felt astonished and enlightened by the following short article:

"SABELLIUS, a Christian teacher at Ptolemais, a native of Africa, lived about 250, and is known as the founder of a sect, who considered the Son and Holy Ghost only as different revelations or *manifestations* of the Godhead, but not as separate persons. The Trinity, according to them, is but a threefold relation of God to the world. The *Logos* of John, called, by the church, the *Son*, was compared by Sabellius to a ray emitted from the sun, active in and through the man Jesus Christ, but by no means a separate existence from the one God. *The Sabellians were suppressed in the fourth century by the orthodox church*, but their views have always found adherents, and even now, theologians exhibit conceptions of the Trinity, coinciding with that of Sabellius, *in order to make it intelligible by reason.*"

Thus Mr. Grund gravely represents and recommends the Sabellian heresy as the true orthodox doctrine of the church; a heresy, disowned and denounced by Presbyterians, by Roman Catholics, by Episcopalians of the Church of England, by Baptists, and Methodists; whilst the only persons who would tolerate and welcome it with any sort of sympathy are the very Unitarians, whom he undertakes to attack for approximating to his own fundamental views of the Trinity! We do not remember an instance in all literary history of greater shallowness and inconsistency than this. Is such a man competent to criticise the opinions and religious character and position of Unitarians?

In replying, as we have done, to a number of popular objections against our denomination, we are far from implying that Unitarians are free from characteristic imperfections, or that we have attained the height of Christian purity and virtue. Doubtless we have much yet to accomplish in this respect. Having seen the evils of fanaticism, and of the absence of all reasoning in religion, it is possible that we may have been driven to the opposite extreme of coldness and argumentation. This, however, cannot belong to our *doctrine*. The Being and attributes of God, the example and authority of the Savior, the teachings and commands of the New Testament, *never* can be adopted as a system of religion by any body of men, without producing, sooner or later, the most sanctifying and elevating effects. Let us therefore be faithful to that system. At an equal distance as it is from fanaticism and irreligion, from Scylla on the one hand, and Charybdis on the other, it shall certainly waft us forward, by a steady and safe channel, towards the haven of unclouded truth and happiness. But this depends much on ourselves. Unitarianism, by itself, as a mere abstraction, never can, and never will work wonders. It must be mingled up not only with living spirit, but with living flesh and blood. It must be infixed in our memories and understandings. It must beat with the pulsations of our hearts. Its principles, motives, and sanctions must walk by the very side of our consciences. When thus made a lamp to our feet, and a light to our path, it will guide us *here* by a humble, safe, plain, narrow, strait, simple, but ever upward path, and in the world to come, it will lead to all those developments of knowledge, holiness, and happiness, which God is keeping in reserve for the Immortal Soul.

S. G.

ART. III. — *The Works of GEORGE BERKELEY, D. D., Bishop of Cloyne. To which are added an Account of his Life, and several of his Letters to Thomas Prior, Esq., Dean Gervais, Mr. Pope, &c.* London: Printed for Thomas Tegg & Son. 1837. 8vo. pp. 479.

BISHOP BERKELEY is remembered on this side of the Atlantic chiefly from his benevolent scheme of founding a college in Bermuda, to assist in the propagation of Christianity among the Indians. In the furtherance of this project, he resided about two years at Newport, Rhode Island, and his benefactions to Yale College and the clergy in his vicinity displayed the deep interest he took in the cause of education and religion in this country, and the catholic spirit that prompted him to aid an institution directed by men, who dissented from his views of doctrine and church government. His philosophical works are not generally known, though the allusions to them are frequent in the writings of other and more popular metaphysicians. Men are disposed to accept upon trust the reputation of that class of writers, to which he belonged, or to glean a scanty knowledge of their doctrines from publications of the present day. Here, they are alluded to or quoted for the purpose of censure or refutation, and the view which the reader gains is distorted and partial. Few authors are more talked about and less studied, than Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.

But, to estimate correctly the reputed discoveries and new systems advanced in our own times, reference must occasionally be had to older works, that novel expressions may not be confounded with original views, nor the mere denial of opinions once received be considered as the progress of truth. To expose impudent quackery in science, to strip false pretenders of their borrowed plumes, by restoring stolen property to the rightful owners, is an attempt, that, however conducive to the ends of justice, may not seem to tend equally to the advancement of knowledge. An advance in philosophy, however made, is more popular than a retreat. But, if the contemplated movement be only destructive in its character, aiming to undo the labors of others, and to raise under a different shape the antiquated absurdities, which were once effectually exposed, then the enterprise of the historian of philosophy assumes a more

important aspect. He may wisely fall back for a century, to avoid a threatened retreat to the age, when philosophical speculation was in its infancy, and formed the amusement of the ingenious and the skeptical, rather than the business of the learned. We believe, that it may be made the guide of life, and the hand-maid of religion; and there can be no better exemplification of the remark, than may be found in the life and works of Bishop Berkeley.

From the mention made of this distinguished prelate in the writings of his contemporaries, one would almost suppose, that all the world was in a conspiracy to praise him. Occupying a station peculiarly exposed to suspicion and dislike, that of an Episcopalian Bishop in Ireland, he acquired from the men of all parties and ranks a degree of respect and influence, equalled only by that of Swift, and far better deserved. The witty Dean of St. Patrick's gained his popularity by an accident, that identified for a time his own selfish views in politics with measures tending to the welfare of his countrymen. Berkeley acquired favor by frequent sacrifices of private interest to schemes of general beneficence, by sound advice recommended by its tolerant and generous spirit to all sects, and by studying the public good in projects too far reaching to be practical in that age, but reserved for the enlarged experience of our own times to carry into effect. He aided in preserving peace in Ireland during the rebellion of 1745, by timely publications addressed to the Catholics of his diocese, and to their spiritual directors throughout the country. In reply, the Romish clergy assured him, "that they are determined to comply with every particular recommended in his address, to the utmost of their power." They add, that "in every page it contains a proof of the author's extensive charity; his views are only towards the public good; the means he prescribeth are easily complied with; and his manner of treating persons in their circumstances so very singular, that they plainly show the good man, the polite gentleman, and the true patriot." Perhaps there are those now living, who may profit from a lesson in toleration given by an English Bishop, of the Tory party, in the last century.

The fascination of Berkeley's private manners aided the power of his moral character, in acquiring the friendship of distinguished individuals. Promotion in the church was thrust upon him by enthusiastic patrons, though not so frequently as

he contrived to evade or decline it. The universal satirist changed the burden of his theme to praise, and ascribed

“To Berkeley, every virtue under heaven.”

Warmly attached from sentiment and conviction to the leading party in the state, whose principles and measures he actively supported with his pen, he never lost the private friendship of his political opponents, nor was he ever compelled, in matters relating to politics, to defend himself against assaults in print. The moral beauty of his life silenced calumny, and deprived envy of its power to wound. Swift laughed at the metaphysical vagaries of his friend, but, contrary to his usual practice, the ridicule was gentle, and had no infusion of bitterness or scorn. Addison made converts among his Whig friends to his love for Berkeley; and the turbulent Jacobite, Atterbury, after an interview that he had solicited, gave his opinion, that “so much understanding, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had been the portion of any but angels, till I saw this gentleman.”

The accomplishments of this remarkable man were more various, than are often found united in an individual. A profound classical scholar, the quiet Platonism of his metaphysical writings attests his constant study of the master mind in Grecian Philosophy. His acquaintance with the exact sciences enabled him to maintain a controversy with the ablest mathematicians of his time. A love for the fine arts, which he cultivated during his travels in France and Italy, added to the graces of his conversation, and promoted the union of a rich fancy and an elegant imagination with the severer qualities of his written style. On a single occasion only, he tried his abilities in verse, and the attempt was inspired by his heroic scheme of benevolence relating to this country. Recollecting that the lines were written a century ago, the last stanza seems to present again the old combination of the poetical and prophetic character.

“Westward the course of empire takes its way;  
The first four acts already past,  
A fifth shall close the drama with the day;  
Time's noblest offspring is its last.”

But of all the traits in Berkeley's character, his disinterestedness and wide reaching philanthropy are the most apparent and the most delightful. He carried the former quality, indeed, to such excess, that his sanity became suspected, and when

the "Minute Philosopher" appeared, his friend Sherlock carried a copy of it to Queen Caroline, that she might judge, whether such a work could be the production of a disordered intellect. One is forcibly reminded by this story of the similar incident related of the Greek tragedian. At the age of thirty-nine, he had attained, almost against his will, a situation that was truly enviable. In the Church, he occupied the Deanery of Derry, an office worth £1100 a year. His reputation as a philosopher and a man of letters and varied accomplishments was excelled by none of his contemporaries. With a keen relish for society, which he was eminently fitted to adorn, his company was eagerly sought in circles most distinguished for rank and learning. He was the leader in a small knot of literary men, whom the Princess of Wales, afterwards Queen Caroline, delighted to draw together at her evening parties. She had a strong *penchant* for metaphysics, and discussions were raised on kindred subjects for her amusement. Clarke, Hoadly, and Sherlock were usually present. The first took the lead in opposition, and was followed by Hoadly, while Sherlock warmly seconded Berkeley. At this period, he formed a project to resign all his preferments and prospects in the church, and to exile himself from his country, in order to found a college in Bermuda for the instruction of Indian youth. He was himself to be the President of the new institution, with the moderate salary of £100 a year. He advocated the scheme with so much eloquence and address, that he persuaded three Fellows of Trinity college, Dublin, to exchange all their opportunities at home, for the sake of becoming teachers in the new college, with a yearly stipend of £40 each.

He published the outlines of his scheme, in a pamphlet form, in 1725. The patronage of government was necessary to the execution of the plan, and in order to obtain it, he passed over from Ireland to England, carrying a letter of introduction from Dean Swift to Lord Carteret, then lord lieutenant of Ireland. The letter is so characteristic, that we are tempted to give an extract.

"There is a gentleman of this kingdom just gone for England; it is Dr. George Berkeley, Dean of Derry, the best preferment among us, being worth about £1100 a year. He is an absolute philosopher with regard to money, titles, and power; and for three years past, has been struck with a notion of founding a university at Bermuda, by a charter from the crown. He

hath seduced several of the hopefulest young clergymen and others here, many of them well provided for, and all of them in the fairest way of preferment. But in England his conquests are greater, and I doubt will spread very far this winter. He showed me a little tract, which he designs to publish, and there your Excellency will see his whole scheme of a life academico-philosophical (I shall make you remember what you were) of a college founded for Indian scholars and missionaries, where he most exorbitantly proposeth a whole hundred pounds a year for himself, forty pounds for a fellow, and ten for a student. His heart will break, if his deanery be not taken from him, and left to your Excellency's disposal. I discourage him by the coldness of courts and ministers, who will interpret all this as impossible and a vision, but nothing will do. And therefore I humbly entreat your Excellency, either to use such persuasions as will keep one of the first men in this kingdom for learning and virtue quiet at home, or assist him by your credit to compass his romantic design, which, however, is very noble and generous, and directly proper for a person of your excellent education to encourage."

The fine ardor and eloquence of Berkeley, in pressing his scheme to a conclusion, are seen to advantage in an anecdote preserved in Duncombe's letters. "Lord Bathurst told me, that the members of the Scriblerus Club being met at his house at dinner, they agreed to rally Berkeley, who was also his guest, on his scheme at Bermuda. Berkeley, having listened to the many lively things they had to say, begged to be heard in his turn, and displayed his plan with such an astonishing and animating force of eloquence and enthusiasm, that they were struck dumb, and after some pause, rose all up together, with earnestness exclaiming, 'Let us set out with him immediately.'" Private subscriptions were obtained to a considerable amount, the king granted a charter, and, upon an address in favor of the project, voted with great unanimity by the House of Commons, the ministers promised to devote £20,000 to the undertaking. With these encouragements, in September, 1728, Berkeley sailed for Rhode Island, with the view of being as near as possible to Bermuda, and of becoming acquainted with the situation and wants of the aborigines and settlers on the continent. He was so much pleased with the country and the people, that he avowed his wish to have the charter removed thither, in preference to Bermuda; but he did not express this desire to the government, lest it should hinder the payment of the grant.



It is unnecessary to dwell on the causes, which finally prevented the execution of this noble scheme. Walpole, then prime minister, had other uses for the public funds, than to endow colleges in Bermuda with them; and Berkeley, in one of his letters, hints at the jealousies and suspicions of men high in authority, "who apprehended this college may produce an independency in America, or at least lessen its dependency on England." He erred in departing for America, before the grant had passed the great seal. His presence in London alone could have ensured the necessary funds; for none but the noble spirit, which first kindled enthusiastic benevolence in the hearts of wits, legislators, and princes, could at last have fanned the impulse into a flame. It is not easy to express our admiration of the heart and intellect of the man, who first conceived such a disinterested scheme of broad philanthropy, and, through so many obstacles, carried the project well nigh to completion. Men of cultivated taste and ripe learning, fond of books and the society of literary persons, are alone able to appreciate the sacrifice, that he proposed, in exiling himself from the polished company of wits and nobles in London to a distant rock in the Atlantic, there to instruct savages in the elements of Christian and secular knowledge. Yet it does not appear from his correspondence, that this self-denial cost him a thought, much less a regret. We care not, if it be said, that the plan was visionary, and that he exaggerated the future advantages of his new institution. It would be well for the interests of humanity, if there were more such dreamers. Those who have carefully traced the influence of the early establishment of our own beloved Harvard on the fortunes of New England, will not be forward to express their doubts respecting the practicability of Berkeley's scheme, and the foresight he displayed in estimating its probable effects. Such instances of godlike benevolence do more to raise our idea of human nature, than all the indifference of common men and the heartless and short-sighted policy of their rulers can do to sink it.

We had purposed to notice other incidents in Berkeley's life, equally illustrating the singular excellence of his character; but we must pass over them to the consideration of his works. These are everywhere imbued with marks of that pure, benevolent, but somewhat fanciful, spirit, which his actions manifested on every occasion. Relating chiefly to speculative philosophy, his favorite pursuit, some were devoted to another object, also

nigh to his heart ; to ameliorate the condition of his Irish countrymen. Such was "The Querist," first printed in 1735, containing a series of questions respecting the economical concerns of Ireland, exposing with keen satire the follies of the rich and the needless degradation of the lower classes, and proposing various schemes of improvement. Some of the remedies are such as a Cato might have suggested ; that the higher classes should shake off their taste for foreign fopperies, deep drinking, and insane expenditures, and that the poor should renounce, what have been for centuries the two great national vices, dirt and indolence. Many of the economical measures are dictated in the same benevolent feeling, that prompted him at his own residence to patronize, at all risks, the manufactures of his immediate neighborhood, and to wear ill-made clothes and worse wigs, as his biographer pathetically represents, rather than allow the tailors and wig-makers of Cloyne to remain unemployed. Other plans show the workings of an acute and sagacious mind, applied to investigating the causes of the domestic welfare of a nation, when as yet the science of Political Economy had not a being. The book contains more sound notions on the nature of wealth, and the causes of its production and distribution, than any other publication with which we are acquainted, preceding the great work of Adam Smith. Some of the anticipations, indeed, are direct ; as where he attributes the creation of wealth to human labor united with natural agents, and develops the proper functions of money. The witty and pointed manner in which the advice is given, and the pithy rebukes that are insinuated, lend an interest to the work, that compensates for its somewhat fantastic form. We extract a few queries, taken almost at random, as a specimen of the author's manner. One who is familiar with Franklin's writings will be frequently impressed with the similarity of style.

"Whether there be upon earth any Christian or civilized people, so beggarly, wretched, and destitute, as the common Irish ?

"Whether our natural Irish are not partly Spaniards and partly Tartars ; and whether they do not bear signatures of their descent from both these nations, which is also confirmed by all their histories ?

"Whether the Tartar progeny is not numerous in this land ? And whether there is an idler occupation under the sun than to attend flocks and herds of cattle ?

"Whether the wisdom of the State should not wrestle with this hereditary disposition of our Tartars, and with a high hand introduce agriculture ?

"Whether in imitation of the Jesuits at Paris, who admit Protestants to study in their colleges, it may not be right for us also to admit Roman Catholics into our college, without obliging them to attend chapel duties, or catechism, or divinity lectures ? And whether this might not keep money in the kingdom, and prevent the prejudices of a foreign education ?

"Whether a woman of fashion ought not to be declared a public enemy ?

"How much of the necessary sustenance of our people is yearly exported for brandy ?

"Whether, if people must poison themselves, they had not better do it with their own growth ?

"Whether the natural phlegm of this island needs any additional stupefier ?

"What right an eldest son hath to the worst education ?

"Whether the poor, grown up and in health, need any other provision but their own industry, under public inspection ?

"Whether the poor tax in England hath lessened or increased the number of poor ?

"Whether the four elements, and man's labor therein, be not the true source of wealth ?

"Whether, if there was no silver or gold in the kingdom, our trade might not nevertheless supply bills of exchange, sufficient to answer the demands of absentees in England or elsewhere ?

"Whether current bank notes may not be deemed money ? And whether they are not actually the greater part of the money of this kingdom ?

"Provided the wheels move, whether it is not the same thing, as to the effect of the machine, be this done by the force of wind, of water, or of animals ?

"Whether there are not such things in Holland as Bettering Houses for bringing young gentlemen to order ? And whether such an institution would be useless among us ?

"Whose fault is it, if Ireland still continues poor ?

If metaphysicians were challenged to produce one broad, definite, and fruitful fact in their science, which had been *discovered* since the time of Bacon, and so established as to admit of neither cavil nor doubt, we know of no better way whereby they could silence the questioner, than by a reference to Berkeley's "New Theory of Vision." Whether it would be necessary to admit, that this is the only instance, or how the

reputation of their philosophy would be affected by such an admission, that with all the labor bestowed in their province, but a single discovery of such a marked character had been effected, are points of which we now say nothing. To resolve the doubt, it would be necessary to enter on a broader inquiry; to determine what Intellectual Philosophy is, and to what end we study it. But of this hereafter. Berkeley's claim to originality in the development of the theory is unquestionable. The hint for this discovery was indeed taken from a pregnant remark in the "Essay on Human Understanding," that ideas of sensation are often changed by the judgment. But Locke was far from perceiving the extent and bearing of his own statement, and other writers, instead of suspecting the truth, had stated the opposite in the plainest terms. The "New Theory" was published when the author was only twenty-five years of age. It was the first fruits of a mind singularly acute and sagacious, passionately addicted to speculative pursuits, and having confidence enough in its own strength to follow argument resolutely, to whatever conclusion it might lead.

One would suppose from the title, that the work belonged to the department of physical science. But the result developed is a psychological fact, and the reasoning is wholly abstract and metaphysical. Briefly stated, the doctrine is as follows; that there is no resemblance between the visible and tangible qualities of material things; that colors are the only objects of sight; and the distances, figures, and magnitudes of external things are perceived through this sense, only so far as their existence is inferred from qualities really visible,—from variations in light and shade and greater or less confusion of tints. Prior to experience, without the aid of the other senses, our eyes could not inform us that anything existed out of ourselves. We do not *see* the outward world. The landscape, that we view with delight, exists only in the mind, which invests the colors seen with all the modifications of size and shape, disposes them at fixed distances, and *literally*

"gives to airy nothing  
A local habitation and a name."

At no period of life do we gain by one step so great an accession of knowledge, as when in infancy we learn to see.

The foregoing statement is strong; but we are not aware that it is exaggerated, or that its terms require any qualification.

It is allowed that colors are seen ; but, in the strictest sense of the term, even this admission is too much. To take a parallel instance, what we term heat is an affection of a sentient subject, not a quality of outward matter ; it is an effect produced on the mind by the transmission to the sense of an unknown principle, which chemists term caloric. Metaphysicians have been censured for their paradoxical assertion, that there is no heat in fire ; and justly too, for the paradox arises from a confusion of terms. So far as heat is understood to be a sensation, it can exist, of course, only in a sentient being ; so far as it is said to exist in fire, it is the cause of that sensation. The case is precisely the same with color. As an affection of mind, it exists only when it is perceived. In the dark, we are not deprived of the gorgeous tints of nature merely from our inability to see them ; they do not really exist. Their cause exists, and, when the light returns, manifests itself again by exciting in our minds the remembered sensation. If color were an attribute of things in themselves, in the same manner that extension is, it is obvious, that an object could have but one tint at one time. Yet, to take but one illustration out of a thousand that offer, let a piece of mother of pearl be viewed by two persons looking at it from opposite points, and each perceives a totally different set of colors.

This account of vision does not shake our confidence in the knowledge apparently obtained from sight. It merely traces this knowledge to its proper source, showing that it is not direct, but mediate. The process is not so mechanical, as appears at the first view. The agency of mind must be combined with the opening of the eyelids, before the scene enters. To use Berkeley's own well chosen illustration, ideas really obtained from vision are a language, in which we read the ideas, that came primarily from experience and the sense of touch. "In looking at a page of print or manuscript," says Stewart, "we are apt to say that the ideas we acquire are received by the sense of sight ; and we are scarcely conscious of a metaphor, when we employ this language. On such occasions, we seldom recollect, that nothing is perceived by the eye but a multitude of black strokes drawn on white paper ; and that it is our own acquired habits, that communicate to these strokes the whole of that significancy, whereby they are distinguished from the unmeaning scrawl of an infant or a changeling." Now, the outward visible world is a book, and the first one in

which the infant learns to spell. There is no more a necessary connexion between visible and tangible ideas, between varieties of light and shade, and the notions of size, figure, and distance suggested by them, than between words and the ideas they denote. The particles or undulations of light, striking upon the retina of one opening his eyes for the first time, are mere words in an unknown tongue, and convey no knowledge whatever, but that a new sensation exists. The mind, taught by experience, invests them with significance, makes them messengers and interpreters between the outward world and itself, and gains from them in a moment an amount of knowledge, which years would hardly convey by the slow step of the original process. How long, it has been asked, would it be before a person endowed only with the sense of touch, by applying his hands successively to every part, could form a notion of the front of a large gothic edifice? Yet in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, the mind receives the sensation of various colors, forms its judgment of the magnitude and figure that must occasion such variety; and pictures to itself, as existing outwardly, that complex whole, with every "jutting, frieze, buttress, and coigne of vantage."

We have not room to give even a sketch of the argument, unmatched for ingenuity and acuteness, by which Berkeley establishes this theory of vision, now universally received. We easily admit, that the distance of any object from the observer cannot immediately be seen by him; "for distance being a line directed endwise to the eye, it projects only one point in the fund of the eye, which point remains invariably the same, whether the distance be longer or shorter." Yet the whole theory is but the corollary of this single admission, and when the hint is once given, a mind of tolerable powers will easily deduce the various conclusions from this fruitful premiss. By a beautiful analysis of the mental process in vision, Berkeley easily refutes the popular objections to his principles, and applies them successfully to explaining all the observed phenomena of sight. Obvious facts show the necessity of experience, before we can obtain correct notions from the eye alone. We are not so much accustomed to see objects at a distance from us in a vertical line, as in a horizontal one; hence, the same visible appearance, if placed directly above or below our own position, does not suggest the same magnitude, as when seen at an equal distance on a level with the eye. Standing on the

sea-shore, a ship distant a few hundred feet appears of the natural size, and men, not pigmies, walk her deck. But ascend to the brow of the cliff, and

“The fishermen, that walk upon the beach,  
Appear like mice; and yon tall anchoring bark,  
Diminished to her cock; her cock, a buoy  
Almost too small for sight.”

When circumstances are casually combined to cheat the judgment, and we rely almost solely upon the eye, the grossest mistakes are often committed. A ludicrous instance occurs to us. A stranger was walking on the high road through a country town, the village church being at a little distance on his left. A high fence bordering the road interrupted the view of all objects between the top of the fence and the eaves of the church. Happening to turn his eyes in that direction, he saw a large bay horse standing composedly on the roof of the building. He stopped and surveyed it curiously a minute or two, his astonishment increasing all the while. There could be no mistake. The animal was there; but how transported to such a height, how he kept his footing on a plane at an angle of forty-five degrees to the horizon, and, above all, why he should stand at such a perilous height perfectly immovable and unconcerned, all was a mystery. The traveller began to think that his own brain was as much disturbed, as Tam O'Shanter's was, on his memorable ride “by Alloway's auld haunted kirk.” At length, retracing his steps a little to the end of the fence that obstructed his view, the whole riddle was solved. His prancing steed was an image about twelve inches long, rudely enough carved and painted, and mounted as a weathercock on a pole in a farmer's barn yard, about half way between the fence and the church. One glance at the real support of the image so effectually dissolved the mystery, that when he returned to his former position, no exertion of mind could recall the illusion.

It was Berkeley's rare good fortune to have the truth of his theory demonstrated during his life-time, and in the very manner too, which he had confidently predicted. The reasoning appeared so satisfactory to his own mind, that he ventured the following assertions in his work.

“A man born blind, being made to see, would, at first, have no idea of distance by sight; the sun and stars, the remotest objects, as well as the nearer, would all seem to be in his eye,

or rather in his mind. The objects intromitted by sight would seem to him, (as in truth they are,) no other than a new set of thoughts or sensations, each whereof is as near to him as the perceptions of pain or pleasure, or the most inward passions of his soul. He would not consider the ideas of sight with reference to, or as having any connexion with, the ideas of touch; his view of them being entirely terminated within themselves, he can no otherwise judge them great or small, than as they contain a greater or lesser number of visible points. Now it being certain, that any visible point can cover or exclude from view only one other visible point, it follows, that whatever object intercepts the view of another hath an equal number of visible points with it; and consequently, they shall both be thought by him to have the same magnitude. Hence, it is evident, one in these circumstances would judge his thumb, with which he might hide a tower, or hinder its being seen, equal to that tower; or his hand, the interposition whereof might conceal the firmament from his view, equal to the firmament. Such a one would not, at first sight, think that anything he saw was high or low, erect or inverted."

The book containing this prediction was published in 1709. In 1726, Cheselden, the celebrated surgeon, couched a boy fourteen years of age, who had been blind from his birth. His account of the case appeared first in the "Philosophical Transactions" of that year, and afterwards in his work on Anatomy, from which the following passage is taken.

"When he first saw, he was so far from making any judgment about distances, that he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes, (as he expressed it,) as what he felt did his skin; and thought no object so agreeable as those which were smooth and regular, though he could form no judgment of their shape, or guess what it was in any object that was pleasing to him. He knew not the shape of anything, nor any one thing from another, however different in shape or magnitude; but upon being told what things were, whose form he before knew from feeling, he would carefully observe, that he might know them again. But having too many objects to learn at once, he forgot many of them. Having often forgot which was the cat and which the dog, he was ashamed to ask; but catching the cat, which he knew by feeling, he was observed to look at her steadfastly, and then setting her down, said, 'So puss, I shall know you another time.' About two months after he was couched, he discovered at once that pictures represented solid bodies; when, to that



time, he had considered them only as party-colored planes, or surfaces diversified with a variety of paint. But even then, he was no less surprised, expecting the pictures would feel like the things they represented, and was amazed when he found those parts, which by their light and shadow appeared now round and uneven, felt only flat like the rest, and asked which was the lying sense, feeling or seeing. Being shown his father's picture in a locket at his mother's watch, and told what it was, he acknowledged a likeness, but was vastly surprised; asking how it could be that a large face could be expressed in so little room; saying it seemed as impossible to him, as to put a bushel of anything into a pint. At first, the things he saw he thought extremely large; but upon seeing things larger, those first seen he conceived less, never being able to imagine any lines beyond the bounds he saw; the room he was in, he said, he knew to be but part of the house, yet he could not conceive that the whole house could look bigger. I have couched several others," adds Mr. Cheselden, "who were born blind, whose observations were of the same kind; but they being younger, none of them gave so full an account as this gentleman."

We have dwelt thus long on Berkeley's "Theory of Vision," from a conviction of its importance in the progress of mental science. Here, at least, is one step gained; one curious fact in the history of mind, not obvious in itself, but first worked out by patient analysis and reflection, and then demonstrated by observation of the predicted results. Its establishment makes for future inquirers a point of departure, not a principle to be questioned, nor a fancied error to be overturned. If the philosophy of mind be capable of advancement, it must be through means of similar discoveries effected by similar means. The very nature of a scientific principle is, that it be fixed, limited, and definite, for these qualities alone distinguish it from vague remark and fanciful speculation. This will be readily admitted with regard to physical science. But there are those, who will not allow it to be applicable to the philosophy of mind, or to what is rather called, as the foundation of all science, philosophy itself. With such persons, the test of a principle or a system is not its literal truth, but its completeness, or rather its universality. Making the boldness of their attempts an excuse for their own failure, they taunt their opponents not with want of success, but with grovelling views. To adopt the words of Bacon, "*rejiciunt itaque lumen experientiae, propter arrogantiam et fastum, ne videatur mens versari in vilibus et*

*fluxis.*" But has their own success been at all commensurate with the lofty promises of their manifesto? To resolve this question, we must inquire more particularly into the origin and nature of the difference of opinion here alluded to, and see what is the real ground of contention. The Scotch metaphysicians, as they are styled, have uniformly maintained that the Baconian mode of investigation, undoubtedly contrived at first with a view principally to physical science, is still a universal *organon* of scientific inquiry, and as such, is perfectly applicable to the philosophy of mind. Perhaps they have harped too much on this string, and by constant appeals to the "Baconian method" and the "inductive logic," as well as by excessive timidity in their own researches, have exposed themselves, in some instances, to well-merited ridicule. Still they have accomplished something by adhering closely to their principles, for the reputation of Reid, at least, founded on his speculations concerning the ideal theory, the difference between sensation and perception, and the analysis of the former faculty, cannot safely be impugned. To this school virtually belong other inquirers, who, in the order of time, far preceded Reid and his coadjutors. Locke first showed the practicability of the method, and the Scotch philosophers made his example, rather than Bacon's precepts, their immediate guide. Berkeley also belongs to the same set, so far as his theory of vision is concerned, and it is remarkable, that this is the only portion of his philosophical writings, the merit of which has never been doubted.

The example of all these writers has proved, that philosophy grows by the successive contributions of different minds, and that observation and patient research are as fruitful in this as in the other sciences. Admitting, that many questions, which had exercised the ingenuity of former inquirers, were beyond the reach of our faculties, a broad field of investigation appeared still open, and the cultivation of it promised to advance the well-being of mankind in the same manner, that discoveries in the department of physics had done, though to a far greater degree. The results would be equally definite and equally tangible, though not so easily referred to their proper source. But this timid procedure has become unpopular of late. A new set of philosophers has arisen, professing not to be mere contributors to the science of mind, but to be authors of new systems, covering the whole ground, and explaining all observed and all possible phenomena. Their followers will admit no-

thing that is partial, but reject every scheme, which does not, like that of Cousin, "embrace in one splendid generalization, God, man, and the universe." There is something very captivating in such a procedure. To reduce all the riddles of human life to one grand problem, and by a single statement, however arbitrary, to resolve the difficulty, is an attempt worthy of a comprehensive and daring spirit. Abstracting entirely from differences of opinion on single topics, and looking only to the manner and object of philosophical inquiries, we find no other distinction so broad and obvious, as the one here stated, between the writings of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin, on the one side, and those of Locke, Reid; and their followers, on the other. Berkeley can be ranked with the latter set in consideration only of his theory of vision. In his other works, he rather appears as the founder of the former school. But the two methods may be considered, for the sake of conciseness, as belonging respectively to the English and the Germans.

We have avowed a preference for the English philosophy. In respect to that of the Germans, the only proper question seems to be, whether it can be properly considered as any philosophy at all. A science grows either by the way of analysis, by the evolution of new principles from those formerly known, or by extended observation embracing more facts, and bringing them, by a wider enunciation of the truth, into one view. Isolated truths are useless for scientific purposes. They do not enter into the body of our knowledge, until the relations connecting them with previous discoveries are perceived, and their due position being thus ascertained, the process of generalizing can be easily completed. But what is called a philosophical system is a thing by itself. If incomplete, it is nothing; it does not answer even its own end. If finished and connected, it must be founded on gratuitous hypotheses and arbitrary definitions; and it leaves the future inquirer nothing to do. No additions can be made, and the student must either sit quietly down in admiration of his predecessor's work, or must commence his task as an improver, by pulling down the whole edifice, to clear the ground for a new construction of his own. Hence, instead of advancing in knowledge, we have only a perpetual seesaw of old errors. It is idle, therefore, for the favorers of such systems to talk of progress. The aim of every inquirer is, to reach by one bound the limits of human inquiry, and to demonstrate, that the utmost exertion of intellect can no farther

go. "His analysis is final; his explanations are universal; his assertions absolute; his science entire." One system is not the stepping stone to another, but a substitute for all that existed previously, and an impediment to future attempts. It is not a bridge, but a wall or a precipice. Thus Kant, with great affectation of logical exactness, demonstrates the folly of all past, and the impossibility of all future, metaphysics. He transports us to a new point of view, — a Transcendental one, in philosophy, maintaining not merely that it is the only true, but the only possible, position. For the absolute certainty, which we seemed to possess on some topics, he substitutes a human and subjective conviction, sufficient indeed for our purposes, but in no wise conformable to the truth of *things in themselves*. To use his own jargon, we live in a world not of *noumena* but of *phenomena*. In exchange for this system, Fichte gives us one of absolute idealism; Schelling, one of entire pantheism; and we learn that Hegel, the last great name in German metaphysics, has published *his* scheme of utter *nihilism*. These systems are not additive to each other, but are mutually destructive. Regarding the lofty pretensions advanced by all of them, there is something ludicrous in the rapidity, with which they succeeded each other. At short intervals, a new philosophical system was expected in Germany with as much certainty as, a few years ago, we looked every six months for a new Waverley novel.

With this sketch, compare the progress of Philosophy in England. Berkeley founded the most successful of his philosophical works on a pregnant remark in the "Essay on Human Understanding," and thereby confirmed the sagacity of his predecessor, and carried out the principle to an extent of which Locke had never dreamed. Hartley selected for the object of his inquiries a mental principle, that his forerunners had hardly noticed, and illustrated its influence and mode of operation with a fulness and accuracy, which have left his successors nothing to do in the way of explaining the Association of Ideas, but to apply it in accounting for the origin of error and prejudice. The works of Reid are not a refutation, but a defence, of Locke. The germs of his most important dogmas are to be found in the "Essay," and these he developed with a clearness and force of reasoning worthy of his Scotch birth. Here, everything is additive, as in the history of an exact science. We are not obliged to unlearn Locke, before we can compre-

hend Berkeley, or to forget Hartley before we can study Reid. And the reason is obvious. Neither claims the merit of completeness for his labors. Each notices the faults of his predecessors, prunes his redundancies and mistakes, and, it is true, commits errors of a different kind himself. But they correct only. They do not destroy. Through all the imperfections, we can discern clearly, that the march is onward. It is slow, too slow, certainly, for our fiery hopes. But it goes on.

We are far from denying any merit to the Continental writers. It would be strange indeed, if men of such various and profound talents, devoted exclusively to philosophical pursuits, should fail of success on every point. The only object, at present, is to point out the radical vice of their method. We can glean from their works many sagacious observations and acute analyses of mental processes, and with these increase the body of truths collected on the English plan. But it is only from the ruins of their fanciful structures, that such gleanings can be made. We must pull down the edifice, before we can use the materials. The builders of them are right by accident, and wrong by system. Their great mistake is the more extraordinary, because it is the same with that committed in the very infancy of speculation, and which has been so frequently exposed. To generalize at once, to reduce all phenomena to one law, to arrive at unity of principle by bold anticipations of the truth, was the sole object of the ancient philosophers. Hence their thousand whimsical theories, the *water* of Thales, the *atoms* of Leucippus, the *omoiomera* of Anaxagoras. The follies of antiquity have reappeared, not only in the form, but frequently in the doctrines, of philosophy. In a modified and less objectionable shape, New Platonism has revived in France; and recently, with still clearer marks of its origin, it has appeared at our own doors. It was aptly characterized more than two centuries since; "*illud alterum genus philosophiæ phantasticum, et tumidum, et quasi poeticum, magis blanditur intellectui. Inest enim homini quædam intellectus ambitio, non minor voluntatis; præsertim in ingeniis altis et elevatis.*"

There is another evil consequent on the universality of the plan, which these writers have in view, that is still more serious than the obstruction to the advancement of knowledge. Poets made the religion of the ancients, and philosophers would fain construct that of the moderns. We have no words to express our indignation at the charlatanry, which tampers with religious

belief and immortal interests, in order to gild and complete a fantastic system of man's device. Philosophy is not the master nor the author of religion, but its servant. It may interpret oracles, but it utters none. We care not, whether by one scheme, man's nature be debased and his hopes of immortality ridiculed, or by another, his faith in things unseen and eternal be refined into a fleeting abstraction, that may heat the imagination, but cannot touch the heart. There is little to choose between the faith of Diderot and Voltaire, and that of Fichte and Schelling. Never was a sounder remark than Bacon's; "from this foolish mixture of divine and human things, there results not only a fantastic philosophy, but a heretical religion." Never was better advice given than his: Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto faith, the things that belong to faith.

No higher praise can be given to Berkeley's philosophical works, than to indicate their constant direction to the defence of religious truth. He did not derive his faith from his speculations, but devoted these to its support. The main object in all his writings, except those we have already noticed, is the refutation of skepticism. To this end, he was admirably qualified by his various learning, the rich and eloquent character of his style, and the fairness, tact, and cogency of his reasoning. These qualities are fully displayed in "The Minute Philosopher," the fruit of his meditations during his residence in this country. In this work, he pursues the adversary through the various characters of atheist, libertine, enthusiast, scorner, critic, metaphysician, fatalist, and skeptic; meeting him at every turn, and fairly vanquishing him with his own weapons. Sometimes, perhaps, the arguments are drawn too fine; and though the difficulty of answering them is thus increased, they do not force conviction so frequently as less subtle reasoning. The work is cast in the form of dialogues, which, with the frequent use of the Socratic mode of disputation, betrays the writer's fondness for the literature and philosophy of the Greeks. Many of the characters in the conversation, particularly that of Crito, a cool and sarcastic observer, are admirably supported.

In his other writings, Berkeley attacked skepticism in a manner equally new and ingenious. Hitherto, the defenders of religion had waged a protracted contest, by merely parrying the blows aimed against Christianity, and vindicating it against assaults of a various, and indeed an opposite, character. Berke-

ley suddenly assumed the offensive, and carried the war with great vigor into the enemy's camp. He showed that the difficulties raised against a scheme of religious faith, existed equally in all departments of knowledge; that metaphysical reasoning, applied with logical exactness to the first principles of all science, exposed greater inconsistencies and stumbling blocks to progress, than could be found in all discourse about necessity, the origin of evil, or the impossibility of believing in miracles. Instead of defending the immateriality of the thinking principle, he attacked the existence of matter. The nature of the Deity is inconceivable, but so are the abstractions of mathematics. Apparent contradictions appear from connecting the ideas of his various attributes, but greater seeming absurdities may be logically deduced from the definitions of the geometer and the analyst. The argument is conducted on the same principles in either case, and the results must be admitted or rejected together. The infidel is thus pushed to the dilemma, either of rejecting all that knowledge and science, on which he grounds alike the most minute and the most important actions of life, or of acknowledging the insufficiency of his own method, and quitting the field altogether. The imperfection of our faculties lies at the bottom of the difficulty. Human ingenuity can weave puzzles, which human intellect cannot solve. But it is the part of overweening self-confidence to suppose, that the problem is altogether insoluble, because *we* cannot find an answer to it; that the ocean is bottomless, because *our* lines cannot fathom it. Yet we have no cause to distrust our capacities, or repine at their insufficiency to answer all the calls of our finite and our immortal destiny. We can sound the ocean sufficiently far to insure the safety of the ship, though not to satisfy a vain curiosity. We can meet any difficulty, with which we have any immediate concern. The obstacles we have alluded to, lie not directly in our path; they cloud no man's prospects, unless he lends his own efforts to raise them. If sought for, they will surely be found, but they come not unasked.

The skepticism of Hume is, in fact, a confirmation of Berkeley's successful mode of conducting the argument. He was fairly caught in the trap, which the ingenuity of his predecessor had set. He considered the writings of the Bishop, notwithstanding their avowed purpose, as forming the best lessons of skepticism, that could be found either among ancient or modern

philosophers. "That all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely skeptical, appears from this," (an extraordinary admission, by the way,) "*that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction.*" Carrying out the principle, Hume attacked the foundations of belief on all subjects. The confiding belief of the child and the imposing certainties of the mathematician, are, on his system, reduced to the same level. His predecessors had shown the impossibility of stopping half way, and he therefore pursued the journey to the end. The result is forcibly stated in his own language. "The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another." The only reply to the argument and the result thus summed up was foreseen by Berkeley, and is forcibly stated by Mackintosh. "Whatever attacks every principle of belief, can destroy none. As long as the foundations of knowledge are allowed to remain on the same level (be it called of certainty or uncertainty) with the maxims of life, the whole system of human belief must continue undisturbed. When the skeptic boasts of having involved the results of experience and the elements of geometry in the same ruin with the doctrines of religion and the principles of philosophy, he may be answered, that no dogmatist ever claimed more than the same degree of certainty for these various convictions and opinions; and that his skepticism, therefore, leaves them in the relative condition in which it found them."

The occasion, on which "The Analyst" was written, sufficiently indicates the purpose, that its author had in view. Berkeley and Addison were both intimate friends of the celebrated Dr. Garth, who held to infidel opinions. When the latter was on his death-bed, Addison visited him, and charitably endeavored to converse on religious topics, with a view of preparing him for his approaching end. The Doctor repulsed him, however, with this singular remark. "Surely, Addison, I have good reason not to believe those trifles, since my friend Dr. Halley, who has dealt so much in demonstration, has assured me, that the doctrines of Christianity are incomprehensible, and the religion itself an imposture." Addison related the conversation to Berkeley, who was so much struck with it, that he resolved to assail Halley on his own ground, and in a short



time, he published "The Analyst, a Discourse addressed to an Infidel Mathematician." It was his object to prove, that the principles and inferences of modern analytic science are no more distinctly conceived, or more evidently deduced, than religious mysteries and points of faith. The pamphlet is written with great vigor and acuteness, and displays the writer's intimate acquaintance with the branch of learning, that he assails. It provoked replies from Walton, Jurin, Robins, and other distinguished English mathematicians, and the Bishop defended himself with temper and ability.

The chief ground of attack is the notion of qualities *infinitely small*, on which the whole theory of Fluxions or the Calculus is based, and which is implied even in the definitions and reasoning of the geometer. This idea has ever been a stumbling block to the mathematician; when hard pressed on the subject, he is reduced to the sorry argument, that the principles and reasoning must be well founded, for the results are correct. No one doubts this. But the superior rigor of his method is poorly supported by an appeal to the argument *a posteriori*. The difficulty in the Calculus arises from the loose and imperfect idea, that we attach to the expression  $dx$ . If it be considered as a quantity infinitely small, since, by the hypothesis, it is an element or integral part of a fixed and assignable magnitude, it follows, by parity of reasoning, that lines may be regarded as made up of points, and surfaces of lines. But how can a determinate length be formed by the continued addition of elements, that, taken separately, have no length? What is the difference between the mathematician's idea of *zero* and of a quantity infinitely small? Either may be suppressed at the conclusion of the process, without affecting the correctness of the result. Why may it not be suppressed, then, at the beginning, or if retained, of what use is it? It is a mere evasion of the difficulty, to say that  $dx$  is merely a quantity that may be rendered as small as we please, without changing those magnitudes, whose relations to each other is sought. This is to make the expression wholly indeterminate, and how then can it preserve unaltered relations to definite magnitudes? In regard to precision of thought, there is little to choose between an expression, that may have any meaning, and that which has no meaning. Suppose a sheet of paper to be cut by a number of planes, at right angles with its surface, and parallel to each other. The cutting planes are mere surfaces, having length

and breadth, but no thickness. However small the sheet, ten thousand planes may be passed through it in this manner, and there will still be as much room as when we commenced. Hence, the paper may be divided into parts infinitely small. Is the meaning of this proposition altered in the least, if we change the expression, and say, that the paper may be divided into parts as small as we please? Whichever phrase we adopt, all the absurd consequences, that flow from admitting the infinite divisibility of matter, are legitimately established, and by reasoning, which is purely mathematical. The consideration of differentials of the second and third degree leads to still greater difficulties. What are we to think of a double indeterminateness, or of a quantity as much smaller than  $dx$ , as  $dx$  is smaller than the universe? Must we not regard the mathematician here as using mere arbitrary symbols, that possess certain wonderful properties and guide him to the desired result, but of whose real essence he knows nothing? He tends a machine, that does his work faithfully, but he is wholly ignorant of its internal construction.

We are not aware, that the metaphysical difficulties, here stated, as involved in the theory of the Calculus, are more serious than many, which attach to the simplest algebraical expressions. Mathematical notation, in its primitive form, is but an abridged statement of reasoning, that may be carried on mentally, and without the use of signs, but with a greater burden to the memory. The process is legitimate, only so far as the technical expression may be referred again to the original ideas. But seduced by the facility of the operation, and following the analogy of the first steps, the mathematician goes too far, and the correspondence between the notation and the mental conception ceases entirely. The symbols become arbitrary, and the process is altogether mechanical. We can understand the expression  $a - b$ , when  $a$  represents a quantity greater than  $b$ . But when this is not the case, the idea becomes wavering and uncertain. Negative quantities, standing by themselves, can be but imperfectly conceived. In like manner, we can speak intelligibly of the square root of a positive quantity, though its value cannot be exactly assigned. But of the square root of a negative quantity we can have no conception; it is wholly absurd. Instances might be easily multiplied from the higher branches of the science, where the notation of the algebraist, as it were, outruns his intellect. But to admit

such examples to shake our confidence in the formulas obtained, would be to allow, that the theological difficulties alluded to could unhinge our religious faith. The writer of the "Analyst" only labored to prove, that there were stumbling blocks of as much importance in mathematical, as in moral, reasoning, and the attempt must be considered as a very fair instance of the *argumentum ad hominem*.

Whatever opinion may be formed of Berkeley's success in his contest with the mathematicians, it cannot be doubted, that his refutation of the materialists is perfectly conclusive. The work particularly addressed to these philosophers is his "Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge," which appeared the year after the publication of the "New Theory of Vision." It contains the system usually denoted by the author's name, and is the chief source of his celebrity in the history of mental science. Considered as the production of a mere youth, only twenty-six years of age, the unrivalled tact which it displays in metaphysical research, the bold and comprehensive views that are advanced, and the singular ingenuity and force of the reasoning, by which they are supported, all excite no less wonder than admiration. The ideal theory, that denied the real existence of material things, had been regarded before Berkeley's time merely as one of the fantastic speculations of the Greeks, that might amuse the leisure of the student with the singularity of the hypothesis, but hardly merited serious comment or refutation. He made it one of the chief questions in philosophy, and supported his own side with so much address, that to have been a convert to his theory at some period of one's life is regarded as a test of ability in abstruse speculations.

There is a prevailing misapprehension respecting the nature and influence of a belief in Idealism. It is often said, that the common actions of life, — precautions against bodily injury, for instance, are at variance with its principles; and that the daily conduct of the Idealist refutes his assertions. To be consistent, it is supposed, that he must imitate the skeptic of the ancients, who would not turn aside, though a carriage drove against him in the streets; or move out of the path, though it led to a precipice. We are somewhat skeptical about the fact, for Pyrrho lived to the age of ninety. But at any rate, the Berkeleian of our day seeks not to establish his consistency by running any such hazards. He doubts not the reality of ideas and

sensations *as such*. Nature exists for him also, but only in his own mind. He fully believes in the uniformity of her laws, — that like causes will produce like effects. He is confident, for instance, that the *idea* of falling from a precipice will be followed by the *idea* of exquisite pain, and if he has common sense, he will avoid those volitions, which constant experience has taught him will lead to its occurrence. He does not, it is true, fear the fracture of a bone, for he thinks that there are no bones to break. But he dreads the conception of such an injury, and the pain which must be consequent on the feeling. Since we are no farther interested in our bodily frame, than as it is a source of pleasure or pain, and since these feelings evidently belong not to outward substance, but to the mind, it is difficult to see any room for the charge of inconsistency. One may dream of being tortured, and though the fire and stake exist only in his imagination, the convulsed motions of the sleeper prove, that the mental agony is real. One might reasonably take precautions against the recurrence of such fancies, though he believes them to be nothing but “written troubles of the brain.”

Berkeley was led to doubt the existence of matter by the same train of thought, that is expressed in his theory of vision. If we *see* the outward world only in imagination, how do we know that it exists at all? The visible world is a phantasm; what better evidence of reality has the tangible? The other senses cannot aid us here; the same arguments, that we have applied to colors, hold equally well with odors, tastes, and sounds. These are effects produced on the mind. We take cognizance of, them, and can even specify the occasions, on which they are excited. But of their causes, the only things supposed to exist externally, we know nothing; and it is vain to make any inquiry respecting them, till we can assign some reason, why an orange tastes sweet, and a lemon sour; why a drum sounds hollow and glass shrill. Yet, as Berkeley remarks, “it is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing among men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word, all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding.” But ask of such a believer a reason for the faith that is in him. What is that matter, for the existence of which you contend? It is something that is extended, figured, colored, hard or soft, &c. But what is that *something*? We cannot tell. It is supposed to be inert, un-

sentient, and unthinking. But if inactive, how can it be a cause of sensation? If unthinking, how can it excite thought? Our notion of any particular substance is but a congeries of sensible impressions, and when we have separated from it the ideas of its particular qualities, its taste, smell, figure, and hardness, the whole conception is destroyed. But these qualities are relative terms, and vary with different recipients, and under dissimilar circumstances, with the same recipient. What is slow to the swallow, is arrowy swiftness to the tortoise. What is a mite, an atom, to man, is a universe to the animalculæ discoverable by the microscope. Our eyes are jaundiced, and a sickly tint is spread over the landscape. Our mouths are parched with fever, and the taste of every thing is nauseous. We have followed the huge war-ship with the eye, till it has

“melted from  
The smallness of a gnat to air.”

How is it possible, that things perpetually fleeting and variable as our ideas, changing on every alteration in the distance, medium, or instrument, should be the image of any thing fixed and permanent? What needs this huge fabric of lifeless matter to excite impressions in us, when the same effects might be produced without its agency? All knowledge proceeds originally from the Supreme Being, the source of truth; but, as the materialist supposes, it comes mediately, or through the intervention of matter. Why not trace it directly to the proper fountain? Dreams, for the time, are real; at least, they produce all the effects of reality, in exciting belief, emotion, and action. Consider the difference between the wild and inconsistent fancies, that crowd the sick man's brain in sleep, and the dreams of a healthy person, which are comparatively well-ordered and consistent. It is as wide, as the distinction, that any one man can draw between his own sleeping and waking thoughts. Why may not all this mortal life be one long dream, from which we shall be wakened only by the last trump?

Idealism is not skepticism, but its opposite. Berkeley did not distrust his senses, or repose with one jot less of confidence in the information they afforded. He opposed only what he held to be an unfair conclusion; that our sensations are caused by inanimate, brute, unthinking matter, of the essence of which we know nothing, and never can know anything. He believed that these ideas came rather from the infinite and omni-

scient *mind*. They cannot be the creations of our own minds, for they exist independently of human volitions; we cannot help receiving them, when the organization of the senses is perfect. Moreover, as they are perceived by us at intervals, and as their reality is admitted, there must be some other mind, in which they exist during these intervals, as they did exist there before our birth, and will exist after our departure. Thus, if we deny the outward existence of brute substance, we must believe that a mind exists, which affects us every moment with the ideas we perceive. We must believe in a God. "How great a friend material substance hath been to Atheists in all ages, it were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it, that when this corner stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground."

Thus far, we can see nothing objectionable in the *hypothesis*, "that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth; in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind." It affords an easy solution to all the difficulties respecting the creation of matter, for we may at once allow the maxim of the skeptic, "*e nihilo nihil fit*," and brave the consequences of the admission. The materialist is silenced, not more by demonstrating the insufficiency of his argument, than by showing the futility of his theory, even if it were received. We make no progress by referring the operations of mind to matter, for we know as much of the former as of the latter. The evidence of consciousness is direct, while that of sensation is mediate. Every one is conscious of thought and volition, and cannot doubt their existence; while the reality of most qualities ascribed to matter is a mere inference from certain effects discoverable in our own minds. Berkeley, however, pushed this argument too far, by asserting that all our knowledge of material things was from inference. In this way, he thought to demonstrate that the existence of matter was impossible. We perceive nothing, he argues, but ideas and sensations, and it is a contradiction to suppose, that these can exist otherwise than in mind. An idea cannot belong to an unthinking substance, nor a sensation to an unsentient one. The supposition that things exist externally, of which our ideas are copies, is equally inadmissible. Thinking can resemble nothing but thought; an idea can be like nothing but another idea. Reid destroyed

this argument entirely by denying the premises. To assume at the outset, that we perceive nothing but ideas, is a *petitio principii*, for the very point of dispute concerns the immediate perception of outward things. Besides, to think and to have an idea are equivalent expressions. The supposition, that there exists in the mind an object of thought distinct from the act of thinking, is entirely gratuitous. There is a double relation, indeed, to the external object on the one hand, and to the thinking subject on the other; but this double relation pertains to one and the same modification of mind.

That the existence of matter was impossible, and a belief in it contradictory and absurd, were points that Reid successfully contested with Berkeley. But, though the former refuted the demonstration, he left the argument from probabilities untouched, or rather opposed to it only the universal belief of mankind. Hence, the difference between the two was aptly summed up by Dr. Brown. "One bawled out, 'we must believe in an outward world,' but added in a whisper, 'we can give no reason for our belief;' the other cried out, 'we can give no reason for such a notion,' and whispers, 'I own we cannot get rid of it.'" Such a difference and such a similarity of opinion will always exist. The vulgar will always believe in a dualism of substance and spirit, and, in his common intercourse with the world, the philosopher assents to this opinion almost against his will. But the latter, in his closet, tormented by the view of problems that he cannot solve, by the difficulty of explaining the mutual dependence, action, and reaction of two principles, continually attempts to resolve all into one, to trace everything to the single operation either of matter or mind. Either opinion is an assumption, but a very convenient one, for if it does not resolve the problems, it at least removes them out of sight. Since Berkeley's time, spiritualism has maintained a marked ascendancy with the mongers of systems. Materialism, after sustaining a vigorous contest in the hands of Priestley and Cabanis, seems at the present day to be almost annihilated. The Scotch school essayed to hold the balance between the combatants by espousing the popular belief, and for their comfort were told by their more aspiring brethren, that their opinions formed no philosophy at all. They shared the usual fate of peace-makers, in being reviled for their timidity by both the contending parties.

We have seen with what success Berkeley applied his sys-

tem to removing the objections of the skeptic. The important point now to be remarked is the fact, that nearly all the schemes of universal philosophy recently invented are identical in substance, though not in form, with the system of Berkeley, and that the authors of them owe all their success in sweeping generalization to the adoption of his opinions. Idealism, more or less disguised, belongs to them all. Cousin expounds his scheme of it after his usual fashion, in a style unmatched for brilliancy and effect. He considers all the objects of sense merely as active causes, or forces. "Change and multiply the phenomena of sensation," he argues, "as you please; as soon as the Reason perceives them, it refers them to a cause, to which it attributes successively, not the internal modifications of the *subject*, but the *objective* qualities producing such modifications; that is to say, it develops by degrees the notion of a cause, but does not go beyond it; for the properties of matter are nothing but causes, and can be known only as such. The external world is only an assemblage of causes corresponding to our real or possible sensations. The relation of these causes to each other constitutes the order of nature. Thus, the world is made of the same stuff that we are, and nature is the sister of man. It is active, living, animated, as he is, and its history is a drama, like that of humanity." And again, "what Natural Philosopher, since Euler's time, conducts his researches with a view to anything but forces and laws? Who now speaks of atoms? Who considers the existence even of molecules, as anything but a hypothesis? If this fact is incontestable, if modern physical science is occupied with nothing but forces and laws, I adopt the legitimate conclusion, that, in respect both to its knowledge and its ignorance, this science does not favor materialism. It adopted spiritualism, when it rejected every other method but that of observation and induction, for these can lead to the knowledge only of forces and laws." It is almost superfluous to remark, that both the theory and the argument here are coincident with those of Berkeley.

Kant's theory is the complement of the systems maintained by other Idealists, while his arguments are the reverse of theirs. The secondary qualities of matter had already been referred to their proper seat in the mind, and were no longer viewed as necessary attributes of outward substance. Their fleeting character, their dependence on the various aspects in which things are perceived, and their altered appearance, when no change



had taken place in the thing observed, but only in the observer, were held to establish their non-existence exterior to mind. Extension, or limited space, remained as almost the only permanent quality inherent in substance, as less affected than others by the changes of the percipient, and therefore probably regarded as a necessary attribute of the thing perceived. To remove this last support to a belief in the objective reality of matter, Kant turns the argument the other way. Universal and necessary notions cannot be furnished by experience, which is concerned only with what is transitory, limited, and casual. But the idea of space is universal and necessary, is the prerequisite or condition of our ability to conceive of anything out of our own minds. Therefore, space is not an empirical idea. It cannot be obtained from experience, and must be regarded as a law of the understanding, or a *form* of the sensitive faculty (*sinnlichkeit*.)

To infer the non-existence of space from our inability to conceive of its non-existence, to believe that it belongs only to the mind, because we cannot even imagine its annihilation as an outward quality, is an argument perfectly after the manner of Kant. Yet on this kind of reasoning the whole "Criticism of Pure Reason" is established. Whatever claims it may possess to be generally received, in this case, it evidently does not support his conclusion. Space may be the form of our belief in outward substance, for it is not merely a necessary *attribute*, but the distinguishing element, the *substratum* in our complex idea of matter. We cannot believe in the existence of anything, without also admitting the existence of that quality, which makes it what it is. We cannot have the idea of a man, for instance, without uniting to it the conception of a certain shape. But space is not a universal form of the whole sensitive faculty, for there are many sensations, — those of odors, tastes, and sounds, that do not involve, or even originally suggest, this idea. Still farther, we acquire the notion of externality or outness, before we are acquainted with extension. A child thinks of existence foreign to itself, — to speak technically, it distinguishes between the *me* and the *not-me*, when it has no conception of space. The idea of expansion is consequent on the belief subsequently formed, that a *number* of objects exist independently of self. Space then comes to be necessarily connected in the mind with the idea of externality. But this necessary connexion no more proves, that space exists only in

the mind, than our necessary attribution of three angles to a figure of three sides demonstrates, that these angles have only a subjective character, and do not exist in the figure itself.

But we leave the argument in order to examine the consequences of admitting the doctrine. It is evident, that the theory is consistent only with a scheme of pure Idealism. The popular belief, that material objects exist in space, is at least intelligible and consistent with itself. Whether adequate proof can be adduced in its support or not, it involves no absurdity. But deny the external reality of space, and you not only destroy the belief in an outward world, but render the very conception of such an existence impossible. On Kant's own principles, we cannot form any idea of material substance, into which extension or limited space does not enter; we cannot believe in the outward existence of that substance, unless as surrounded by space. To unite the two points in one system, to assert that space exists only in the mind, and at the same time to maintain the reality of outward things, is an attempt worthy the genius of Kant. His demonstration of the latter point, with the annexed comment on the theory of Berkeley, is so characteristic, that we submit it to our readers. Our translation claims no other merit, than that of strict fidelity to the original.

“ Idealism in respect to matter is that system, which declares that the existence of objects in space out of ourselves is either doubtful and not susceptible of proof, or that it is wholly unfounded and impossible. The former is the problematic Idealism of Des Cartes, who held that only one empirical assertion (*I am* or *I exist*) could not be doubted. The latter is the dogmatic Idealism of Berkeley, who maintained that space and everything, with which space is connected as a necessary condition of its being, were in themselves impossible; and therefore, the existence of objects in space was a mere delusion. Dogmatic Idealism is unavoidable, if we regard space as a property belonging to things in themselves; on this hypothesis, space and everything existing in it is a nonentity (*Unding*). But the grounds of this Idealism are taken away in our system of transcendental æsthetics. Problematic Idealism, which asserts nothing but our inability to prove from immediate experience any existence but our own, is agreeable to reason, and conforms to an important rule in philosophy, never to permit a decisive judgment, till satisfactory evidence has been discovered. The required proof must therefore establish this point; that we have *experience* of external

things, and not merely an *imagination* of them. This can be done in no other way, but by proving that even our internal experience, admitted as certain by Des Cartes, is possible only by assuming external experience beforehand."

"*Theorem.* The mere consciousness, determined empirically, of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space out of myself."

"*Proof.* I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. But every determination in time presupposes something fixed and permanent (*etwas Beharrliches*) in perception. But this fixed and permanent object cannot be anything in me, for by its means only can my existence in time be determined. Therefore the perception of this fixed and permanent object is possible only by means of something out of myself, and not by any bare mental representation or idea of such things existing externally. Consequently, the determination of my being in time is possible only through the existence of real things, which I perceive out of my own mind. But consciousness in time is necessarily connected with a consciousness of the possibility of this determination in time; therefore, it is also necessarily connected with the existence of things out of myself, as the condition of the determination in time; that is, the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things out of myself."

"*Observation.* In the foregoing proof, one may perceive that the tables are turned upon the Idealists, and their own weapons directed with greater justice against themselves. They assume, that the only immediate experience is the internal, and from this we know external things only by inference; but, as at all times, when we reason from given effects to a determinate cause, the inference is not to be depended upon, because there may be in our own minds the cause of those conceptions, which we, perhaps falsely, ascribe to external objects. But here it is proved, that external experience is properly immediate, and on this depends the possibility, not indeed of the consciousness of our existence, but of the determination of this existence in time; that is, on external experience depends the possibility of internal experience." \*

These are profound sayings, —

“Φωσάντα συνετοῖσιν ἔς  
Δὲ τὸ πᾶν ἡμυγνῶν  
Χωτίζει.”

He, who does not understand the proof, may rest assured that the fault is in his own want of comprehension, and that he has

no genius for metaphysics. He who does not admit its conclusiveness, is an impracticable infidel, and we will have nothing farther to say to him.

We hardly know of an opinion more universal and more unfounded, than that which ascribes skepticism to the philosophy of Berkeley, and the refutation of skepticism to that of Kant. We have seen the total injustice of the former imputation. For the existence of the latter opinion, we can only account by the fact, that the doctrines of the German philosopher are so imperfectly known. His answer to Hume's doctrine of causality amounts to no more than the same vigorous protest against it, which was entered by Reid, and to a statement of the fact, also noticed by the Scotch philosopher, of our necessary belief, founded on the very constitution of the mind, in the connexion between cause and effect. With this exception, Kant's theory consists in an abandonment of the whole ground to the skeptic, and in a fancied demonstration of the impossibility of answering his doubts. To consider the operation of outward things on the mind, believing the former to be well known, and studying the constitution of the latter through their effects upon it, was the old method in philosophy. The German metaphysician reversed this process. He looked upon the outward world as modified by our own mental constitution, and regarded its phenomenal laws as the mere expression of our intellectual principles. The cognitive faculty of man contains two elements, the aptitude to receive impressions from without, or *receptivity*, and *spontaneity*, or the power of reacting upon and modifying these impressions. One who had never seen the face of nature but through green spectacles, would undoubtedly believe that the color of things in themselves was green. He could not admit the possibility, that they should have any other color. At least, he would retain this mistaken opinion, till he had studied the principles of Transcendentalism, which would fain teach him, if it had the power, to analyze his faculty of vision, and to distinguish in his perception the *objective* element, or that quality really belonging to the outward thing, from the *subjective* element, or the property superadded to the thing by his manner of looking at it. The illustration is a homely one, but we cannot find a better. The human mind, on Kant's theory, is like the green glasses of this unfortunate individual. It invests the objects of its knowledge with its own properties, and blends these so inti-

mately with qualities existing in the object itself, that a separation is impossible. The illustration fails here. The person in question might remove the impediment to perfect vision, and then the landscape would appear to him in its real colors. But we can acquire knowledge only through the mind. Imperfect and deceptive as the instrument is, constantly leading us to ascribe its own defects to the constitution of things without, we can obtain no other. "It sounds strange indeed at first," says the master himself, "but it is not the less certain, when I say, in respect to the original laws of the Understanding, that it does not derive them from Nature, but imposes them upon Nature." \*

The old definition of truth, the object of former metaphysical research, made it consist in the conformity of our ideas with the things which they represented. According to Kant, this inquiry must be abandoned, for the answer must ever be without our reach. The idea and the archetype, subjectivity and objectivity, matter and mind, are so inextricably interwoven, that no human power can separate them; otherwise, intellect could resolve a difficulty, of which its own operations are the cause. It is obvious, that this theory is the very essence of skepticism, for it resolves everything into doubt. Gladly must its ingenuous disciple take refuge in a scheme of positive unbelief, the utter torpor of which would be far preferable to the feverish anxiety consequent on inquiries, that can never be abandoned and never answered. It is a vain attempt, to limit our curiosity to a mere examination of the laws of mind, of the conformity of thought with mental principles; to reduce all the articles of creeds that transcend the immediate province of the intellect, to objects of faith, but not of knowledge. An irresistible impulse carries us beyond these boundaries. The existence of this impulse is recognised in the Transcendental philosophy, but the possibility of gratifying it is denied. The oldest subjects of philosophical investigation, *God, liberty, immortality, &c.*, as they transcend the limits of immediate mental experience, are beyond the reach of our faculties. The arguments are presented on each side, and declared to be of equal force. No decision then is possible. The several modes of proving the existence of a God, reduced by this nomenclature to the *ontological*, the *cosmological*, and the *physico-theological* argu-

---

\* Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen metaphysik. — p. 113.

ment, are separately examined, and all held to be indecisive of the question. The Transcendentalist maintains, that this procedure shelters these great interests of man from the attacks of reasoning, since the assailant, no less than the supporter, is silenced. It does indeed shelter them, by classifying them with all other arbitrary hypotheses, that can neither be proved nor disproved. The results of the whole system may be well summed up in the language of its founder. The province of the understanding "is an island, inclosed by Nature herself in unalterable limits. It is the land of Truth (an attractive term) surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the proper abode of delusion, where many a cloud-bank and rapidly melting ice-field assume a false appearance of land, and ever deceiving with empty hopes the voyager intent upon new discoveries, involve him in adventures that he can never abandon, and never bring to an end." \*

But we have no room to pursue this subject further, and we gladly return to Berkeley. All the philosophical works of this writer, that we have yet noticed, with the exception of the "Analyst," were the productions of his youth. He gave his name to some of the most important speculations in philosophy, that have ever gained the attention of the curious, before he had attained the age of thirty. His sense of duty compelled him to give the vigor of his manhood to exertions more directly affecting the immediate interests of his countrymen and the world in general. When grown old, however, his mind naturally reverted to the studies of his early years, and the fruit of his meditations appeared in a singular work, that united the characteristics of the philanthropist and the scholar. As the infirmities of age were stealing upon him, he had received much benefit from a medicine, the use of which he had learned in America. An exaggerated view of its efficacy in all cases of disease prompted him to communicate the secret to the world, and he published "Siris; a Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries concerning the Virtues of Tar Water." It is a fanciful work, reviving the method of the ancients in a strange mixture of physical and metaphysical research. The medicine is recommended, of course, as a panacea, and the theory of its virtues is expounded in a manner, that, in point of scientific accuracy, reminds one of Bacon's most unfortunate

---

\* Kritik der reinen Vernunft. — p. 214.

inquiry concerning heat. From a discussion of the subtle properties and fluids of vegetable life, the author passes to the speculations of the ancients on animal spirits, the soul, the *anima mundi*, and brings out the whole store of his multifarious classical knowledge. Valueless as a scientific production, the work is still attractive from its fascinating style, the stock of curious learning, and the light it casts on the character of its amiable author. As a written composition, indeed, it is superior to all his other publications, for it would be difficult to produce a finer model of a style, at once elegant, clear, and richly illustrated, without tawdriness or affectation. Though Berkeley survived the appearance of this work for several years, his health was so much broken, that we may regard the preparation of it as the closing effort of a life faithfully and effectually devoted to the service of God and man.

F. B.

---

ART. IV.—*The French Revolution, a History*. In three volumes. By THOMAS CARLYLE. Three volumes in two. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown. 1838.

HOWEVER various the judgments on this work, all must accord it the praise, due to so few books, of being a genuine production of the author's mind. His page is never a collection of phrases, with whatever thought may still adhere, from Reviews and conversations, but words out of his heart. As an old writer expresses it, "the consubstantial words that thought begetteth and goeth forth in." It might weary the eye to see announced a new discussion of a subject that has already deluged the reading community. But the work turns out no vain repetition, like the false sun in a watery cloud, but a bright, strong original. Truly the author deserves for himself the praise he gives Mirabeau of having an *eye*. And let him, that has *this*, tell us again of what has been weakly described for the thousandth time. If the true poet go to Niagara or the White Hills, let us have his vivid picture, for all the water-colors of the travelling crowd, who, having eyes, see not. And after all the sketches and side-views that have been given

of the French Revolution, let us go eagerly, to behold this magnificent Panorama at last.

We give thus at once the great merit of the book. In *picturesqueness* it surpasses all others. Scott himself draws no pictures so life-like, while often his images lack expressiveness and condensation, and his whole work shows the hurry and superfluity, likely to mark the labors of a man writing himself out of debt. We once heard a book, plethoric with illustration, compared to the milky-way, because it had a great deal of *unappropriated light*. But, though Carlyle abounds in tropes, it is as the sky abounds in stars, with but an occasional haze. Dull geniuses find much fault with what they call diminutively the flowery style, and let grandiloquence have its rebuke. But the thick-flowering tree, though many blossoms fall fruitless, bends lowest its laden branches at last. We could wish indeed Carlyle's imagination were more various and chaste. Fire and sulphur from below, as well as celestial elements, are mixed abundantly upon his palette. A passage occurs to us for instance in one of the most remarkable descriptions in the book, the Flight of Royalty from Paris. No chapter in a romance has stronger interest. Like many other descriptions, it confirmed our old faith, that reality, well observed, will furnish as much to kindle the soul as ideal characters and scenes. The "Annals of the poor" among ourselves would thrill us more than most romances. The passage in question shows that kind of wanton mixture of the sublime and vulgar, of which we complain. We need not grossness to save us from sentimentality.

"Those peaked stone-towers are Raincy; towers of wicked d'Orleans. All slumbers, save the multiplex bustle of our new Berline. Loose-skirted scare-crow of an Herb-merchant, with his ass and early greens, toilsomely plodding, seems the only creature we meet. But right ahead the great North-east sends up ever-more his gray brindled dawn; from dewy branch, birds here and there, with short deep warble, salute the coming sun. Stars fade out, and galaxies; street-lamps of the city of God. The Universe, O my brothers, is flinging wide its portals for the levee of the GREAT HIGH KING. Thou, poor king Louis, farrest nevertheless, as mortals do, towards orient lands of Hope; and the Tuileries with *its* levees, and France and the earth itself, is but a larger kind of dog hutch, — occasionally going rabid." — Vol. II. pp. 15, 16.



Again.

"How each one of those dull leathern diligences, with its leathern bag and 'The king is fled,' furrows up smooth France as it goes; through town and hamlet, ruffles up the smooth public mind into quivering agitation of death-terror; then lumbers on, as if nothing had happened! Along all highways; towards the utmost borders; till all France is ruffled,—roughened up (metaphorically speaking) into one enormous, desperate-minded, red-guggling turkey-cock!" — Vol. II. pp. 18, 19.

The book abounds with such phrases as "Purgatory and hell-fire," "Theatrical thunder-barrels, mere resin and noise," "Thunder-chain," "Bituminous alarum-fire," "Fiery, Fuliginous mass," "smoke-atmosphere," "Electric murkiness," "Fire-mahlstrom." Our author may perhaps say he has chosen his *frames* for his *pictures*. At any rate, let not some errors of taste prevent our acknowledgment of his truly wonderful and admirable power of delineation. All other books on the subject, that have appeared, contain probably not so many instances of graphic portraiture. His tale seems not one of years gone-by, but of yesterday. He seems just escaped from the troubled scene, and with glowing face and rapid gesture, giving us an account. Or rather we seem ourselves in the midst, at the taking of the Bastille, in the Insurrection of women, by the death-bed of Louis the unforgotten, or in the National Assembly as it sits in Convenient hall, or Tennis-court, and is shaken by the thunders of Mirabeau. It has become common to accompany a book with drawings illustrative of its scenes; as in Goethe's *Faust*. "The History of the French Revolution" does not need them! For we know not what gallery of pictures could equal these word-paintings in truth and effect. Even that enormous pile lately described to us,\* the palace of Versailles itself, might be searched in vain for more lively portraits.

Connected with this trait of Mr. Carlyle's work are some qualities of style which deserve to be more gravely considered than that coarse and wanton character of his illustrations already noticed. *Connected* with this trait, we say; for it seems to us the qualities referred to show the condensing action of this same predominant faculty of his mind, the imagination. Many do not hesitate to accuse him of affectation. But great *singularity*

---

\* London Quarterly Review, January, 1838.

is possible without this, and must be discriminated from it. We cannot think, indeed, he has much of what, in an article in the *Edinburgh Review*,\* he labored to show is the true element of genius, "a certain unconsciousness." He seems very self-conscious. But so does John Milton, as both he and Coleridge have said. And great genius is consistent with this, though not perhaps the greatest. How it would have marred the creations of Shakspeare! But there should be a distinction made between self-consciousness and consciousness of other things. Utter "unconsciousness" seems neither possible nor desirable. We ought to be conscious of our faults; and we must be conscious of the noble dispositions, in which virtues take root. When we rise into those higher natures of Goodness, Beauty, Justice, and Truth, we are *conscious* of the operation upon us of unearthly energies swelling and lifting the soul, till all thought of self fades away in rapt adoration. Does not this view end the dispute as to the justness of Mr. Carlyle's sentiment? In fact, is not Genius unconscious in one way, but very conscious in another? Does not spiritual Life, in proportion as it is quick and lofty, involve at once forgetfulness of the individual; and consciousness of divine power and grace? What we should be unconscious of is the merely personal relations of things, especially the lower personal. The highest state would be a due combination of the self-losing and self-recovering power. Mr. Carlyle appears even more than we like in his writings.

But there are some minor traits of his style, which we cannot approve. He is quite careless of grammatical propriety in the comparison of adjectives, and says "welcomer," "peaceablest," "unhappiest," and strangely presses words into compound forms; and makes new words without apology. And to one, whose taste is not too much offended, the delineations are thus sometimes rendered more lively. We leave it to others to say, whether such an advantage can warrant such liberties in an individual; and only remark ourselves, that it would be somewhat shocking if any should be seduced to follow his example. His own style, indeed, has undergone great changes, we know not whose so great, in so short a time, since the appearance of the "*Life of Schiller*." It is more vigorous and striking, but less simple and pure. We need only quote some of his expressions. "Bemurmured," "Moribund," "Wreck-

---

\* Characteristics.

age," "Renunciation," "Gabblement," "Eleutheromaniac," "Internequine," "Undemolishable." These are but specimens. We know, a man may have meanings which no common words or phrases can express precisely and tersely, as they exist in his mind. Every genuine thinker must, at times, be tempted to coin words for himself. But there are few, who appreciate the force of the language as it stands, and to whom still more earnest thought will fail to reveal, not its poverty, but its richness. Passages force themselves into our mind of the old writers, whose plain force of expression shames this oddness. At least there should be some limits to the privilege of pardon in this matter, and such extensive forgery should not escape condign punishment!

We will give the happiest instance we remember of the impressive effect just alluded to, as coming from this "liberty of speech," as bad in literature as, in these days, it sometimes is in morals. When the king requested the national Deputies to dissolve for a time, after he had "filed out" with his retinue, the assembly stands in gloomy silence and uncertainty. But,

"One man of them is certain; one man of them discerns and dares. It is now that king Mirabeau starts to the Tribune, and lifts up his lion-voice. Verily a word in season; for in such scenes the moment is the mother of ages. Had not Gabriel Honoré been there, one can well fancy how the Commons Deputies, affrighted at the perils which now yawned dim all around them, and waxing ever paler in each other's paleness, might very naturally, one after one, have *glided off*; and the whole course of European History have been different!

"But he is there. List to the *brool* of that royal forest-voice; sorrowful, low; fast swelling to a roar! Eyes kindle at the glance of his eye."

What is meant in another place by the "clamm of death" is not so certain.

We hope to be excused for mingling praise and blame. We have no sympathy with the common custom of writing a review, as one would make a special plea to serve party or personal prejudice; really injuring a man by splendid exaggerations of eulogy, or drowning his merits in the passion vented upon a few defects.

We have spoken of the faculty for description evinced in these volumes. But it relates not only to *scenes*, but *characters*. And here, too, Mr. Carlyle shows great power. He has

first, fine discernment. A piercing imagination places him immediately at the centre, and unveils to him the springs of action. Then, he has wonderful discrimination to fix on the characteristic traits. And, lastly, unbounded power of language and illustration to set them forth. Louis, Robespierre, Danton, Necker, Calonne, Talleyrand, Lafayette, and many others, and especially the Mirabeaus; Gabriel Honoré of course above all others, though nothing can be finer than his sketches of his father, the "Friend of Man."

Generally his delineations consist of few touches, like some portraits, but every stroke has meaning. We do not know enough to vouch for the truth of his portraits. There is plainly no intention to flatter, or set down aught in malice. Whatever mistake there is seems to arise oftener from a wrong estimation of the commendableness of certain qualities, than from misapprehension of the qualities themselves. We have in mind some instances of happier and more tasteful portraiture, but none where single features and expressions are more skilfully seized.

We give a sentence about Controller Calonne.

"A man of such facility withal. To observe him in the pleasure-vortex of society, which none partakes of with more gusto, you might ask, When does he work? And yet his work, as we see, is never behindhand; above all the fruit of his work, ready-money. Truly a man of incredible facility; facile action, facile elocution, facile thought: how, in mild suasion, philosophic depth sparkles up from him, as mere wit and lambent sprightliness; and in her Majesty's Soirées, with the weight of a world lying on him, he is the delight of men and women! By what magic does he accomplish miracles? By the only true magic, that of genius. Men name him '*the Minister*;' as indeed, when was there another such?" — Vol. I. p. 65.

We must add part of the scene between him and the deputies of the Bureaus.

"He is standing at bay; alone; exposed to an incessant fire of questions, interpellations, objurgations, from those 'hundred and thirty-seven' pieces of logic-ordnance,— what we may well call *bouches à feu*, fire-mouths literally! \* \* \* \* \* To the raging play of so many fire-mouths he opposes nothing angrier than light-beams, self-possession, and fatherly smiles. With the imperturbablest bland clearness, he, for five hours long, keeps answering the incessant volley of fiery captious questions, reproachful interpellations; in words quick as lightning, quiet as light." — Vol. I. p. 70.

These extracts show one of Mr. Carlyle's most peculiar habits as a writer, — the repetition of words and phrases. It is sometimes wearisome, and sometimes very impressive. Robespierre never appears without his "sea-green" complexion, probably from some dim symbolic connexion of this with his mind. France is represented by the interesting metaphor already quoted, but repeatedly as a "Sahara sand-waltz," its dancing pillars kept up or dissolved by the wind. The author recurs with loving pride to his own illustration, till sometimes it is like to perish with fondling.

Danton is given in Carlyle's bold sketching manner in contrast with Robespierre, — "chief products of a victorious Revolution."

"One conceives easily the mutual incompatibility that divided these two; with what terror of feminine hatred the poor sea-green Formula looked at the monstrous colossal Reality, and grew greener to behold him; the Reality, again, struggling to think no ill of a chief product of the Revolution; yet feeling at bottom that such chief product was little other than a chief wind-bag, blown large by popular air, not a man with the heart of a man, but a poor spasmodic incorruptible pedant, with a logic Formula instead of a heart; of Jesuit or Methodist-parson nature; full of sincere cant, incorruptibility, of virulence, poltroonery; barren as the east-wind! \* \* \* \* \*

For in France there is this Danton only that could still try to govern France. He only, the wild amorphous Titan; — and perhaps that other olive-complexioned individual, the Artillery officer at Toulon, whom we left pushing his fortune in the south?" — Vol. II. pp. 403, 407.

We cannot leave this aspect of the book without giving some of the closing remarks upon Mirabeau.

"From amid the press of ruddy busy Life, the Pale Messenger beckons silently; wide-spreading interests, projects, salvation of French Monarchies, what thing soever man has on hand, he must suddenly quit it all and go. Wert thou saving French Monarchies; wert thou blacking shoes on the Pont Neuf!" — Vol. I. p. 413.

When Mirabeau had gone.

"How touching is the loyalty of men to their sovereign man! All theatres, public amusements close; no joyful meeting can be held in these nights, joy is not for them; the People break in upon private dancing-parties, and sullenly command that they

cease. \* \* \* \* For three days there is low wide moan ; weeping in the National Assembly itself. The streets are all mournful ; orators mounted on the *bornes*, with large silent audience, preaching the funeral sermon of the dead. Let no coachman whip fast, distractively with his rolling wheels, or almost at all, through these groups ! His traces may be cut ; himself and his fare, as incurable aristocrats, hurled sulkily into the kennels. \* \* \* \* In the Restaurateurs of the Palais Royal, the waiter remarks, — ‘ Fine weather, Monsieur : ’ — ‘ Yes, my friend,’ answers the ancient man of Letters, ‘ very fine ; but Mirabeau is dead.’

“ As he, for his part, had swallowed all formulas, what Formula is there, never so comprehensive, that will express truly the *plus* and the *minus*, give us the accurate net-result of him ? Moralities not a few must shriek condemnatory over this Mirabeau ; the Morality, by which he could be judged, has not yet got uttered in the speech of men. \* \* \* \* Honor to the strong man, in these ages, who has shaken himself loose of shams, and *is* something. For in the way of being *worthy*, the first condition surely is that one *be*. \* \* \* \* There lay in him, as the basis of all, a sincerity, a great free earnestness. \* \* \* Hate him not ; thou canst not hate him ! \* \*

The light of genius itself is in this man ; which was never yet base and hateful ; but at worst was lamentable, loveable with pity. They say that he was ambitious, that he wanted to be Minister. It is most time ; and was he not simply the one man in France, who could have done any good as minister ? Not vanity alone, not pride alone ; far from that ! Wild burstings of affection were in this great heart ; of fierce lightning, and soft dew of pity. So sunk, bemired in wretchedest defacements, it may be said of him, like the Magdalen of old, that he loved much. \* \* \* \* New Mirabeaus one hears not of : the wild kindred, as we said, is gone out with this its greatest. \* \* The chosen last of the Mirabeaus is gone ; the chosen man of France is gone. It was he who shook old France from its basis ; and, as if with his single hand, has held it toppling there, still unfallen. What things depended on that one man ! He is as a ship suddenly shivered on sunk rocks ; much swims on the waste waters, far from help.” — Vol. I. pp. 416 – 422.

All that is said of this wonderful man here, and closely resembling it, in the article in the Westminster Review, is at least interesting. Of his energy and, in the main, honesty, we may not doubt ; yet if he was guilty of any acknowledged vices the morality *has* been uttered, both by Christianity and

Reason, that so far will judge him. We would sympathize with human nature in all its varieties; but however sincere our love, our judgments must be regulated by a moral standard; and whatever palliation circumstances may furnish for individuals, we must never lose sight of the eternal difference of right and wrong in actions. Mr. Carlyle says that Mirabeau *swallowed all Formulas*; and takes a delight in repeating the expression, which seems to come at once from the happy phrase invented and contemplation of the quality it celebrates. But however strong mental constitution may render it safe for some to swallow all Formulas, we should not counsel it to every one, either in Politics, Mathematics, or Religion.

There is a tone of sentiment, or a philosophical doctrine, we know not which to call it, that occasionally comes to view in Mr. Carlyle, with which, without qualification, we do not sympathize. It is expressed in various forms. He gives his strongest praise to men, who have *being*, not seeming merely, who have abjured "shams," and act out their nature as it is; who have swallowed all Formulas, and strive to remodel the world according to their own Idea. We shall comment upon this sentiment or doctrine so far as its dimness will allow. What is a Formula? It is, we suppose, a prescribed rule of action. To be a man of Formulas then is in itself no reproach. Even the action of Deity is formulary; that is, it is regular. We believe every act of his perfectly free, and what we call laws but a series of similar acts, and an unusual act a miracle. And when men imitate God, acting in the same way in the same circumstances, which they will do more and more, as they are freed from the caprice of impulse and approach the perfection of Reason, they act by a Formula. We have a thousand habits, muscular and voluntary, which would be embraced in a Formula. But it is the Formulas alone relating to the mind's higher action, that are here in question. A political constitution, a religious creed, is a Formula. There is a best way of doing everything, and this, once discovered, should be always pursued. There is a mode of administration best suited to a state, a form of government and Faith most useful to the Church. And without these Church and State would be forever toppling, and accomplishing no end. There are social habits best calculated to secure order and courtesy in life, and it is a benevolent law, which gives them a certain fixedness. There are a thousand customs adopted by mankind, which at

length become mechanical and constitute a *vis inertiae* not slightly overcome, a great balance-wheel keeping everything safe and without jar. And this arrangement of the Creator we think more beneficent on the whole, than the plan of those who would be forever disarranging the world, and then setting it to rights again. These Formulas are not absolutely unchanging, but enlarged as experience teaches new lessons. But this, we are aware, is not the whole truth. Mankind is not stationary, but progressive. And when Formulas act injuriously upon the rights and wants of men, they should be opposed, "swallowed." This is the right of Revolution. There are times when custom has become intolerably false to the soul; then let there be a Revolution and a Mirabeau to conduct it. But let us not view his character as very lovely in itself, though it answered a good end, as in the counsels of Providence may an Attila or Gengis Khan. Let us beware of reproducing him in a time of comparative justice and peace! Present manners and institutions commonly express the best attainments in sentiment and doctrine of the human mind. And we have no sympathy with those, who, when the system of society is in tolerable health, are for always convulsing it with violent medicine. Let gentle Reform supersede the necessity of violent innovation. And let those, who are most anxious for order, not insist on a dead order; for while they seem conservative, they are the real hasteners of Revolution. Do we not know a dam produces an outbreak? But alas for men or nations absolutely without Formulas. For this is to be without Reason, and under the leading of passion into anarchy and death. Every parent finds it too hard to subdue his children to just Formulas, to have his work hindered. And society has had too much trouble with irreverent young men, who despise Formulas, to have the influence of established laws of Morality lessened.

We fear Mr. Carlyle's praise of the natural character seeking only to act out itself must undergo some abatement. We had thought it the great business of every one to *act upon* as well as act *out* himself. Nay, we had supposed this first was *man's* highest office. The animals can act out their "instincts," but cannot act upon their souls. And we are sorry Mr. Carlyle has not insisted more upon that moral self-discipline, which is essential to the highest state of any man; though, like Mirabeau, he "*is something*" already, or, like Danton, is "*a Man; fiery-real, from the great fire-bosom of Nature herself.*"



The greatest men in History, we believe, will be not the men of impulse, who grow up rugged as the forest-trees, but the men who have acted most mightily upon themselves, who have transformed and exalted themselves evermore into new glory of spiritual strength; who have ruled their own spirits instead of taking a city. A Napoleon may have fame till his bloody footsteps are erased from the earth. But moral strength alone will stamp a character for enduring glory, from Him, who "was tempted in all points, like as we are, yet without sin," to many in later times, who have not such a name of thunder as Danton or Mirabeau. Shall not the beneficent lustre of Howard and Fenelon shine on to the final eclipse of all meteors?

The principle, then, of Mr. Carlyle, so far as we can seize it, must be qualified. Still, as we have said, it has its truth. It is what we may call a half-truth, of which it is not the only instance in his writings. Notwithstanding the truth, as expressions, and good influence, as means, of many Forms, there is always something in man which no Forms can measure. And we should prefer rather to see men somewhat disorderly, than to see them so commonly labelled like merchandise. Friends! let us not consent so freely to have names written upon our foreheads, and submit our souls to wear uniform, but rather do battle with our own convictions against the forces of evil. Let us not stand so quietly in herds, to have the *girth* of our spirits taken and proclaimed. Let us not commit ourselves to be borne away upon the crested popular wave. Let us not surrender conscience and will into the hands of an irresponsible crowd. What! is there not a deep in the soul not to be sounded, but having entrance to an unfathomable sea of strength and love?

Let us then be free. Let us wait reverently at this entrance for new suggestions and inspirations of divine wisdom; helping our fellow-men indeed, individuals, masses; but helping them always as we believe right, and varying our effort and speech with our changing convictions. We shall be persecuted for not making binding confessions of faith on this point and that, and accused of temporizing and timidity, and dishonest concealment. But better is wise silence, than ill-considered speech. Better is prudent waiting, than rash doing. Better sit forever a sphinx by the road-side, than be false to the soul's faith, or cramp the soul's life. Better lead all men by the breathings of pure Religion to reverence God, than by hot zeal upon

questions of the day to blow their passions into flame with each other. And so far as Mr. Carlyle, in these days of aggregation and animal sympathy and moral fear, will teach the doctrine of individual independence, and by his example and writings nourish the spirit of inward freedom, he shall have hearty thanks.

But it is time we should come to some general judgment of the work before us. It purports to be a History, and is to be judged at once by comparison with other Histories, and reference to a perfect Ideal. As a work of taste and art it is inferior to the two remarkable books lately published among ourselves. There is nothing in it like the easy vigor, profound reflection, and complete finish, of the History of the United States, or the smooth beauty and chaste Castilian dignity of that of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. But, as a work of originality and genius, it far transcends them both. In these respects it is the most remarkable production of the day. But referred to an Ideal model, it shows, as everything finite and actual must, considerable imperfections. The question in this view is, What is the object of a History? And what are the faculties and means of the true Historian? A perfect History is the revival of the past in its events, its spirit, its causes and results, and its character. The faculties needful then are plainly, first, exact learning that the facts may be possessed: next, imaginative and sympathetic discernment that the *meaning* facts may be selected from the rest, and those workings of the soul beheld which produce all other agitations; then, profound reflection, to investigate the sources of human action and analyze the principles developed from age to age; and lastly, moral judgment to perceive the religious quality of actions, men, and nations.

We see, then, no work requires greater combination of powers than the true History, nor can we expect often to find them existing in perfect balance. The first two, knowledge and insight, Mr. Carlyle surely has in a very remarkable degree. For deep reflection and just judgment he does not seem to us so distinguished. He begins in the midst and leaves off in the midst, careless of cause and effect. He does indeed, as he proceeds, cast quite significant occasional glances at the origin of the horrors he depicts, and the light of some noble idea is ever upon his page; but he never sets himself to that serious consideration, which this topic demands. In his other writings

he makes some striking allusions. In his article upon Diderot, in the *Foreign Quarterly Review* for April, 1833, he says, — “French Philosophy resided in the persons of the French Philosophers; and, as a mighty deep-struggling Force, was at work there. Deep-struggling, irrepressible; the subterranean fire, which long heaved unquietly, and shook all things with an ominous motion, was here, we can say, forming itself a decided spiracle; which, by and by, as French Revolution, became that volcano-crater, world-famous, world-appalling, world-maddening, as yet very far from closed!” But the only thought apparent on the point in question consists in allusions and intuitions. There is no coherent and digested view. Mr. Carlyle indeed takes no pains to conceal his contempt of the logic-faculty in man, “the hand-lamp of what I call attorney-logic.”\* And for barren syllogisms, not touching and drawing life from Reality, or attempting to embrace what is incomprehensible and infinite, we may have as much scorn as he. But there is a power, not simply of seeing, which he so much lauds, but of *seeing things in connexion*: not of inferring one thing from another, but beholding their essential coherence; and this power unfolds cause and effect, as well as actual scenes in the historical progress of man. And this, so far from being a vulgar power, is the most exalted faculty of the human intellect. We have read articles upon the Revolution, in which it was more strikingly displayed than in these volumes. The highest style of thought, expressed in writing or speech, is not a succession of brilliant particulars volatile as quicksilver, one clause leaving the mind as another enters, and the whole fading in air like a strain of music at last, but that where all the parts are held in union by the strictest method, where the view, opened more and more widely, becomes more and more intensely interesting, the force of all that precedes being gathered upon each sentence, and accumulated with overwhelming power at the close. This is the style of the highest mind, philosophic as well as poetic, but is not yet attained by Mr. Carlyle.

There are some principles frequently hinted at, but not so brought out as to give a philosophical consistency to the whole work. One of these is the inevitable detection and death of all falsehood, and the permanence and triumph of Truth only. Another is the faculty and right belonging to man as man, the

---

\* Sartor Resartus.

impossibility of forever holding "twenty-five millions" of people in bondage, and the necessary rising of the race from all the loads of oppression to a higher and higher dignity. Mr. Carlyle is in the true sense Democratic.

But perhaps we must qualify this praise a little in speaking of the last faculty of the Historian, moral judgment. We believe it the Historian's province honestly to give the relation of the deeds and characters he reviews, to the eternal law of Rectitude. We know how difficult it is to escape all bias. We are aware of the misrepresentations of Gibbon and Hume; and that no Historian has, like a Hebrew Prophet, risen above all that is personal and local. Still it is better the moral nature should act imperfectly than be set aside, and were it to put forth here its true and noble energy, the Historian would be the truest preacher, and from the whole world, as a vast Cathedral, would sound forth with irresistible effect the lessons of duty. This moral view does not pervade the work of Mr. Carlyle. There are passages of great solemnity, as the death of Louis the forgotten, some paragraphs on the misery and might of the mass of the people, and where he attributes the destroying of Religion, not to Philosophism, the Courtiers, Turgot, Necker, the Queen's want of etiquette, but to "those that made the Holy an abomination and extinguishable," — to "every scoundrel that had lived, and quack-like pretended to be doing, and been only eating and ~~mis~~doing, in all provinces of life, as shoeblick or as Sovereign Lord, each in his degree, from the time of Charlemagne and earlier."

But there is often a painful *Levity*, a "sardonic" smile over the troubles he describes. He seems to escape from a true sympathy with his fellow-men into that German artist-state of mind, for which he eulogizes Goethe as catholic in comparison with Schiller as sectarian, but which Goethe's life seems to show is as much indifference to moral considerations as catholicism, and, with all his extraordinary merits, degrades him in our view far below the warm-hearted religious Herder. Let us, though without pledge or bond of slavery, still cherish some sympathy with our fellow-creatures, and take some interest in the moral and political questions affecting their welfare, though it be by some deemed narrow and "sectarian." We hope this spirit of superior smiles, and cold survey of Humanity, will not infect many minds among ourselves, especially of the young. These beating human hearts were never intended to be made

the subject of amusing speculation, or wrought into fantastic ornaments. Especially such a fearful scene as the French Revolution, a thunder-storm in the moral sky, endangering institutions and life, should still and solemnize the heart. To Mr. Carlyle's standard of judgment on character we have already alluded. It does not seem to be very strictly a moral standard. The qualities that please his Taste seem to be naturalness, reality, power in action, more than self-denial and self-control. But all the strength expended in self-restraint from questionable procedures is accumulated for self-excitement in noble ones, and we shall continue to deem moral purpose a nobler motive than native instinct. "New Mirabeaus one hears not of," says Mr. Carlyle. And we hope we shall not hear of them. We hope our young men will not adopt the new doctrine of greatness, and will not imbibe the spirit of the falsely great. Let them repair to nobler exemplars, as Washington and Oberlin; especially those shown to us in the supernatural dispensation from Heaven.

The literary public is so exactly divided into those, who have either ardent admiration or strong censure for Mr. Carlyle's style, that few may be satisfied with our remarks, or be able to understand how anybody interested to write at all should not have written a partisan review. But we have striven to divest ourselves of all personal affections, though they be very strong, and give an honest view. Notwithstanding what we deem his defects, he has spoken to us with a power, which few writers of the age have. And in what we have said of the moral quality of some of his views, we by no means intend to give a general criticism upon the moral effect of his writings. No one has given more thrilling utterance to the highest principles of faith and fervors of worship. His single sentences are sometimes of more worth than volumes of homilies, and good books, and theological treatises. For our gratitude alone we must say, no appeals have gone with more direct and stirring force into our hearts. And notwithstanding his levity, we believe him in the main earnest, though his earnestness is too much wreathed in smiles, and not seldom in too cold ones. Surely we hope he will write more. As one of the most original thinkers and genuine characters of the age, we trust he will go on, and that the force of sympathy will more and more remove him from his Artist-station in the cold mountain air into the mid warmth of human life and fortunes.

We had intended some remarks particularly upon his other writings ; but one of them, "*Sartor Resartus*," has already been noticed, and we have nothing to add. We are rejoiced to see the announcement, under the care of one of our most distinguished literary men, of the *Carlyle Miscellanies*. We know not but these should be considered his most remarkable productions. They exemplify particularly his power of character-painting. Who remembers not the truly beautiful and spirited article upon Burns ; the striking thoughts in his articles upon German Literature, Characteristics, Signs of the Times, and in those on Schiller, Goethe, Richter, Voltaire, Novalis, and Diderot ?

The late Review of Lockhart's Scott naturally meets quite various reception. For Scott has been overrated by the multitude, and is underrated by Mr. Carlyle, who confesses his "small inward vocation" to this work. Scott has not addressed our profoundest faculties, nor advocated great principles of Truth and Duty, nor extended greatly the boundaries of knowledge, nor, consequently, much advanced the fortunes of man. But he has furnished the whole world with a great amount of innocent joy. His works have been as a place of recreation, accessible to all men and forever thronged. And we cannot but be grateful to him, by whom we have been so often feasted. Then he has given descriptions of scenery, manners, and character, by which we have been interested, and often deeply touched. The great characteristic of Scott is his Truth. He does not reflect upon things and modify them, and give them in new forms, and disclose their hidden meaning. The world is reflected in his mind as in a mirror. And though he lack some higher traits, let this be estimated at its real worth. It does not place him among the immortals, but it will prevent him from being soon forgotten. His vivid characters will not be of local, temporary interest, though clothed in the customs of particular places and times. A single spot has charms for the world, and a particular time may perpetuate its interests to all ages. Scott's power is indeed that of observation, sympathy, and description, and not in the highest sense poetic and creative. Therefore his orb grew dim before Byron, and not simply because Byron was a meteor, though he was a "*wandering star*."

Scott's power, we have said, is clearly to see, and set forth what he sees. Accordingly his merit lies in what he says, not in what he suggests. He is not a suggestive writer, and there-

fore does not work strongly upon the soul. The world interests him for what it is. It interests Coleridge and Wordsworth, on the contrary, for what it indicates and wakens in the soul. And though their words may not please us more, they work more strongly within us. We doubt whether even an ardent admirer would say of Scott what Coleridge said of Wordsworth; that whenever he listened to him he seemed to hear "*non verba, sed tonitrua!*"

Scott does not generally go to the source of passion, and describe its pure working. He gives us its appearance and result in speech and action, but not often its struggle in the bosom. For dramatic talent he has been compared with Shakspeare. But however his *close* apparent magnitude may overawe judgment, the perspective of time will show his great inferiority. Scott's faculty was graphic, but Shakspeare's the true Ideal. Scott delighted to describe outward commotions, Shakspeare told their origin in the movements of the soul. Scott could portray what he had seen in the creation, but Shakspeare, independent of all particular observations, give a character, never seen, yet felt to be human, recognised as such if met, and thus in a sense *add* to the creation. And here is the difference. The inferior genius describes, the true Poet *makes*.

Still Scott's was a wondrous gift, a wondrous combination of faculty and disposition. To cleanse one's self from all selfishness and passion, as he showed his moral superiority to Byron in doing, to enter into another with such loving heart as to possess and be that other for the time, to enjoy equally, as we are told of him, the society of all human beings from princes to clowns; all this implies no slight energy of soul and element of greatness. And though he does not go down into the depths of human nature, he gives its manifestations with wonderful truth. Nor shall we cease to love such characters as Rebecca and Elspeth, the Antiquary and Old Mortality, though we never compare them with Hamlet, Lady Macbeth, and Lear!

As we have meditated our subject one conviction has been ever rising in our mind, and now recurs with so much force that we must be excused for giving it utterance. It is the importance of mutual *toleration* among minds of different structure and tendency. Perhaps it is not an unseasonable suggestion viewed in reference to the present state of our own literary community. When the season of servile imitation is over, and men no longer resorting to a common fountain, which makes

them so many channels, begin to speak and act from themselves, there will be a variety of intellectual character corresponding to the differences at once of original endowment and voluntary aim. There is doubtless an ideal perfection of mind, which is a standard of judgment for all actual minds. But how few approach even the perfection of harmony, what we call balance of character; and perfection of degree belongs only to the Infinite. Yet towards both these perfections the earnest souls struggle. And because the essay of one, in the infantile effort of this world, goes in one direction, and of another in the opposite, why, in the name of all that is human and holy, should they live in mutual dislike and repulsion? Did they but know it, they are not foes, but each other's best servants and friends. For if capability of service be the qualification of a friend, they should be more friendly than if they were alike, as they can do more to supply each other's deficiencies, correct each other's faults, and raise each other towards the common perfection of all minds. Is there not indeed a deep meaning of good to yourself in the exhortation, "Love your enemy?" for, if you will, may not your enemy be your most useful friend? Our own community of mind has of late years had its decided differences of taste. And perhaps the self-exaltation and intolerance produced have not been less for the genuineness of the qualities which by one party or another have been prized and defended. But surely this hostility should cease. For all it concerns, properly viewed, is in union. "If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing?" Let not the man of practical strength think meanly of him, whose eye is upturned to visions of Beauty; for this Beauty is related with and may flow into the most common actions of life. Neither let him, whose imagination spreads for him daily feasts of ambrosia and nectar, with a worse intolerance despise the conscientious hard-working supporters of good social institutions; for there is a Beauty in their action, whose absence would sadly impoverish the Beauty of his thought. Let there be no mutual scorn between the Fine and the Useful arts, for they both receive an equal dignity from their union in the moral nature. Let the war end between Transcendentalism and Common Sense. There is no "schism" in the true soul, in which both are perfect. And let us all strive after that charity, which, while tongues shall cease, and knowledge vanish away, never faileth.



ART. V.—1. *Reports on the Geological Survey of the State of New York, communicated to the Governor and the General Assembly, February, 1837.*

*First Annual Report on the Survey of the First District.*  
By W. W. MATHER.

*First Annual Report on the Second District.* By Professor  
E. EMMONS.

*First Annual Report on the Third District.* By T. A.  
CONRAD.

*First Annual Report on the Fourth District.* By LARDNER  
VANUXEM.

*Report on the Mineralogical and Chemical Departments of the Survey.* By Dr. LEWIS C. BECK.

2. *First Annual Report on the Geology of the State of Maine, accompanied by an Atlas of Plates.* By C. T. JACKSON, M. D. Member of the Geological Society of France, &c. &c.

3. *First Annual Report of the Public Lands belonging to Massachusetts and Maine.* By the same. Boston. 1837.

4. *Second Annual Report on the Geology of Maine.* By the same. Augusta. 1838.

5. *Second Annual Report on the Geology of the Public Lands.* By the same. Boston. 1838.

WE welcome these reports with great interest. They have afforded us much instruction, and have thrown much new light upon the before undeveloped resources and mineral productions of the sections of country to which they relate. It reflects great honor upon the Chief Magistrates of those States, that their influence has been thus opportunely exerted, in a way so directly calculated to advance the best and most immediate interests of their constituents.

It is one of the happiest omens of the times, that the Science of Geology, from its economical and practical bearings, as well as from its essential and almost unparalleled importance, as a high and noble branch of human learning and research, is beginning to receive, at all hands, the attention which it deserves. We speak here in reference to our own country, where by means of popular lectures, Lyceums, Scientific tracts, &c., a facility has been given to the dissemination of knowledge, rarely, if ever, equalled by any other people. No subject is

listened to with greater interest, by a popular assembly, and none inspires greater love and enthusiasm in the student. Its theme is the history, primeval and recent, of our planet, all whose phenomena and revolutions it attempts to explain. It is the ally of Scripture, for it gives unequivocal testimony in favor of the Mosaic records, as to the creation and the flood, by the disclosures which examinations are continually bringing to light, all tending not only to confirm the *leading facts* in the cosmogony of the historian, but establishing precisely the same order which he has assigned to the different epochs of creation, ending finally in man, whose remains have never been found in the fossil state, either by themselves or accompanying the bones or vestiges of other animals, everywhere so numerous, with which, had they existed on the earth at the same early period, we should now expect to find them buried in the same strata. We might have concluded *a priori*, that the coincidence, of which we have spoken, would have been found to exist, that there would prove a resultant harmony between the Works and Word of the Creator. This being the case, it were to be hoped that the friends of Geology and of the Bible, who find in one a confirmation of the other, might have been spared the wholesale sneers and ridicule which have been levelled against them by various infidel writers. It is indeed said, with some truth, that this ridicule has not been entirely unmerited, as some writers have shown a disposition to force the coincidence, or frame some new system, by adducing arguments neither derived from reason nor supported by common sense, and have thus, unintentionally, injured their own cause and laid themselves open to attack. This is much to be regretted, on account of a large class of persons who are honest in their skepticism, and who have taken up the subject unbiassed either against or in favor of the Scriptures; but who, if they are ever made to *believe* in them, through the discoveries of science, must be led on by a process of rational and philosophical deduction from well attested facts. It is believed that there is a large number of young men to whom these remarks will apply with much force; for their sakes, we say, let the subject be treated as it should be. Mere theologians, who know nothing of practical geology, are not the suitable expounders of its teachings, and they betray a latent skepticism, whenever they show their fears as to the results or tendencies of any physical investigations which may have a bearing upon revelation. The two writers who have

attained the most notoriety for their new views and explanations, are Mr. Granville Penn and Mr. Fairholme. Their works, the former, entitled "A Comparative Estimate of the Mineral and Mosaical Geologies," and the latter, "A General view of the Geology of Scripture," both aiming mainly to establish the same theory, have, though written with the best intentions, done much to destroy a well founded, and very general confidence in the truth of the Mosaic records, without throwing any new light upon the subject. They interpret the sacred text literally, as to the *six days* of the creation, and reject the prevalent idea of the gradual deposition and crystalization of the materials composing the primitive rocks from a chaotic state. Like the first plant and the first animal, they believe the primary masses to have been created perfect at once, by the immediate fiat of the Almighty; and resting their evidence upon what must be regarded as a forced rendering of the Bible, they have discovered that the *Earth, we now inhabit, was not that peopled by the Antediluvians*. During the Deluge, the old world, they inform us, was suddenly submerged to the bottom of the sea, and the bed of the then existing ocean rose up to become the future habitation of man. Of course the Garden of Eden, and the Rivers which are described as issuing from Paradise before the flood, must now be at the bottom of the ocean; but our authors find no great difficulty in removing this objection to their theory, by endeavoring to prove that the four descriptive verses in the second chapter of Genesis, were an explanatory note added to an early manuscript, which, in process of time, had become incorporated into the Sacred Text, by the ignorance of some transcriber.\*

Though the system of these gentlemen is supported by much ingenuity and learning, it is almost useless to say, that the discoveries which "Mineral Geology" has brought to light have incontestibly disproved it, by establishing the identity of the *ante* and *post* diluvial continents, so that, at present, it has but few, if any, adherents. It is fortunate for the world that authors, like Cuvier, Conybeare, Buckland, and a few others, have, at last, by years of study and careful geological re-

---

\* The passages of Scripture, on which they principally found their theory of the *total* destruction of the "ancient earth," are Genesis vi. 13, and 2 Peter iii. 6, 7, on the meaning of which learned commentators of all parties are opposed to them.

search, placed us in possession of facts which must forever settle the question, as to the essential truth of the Mosaic Cosmogony, as it has been generally understood, and not according to any ingenious system-favoring interpretation. They have shown that the facts of the creation and the deluge do not in truth rest exclusively, or mainly, on the authority of written evidence of any kind; but are proved by the undoubted testimony which the rocks themselves afford — that “elder Scripture” which no exegetical skill, “marginal interpolations,” or supposed “false renderings” can ever invalidate or explain away.

There are, then, considerations of great moment, independently of its bearings upon the economy of life, why the science of Geology should be universally understood. But as our object, in this article, is rather to offer some notice of the Reports, the titles of which have been given, we must here leave the discussion of this part of the subject, though it would not be inappropriate on another occasion, had we time and ability, to offer, in the pages of this work, some more extended observations upon a topic, which has occupied so much attention in various journals of the day, both theological and scientific. We gladly refer our readers to the late treatise of Professor Buckland,\* and also to a still more recent work by Mr. Babbage,† entitled the “Ninth Bridgewater Treatise,” where they will find the subject, in all its bearings, critically and impartially considered.

The credit of preparing, and carrying into execution the first Geological State Survey, belongs to the Legislature of North Carolina; and although but few years have since elapsed, several of the other States have, with a commendable alacrity, followed the example; and, at the present time, no less than

---

\* Geology and Mineralogy considered with reference to Natural Theology. By the Rev. William Buckland, D. D., Canon of Christ's Church, and Reader in Geology and Mineralogy in the University of Oxford. Philadelphia: Carey, Lea, and Blanchard. 1837.

† Charles Babbage, Esq., Professor in the University of Cambridge. This work will be read with great interest, and we hope soon to see it reprinted in this country. We much regret, however, that the author, or his friends, have thought it advisable to give a title to his book, which conveys the erroneous impression to the world, that it belongs to the series of the Bridgewater Treatises. It were far better that no such disguise to render it popular had been resorted to, since, emanating from such a source, it could scarcely fail to be so.

nine or ten of their territories have been, or are being, explored. The reports made to their respective Legislatures comprise not only accurate information, as to their principal rock formations and mineral deposits, but also embody their mineralogy, botany, zoölogy, or, in other words, their general natural history. Our National Legislature, too, has wisely authorized the exploration of the Public Lands, in the distant territories of Missouri and Arkansas, and the reports of Mr. Featherstonhaugh, who was appointed to the work, have already been laid before the public, disclosing information which proves that they must ultimately become highly interesting and valuable as sources of vast mineral wealth.

It is to be regretted, however, that this gentleman has given himself up so much to generalization and the drawing of mere theoretical inferences, quite foreign to a work on descriptive geology, professedly designed to treat only of well established facts.

The survey of New York was commenced upon a more generous and extended plan of operation, than could perhaps have been expected from the Legislature of either of the other States. The appropriation was so liberal as to command the services of four distinguished geologists, with their assistants, besides providing for a Zoölogist, Botanist, Mineralogist, and Chemist. The State was divided into four grand sections, each being assigned to a geologist and his assistants, and four years were allowed for the entire completion of the survey.\* As these gentlemen have, as yet, given us only their first reports, which do not enter into many minute local details, excepting such as seemed of immediate practical utility, but rather present the leading, or most prominent features of the several districts, their relations to each other and to similar formations elsewhere, of course much additional information is to be expected in the progress of the work, and especially, on its final completion. Although we are far from allowing equal merit to each of the reports which have been published, we may yet venture to say that, when the final volume shall appear, accompanied by geological maps, sections, views of remarkable scenery, &c., nothing, of a similar character, which has yet

---

\* It is understood that the expense of this work will amount to, at least, *thirty thousand dollars*. This accords with the public spirit which this State has ever manifested.

appeared in this country, will surpass it, in the clearness and accuracy of its details, or in the importance and variety of the discoveries it will make known. We venture this remark, knowing the high reputation of the gentlemen employed for "field service," and being informed, from other sources, of the remarkable interest possessed by the regions they are to examine. It presents great diversity of geological structure, exhibiting all the principal rock formations of our country from the oldest to the most recent. The primary occupy, for the most part, the Northern Section, while the transition, secondary and tertiary, prevail in the other portions of the State; though these latter are often pierced through by the primary underlying strata of granite. These rocks furnish valuable beds and veins of iron and lead, besides limestone, marble, and gypsum, which have already proved sources of immense wealth to the State; while of simple minerals, of no utility as applicable to the arts, but interesting to the scientific mineralogist, it is believed that no State in the Union offers an equal number. They are among the most admired and valuable specimens to be found in the Cabinets of our Mineralogists, and we must be pardoned for mentioning, in particular, those almost perfect gems, the transparent crystals of quartz, from Lake George and Saratoga, the six sided prisms of phosphate of Lime, and the variously shaded crystals of Iceland and fluor spars, which are not surpassed by the finest foreign specimens. We think that no one can view these perfect forms of inorganic matter, as for example the cube of fluor spar with its edges so smoothly pared away, its points or angles reflecting sometimes one, and sometimes three, brilliant beveled triangular faces, which, whether large or small, always bear the same invariable inclination to each other, and to all the other sides of the crystal, without being vividly impressed with a sense of their wonderful beauty and perfection, and the evidence they afford of the One great all-designing Mind.

The occurrence of these valuable substances will go far to compensate for the hitherto undiscovered mines of coal, which abound in some of the adjoining States, but of which only a few scattered and unprofitable beds are met with in this. There are reasons assigned in one of the Reports, why it is not probable that any more extensive beds of coal, either of anthracite or bituminous, will ever be discovered. This opinion is founded on the want of similarity in the accompanying fossil remains, when compared with those of the "coal measures" of Pennsylva-

nia, proving them to belong to formations not geologically identical. We offer an extract from Mr. Vanuxem's Report on this subject, which we think satisfactory.

"The rocks, of this district, abound in *marine* organic remains of shells and zoöphytes, showing the presence of the sea, and not of land favorable for plants, coal being a *vegetable* product. To those who may doubt the vegetable origin of coal, it may be necessary further to state, that in all countries, so far examined, the regular associates of coal are blue shale, grey sandstone and conglomerate; one or all with vegetable remains. The exceptions only have other kinds of rocks and marine fossils, accompanied by those of the vegetable kingdom likewise." — *Report on the Fourth District*, p. 197.

In the Report of the Third District, by Mr. Conrad, comprising the countries bordering on Lake Ontario, we are presented with some new and important facts in relation to the red sandstone, which forms so large a portion of its surface, containing all the salt springs and beds of gypsum in the State, and usually known as the "saliferous rock" of Professor Eaton, who, under the auspices of that distinguished patron of science, Mr. Van Rensselaer, was the first to make any very important investigations into its character. It has generally been supposed to be identical with the new red sandstone of Phillips and Conybeare, in which the vast rock salt mines of England and Poland are found, while some have referred it directly to the old red sandstone. Mr. Conrad, however, guided in his opinions by the only infallible evidence we can have of the comparative age of rocks, namely, that furnished by their fossils, assures us, "that it does not bear the remotest analogy, in the contained organic remains, or in its relation to other rocks," with either of those above named: a conclusion, he adds, "of great importance, because it bears directly on the question regarding the existence of coal, any attempt to discover which, within the range of this sandstone, would prove abortive." It thus differs essentially from the sandstone, which includes the salt springs of Ohio, of Nova Scotia, and of Durham in England, for at these places the springs rise up in the very midst of the coal strata.

The existence of a large number of salt springs in the sandstone of this District, has encouraged the hope, that valuable deposits of massive rock salt would also be discovered; but Mr. Conrad inclines to the opinion that none such exist; and

•

thinks that the origin of these springs, like that of many others in this country and Europe, where no traces of rock salt have been discovered, is still involved in obscurity. We shall give his opinion as to the only sure means of solving the problem. "The sandstone of this region having been found to contain cavities, which, from their forms, we infer to have contained crystals of muriate of soda, may possibly have contributed their share to the saline impregnation of the springs, and are well worthy of minute attention, as they will probably solve the problem regarding the occurrence of rock salt in mass." But it should be added, as a remarkable fact, that these cavities have never, in a single instance, been found to contain salt, even when included in the most compact and indurated strata, in which, had it existed, it would be the least likely to be dissolved out. What then was their origin, and how has the substance which once filled them disappeared? The subject is one which is destined to excite a good deal of interest in speculative geology, and perhaps, in the nature of things, can never be satisfactorily accounted for; at least, only by penetrating the muriatiferous strata to a greater depth than has yet been attempted. The opinion of Professor Eaton is, that the brine or salt is formed by a direct combination of elementary materials furnished by the surrounding rocks, and that this combination is continually going on. Mr. Conrad thus speaks of one of the springs.

"In company with Governor Marcy, whose polite attention merits our sincerest thanks, we visited a brine spring near the head of little Sodus Bay, on the farm of Mr. Switser. It has been slightly protected from the influx of fresh water, and is the most strongly impregnated with salt of any natural well we have tasted. Mr. Switser has sunk a hollow log in the site of the spring, and erected a pump, which enables him at any time to make the amount of salt required for the use of his family. He supposes about seventy gallons are requisite to make half a bushel of salt. The well is said to be elevated between thirty and forty feet above the level of Lake Ontario, and is about one mile distant from the head of Little Sodus Bay. A brine spring, equal in volume and strength to that at Salina, would in this most eligible site be of immense value, where there is a superabundance of wood, and navigable waters communicating with Lake Ontario; but we fear there is no probability that any important increase of brine, in quantity or saturation, would be obtained by boring. There is no evidence here of a deep basin,



like that of Salina, where springs unite and concentrate their mineral wealth."

The gypsum, with which the salt springs are associated, presents nothing worthy of particular attention, though the manner of its occurrence may appear somewhat peculiar. Mr. Conrad remarks that it is found in "irregular somewhat conical masses, imbedded in gypseous marl, rarely as much as twenty-five feet in diameter at base, and from ten to thirty feet deep;" and never occurs in parallel layers alternating with the rock to any considerable extent. In only one instance was a specimen of this gypsum found to be *anhydrous*, another circumstance which tends to prove the non-existence of the native rock salt. Mr. Conrad does not find any of the beds of limestone or marble, which are numerous in the same region, in actual contact with the gypseous strata, and therefore places them in a more elevated series. These two dissimilar salts have, however, been found in juxtaposition at other localities, where there can be no doubt of their contemporaneous origin. But these are not within the limits of the United States. The curious question which they suggest, is this; — Was the lime in the pure state, and then united with sulphuric and carbonic acids, or was it in the state of a carbonate alone, and then changed into gypsum by the infiltration of sulphuric acid amongst the strata? Mr. Conrad does not ask the question; and though we have, we do not feel bound to answer it.

We subjoin an extract from Mr. Conrad's Report, in relation to the wearing away of the rocks at the falls on the Genesee and Niagara Rivers, by which it will be perceived that, though the degradation of the rock at both places continues to be very considerable, it must obviously become less and less so every year, so that the much talked of period when, by the retrocession of the Falls of Niagara, Lake Erie itself shall be drained of its waters, is, to say the least, so far removed in the vista of Time, that it can scarcely be regarded in any other light than as a subject of mere speculation.\*

---

\* Mr. Lyell has calculated that it will require upwards of *thirty thousand years* for the Falls to reach Lake Erie, supposing that the erosive action should continue about the same as it now is; but he seems to think that before that time has elapsed, the lake may be filled up by accumulations of sand, gravel, &c. — *Principles of Geology*, Vol. 1. p. 264.

"In its manner of retrocession this fall closely resembles those of Niagara, which, as was first observed by Mr. Eaton, must recede more and more tardily the nearer they approach to Lake Erie, in consequence of the greater thickness of limestone, which every new fracture will expose. The same strata have been divided both by the Niagara and Genesee rivers ; allowing for the difference in size and extent, the gorges are very similar, and the falls of both rivers commenced their career at the same geological epoch, when, in consequence of the rupture of its ancient barrier, Lake Ontario subsided to its present level. We learn that a considerable alteration of position, and wearing away of the third fall of the Genesee, near Carthage, has taken place within a period of thirty years. At a future, though distant period, unless artificial means be resorted to for the purpose of preventing their retrocession, the second and third falls must ultimately be lost by the disappearance of the rocks which support them, even whilst the great fall shall not be far removed from its present site. There will then be one cataract of extreme interest and beauty, equal in height to those of Niagara, and from its insolated character, more imposing in a high stage of the water than the former. These falls afford a hydraulic power equal, as Gordon states, to 1,920 steam engines of 20 horse power each. So great a body of water cannot but exert a most powerful energy in the disintegration of rocks, whose particles, united by argillaceous cement, readily separate when exposed to the action of moisture and frost."

The subject of soil is particularly discussed in the Report of Mr. Mather on the First District ; and if any of our readers should be agriculturists, we recommend it to their careful perusal. It states, with great clearness, the principles on which the application of science to farming is founded ; but we have room only for one extract in reference to the composition of soils.

"The chemical as well as the mechanical composition of soils exerts a powerful influence over vegetation. Salts, alkalies, and alkaline earths act as stimulants, if used moderately ; but if in excess, are injurious. Many soils contain calcareous rocks, stones or pebbles, which are continually undergoing disintegration and solution by atmospherical agents, and thus serve as permanent mineral manures. Other soils abound in stones from such rocks as contain potassa as a constituent, and by their decomposition furnish this alkali in solution to the roots of plants, by which it is absorbed and carried into the circulation, and there,

acting as a stimulant, remains combined with some vegetable acid. The decomposition of gravel, pebbles, and rocks, has been observed to be a benefit to vegetation; and as the rapidity of decomposition depends on the surface exposed, it follows, that if such materials be ground fine, and sowed upon the soil like plaster of Paris, a more decided benefit would result. This has been partially tried with success, and it is to be hoped that the intelligent farmers of this State will give it a more thorough trial.

"The potash of commerce is all derived from wood ashes; and plants originally derived it from the soil of the decomposed rock. Marine plants afford soda, and even wood ashes from maritime districts contain much of this alkali, mixed with potash."

In the southern part of New York, particularly on Long Island, Mr. Mather was presented with some striking proof of a transporting agency, which had removed large masses of rock many miles from their original locations. They are precisely such as Professor Buckland has designated as *Diluvial* boulders, which are common in Europe, as well as in various parts of this continent, and which may be uniformly traced back in one direction to the sources whence they were originally derived, namely from Southeast to Northwest, or deviating but little from these points. Upon the extremity of Long Island, nearly opposite New Haven and New London, were observed numerous water-worn masses of granite, red sandstone, and verde antique, and the varieties of trap rock, — all identical with well known localities of these rocks in Connecticut, near the towns above mentioned, from which they must have been carried over Long Island Sound to the distance of not less than twenty miles, as their origin from these sources is certain. Mr. Mather, however, seems to doubt whether they could have been removed thus far by any powerful current of water, and thinks that the fact of their being imbedded in sand, gravel, and loam, even forbids the idea. This however, to others, would furnish only stronger proof; it is the groundwork of Professor Buckland's theory; for after the principal force of the current had been spent, these less weighty materials would follow on, and be buried in and among the heavier detritus. Certainly the theory of their transport by ice, suggested by some and favored by Mr. Mather, does not seem any more satisfactory, and we do not see how it can be tenable, on the ground that erratic boulders, as has been before observed, are always found distributed in but one direction from the rocks to which they were

once attached; this evidently would not be the case, if they had been carried by mere ordinary, or tidal currents, while adhering to masses of ice. But equally strong evidence of the diluvial current is afforded by the parallel scratches, mentioned in the Report on the First District, as occurring upon the surface of sandstone at Hammond, in St. Lawrence County. Professor Emmons thus speaks of them.

"The upper surface of this rock is always smooth and polished, and sometimes ground by what are termed diluvial scratches. Their direction is *nearly north and south*. That this smoothness is owing to the wearing action of something which has slid over it, appears from the fact, that on cleaving up a new layer, the under surface is rough and harsh. These phenomena are exhibited at Potsham, Hammond, and Theresa."

In the same district he also mentions numerous bowlders of primary rocks, including masses of opalescent feldspar, the original localities of which he traced to still more northern sections of the State. He attributes their removal to a powerful current that swept over the country from north to south, carrying them even into the valley of the Hudson. But we think that he has thrown out a very improbable conjecture, when he says, that some of the masses of feldspar may have been drifted from Labrador, merely because they happen, in a few instances, to be found either a few miles north or west of any *present* known localities of this mineral in the State. Is it not probable that, at the time of the current, some patches of the granite, containing the feldspar, were bare, though now covered by diluvium? or may not the fragments have come from some of the hills of Canada, composed of similar granite, without supposing, with Professor Emmons, that the granite does not again rise until it reaches the shores of Labrador? The evidences of the same devastating current in Canada, were long ago pointed out by Dr. Bigsby, in his examinations of the Districts of Lake Huron and Lake Erie. They are also common throughout the whole extent of this Continent, and form, from their supposed connexion with Scriptural History, one of the most interesting subjects that can engage the attention of speculative geologists. Nowhere, perhaps, are they more conspicuous than in the State of Massachusetts, either as regards the grooves or bowlders, and they are treated so conclusively in Professor Hitchcock's report on the Geology of that State, that we must be permitted here

to introduce the conclusion at which he arrives, though his remarks may not be new to some of our readers. He says,

"It seems to me that the fair result of all the facts and reasonings which I have presented on the subject of diluvial action is, that a mighty deluge has swept from the north and northwest over every part of Massachusetts; and that it cannot be accounted for by the original elevation of the strata of rocks; nor can our diluvial phenomena be explained by the agency of rivers, rains, frosts, or any other agent now in action. This deluge must then have occurred since the earth's surface assumed essentially its present form; and was the last of those catastrophes to which this part of the globe has been subject; and which cannot be referred to existing agencies. The inquiry naturally arises, whether this deluge was identical with that described by Moses. I have already remarked that this question can have no very great interest as bearing upon the veracity of the sacred historian; since nearly all geologists agree that their science exhibits no evidence against the occurrence of such a deluge as he has described. Yet, as it is a characteristic of human nature to go from one extreme to another, and as it has been customary to impute almost every geological change to the deluge of Noah, is it not probable that philosophers, disgusted with so much false reasoning on the subject, will be apt to overlook even creditable geological evidence of that event? I have shown, if I mistake not, that the last deluge in Massachusetts was universal, and that it was comparatively recent. The deluge of Noah is described as universal over the globe; and historical records give us no account of one more recent. Where then is the objection against considering them as identical? Until some substantial reason can be given against such a conclusion, is it not unphilosophical to refuse to admit it?

"I have thus far reasoned exclusively from diluvial action in Massachusetts. But there is evidence that the last deluge rushed from the north over all that part of North America, between Nova Scotia and Lake Huron. Dr. Bigsby has stated facts in the sixth volume of the *Geological Transactions*, and the Messrs. Lapham, more recently, in the twenty-second volume of the *American Journal of Science*, proving the truth of this statement in respect to the country about our western lakes; and the Authors of the memoir on the *Mineralogy and Geology of Nova Scotia* have drawn the same inference from the present position of erratic bowlders in that country. Do not these facts, in connexion with those stated in this report, render it extremely probable, that over the whole breadth of North America, the

current came from the north; although somewhat deflected in some places by local causes?

"Nor is this all. The facts that have been observed in relation to diluvial action in England, Scotland, Ireland, Sweden, Germany, Russia, and the northern parts of Asia, seem to justify the inference, that the last deluge in those portions of the globe came from the north; though modified in its course by local causes."

The fact, that these bowlders, wherever they are found, are strewed over the land in but one direction, and that the furrows upon the rocks point precisely the same way, affords strong proof that they are the effects of one and the same cause; and we know not how they can be explained more consistently than by the theory so ably maintained in Professor Buckland's "*Reliquiæ Diluvianæ*," which attributes them to a universal and mighty flood of waters from the north, and identifies this flood with the Deluge of Noah. The objection to this theory, at first sight, is that the language of Scripture seems to describe no such sudden and tumultuous rushing of waters; this, however, Professor Buckland endeavors to remove; and though, in the opinion of some, he should fail to identify the cause of these phenomena with the Deluge of Noah, no new explanation, as to the *nature* of the agent employed, need be offered; they must then be referred to an *earlier* deluge than that mentioned by Moses, and of which all history is silent; — the proof of *some* deluge they unquestionably are. No causes, like those now in operation, such as the bursting of lakes, the action of rivers, and the wearing away of mountains, could be adequate to produce them, and the theory of Dr. McCulloch, founded on these, has, we believe, few supporters at the present time. Nor is the system of Mr. Lyell, built also upon the theory of the sufficiency of causes now in action to account for all geological phenomena, likely, though supported by every argument which ability and ingenuity could suggest, to meet with a more general reception among geologists. He seems to have enlarged upon the idea originally thrown out by Dr. McCulloch, an author whose recent death, by an accident while on a geological excursion in Scotland, the friends of science must deeply lament. His papers, as published in the *Geological Transactions of Edinburgh*, are among the finest specimens of descriptive geology that have ever appeared, remarkable for their graphic descriptions of scenery, as well as for thoroughness and accuracy in their scientific details.

Dykes of trap are frequent in the Granite of Essex and St. Lawrence Counties, and Professor Emmons has no doubt of their igneous origin, from the changes they have effected in the rocks they traverse, as well as from the evident marks of fusion they themselves exhibit; and in corroboration of this opinion, he mentions a circumstance, which, we confess, has much surprised us, namely, the occurrence of *local earthquakes*, a fact attested by persons long residing in the neighborhood. These, if further inquiry should prove them true, seem to indicate the existence of present, though deeply seated volcanic action. Their occurrence in primitive regions has seldom been remarked, excepting when communicating subterraneously with distant volcanic eruptions, which they immediately precede, or accompany. But as the seat of volcanic action is supposed to be beneath the granite, or rather within it, it may be regarded as a very natural consequence, that all volcanic paroxysms should be the soonest felt by those living immediately upon its crust, for the reason that no incumbent mass of secondary rocks could interfere to offer any resistance to the free action of the force or motion from beneath the granite. During the earthquake at Lisbon, in 1755, it is well known that the waters of our large lakes\* were violently agitated; and there can be no doubt that the force which effected this, was communicated to them through the widely encircling granite strata, beneath the bed of the Atlantic ocean. The great depth of these lakes, particularly of Lake Superior, which in some places exceeds twelve hundred feet,† renders it very probable that granite may be the material on which their waters rest, and through this an undulatory motion would be readily communicated to them, causing the agitation of the surface.

Professor Emmons seems to think that, in some cases, the concussions of the earth, caused by falling rocks and slides, may have been mistaken for earthquakes, here as well as elsewhere; but adds, "there is ground to believe in the prevalent opinion that earthquakes do yet occur in this region." The protrusion of the trap dykes through the strata of gneiss, primitive limestone, beds of iron ore, &c., has occasioned singular contortions and dislocations, which are well described in Professor

---

\* Bakewell's Geology, Silliman's edition, p. 247.

† Captain Bayfield, Transaction of Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, Vol. 1. p. 5.

veins contained in those rocks, which have also concretionary masses of the same metals disseminated through them, we think his reasoning very satisfactory. But to account, in this way, for the origin of all veins, is more, we believe, than facts will warrant us in doing; and the theory of igneous injection from below, certainly offers a much more rational explanation of many that we could point out, some of them being entirely foreign in their nature to the rocks through which they pass. Whether we attempt to explain them by segregation (caused by electro-chemical agency, as first suggested by Mr. Fox) or by sublimation, or lastly, by injection from beneath, we must think, with Mr. Bakewell, that the subject is involved in much obscurity, and that the state of chemical science, with the facts at present known, do not throw any very certain light upon it. We think, too, that Mr. Vanuxem opposes too strongly the theory of the igneous origin of metallic veins in any case, when he states the isolated fact, that "the extinct volcanoes of France afford no other metallic mineral than 'a little oligiste iron,'" meaning, we suppose, to imply that if they were formed by igneous injection, these volcanic rocks would present them to a great extent, or would be the richest in metals. But we are not to infer that the metals were always in a situation to be thrown up, and hence the rocks of some epochs may be pervaded by them, having their seams and fissures filled, while those of another period may be comparatively non-metaliferous. It is, however, a well known fact, that veins of magnetic iron ore, of manganese, and copper, are often seen in trap rocks, as well as tellurium, gold, and antimony, among the recent volcanic lavas, so that the mere fact of the occurrence of *fer oligiste*, among the early volcanic products of France, cannot, as it seems to us, offer any weighty objection against the igneous origin of veins in general.\*

---

\* Since preparing this article, the Second Annual Reports have been received. They are accompanied by Lithographic representations of scenery, and by Geological maps and sections. And to ensure greater completeness to the work, as an elaborate scientific survey, a new Department has been established and assigned to Mr. Conrad, relating exclusively to *fossil organic remains*, called the Palæontological Department; Mr. Conrad's situation as surveyor of the Third District, having been supplied by Mr. Vanuxem, and Mr. James Hall appointed to the Fourth.



The Reports of Dr. Jackson comprise a reconnoissance of the public lands, belonging to Maine and Massachusetts, authorized by the Legislature of the latter state, and also a survey of the entire state of Maine, authorized by its own Legislature. He was assisted by two geologists and a draftsman; and his first report is accompanied by picturesque views and colored representations of some of the most interesting localities, presented along the coast. We offer an extract showing the plan marked out by Dr. Jackson, as the one best calculated to facilitate the satisfactory accomplishment of his work, his first object being to ascertain the geological boundaries of the state; or, in other words, the limits of the different rock formations.

In effecting this, the sea coast afforded him remarkable facilities, presenting bold sections, by which the structure and superposition of the rocks might be clearly ascertained, and their mineral contents developed. He observes, "The State of Maine is one of the most interesting sections of our country, and presents a great diversity of geological facts, which are important in the advancement of the arts and sciences. No other State in the Union has such an extensive and varied rocky coast, indented by thousands of arms of the sea, and estuaries of great rivers. Knowing from former observations, that the general direction of strata in Maine is Northeast and Southwest, I found that the coast section would give me the extent of most of the strata in a longitudinal direction, while the indentures, bays, and mouths of rivers gave those of a transverse order. I was anxious to divide the State, as far as practicable, into squares, so as to intersect every rock on which it is based, and explore the different beds and veins of metallic ores as they presented themselves to view. This plan has been followed, and advantage was taken of the river courses to obtain the most perfect views of the strata." We feel that the only way to do justice to these able Reports, would be to lay before the reader copious extracts from them; but as the limits of this article, already, we fear, too much extended, will not admit of our doing this, we must content ourselves with giving a few brief statements of some of their most important facts and discoveries, referring our readers, for further information, directly to the Reports.

Dr. Jackson makes a division of his subject into Topographical, Agricultural, and Economical Geology; the latter treating of those substances which are of pecuniary value. The rocks

enumerated under the first head are mostly members of the primitive class, forming the principal mountain elevations of the State, and affording many valuable quarries for architectural purposes, besides beds of white marble, often pure enough for statuary, and various metals.

Towards the eastern part of the State, the transition and secondary rocks are predominant, forming a large extent of the sea-coast, and extending northward to the boundary line, rarely broken in their continuity by the older rocks. Among these are limestone, containing fossil shells, sandstone, graywacke, breccias, and the varieties of trap or greenstone.

The various simple minerals, contained in these, are enumerated with much particularity in the economical department; and in the fuller development of these, the citizens of Maine will have at their command treasures which must make them an industrious manufacturing people, and supply them with many articles which they must now obtain from other sources. As the discovery of coal was an object of great importance to the State, Dr. Jackson made this the subject of very careful examination. The new red sandstone, on the St. Croix river, was found to be connected with that of New Brunswick, which contains the coal measures of Grand Lake, and is identical with that in which the gypsum and bituminous coal of Nova Scotia are found; but no beds either of coal or gypsum were discovered, and Dr. Jackson thinks it may prove that some of the members of the coal series are wanting, at the particular places examined, though he recommends boring, as the best means of determining the question.

Among the metallic ores enumerated, besides iron, lead, zinc, copper and bismuth, is wolfram, an oxide of tungsten. It occurs in granite, and as it accompanies all the tin mines of Europe, Dr. Jackson was led to anticipate the discovery of this last named metal in Maine; a discovery which has been made only in one place in the United States, and is there confined to one or two single crystals. The discovery of gold was announced sometime since, by Prof. Cleaveland; but it would appear from Dr. Jackson's statements, that the specimen sent to Prof. C. was of foreign origin, and that some deception must have been practised. The dykes and veins of trap, which are found in so many instances, piercing the granite and other rocks, have left abundant proofs, both chemical and mechanical, of their fiery origin, sometimes changing the rock

into scoriæ, and forming, by their sudden intrusions and inter-fusion, new combinations of materials, out of the previously existing strata. The phenomena presented by beds of magnetic iron in the vicinity of Mount Desert, and of the limestone, wherever wrought, are of the most interesting character with regard to this point. We doubt whether there have ever been recorded facts more strongly attesting the igneous theory, than are presented in these Reports, and as our author has become conversant with such phenomena from much experience in visiting many of the most noted localities in Europe, his inferences are entitled to great weight. The chemical changes effected upon the limestone by these dykes are thus mentioned by Dr. Jackson. "The limestone at its junction with the trap is closely cemented to it, and is converted into a perfectly white crystalline variety, which loses this character in proportion to its distance from the dyke. This fact was observed at all the quarries thus intersected. The effect was the same in the beds of the blue magnesian limestone, the compact rock being always transformed into granular, and semi-crystallized dolomite,—the extent of the change being exactly proportionate to the size of the dykes." The opinion of Von Buch, that limestone owes its magnesia to the presence of these dykes, is not confirmed by facts at the localities here referred to, nor indeed by any which have been brought to light in this country; and Dr. Jackson observes that "after carefully examining the places referred to in Europe by Von Buch, he is convinced that the igneous rocks acted there also only by fusing a limestone which contained magnesia in the original state."

The subject of diluvial bowlders and furrows is frequently referred to in the pages of the Reports; and although it has already been alluded to in this article, we cannot forbear recording the concurrent testimony of so accurate an observer, on a subject of so momentous and significant a bearing. We give his remarks relating to the grooves.

"Diluvial grooves in the rocks are exceedingly common in Maine, but I know of few localities where they are so distinct as at Hope and Appleton. Here they may be observed, running in a northwest and southeast direction, while they are very deep and perfectly defined. Their direction, it will be remembered, does not coincide with that of the stratification of the rock, and could not have resulted from disintegration of the different strata.

Three quarters of a mile southeast from a hill in Appleton, they may be seen forming deep channels in the rocks, to the depth of a foot, and six inches in width. Since the direction and appearance of these grooves, correspond with those observed in other parts of our country, I feel no hesitation in attributing them to a similar origin. They are certainly the result of an aqueous current, which once prevailed over New England, and probably over the whole world. This current, from similar grooves seen in other places, appears to have proceeded from north to south, or from northwest to southeast."

The whole subject of diluvial phenomena is closed with this reflection, which we think both just and philosophical, as showing that out of what has generally been regarded *only* as a punitive catastrophe, have followed new proofs of the Divine Beneficence. "Although it is commonly supposed that the deluge was intended solely for the punishment of the corrupt antediluvians, it is not improbable that the descendants of Noah reap many advantages from its influence, since the various soils underwent modifications and admixtures, which rendered them better adapted to the wants of man. May not the hand of Benevolence be seen working, even amid the waters of the deluge?"

Dr. Jackson has stated an important fact, proving that the rocks in Lubec Bay have changed their level within the recent zoölogical period, having discovered attached to the sides of the trap, at the distance of twenty-five feet above high water level, numerous remains of shell fish, precisely like those now living on the neighboring coast. He says "it is evident from the position in which these shells are found, and the attachment of barnacles to the rocks in place, that the sea once stood over the very spot, where these marine relics are deposited. Has the level of the sea become depressed, or have the rocks been elevated? To answer these questions, I would observe, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to account for a subsidence of the waters here, without a general change of level in the ocean, and this is not proved to have taken place. We cannot suppose a partial subsidence of the waters; for the bay communicates freely with the ocean, and the level would be invariably maintained. The concurrent testimony of all geological observers is in favor of a change of level in the land, by elevation; and such a change appears to have taken place here, within the recent zoölogical period." The proofs

of such local elevations of rocks have been greatly multiplied by the observations of geologists during the last few years; and though it would appear in some few places that the sea has subsided from its former level, and in others has risen, the general inference from all facts bearing upon this point, is that the land only has been raised or depressed, and that the cause of these changes, whether local or general, in the relative level of the land and sea, must be sought for in the agency of earthquakes and volcanoes.

Some of these have happened, not only within the present zoölogical period, but within the last century, and so late as the year 1822, the land on the coast of Chili, for the distance of more than one hundred miles, was suddenly raised three or four feet; the paroxysm of elevation extending also into the mountains, and producing dislocations and chasms in the solid substratum of granite. \*

We have thus, in the preceding remarks, endeavored to give our readers some idea of the labors and discoveries of the geologists employed to survey the States of New York and Maine, so far as their reports have made them known to us. We have, perhaps, dwelt too minutely on some portions of them, while to others we may not have given due consideration; but while we have found reason to question the accuracy of one or two points presented by them, we reiterate the opinion, expressed in the beginning of this article, that, taken together, they give the promise of equalling in the extent and thoroughness of their details, any work of a similar character, which has yet appeared. We shall look anxiously forward to the completion of the surveys, and the embodying of the several reports into separate volumes, replete with maps, colored sections, and other illustrations. In the mean time, we hope to see the other States of the Union, through their Legislative Assemblies, engaged in similar explorations, until the whole structure of our country shall be thoroughly explored, and all its most interesting phenomena permanently recorded. We should thus have all the data for the construction of an accurate geological map of the United States, a work, which to the discredit of American geology, has been suffered too long to remain unaccomplished. In the end, we doubt not that the

---

\* Mrs. Maria Graham, as quoted in the *Geological Manual*, by De La Beche, p. 131.

arts and manufactures, as well as natural history in general, will be greatly benefited by the rich and diversified mineral productions, and the many valuable facts, which will be disclosed. Our Colleges and Lyceums will also derive signal advantages from these surveys; especially if the plan proposed by Dr. Jackson could be carried into effect; namely, that each state, surveyed, should, after providing for its own Institutions, exchange complete suits of its productions with those of every other State in the Union; the cabinets thus collected, to be arranged in some of the most central of these Institutions, and open to the inspection of all. Students in natural History will thus have spread before them correct guides, or indexes, to the Geology of the whole country. Though the complete realization of this plan is perhaps what few are sanguine enough to expect, its advantages are at once so obvious and so important, as to demand the favorable consideration of the friends of science.

F. A.

---

ART. VI. — *Retrospect of Western Travel*. By HARRIET MARTINEAU, Author of "Society in America," "Illustrations of Political Economy," &c. In two volumes. 12mo. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1838.

WE doubt whether this publication will add much to the reputation of the Author, in any point of view. Neither, perhaps, will it greatly detract from it. Like all her productions, it is strongly marked with the peculiarities of her manner, whether for good or for ill. But it contains, so far as we can discover, very little that is not to be found in her former work on the same subject. Her details of domestic manners are somewhat more full; and the spirit of the abolitionist is more diffusive and pervading. The former, however, we are constrained to remark, are not always to be implicitly trusted; whether the latter be a virtue, is a question which will be differently answered by different individuals.

The best parts of this work, as well as of the former, in our judgment — best in every point of view — are the descriptions of natural scenery; and these are more abundant and drawn with a happier facility, as we think, in the former. In these

she often displays a love of nature, a sense of the picturesque, and a freshness and truthfulness of spirit, not always so conspicuous, to say the least, in her speculations on politics and religion, or in her sketches of society and manners. Miss Martineau has a quick eye to perceive, and an active imagination to group, the features of a natural landscape. And she paints them truly and forcibly. There is an elevating and redeeming influence in the grand temple of Nature, in whose holy presence, the scales of false philosophy fall from the eyes, and truth reasserts her power over the soul. Of her moral pictures we cannot speak altogether so favorably. In these there are apt to be great violations of the laws of perspective. There is little shading or foreshortening; and where you look for a portrait you sometimes meet with a caricature. A single feature fills and occupies her vision. She can see nothing but this; and, of course, she permits her readers to see nothing else.

In any case, and in all cases, this is bad enough; and always, and of necessity, presents imperfect and distorted views. But if, as sometimes happens, the trait which first seizes her attention, is by no means the characteristic one, the case is still worse. The picture drawn presents no likeness; the impression given is altogether false, or erroneous. We have said, that her details of domestic manners are not to be implicitly trusted; and we may safely extend the remark. She is, we think, a very *inaccurate* writer. Inaccurate, we mean, not in her use of language, but in her representations of principles, opinions, and facts. Over untrodden ground she is not a safe and trustworthy guide. Not that she is deficient in discernment. It is not on this ground that her conclusions are so often wide of the truth. Neither, as we are disposed to think, is she greatly wanting in candor and fairness of feeling; in a certain modification of these, at least. But her self-confidence is inordinate. Her present impressions, as it seems to us, are, in all cases, to her own mind substantial verities; unquestioned and unquestionable, — the truth and the whole truth. It is not, then, that she consciously and intentionally mistakes facts, or spreads so often the colors of falsehood over what may be substantially true. We are willing to believe, for "charity believeth all things," that she has a sincere regard for truth, truth of principle, and truth of fact. We trace her inaccuracy to another source, a copious and permanent one. Amidst her manifold inconsistencies she is true to herself. True, we mean, in this regard, that they

all spring from the same mental habitude. There is a deep vein of self-satisfied, self-confident vanity winding, like a thread of gold, through the whole of them, and binding them together in a consistent series of inconsistencies. It is amusing to trace the operation of this principle, on all sorts of subjects and occasions, in her judgments of men and things, in her statements of facts, and in her discussions of principles. The veriest glimpse that her eye catches of any object is sufficient, — reveals it at once to her mind in its whole extent, in the clearest light and broadest proportions. The twilight region of doubt and misgiving, where ordinary minds are so often compelled to wander, cautiously groping their way, “if haply they may feel after and find” the satisfactory solution of things, seems to be a realm she has never trod. Her sun is always at the meridian; her heavens without a cloud. The merest hint, a passing remark, the idlest badinage, is a sufficient key to the character of the deepest politician or diplomatist of the day. One cannot forbear smiling to witness with what perfect simplicity, and unsuspecting self-complacency, she sets about analyzing the minds and characters of half the statesmen, divines, and literati of the country, and this with no hesitation, or misgiving; without other opportunity, or means, of ascertaining the truth than, perhaps, a casual intercourse of a few days or hours, and this clogged and impeded by her very imperfect hearing. It is obvious, we suppose, to every one, but Miss Martineau, that opinions thus formed, are entitled to very little consideration, and ought to be received with no little distrust. That which is obvious to every passer by, which is matter of public notoriety, she may well be admitted to have ascertained. Beyond this, all is random conjecture, the creation of her own fancy. She may be right, and she may be wrong; and as truth is one, and error is multiform, she is far more likely to be wrong than right. Yet she would seem to have felt that she had a commission to go forth through the land, “in the length thereof, and in the breadth thereof,” in a sort of high judicial pomp, while the mighty ones of the people gathered round her to have the dimensions of their minds taken and recorded; and the irrefragable seal affixed to their characters.

And all this is given forth with perfect good faith. She seems throughout wholly unconscious that anything of arrogance, any violation of modesty, was implied in the position thus assumed. On the contrary, it would appear the most



natural thing in the world that "the sun and the moon and the eleven stars" should stand round and do obeisance to her. Judges learned in the law, wasted by the vigils of twenty years, and statesmen trained for successive lustrums in the councils of the nation, press to ask counsel of the priestess and oracle of radical philosophy. "Nec inconsulti abeunt." She is not chary of her wisdom. She "giveth liberally."

We recollect having been somewhat amused, several years since, when Miss Martineau and we were comparative strangers, at a statement of hers, how, having sat down to write a tale of some sort or other, she rose up, much to her surprise, a political economist. We think we can understand this now; and we deem it not improbable that, if she chose, she might relate a more extensive experience of this sort. No small portion, we apprehend, of her politics, theology, and general philosophy came to her much in the same way.

All this, as we have said, may well provoke a smile; but can hardly stir any deeper emotion. Vanity in its wildest excess is hardly to be attacked with any other weapon than ridicule. But the subject has another aspect of a character somewhat graver; and on which we propose to say a few words in a more serious strain, and with a broader reference than to the case immediately before us.

Many of the characters thus shown up, for the instruction or amusement of the public, are those of persons whose hospitality she had experienced, — a hospitality, by her own showing, frank and generous almost without precedent. Now we must say that we consider this practice wholly unjustifiable, and we wish to avail ourselves of this opportunity to record our solemn protest against it. Miss Martineau, we are well aware, may plead abundant precedent for the freedoms she has allowed herself; and we do not mean to hold her amenable for any transgressions not her own. But no precedent can justify a practice intrinsically wrong. And we certainly hold this practice to be wrong in the extent to which it is carried, even in regard to those who are called public men. We do not think even these are to be treated as if they were altogether *public property*, — *commons*, on which every straggler has a right to graze at large. We cannot think that the public good requires this; and we are quite sure that neither private morality nor delicacy of feeling is promoted by it. What good purpose can it be supposed to serve? How is the cause of truth, of virtue, or of sound

information even, benefited by this display of the domestic habits and personal peculiarities of any class of men, in whatever sphere of life they may be called to move? What right has the public to these details; we do not say, in this or that particular instance, as given by Miss Martineau or by any other person; but *in general*? What right, we repeat, have the public — affix what idea you please, to this most convenient abstraction — to claim, not only the time, the mental and moral energies of this or that gifted individual, but also to learn, by whatever means, how he sits at table, spreads his bread and butter, sips his coffee, or lolls upon his sofa?

But we shall be told, that the desire to become acquainted with the private habits of illustrious men is a natural one. We admit that it is so. And the appetite for petty scandal and idle gossip is, we are afraid, natural also. But is it laudable, and ought it to be gratified? That is the question. Should the mighty machinery of the press be prostituted, at once to gratify and to stimulate this insatiable appetite? And what better than petty scandal is the greater portion of the anecdotes and sketches of living characters, with which the journals of travellers, at home and abroad, are stuffed? Verbal scandal, the village tittle tattle, is silly and mischievous enough, when it is addressed only to the ear, and dwells nowhere but in the memory of the idle and unthinking. But when it is fixed in visible and permanent forms, and incorporated into the literature — heaven bless the mark — of the day, it assumes, in the eye of the moralist, a graver character, and calls for a more indignant rebuke. It is the business, the appropriate office of literature, to minister to the interests of truth and virtue; to regulate and check the evils and abuses to which the social principle is continually exposed, to elevate and purify the tone of social intercourse, to render it more intellectual and more spiritual, more conversant with general principles and great truths, and more in harmony with the finer creations of fancy and genius. Its high vocation is abandoned, its office is desecrated, when it stoops to pander to vulgar curiosity, or busy intermeddling malignity. Men are prone enough, at the best, to pry into the affairs, and scan the characters of their neighbors. This disposition needs no prompting from the press. The licentiousness of the newspaper press, in this regard, as well as others, has long been a subject of regret and anxious apprehension to all good patriots and sober-minded men. It needs

not to be encouraged and cheered on by the example of works of higher pretension, and of a graver and more permanent character. The evil, we cannot but think, calls loudly for redress. Such would be our views of the subject, on the supposition that these publications contained nothing but the truth, that the facts were correctly stated, and the characters fairly delineated. We should say, even then, without hesitation, that they were not worth the expense at which they were obtained; and therefore it were better for the public to be without them.

This we should say, viewing the subject in reference to those only who are called public men. In regard to private individuals the application of the principle, we maintain, is still more obvious and forcible. We hold that modesty, call it virtue or grace, in man or woman, is worthy to be cherished and respected; and we are sure it must be wounded, and its fine gloss soiled, by such perpetual exposure. In fact we can hardly imagine anything more annoying to a retiring and delicate spirit, than to have its private pursuits, its domestic habits, its trials and sorrows even, made the topics of the literary gossip of half the world.

But the practice has not even this apology to offer; this mitigation to plead. Generally speaking, the information gained in this way, concerning the characters of individuals, is utterly worthless; and any reliance placed on it were wholly fallacious. The portraits drawn seldom present any other likeness than a generic one. The sketches in Miss Martineau's work, for instance, might, with few exceptions, as well have been made in London as in Washington or Boston. We refer, as proof and illustration of our position, to her description of country physicians, in volume second, page 196. She had occasion, it seems, to employ one, and found, as she supposed, some peculiarities in his mode of practice, something different, at least, from what she had been accustomed to; and, with her usual rapidity of generalization, she puts him down at once as the representative of a class, and this class embracing all country practitioners. She, very likely, misunderstood, and consequently misrepresented and caricatured the individual; there is not much of verisimilitude in the picture; but, to infer, that such as was this specimen, such must all country physicians be, was a felicity of her own.

In these remarks we would not be understood as referring specially to Miss Martineau. Her case presents no very pecu-

liar features in this respect. She has not, we believe, outshined the average rate of tourists. We are not disposed to consider her guilty, in manner or form, of any specific betrayal of confidence; in fact we doubt whether, in most cases, any other than a very limited confidence was given her. We doubt, in the first place, whether many persons felt altogether free to pour their inmost souls through that same *condensing tube*; and moreover, we apprehend, that most, who conversed much with her, spoke with the consciousness that they were in the presence of a "chief" who was "takin' notes."

But there are other means of obtaining information than by direct communication, and other avenues than through the ear; and of these she has known how to avail herself. She is a vigilant and keen observer, and a ready, if not always an accurate, reasoner. No hint is lost upon her. A very slight circumstance not unfrequently swells out, in her "forgetive" imagination, into a comprehensive theory, or a broad and general illustration at least. In one way or another, and with more or less of accuracy, she certainly contrived to amass a fund of personal history and domestic detail, that does credit to her industry. Nor has she, perhaps, made a less discreet use of it than might fairly have been expected. Every one knew that she was both a book-maker and a radical reformer; and that she must, of course, view all things, persons, and events in reference to these *two facts*, and in the light, and with the coloring, that these would throw upon them. Generally speaking, we do not think her an ill-natured observer, and as a traveller, by sea or land, or over the *amphibious* regions of the south, she certainly is no fault-finder. On the contrary, she seems to have carried with her a facility of manner, and a readiness to be pleased, that are altogether laudable, and that most travellers, whether her countrymen or our own, would do well to imitate. But, we repeat, our quarrel is with the principle, as developed, of course, in the practice growing out of it; a principle, which will be found, in the last analysis, to resolve itself into the popular, but erroneous maxim, that the individual is for society, not society for the individual; and, therefore, that public interest is always to supersede private. This principle, we say, is erroneous; and it is so, unless in a very modified sense. Society has no right, other than the right of the strongest, to sacrifice the life or property of any individual to what it may choose to regard as the public good.

Every individual may be fairly required to contribute his share to the promotion of the public welfare, but not a jot more. The principle is correct just so far as the obligations and duties it imposes are mutual, and no farther. Men are bound to assist their fellows, their neighbors, those that have a substantive existence like themselves. The obligation is of individual man to individual man; not to a misty abstraction called the public, which can have neither interests, duties, nor rights. There are no interests but those of individuals, just as there are no sufferings, or enjoyments, no physical or moral powers, no hearts or consciences, but of such. To say, then, that private rights may justly be infringed when the public good requires it, is only to say, in other words, that the strong may supersede the rights of the weak; the many, those of the few. The public good, when properly understood, can never require the violation of private right; for the sanctity, the inviolability, the universal respect, of private right, is itself the highest good of the community, or at least the necessary basis on which it must be reared. It is quite certain, that there can be no public good, for there can be no community where this is not. Public good, then, cannot be promoted by private wrong. A little injustice may not be perpetrated even with the honest intention of compassing a great advantage. The terms, in truth, are deceptive. There is no such thing as a little injustice; nor can any real advantage ever be attained by such means. He who commits injustice violates an eternal and immutable principle; and the consequences of such violation no arithmetic can calculate. It were well if legislators could be made to comprehend, effectively, the full force of this truth. It would free the statute-book from many a crude and mischievous enactment.

We wish not to incur the charge of over-statement in regard to this principle. We only give utterance to the convictions of our sober judgment. It meets us, we think, everywhere, in the *goings on* of society, and in all varieties of form. Now it cuts a turnpike, or railroad, through our farms or gardens; now prescribes, in the name of some self-constituted inquisitorial society, "what we shall eat, or what we shall drink;" or, in one form or another, drives the plough-share of reform through our interests, our prejudices, or our cherished associations. It takes us away from ourselves, puts our consciences into the keeping of the public, and exposes our whole being, at every point, to the action of public opinion. It leaves us no true

freedom of thought, no individuality of character. If this principle, in its multifiform modes of action, proceeds unchecked, private rights, not only, but private life, will ere long become a mere figure of speech. The whole world will be abroad, out of doors. Hearths and fire-sides will be as open to the public eye as the Exchange or the Mall. Society will be converted into one huge panopticon. We do not relish this state of things. We are free to confess, that, for ourselves, we like to have some private corner, where we may "play the fool" according to the bent of our own humor, without eye of mortal wisdom to "molest or make us afraid." We could neither move freely, nor breathe freely, with the sense that this many-eyed Argus was overlooking our every step, "waiting for our halting," and ready with his trumpet at his lips to proclaim our virtue or our weakness, our success or our discomfiture, to all the winds. We think we could hardly contrive to be honest and direct, even in our very purposes, if in the habit of referring everything we did to a tribunal without us. We are sure this habit would fritter away our moral strength, and eat out the very vitality of our being. It would destroy the consciousness of our identity, and render us mere part and parcel of the wide spreading community of cant. This may indeed be a peculiar weakness of our own, with which those of robuster stamina may not fully sympathize. Still we think we cannot be altogether mistaken in either the tendency, or the actual effects of this universal supervision and tutorage of public opinion, as exercised through the medium, specially, of the press. It oppresses men's minds, and sits like an incubus on their souls, rendering them weak and timid, and fearful of giving utterance to their free thoughts and undisguised feelings. We appeal to every man at all in the habit of seeing with his own eyes what is passing around him, whether there is not a manifest decay and diminution of *individuality* in the opinions and characters of men; and, of course, of true independence. We hear, indeed, as frequently as at any period, professions of independent judgment, but we distrust them. They are rather too bustling and obtrusive, we think, to be altogether genuine. They are made, we apprehend, often at least, because they are thought to be called for. It is the fashion to be liberal and free. They are indications to our minds not of strength, but of weakness; not of self-sustaining power, but of leaning on external props. The man of true independence cares little for

seeming. True vigor is apt to be unconscious. When it begins to think much of itself, it is a symptom of commencing feebleness. The truth is, that professions of any sort, uttered in words, or bodied forth in action, public and conspicuous action, are the very current coin of cant and quackery, the reigning sin, the deep and ingrained stamp of the age. How seldom do we hear any question of practical morals, for instance, decided on its merits? What is the character of the reasons we generally hear assigned for doing this, or abstaining from doing that? Is it anything in the nature of the actions themselves, or in their true relations to the human soul? Is it not rather, what will be their influence in this quarter, or in that? what will such an individual, or such a party, such a church, or such a society think of them? How will they harmonize with the *movements* of the time, with the "spirit of the age?" All this is not always, perhaps not often, expressed in words; but unless we are very inaccurate observers, it is very generally intimated or implied. And we say this is not a healthy tone of morality, nor the principle from which it springs a true one. Men were not made to lean on each other, like so many sheaves of grain, that cannot stand singly. Every man's virtue must be his own, self-rooted, and self-sustained, or it is nothing. The kingdom of heaven is not to be purchased by joint stock operations. Capital cannot be clubbed for this object. The great problem of life must be wrought out by each man singly and for himself. One can no more avail himself of his neighbor's virtue, than of his neighbor's digestion. For the great purposes of our existence, men seem not to be duly sensible *how little it is that one man can do for another*. We are not calling in question the power or the wholesomeness of mutual sympathy; or the value of the social principle. But we do say, that this principle has been stimulated into an action too minute, universal, and intense. It is accustoming men to look altogether too much out of themselves for the real purposes of life. It were far better, in our judgment, if there were more of individual action, and less of concert and combination. There would, perhaps, in this case, be less of noise and show, less of the pomp and circumstance of beneficence; but not less of truth and reality.

But we shall be told, that respect for public opinion is often auxiliary to virtue, a defence of the weak against temptation; that it comes, in many cases, as a seasonable support to the

unsettled principle and wavering resolution, and preserves it from utter discomfiture. Of this we are well aware. And we are aware, too, that a crutch is often a desirable support to the crippled and disabled frame. But we apprehend that a race of men accustomed to lean on this from their childhood, would be neither very graceful, nor very vigorous. Neither will the man, who has not strength and vitality of moral principle from within himself, who has no higher and steadier a standard than the opinion of the world, be likely to acquit himself well and successfully in the great battle-strife of humanity.

But we must pass to another topic, a topic to which passing events are giving an increasing and fearful interest,—the topic of Abolitionism. This may be called the principal staple of Miss Martineau's book, for it pervades the whole of it; and on this subject, as on others, she embraces no modified opinion, nor is checked by any scruples or misgivings. In this respect, however, she is not peculiar. It is the distinctive trait of abolitionists; that which constitutes the difference, theoretically at least, between them and others who are not the advocates and defenders of slavery. In the opinion that slavery is an evil, a crying evil, and gross injustice, that it is a flagrant violation of the primary law of humanity, that the rights of the slave-holder to the beings he calls his property, when traced to their origin, rest on no other basis than fraud or violence, or a combination of both; and that, if it were not so, the subject itself of this claim, a human being, a brother man, is one to which the right of property cannot attach; and therefore time cannot sanction, nor legislation make valid such a claim; in all this there is no difference, between us, at least, and the most thorough abolitionists, in this country or elsewhere. In first principles we entirely coincide; and we will not admit that they hold these principles more honestly or nearer to their consciences, than ourselves. We have a right to make this statement, at the outset, and to have it believed. It is no more than simple justice that we claim, and no more than we are ready to allow in our turn. We protest before hand against being considered as the advocates, or apologists of slavery, in consequence of the views we feel it our duty to present. We are neither the one nor the other. We are not in love with injustice in any form it can assume; and hold no sympathy with the tyrant and oppressor in any walk of life, civil or religious, public or domestic. And he that forgets the law of reciprocity, he that arrogates to



himself what he withholds from others, is, in so far, a tyrant and usurper. We are the apologists of none such; and, to the extent of our ability, word or action of ours, in such direction and so far as our sense of duty will permit, shall never be wanting to repress the wrong-doer and to vindicate the injured. And if we thought that anything we are about to write, or have written, would be the means of prolonging the thralldom of one human being for a single day, after freedom would be to him a real benefit, we would throw our pen into the fire, and blot forever the marks already traced.

We agree, then, with the abolitionists that slavery ought to be abolished; that neither now, nor at any time, in this region or in that, ought man to be in thralldom to man; that there seems to our minds an incongruity and mutual repugnance in the terms, that renders it a species of outrage to couple them together; and that, therefore, whatever, in a fair and dispassionate estimate of our duties and obligations, we can be justified in doing to effect this result, we are cordially disposed to do. But just here is the point of separation between them and us. Agreeing in principle, we disagree in the application and legitimate results of this principle. We maintain that it is a very supposable case, that it is a case not of rare occurrence, in the manifold combinations of human life and agency, that a principle may be right, and yet we may not be justified in acting upon it; and an object desirable, which we may not be required to effect. This remark, we think, is pertinent to the present question. We consider it the radical error of our opponents, that they hold their principles without the requisite restrictions and qualifications. Embracing a great truth, they pursue it to an extreme that converts it into practical falsehood. "If slavery is an evil," such is the course of their reasoning, "then it ought to be abolished without delay. If there can be no just right of property in a human being, then every slave-holder is, by necessary implication, a thief and a robber, guilty of outrageous injustice every hour that he retains possession of his slaves." We are free to say that we do not think these inferences necessarily true and just. We can very easily conceive, that there may be cases, and numerous ones, in which it would not be the present duty of the master to emancipate his slaves. We may be mistaken in the fact — this is, in a great degree, matter of opinion, not capable of being decided on general principles — that there are such cases; cases, we mean, in which emancipa-

tion would be an evil and not a good to the bondmen themselves. But, surely, if there be such cases, all must admit the correctness of our position in regard to them. It cannot possibly be the duty of the master to make the condition of his slave worse, knowingly and designedly, for the sake of conforming to a general principle, however clear and however important. Thinking thus, we cannot, of course, admit that all slave-holders are no better than man-stealers, or that they are guilty of great sin in continuing to hold their slaves in subjection. We do not hold them responsible, in all cases, for the original injustice and wrong, in which their title is admitted to be founded. Many of them came into possession of this property without any fault of their own; without any volition even, in regard to it. Their slaves were put into their hands by the providence of God; the relations they sustain were imposed on them, not assumed; and their duties, in regard to them, grow out of these relations, and must take their shape and direction from the circumstances which constitute them. They must either retain possession, or emancipate them. There is no other alternative. It may not be in their power—we speak of course of individuals—to do the latter. Is it then wrong, is it atrocious iniquity, to do the former? Suppose an individual slave-owner to be fully convinced that slavery is wrong; that he has no just right to retain his fellow-men in bondage; and suppose him to be sincerely disposed to obey the dictates of his conscience, and free his soul from guilt. What is he to do? What course shall he pursue? The laws, perhaps, forbid manumission, or burden it with conditions he cannot comply with. It is therefore, to him at least, impracticable. What then is to be done? Shall he abandon them, and go away, in order to avoid the guilt of slave-holding? and will he hereby exonerate his conscience, and acquit himself of his duty? We conceive not. On the contrary, in many cases, this might be the very thing he ought not to do.

Our object in these remarks is to show that abolitionists are altogether too sweeping in their statements, and too indiscriminate, and uncharitable in their judgments. They overlook important circumstances, in their zeal in maintaining an abstract principle; circumstances on which the whole question, in a practical point of view, may be said to turn; and in so doing rush headlong into manifest and inevitable evil, in pursuit of an object, which, however important and desirable in itself, lies, as

we conceive, beyond the sphere of their duty. For we maintain, that even if it were in their power, the citizens of the northern States have not the *right* to emancipate the slaves of the South. They cannot attain this object except by the violation of a clear and solemn obligation, by the rupture of a sacred compact; and we remember who has told us, that we may not do evil that good may come. We are not, then, abolitionists, because we cannot find that it is our duty to be so. We regard the object, at which they aim, though absolutely right, yet wrong and unlawful in relation to us. Positive obligations forbid us to attempt its accomplishment. Show us that this is not the case, convince us that slavery at the South is actually our concern, that our consciences are touched by it, that *we are responsible* for its continuance, and have therefore a right to dispose of it; show us all this, and we will become abolitionists to-morrow. At present we cannot see the question in this light. As individual men, indeed, as Christians, as lovers of humanity, as those who recognise the universal brotherhood of man, who respect God's image in whatever form developed, and stamped with whatever color, we may lament the existence of this evil, as we do earnestly and deeply lament it. We may wish, as we do, and pray, as we ought at least, for its removal; that God would break every yoke and let the oppressed go free. All this we may do, and ought to do. And we may as individuals freely express what we truly feel, at any time, and at all times, subject to no other restraints, than those that truth, modesty, christian forbearance, and a just respect for the rights and feelings of our neighbors, impose. We are not called on to close our lips, or to speak any more than to think lightly, on the subject of slavery wherever it exists. And for ourselves we have never done so. And if we can, in any way that involves no violation of duty, gain access to the hearts and consciences of slave-holders, in any way so bring the truth to bear upon their minds as not to neutralize, or, worse, to *pervert* its effects, in God's name, let us endeavor to enlighten their judgment, and rouse their consciences to a true perception of their position and relation. Let us do this as soon, and as far as an impartial self-inspection and a modest estimate of our position and qualifications shall justify the conclusion, that we are called upon to constitute ourselves our "brothers' keepers." No sooner, and no farther. It is not thrifty husbandry to leave our own vineyard overrun with weeds, while we are officiously dressing those of our neighbors.

It is not our purpose to argue this question on the ground of expediency ; else we would point the zealots in this cause to the obvious tendency, and probable results of their measures ; to the riots, disorders, and outrages in our populous cities, of which they are, to say the least, the fruitful occasion ; and to the deep and wide spreading jealousy and resentment they are producing at the South, which menace the peace of the country and the stability of the Union ; and we would ask them whether the consideration, that the evil they are producing, is both great and inevitable, while the good they propose is certainly contingent, ought not to have some effect to moderate their ardor, at least, and induce them to hesitate and reflect. But we pass by such topics as these, too well aware that it is of the "very stuff" of fanaticism to look only at the principle of action, and give the consequences to the winds ; and feeling, therefore, that our appeals would be without effect. We will meet them on the question of right, of moral obligation. And we say they have no *right* thus to precipitate the North upon the South in a crusade for the emancipation of the slaves ; they have no right to organize societies, and form combinations, and concert measures, the avowed, or, if not avowed, the natural and obvious design of which is to effect this object. They can have no just right to do these things, because they have no right to effect the object itself, to which these things tend. They have no right to interfere with the social institutions and arrangements of other States, whatever may be the character of these. They are not competent to pass upon them *practically*. It is the right of every independent state, or nation, and a right essential to its independence, to mould the elements of its organization according to its own pleasure ; and with the exercise of this right no other community may intermeddle, except for such reasons as would furnish just cause of war to its neighbors, if just cause of war can be. We hold this principle to be incontrovertible ; and we deem it perfectly applicable to the case before us. With regard to foreign nations we are not aware that it has ever been controverted, in theory or in act. We have heard of no societies formed for the removal of servitude in Russia, either political or personal. Yet why not ? Is slavery a less "bitter draught" there than in Carolina or Louisiana ? Or are the Muscovite serfs less nearly allied to us, less members of the human brotherhood, less children of the Universal Father, than the blacks of the South ?

If not, why should all our sympathies be engrossed by the latter, while we look so coldly on the former? The principle laid down above is a sufficient answer to our minds. We have not the right to interfere with a view to effect a political or social change in the Russian Empire, however desirable we may deem such change. But we see not how this answer should satisfy the mind of an abolitionist. Evil exists, enormous evil, and one that, in its nature, is susceptible of a remedy. Why should not such remedy be attempted, at least? It is safer, doubtless, to utter intemperate harangues, and organize processions in Boston or Philadelphia, than in St. Petersburg or Moscow. Perhaps, too, the prospect of success is somewhat greater, and more immediate; but we are not sure that either of these considerations is one, that a true abolitionist would recognise as a motive of conduct. On the score of *right* we are prepared to show satisfactorily, to our own minds at least, that the cases are not so widely different.

What is the fact, or circumstance, in the relation between States, that forbids their interference with the internal polity and social arrangements of each other? Is it not their distinct and recognised sovereignty and independence? It is this which gives to every regularly organized community, to which it attaches, the right of managing their own affairs in their own way, unimpeded and unquestioned, by its neighbors, within the limits stated above. Now, we contend, that this very element of sovereignty and independence, to an extent sufficient to cover this question at least, and in fact with a *special pertinency* to this question, belongs to the slave-holding States of this Union. They have never surrendered it, directly or by implication. This truth, the very hinge, in our apprehension, on which the whole question turns, the abolitionists seem wholly to overlook, or studiously to conceal. All their reasonings as well as their movements, in regard to the subject, evidently proceed on the assumption that this is a consolidated, not a federative commonwealth. They identify each of the States with all, and all with each; and make conscience of their neighbors' faults, as if they were their own. They declaim about the sin of slavery as a *national* sin, spreading its dark shadow over the whole republic, the North equally with the South. This, we take it, is altogether a mistake. It is national in no point of view. It is wholly, and in every respect, a local affair. It touches us only as one of the general interests of humanity, which we could wish

to have rightly understood and duly regarded; but with which we have no immediate and personal concern. The States where it prevails, and they only, are responsible for the evil; and they must abide the results, be these what they may. "Our withers are unwrung."

Are we, then, it will be asked, disposed to look on with indifference and unconcern, while this great and fearful problem is solving before our eyes? We have answered this question in advance; we have stated the principles which we think ought to control our conduct in this matter; and we repeat that we are not indifferent to the existence of slavery any where; certainly not in these United States. We are attached to our brethren of the South by many interesting and affecting ties; and word or act of ours shall never be wanting to this cause, or any other in which their welfare is involved, whenever they are disposed to require it, or to receive it in the spirit of cordial good will, with which it will be given. Further than this we are not prepared to go, because, as we conscientiously think, we have no right to go further. Till this condition is fulfilled, we are free to say, we *are* "disposed to look on," though with anything but indifference. Let us repeat the substance of our argument on this point. It is this. But for the Federal Constitution the slave-holding States would be to us, politically, what Mexico, or Columbia is; and we to them. Now this instrument, that forms our only bond of union, that alone makes us one people, and entitles us to take any peculiar interest in their affairs, more than in those of other nations, gives us not one jot of power over this subject, but expressly reserves to it the respective States. By this compact we are solemnly bound; and we may not avail ourselves of the access it gives us to the demesnes of our neighbors, to their firesides and hearths, for the purpose of disturbing interests, which we ourselves have solemnly recognised, and which they, wisely or unwisely, deem vital to their welfare.

It ought to be borne ever in mind, that our Constitution is, as it has been a thousand times repeated, the result of compromise, a compromise of jarring interests and conflicting prejudices. It is the best, which, at the time, could be obtained. On the subject of slavery it is *all* that could be obtained. The South was then, as now, peculiarly sensitive and jealous on this point; and the only concession they could be brought to make in regard to it was, that the foreign trade might be in-

terdicted after a certain period. This concession was promptly acted on; and there the constitutional power of Congress over the subject terminated. This is the only right or power in regard to this business, with which the States of the South, previously free and independent, possessing the entire control of it, not liable to be called to account by any earthly power, consented to relinquish when they entered into the Federal compact. This, as it seems to us, is the true state of the question; and it is one, that, by its very terms, precludes all right of interference on our part. It leaves us, so far as this question is concerned, in the same relation to the southern States, that we sustain towards France or Great Britain.

On this condition the slave-holding States entered into the Union; and they regard this as an essential element in the compact. If we violate this, they maintain that the compact loses its binding force. And for ourselves we see not how this consequence can be evaded; and we deem it strange that, by reasonable men, it should be overlooked or disregarded. Let it be distinctly understood, that, probably, the continuance, certainly, the cordial continuance of the Union, depends on our abstaining from all measures of a public character tending to disturb the domestic institutions of the South. Let this be distinctly understood; and if men will persist in these measures, let it be with this alternative fully and fairly in their view. Let there be no mystification, or blinking of the question; no attempts to draw a veil over the final results, while the intermediate process only is thrust upon our notice.

It is idle to affirm that the object is only to enlighten the public mind, and rectify the public sentiment, at the North. This, we are constrained to say, is not a fair and honest statement. It is not the whole truth. Suppose every man, woman, and child in this section of the country to have become a thorough abolitionist; and what then? Is the work accomplished, the object attained? It is obvious that all this is only the means; lawful, if you will, but to an unlawful end. We do not call in question the motives of the agitators; but we do question the soundness of their moral discernment, their prudence and discretion; and we would gladly persuade them to pause, and contemplate the course they are pursuing, and see whither and to what it tends. We beg them to remember, that zeal and earnestness are not the only desirable qualities; that moderation, too, claims a place in the circle of human virtues.

That the views of the subject presented above should escape the attention of foreigners, who either cannot or will not understand the nature of our polity, is perhaps not much to be wondered at; but that our own citizens should resolutely shut their eyes to it, can only be accounted for by the supposition, that they are determined not to see obstacles in the way of attaining their objects.

But, even if we thought the *object* of the abolitionists a lawful one, one that could be attained without the violation of positive engagements, still we could not but condemn the spirit they too generally manifest, as well as many of the measures they adopt for the accomplishment of their purpose. We do not think they are *just* to the great body of the slave-holders, just in the estimate they have formed of their characters, or their conduct. They do not give them credit for the conscientious equity and kindness which generally mark their treatment of their slaves. We do not speak loosely on this subject. We have been long and attentive observers of this system, in all its aspects, and we know how it works. We have never seen anything to satisfy us of its justice, or *expediency*. We do not, like a late legal writer of high authority, regard it as an essential element in the attainment of the highest social virtue and civilization, but we have witnessed much to approve and commend in the characters of many slave-holders, and in the manner in which they discharged the duties of this very relation. We will go farther, and state, because it is true, and because we hold that no good cause can be benefited, in the long run, by exaggeration and false coloring, that we have seen something to convince us, that this system, ill as we think of it, is not that unmitigated and *immitigable* mischief which the abolitionists represent it to be. The relation between master and servant is not, in practice, wholly barren of good and genial results to both parties. It is not productive merely of suspicion and tyranny on the one side, and fear and hatred on the other. And it is a subject of grateful reflection, that man can hardly be placed in any condition that shall wholly preclude the cultivation of what is noble and generous in his nature. We know that instances are not rare of considerate and protecting kindness on the part of the master, and of devoted loyalty and unwavering fidelity, a fidelity that temptation or danger could not shake, on the part of the slave. We know that the attachment of slaves, of both sexes, to the young members of



their masters' families, is proverbially remarkable and affecting ; and we appeal to the common judgment of mankind, whether minds, capable of cherishing these lofty and beautiful sentiments of our nature, *can* be wholly debased and brutified by oppression. And we say farther at the hazard of being thought to wander from the point, that, in the eyes of the political economist, as well as of the lover of humanity, it is some compensation for the evils of this system, that the communities in which it exists are comparatively free from the curse of pauperism, which, in free States, like an infernal shadow, dogs the heels of civilization, darkening at every step.

We make these statements, not to show, for they do not show, that slavery is not an evil, and a great one ; but because we would deal fairly with every subject ; because we like to contemplate every object in the light of truth, and to see it as it is ; and because we really do not conceive that the welfare of the slave is likely to be promoted by our forming incorrect opinions, or cherishing unkindly sentiments towards the master. We do not think that we shall be likely to conciliate the good will of the latter, and obtain for ourselves a patient and candid hearing, by addressing him in the language of contumely and menace. We believe that we are absolutely injuring both parties, and we are sure we are not improving our own christian graces, by the tone of violence that marks the proceedings of the Anti-slavery Societies of the North. These proceedings, in the judgment of human reason at least, have already thrown back the cause of emancipation half a century. Those who will recur to the proceedings in the Virginia Legislature particularly, a few years since, will hardly fail to recognise the substantial truth of this remark. It is a strong and deep-rooted principle in human nature that prevents men not only from "giving reasons," but from acting reasonably, "on compulsion."

But, if abolitionists are worthy of rebuke, both on account of the object they pursue and the manner of pursuing it, the anti-abolitionists, in our judgment, are no less so. The movements of the former we regard as ill-timed and injudicious, the results of an untamed and fanatical imagination ; the *counter-movements* of the latter are unqualified violence and atrocious outrage.

While we are penning these very lines, our ears are assailed by the cries of an infuriate crowd, and the flames of a mob-kindled conflagration are reddening the midnight heavens. The

very heart sickens at the scene; and reads by its lurid light dismal omens of the time to come. The immediate agents in such transactions, those that actually lay unholy hands on their neighbors' property or persons, are few in number, and worthy of small regard. They do but labor in their vocation. They are the devil's instruments, his servants of all work; ready at all times to do his bidding. They exist at all periods and in all communities; and *their* case presents nothing very new, or peculiarly alarming. The alarming fact in the case is, that apathy of the public mind, that ill-concealed satisfaction at the result, while a decent disapprobation of the agents and the manner is carefully expressed, which renders the perpetration of such outrages safe, or possible. This is the fact that presses on the minds of sober and reflecting men, and makes them tremble for the future. If these things are to be, if the frenzy of fanaticism is to be, ever and anon, checked and repressed by these outbursts of popular violence, then we say that no social institutions can sustain the shock. The tempest and deluge will prostrate all the barriers of society, and sweep away every vestige of law and order. The days of the republic are numbered and its destiny sealed.

M. L. H.

---

#### NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

*Proof of the Genuineness of the Writings of the New Testament: for intelligent readers of all classes.* Translated from the German of Dr. H. OLSHAUSEN, with Notes, by DAVID FOSDICK, Jr. Andover. 1838. 12mo. p. 216. — It is the design of this little book to present a proof of the genuineness of each book in the New Testament. Some idea may be formed of the general spirit of the writer from a single sentence, stating his reasons for not investigating the writings of the Old Testament. "To Christians, the *testimony of Christ and his Apostles respecting the Old Testament*, the canon of which was then completed, affords a much more certain evidence of its divine origin, (and thus of its genuineness,) than any historical reasoning could exhibit." p. ix. He affords us a very good summary of the evidence in favor of the Gospels. He admits that Matthew wrote in Hebrew, and then himself translated the book into Greek, but omitted many passages. He thinks one Evangelist

sometimes made use of the writings of another, and all had recourse to short accounts of particular parts of the Gospel History, such as narratives of particular cases of healing, relations of journeys, and the like. When two writers use the same accounts, their language and statements will be the same. But much of the similarity between them arises from oral narrations.

He maintains that Peter *gave authority* to the Gospel of Mark, and Paul to that of Luke; thus the writings of these two Evangelists are as valuable as the depositions of eye witnesses. They are in fact the Gospels of Peter and Paul. John wrote later than the other Evangelists, and aims to give the spirit of the Savior. The other three were the Xenophons, John was the Plato of Christ. He cites the Fathers who have spoken of the Gospels, though without reference to the portion of their books which he cites.

It is scarcely necessary to speak of his remarks upon the undisputed Epistles. His arguments, both the historic and the critical, are sound, well chosen, and satisfactory. He thinks Paul did not write the Epistle to the Hebrews, but that it was composed by some one under his influence. The book therefore is to be esteemed canonical. "Paul had an essential share in its composition." Of the Catholic Epistles he receives the three of John and the first of Peter as undoubtedly genuine. But the second of Peter is suspicious. All doubts upon it cannot be obviated; yet we may obtain a *subjective* conviction of its genuineness. He makes almost the same remarks upon the Epistle of Jude. Indeed the two must stand or fall together. The Epistle of James is not the work of an Apostle; nor is it confirmed by one of the twelve; but he was a man of authority and influence, and "a pillar" of the church. It is therefore justly placed in the canon. He defends the genuineness of the Revelation against the arguments of *De Wette*, but without success, as we think.

The work may be regarded as a valuable addition to our popular theological literature, though many will dissent from some of the author's conclusions. There are many pleasant thoughts scattered up and down its pages; many valuable remarks, and pious suggestions. But some of his assertions can scarcely be subscribed by any liberal-minded theologian. The following sentence is a good example. "Perhaps it is not too much to conclude, that the books of the Old Testament, which are not at all mentioned in the New, should be regarded very much as the so-called deuterio-canonical [the apocryphal] books of the New Testament." — p. 211. But *seventeen books* of the Old are not directly

quoted in the New Testament.\* Are all these of no better authority than the deutero-canonical books of the New Testament?

*A History of the Corruptions of Christianity.* By JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LL. D. In some parts abridged, with Appendices. By A. L. L. Keene, N. H. J. & J. W. Prentiss. 12mo. pp. 312. — Dr. Priestley regarded this as “one of the most useful of all his publications.” At its first appearance, however, it met with much rough usage, being furiously assailed by the advocates of the established faith at home and abroad. Nay, to such phrenzy was the opposition carried, that in 1785 the work, according to Mr. Rutt, was “burnt by the common hangman in the city of Dort.” All this only proves that it was felt at the time to be an able exposure of antiquated errors and abuses, which it was impossible to answer by fair argument. We are under obligations to the editor and publishers for this reprint; an enterprise, now that it is accomplished, which every one will wonder has been delayed so long. It fills a gap in the reading generally accessible to the majority of inquirers in this country, and this too as well perhaps as it could be filled by a new edition of any English book. The parts abridged are those which relate to topics the least interesting or valuable in the existing state of the controversies and divisions in the church, while the history of opinions respecting the trinity, atonement, original sin, &c., are given nearly entire. Hence, to guard against misapprehensions or unfair inferences, it is said in the Preface to the American reprint: “The views of Dr. Priestley differ much in several respects from those of a large portion of Unitarians. He is not to be taken as the representative of their faith; nor is any other single individual. Least of all, would those engaged in the present work undertake to defend all his opinions, or vouch for the soundness of all his reasonings. But where compelled to disagree with him, they cannot but love and respect his uniform and unequalled candor, good temper, love of truth, and moral independence. The following is a book of *facts*, not merely the statement of opinions; and though some may not agree with the author in all his inferences from his historical facts, yet all are here furnished with a storehouse of invaluable materials for making up independent judgments of their own on the subjects discussed.” The “Appendices” consist of short extracts from the writings of Dr. Channing, Mr. Norton, and others, which help to illustrate still further the matters in dispute, and add considerably to the worth of the volume.

---

\* See Dr. Palfrey's Academic Lectures. Vol. i. p. 24, note.

# INDEX.

## A.

Abolitionists, 286 — are not the only enemies of slavery, 396 — their error consists in holding their principles without the necessary restrictions and qualifications, 397 — northern abolitionists have no more right to interfere with slavery in the Southern States, than with political institutions of Russia, 399 — slavery matter of deliberate and understood compromise in framing the Constitution, 402 — abolitionists unjust to slaveholders, 404 — lawless manner in which they are opposed, deprecated, 405.

American Quarterly Register noticed, 135.

Aristobulus, remarks on, 116.

Associations, voluntary, dangers of, 289.

## B.

Barrett's, S., Sermon, on the late duel, noticed, 274.

Berkeley and his Philosophy, article on, 310 — notices of his life and character, *ibid.* — his extraordinary philanthropy, 312 — notices of his works, 315 — "The Querist," 316 — "New Theory of Vision," 317 — confirmed by Cheselden's experiment, 321 — importance of this theory, 323 — his merits compared with those of the German school, 325 — a defender of religious truth, 328 — "The Analyst," 330 — "Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge," 333 — nature of idealism, 333 — how far confuted by Reid, 337 — his "Siris, or the Virtues of Tar Water," 344.

Beard's Collection of Hymns, reviewed, 90 — formed on the extraordinary plan of rejecting all not written by Unitarians, 93 — specimens given, 97.

Buckland's, Professor, Theory respecting diluvial remains, 376.

## C.

Carlyle's French Revolution, reviewed, 345 — its picturesqueness, 346 — faults of style, 347 — delineations of character, 349 — his questionable philosophy, 353 — general estimate of the author's merits as a historian, 356 — his article on Scott, 360 — tolerance due him, 361.

Cheselden's experiment in confirmation of Berkeley's new theory of vision, 322.

Complutensian Polyglot, some account of, 108.

Conrad's Geological Report, reviewed, 363.

Costigan's circumnavigation of the Dead Sea, and his death, 45.

## D.

Dante, criticised, 213.

Dead Sea, account of in Incidents of Travel, 45.

Diluvial bowlders, 373, 383 — other traces of the flood, 374.

De Wette, article on his views of Religion and Theology, 137 — his popularity with the English and the Orthodox, 138 — biographical notices of, 141 — banished from Prussia, 144 — his critical works on the Old Testament, 148 — and on the New, 150 — his philosophical writings, 153 — a follower of Fries, 155 — his view of the different modes of conviction, 156 — faith in religion

has its foundation in feeling, 156  
— his views on this subject opposed by Supernaturalists, 161 — and by Rationalists, 163 — his history of religions, 164 — recent developments of Protestantism, 167.

## E.

Emmons's Geological Report, reviewed, 363.

Epic Poetry, article on, 201 — advantages enjoyed by Homer and Virgil, 202 — reasons for not expecting another great Epic, 203 — remarks on the Iliad and Odyssey, *ibid.* — Aristotle's rules of the Epic, 208 — why Virgil made less impression than Homer, 209 — Tasso's great poem, 211 — Dante's, 213 — Milton's, 214 — different spirit of ancient and modern poetry, 217.

## F.

Faith, Dr. Wette's views of, 158.

Flood, Noah's, geological monuments of, 373.

French Revolution, Carlyle's, reviewed, 345.

## G.

Geological surveys, article on, 363 — of New York, 367 — of Maine, 381.

Geology, the ally of scripture, 364 — diluvial bowlders, 373, 383.

German Philosophy, strictures on, 325.

Gnosticism, Professor Matter's history of, reviewed, 112 — works on, *ibid.* — origin of, 116 — Philo's influence, 117 — its first schools and various denominations, 118 — the Syrian school, 120 — the school of Asia Minor, 123 — the Egyptian school, 124 — value of Gnosticism, 128.

Grund's Americans reviewed, 298 — misrepresents American Unitarianism, *ibid.* — his allegations confuted, 300. See *Unitarianism*.

## H.

Heinroth's parallel between Swedenborg and Don Quixote, 355.

Hindmarsh's, R., reply to Dr. Priestley, reviewed, 1.

Hitchcock's, Professor, notices of diluvial remains, 374.

Homer, remarks on his Iliad and Odyssey, 203.

Hopkins, Samuel M., Correspondence on the Wine Question, reviewed, 65.

Hymns, Beard's Collection, reviewed, 90 — specimens given, 97.

## I.

Idealism, nature of, 333.

Incidents of Travel in Egypt, &c., reviewed, 31 — accounts of Petra, 35 — and of the Dead Sea, 45.

Influence of Christianity and of the Progress of Civilization on Epic Poetry, 201. See *Epic Poetry*.

## J.

Jackson's, Dr. C. T., Geological Reports, reviewed, 363.

Joanna of Naples, noticed, 131.

## K.

Kant's opinion of Swedenborg, 19 — strictures on his philosophy, 338 — not entitled to any credit, as an opponent of Hume, 342.

## L.

Law, true dignity of the profession, 222 — its connexion with man's highest interests, 224 — a lawyer not justified in availing himself of law against right, 226 — the lawyer a great moral teacher, 227.

Limitations of Human Responsibility, Dr. Wayland's, reviewed, 277. See *Wayland*.

Logos, Philo on the, 117.

Love Token, for children, noticed, 132.

## M.

- Maine, Geological survey of, 381.  
 Malthus's principles exposed, 59.  
 Martineau's, Harriet, Retrospect of Western Travel, reviewed, 386 — her inaccuracies referred to her self-conceit, 387 — her manner of showing up the characters of individuals, 389 — her abolitionism, and its effect on all her judgments, 396.  
 Mather's Geological Report, reviewed, 363.  
 Matter's *Histoire du Gnosticisme*, reviewed, 112 — plan and analysis of the work, 116.  
 Milton's Paradise Lost, remarks on, 214.  
 Miracles, examination of Swedenborg's, 14, — proper evidence of a divine mission, 22 — Swedenborgian objections to them answered, 24.  
 Muzzey's Sunday School Guide, reviewed, 187.  
 Mystics and Mysticism, 258.

## N.

- New York, geological survey of, 367.

## O.

- Olshausen's Genuineness of the books of the New Testament, 406.

## P.

- Peirce's Algebra, noticed, 274.  
 Petra, account of, in Incidents of Travel, 35.  
 Philo, his connexion with Gnosticism, 117.  
 Philosophy, the prevailing theories defective in a religious point of view, 271.  
 Poetry, See *Epic Poetry*.  
 Political Economy, practical influence of, 47 — importance in this country, 54 — doctrine of Malthus examined, 59.  
 Prescott's Ferdinand and Isabella, reviewed, 99 — its thoroughness, accuracy, and candor, 101 — peo-

- ple, as well as kings and priests, to be blamed and feared, 103, — Cardinal Ximenes and the Complutensian Polyglot, 108.  
 Presence of God, article on, 171 — not to be established on logical argument, but on direct spiritual perception, 173 — we look at nature with the eye of a Utilitarian alone, 175 — we substitute *nature* for God, 179.  
 Priestley's, Dr. Letters to Swedenborgians, reviewed, 1. — History of the Corruptions of Christianity, noticed, 408.

## Q.

- Quietists and Quakers, 257, 265.

## R.

- Ripley's Specimens of Foreign Literature, noticed, 270.

## S.

- Sacred Offering, noticed, 275.  
 Scott, Sir Walter, remarks on, 360.  
 Sketches of a New England Village, noticed, 133.  
 Slavery, in the District of Columbia, 285 — abolitionism, 286 — how far the non-slaveholding States have a right to interfere, 399.  
 Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature, noticed, 270.  
 Sunday School System, article on, 182 — obligation of, founded on utility, 187 — designed to aid the pastor, 191 — duty of the pastor in regard to it, 192 — religious spirit of the teachers, 194 — reasons for lessening their number, 195 — should be exclusively devoted to religious instruction, 197 — and this instruction should be systematically given, 198.  
 Swedenborg, Emanuel, two articles on the life and pretensions of, 1, 230 — his birth and education, 2 — becomes assessor of the mines, and publishes several scientific treatises, 3 — devotes